Mgr A/L Kuppusamy v Gavitha A/P Muthu Nakan (NA-A53-03-03/2017)

This is an interesting case.

The plaintiff was employed by the defendant as a lorry driver. The defendant is a company providing transportation services for scrap metals and used tyres.

The fact that the plaintiff was a lorry driver in the defendant’s company was admitted by En Thirumoorthy a/l Shanmugam (“SD1”) in his evidence as follows: 2 MGR adalah pemandu motorlori ke tapak-tapak pelanggan-pelanggan GT Matel Enterprise untuk mengangkut tayar-tayar lama dan menurun tayar-tayar lama. (see witness statement of SD1-Q&A no.8)

On 1 July 2015, the plaintiff was instructed by the defendant to send used tyres belonged to the defendant’s customer to an identified site namely, no. 4201A Kampung Keru, 73000 Tampin, Negeri Sembilan (“the site”). The evidence of this respect is reproduced herein: MGR ada ditugaskan. Saya telah diminta oleh sebuah syarikat bernama Sin Choo Joo Rubber Sdn Bhd untuk pergi ke tapak Green Sky Recycle Industry Sdn Bhd dan mengangkut tayar-tayar lama yang adalah tayar-tayar tractor dan motorlori dan menghantar tayar-tayar itu ke tapak Syarikat Sin Choo Joo Rubber Sdn Bhd di alamat No.420, Kampung Keru, 73000 Tampin, Negeri Sembilan Darul Khusus. Saya telah mengarahkan MGR untuk memandu motorlori dari tapak mengangkut tayar-tayar itu ke tapak menurun tayar-tayar itu. (see witness statement of SD1-Q&A no.16)

There, the plaintiff involved in an accident. This is the version of events as narrated by the plaintiff in his statement of claim:

Pada 01/07/2015, Defendan telah mengarahkan Plaintif untuk menghantar barang-barang lusuh dan tayar-tayar lama ke alamat 4201A Kampung Keru, 73000 Tampin Negeri Sembilan Darul Khusus yang merupakan tempat pembakaran tayar-tayar. 3

Sewaktu menjalankan tugas Plaintif di premis tersebut, iaitu menurunkan barang-barang tersebut seperti yang diarahkan oleh Defendan, Plaintif telah dihempap oleh satu mesin jengkaut di bahagian kepala dan tangan Plaintif.

The plaintiff then gave full details of the accident in his witness statement at Q&A no.6 as follows: Apabila saya sampai ke Lot 4201A itu, saya memberhentikan lori di tempat yang disediakan. Semasa itu saya turun daripada lori untuk membuka pintu-pintu belakang untuk membolehkan pekerja di sana untuk menurunkan tayar-tayar yang telah ditempah untuk pembakaran. Saya ada memberitahu pekerja di sana untuk tunggu sehingga saya selesai membukakan pintu-pintu lori dan selepas itu dia boleh menurunkan barang-barang tersebut. Sedang saya membuka pintu-pintu lori, seorang pekerja kilang itu yang memandu sebuah jengkaut dan secara tiba-tiba datang melanggar saya. Sebelum saya dapat membuka pintu-pintu lori itu, dia secara tiba-tiba, tanpa menghiraukan kehadiran saya atau tanpa pengetahuan bahawa saya ada di sana-datang menghempap saya.

Because of the unfortunate incident, the plaintiff sustained injuries.

The plaintiff, instead of proceeding against the driver of the excavator and/or the owner of the said heavy machine and/or the owner of the site, filed this action against the defendant on two main grounds: 4

failure to provide safe system of work(the negligence against the defendant is that alleged in the particulars of negligence in the statement of claim (“safe system of work”); and

failure to pay the plaintiff the insurance policy monies received from Zurich Insurance Malaysia in view of the claim made out of the above said accident. It was the plaintiff’s claim that the monies were held by the defendant on trust and liable to be paid to the plaintiff (“the trust monies”).

The defendant in its pleading resisted the claim. In the defence, the following defences were raised:

the defendant denied any liability for the accident to the plaintiff and alleged that the accident was caused, or materially contributed to, by the negligence of the plaintiff.

the defendant also denied any liability because the plaintiff’s action was barred by section 31 of the Employees’ Social Security Act, 1969 since the plaintiff was the contributor under the said Act and he had been paid compensation under the same legislation. 5

the defendant further denied any liability to pay the claimed sum or any amount because the defendant is the person paying the premium and had not constituted itself a trustee for the plaintiff.

In view of the above said defence, the defendant filed a counterclaim against the plaintiff for losses incurred in defending this matter. According to the defendant, the plaintiff had mala fide in mind to ruin the business of the defendant by proceeding with this action.

However, the counterclaim was later withdrawn by the defendant at the stage of submissions. Issues 12. The issues that arise for determination are as follows:

whether the injuries suffered by the plaintiff in the accident resulted from the failure on the part of the defendant to provide safe system of work?

whether the plaintiff’s action was barred by section 31 of the Employees’ Social Security Act, 1969? 6

whether the plaintiff is entitled to the alleged trust monies from Zurich Insurance Malaysia issued in the name of the defendant? Trials 13. The case was proceeded by way of full trial with one witness for the plaintiff i.e. the plaintiff himself, while the defendant called two witnesses. Whether the accident occurred resulted from the failure on the part of the defendant to provide safe system of work

The plaintiff’s cause of action on the pleadings was for, inter alia, a breach of an employer’s duty to provide a safe system of work. This is clear from paragraph 7 of the Statement of Claim. Because of that,it was the plaintiff’s case that he was put in a dangerous situation where he had no opportunity to avoid the accident.

Before considering whether there was negligence conduct on the part of the defendant in its duty as an employer, one would have to ask whether the latter owed any duty of care towards the plaintiff in the circumstances of the case? 7

The Court of Appeal in Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Bhd v Emas Bestari Sdn Bhd [2014] 2 MLJ 49 had made this reminder: [17] The tort of negligence was established by the House of Lords in Donoghue (or McAlister) v Stevenson [1932] AC 562 (HL). Lord Atkins explained in Donoghue v Stevenson when the duty arises: The rule that you are to love your neighbour becomes in law, you must not injure your neighbor; and the lawyer’s question, ‘Who is my neighbor?’ receives a restricted reply. You must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which you can reasonably foresee would be likely to injure your neighbor. Who, then, in law is my neighbor? The answer seems to be: persons who are so closely and directly affected by my act that I ought reasonably to have them in contemplation as being so affected when I am directing my mind to the acts or omissions which are called in question. [18] In the same case, Lord Macmillan had this to say: The law takes no cognizance of carelessness in the abstract. It concerns itself with carelessness only where there is a duty to take care and where failure in that duty has caused damage. In such circumstances carelessness assumes the legal quality of negligence and entails the consequences in law of negligence. [19] The tort of negligence is not concerned with the ordinary notions of carelessness and for liability to arise there must be an assessment of circumstances to determine whether a duty of care had arisen between the plaintiff and the defendant. 8 [20] An action under the tort of negligence involves establishing the following elements:

a duty of care owed by the defendant to the plaintiff;

a breach of that duty by the defendant;

the breach caused the damage; and

the damage is a foreseeable and not a too remote consequence.

It is trite under the common law, duty of an employer is to take reasonable precautions to protect his workers against danger. He is not required to insure them and to protect them against all risks of any kind but he is obliged to provide a reasonable safe system of work and to take reasonable care for his employees (per Roberts CJ in Gelau Anak Paeng v Lim Phek San & Ors [1986] 1 MLJ 271).

Unlike the plaintiff in Gelau Anak Paeng’s case above and the cases cited by the plaintiff in his submissions i.e.Ng Kim Cheng v Naigai Nitto Singapore Pte Ltd & Anor[1991] 4 CLJ (Rep) 1009, Malie Johi v Pengarah Jabatan Alam Sekitar (Negeri Sarawak) Kementerian Sains, Teknologi & Alam Sekitar & Ors [2011] 5 CLJ 83, and Chai Yee Chong v Lew Thai [2004] 2 CLJ 321, the circumstances of the instant case are different.

The accident in which the plaintiff hereininvolved took place not at the defendant’s working place. It occurred at the defendant’s 9 customer’s site and the excavator which knocked down the plaintiff was his customer’s.

The site was under the full and exclusive control of the defendant’s customer.As said, the plaintiff, instead of suing the defendant’s customer for failure to provide a safe system of work, proceeded against the defendant for damages resulted from the injuries sustained at the site of the defendant’s customer.

The question is: whether the duty to provide safe system of work extends to other working place belongs to other party in which the plaintiff was permitted to enter in discharging his duty as a lorry driver upon instruction of the defendant?

I will answer the question in the negative. These are my reasons.

Let me start with the pleading point.

The duties of care that fall under the safe system of work alleged by the plaintiff to have been breached by the defendant are found in paragraph 7 of the statement of claim.

In the said paragraph, the plaintiff had listed down five (5) particulars of negligence against the defendant as follows: 10 a. gagal dan/atau cuai apabila menugaskan Plaintif ke kawasan yang berisiko tinggi dan merbahaya dari segi keselamatan; b. gagal dan/atau cuai apabila tidak memberi sebarang amaran atau langkah berjaga-jaga kepada Plaintif; c. gagal dan/atau cuai apabila tidak memberi maklumat atau informasi untuk mengelakkan diri daripada sebarang kemalangan atau kecederaan; d. gagal dan/atau cuai apabila menghantar seorang pekerja ke tempat yang melakukan kegiatan/aktiviti yang haram dan/atau larang di sisi undang-undang, terutamanya Plaintif; e. gagal dan/atau cuai apabila tidak menyediakan satu sistem kerja yang selamat dan/atau memuaskan.

I have perused the entire pleadings filed by the plaintiff. For me, to merely plead what were stated above are too vague and too general. The pleadings on the breach of duty to provide safe system of work must not be left vague and undefined. They ought to be pleaded with clarity and precision. Failure to do so, would render the pleadings wanting in particulars.

One must know from the face of the record precisely what case he must answer. He must not be left to speculate or guess the particulars of the case alleged against him. 11

The same was raised by the defendant during the cross-examination of the plaintiff: : Sekarang lihat perenggan 7 dalam dokumen yang sama. Ini adalah aduan anda terhadap defendan. Anda menyatakan bahawa defendan telah gagal menyediakan satu sistem kerja yang selamat. Dan kamu ada beri 5 alasan mengapa defendan tidak menyediakan satu sistem kerja yang selamat. Sila lihat perenggan (a) kamu katakan kawasan itu kawasan berisiko tinggi dan merbahaya dari segi keselamatan. : Ya : Adakkah MGR setuju bahawa tidak memberi apa-apa alasan mengapa kawasan itu berisiko tinggi dan tidak selamat? : Ya setuju : Dan dalam perenggan (b) anda menyatakan gagal/cuai apabila tidak memberi sebarang amaran atau langkah berjaga-jaga kepada plaintif. Tapi anda tidak menyatakan apakah amaran yang harus diberi, setuju? : Ya setuju : Di perenggan (c) bahawa defendan gagal dan/cuai apabila tidak memberi maklumat atau informasi untuk mengelakkan diri daripada sebarang kemalangan atau kecederaan. Setuju jika tidak menyatakan apakah maklumat informasi yang harus diberi? : Setuju 12 : Di perenggan (d) defendan telah gagal dan/atau cuai apabila menghantar seorang pekerja ke tempat yang melakukan kegiatan/aktiviti yang haram dan/atau dilarang di sisi undang-undang. Dan saya ingin encik merujuk kepada soalan nombor 9 dan 10 penyata saksi anda di mana soalan 9 menyatakan menegnai tempat kawasan kemalangan berlaku dan soalan 10 memberi gambaan kepada kawasan itu. Setuju jika saya cadangkan kepada anda bahawa anda tidak tahu sama ada kawasan kilang tersebut melakukan kegiatan haram atau aktiviti haram di dalam kawasan tersebut. Anda sendiri tidak tahu. Setuju? : Ya setuju. : Sekarang lihat penyata tuntutan asalan yang terakhir (e) defendan gagal dan/atau cuai apabila tidak menyediakan satu sistem kerja yang selamat dan/atau memuaskan. Setuju bahawa Encik MGR tidak memberi butir apakah terma-terma kerja yang tidak selamat itu. Setuju? : Setuju

Asmabi Mohamad JCA (as she then was) had this to say on the principles of pleadings in The Carbon Co Sdn Bhd & Anor v Ng Lee Hoon (conducting under ‘Forest Wood Flooring’) [2017] 4 MLJ 791: [36] Pleadings play an important role in civil litigation, as parties are bound by their respective pleadings. This is trite. The facts pleaded in the pleadings will define the parameters of each party’s case and serve as a clear notice to the adverse party the case that will be adjudicated so as to prevent either party from being taken by surprise during trial. Pleadings too will serve a guide to the court in determining the issues to be tried. 13

In a case where negligence is being alleged against the adverse party, the alleger must plead the salient and particular facts in his pleadings alluding to the alleged negligence. The upside of that rule is that a party cannot pursue matters or issues that it has not pleaded in his pleadings (per Abang Iskandar JCA in Ketua Pengarah Jabatan Kerja Raya v Strongkota Development Sdn Bhd and another appeal [2016] 6

In the instant case, as said, the particulars of the negligence under the preview of safe system of work are rather plain, simple and straight forward.However, the facts that were adduced through the plaintiff were more specific and detailed which were neverfound in his statement of claim or reply to the defence.

What was done by the plaintiff in his testimony was an improvement of his pleading by giving the circumstances under which the duties of the defendant were said to arise. : Sila beri gambaran tentang tempat itu. J : Tempat itu adalah sebuah ladang kelapa sawit. Saya perlu masuk ke dalam ladang itu sejauh 500 m hingga 1 km untuk menurunkan tayar-tayar lama. Di situ ada satu tempat yang digunakan untuk membakar tayar-tayar lama dan ada beberapa rumah atau kongsi untuk pekerja-pekerja mereka tinggal. 14 Saya tidak tahu samada tempat pembakaran tayar itu adalah salah di sisi undang-undang kerana ia tersorok di tengah-tengah ladang kelapa sawit. Sekiranya tempat itu adalah salah di sisi undang-undang, majikan saya tidak sepatutnya menghantar saya ke tempat sebegitu yang mempunyai risiko yang tinggi (Q&A no.10 of the plaintiff’s witness statement) : Ada majikan kamu (GT Matel) beri apa-apa barang-barang keselamatan seperti helmet keselamatan atau sebagainya untuk digunakan sewaktu menaikkan dan menurunkan barang? J : Tiada (Q&A no.12 of the plaintiff’s witness statement)

This, in my considered view, was wrong as it was made without the amendment to the pleadings and hence should not be allowed.

The plaintiff had then gone too far whenin his submissions the alleged particulars of negligence under the head of safe system of workwere said to include the followings:

Plaintif ingin menghujahkan seperti berikut bagi membuktikan kecuaian pihak Defendan di dalam kes ini. Adalah sangat jelas bahawa seorang majikan seperti defendan mempunyai kewajipan berjaga-jaga terhadap Plaintif yang juga merupakan pekerja kepada Defendan. Salah satu peranan majikan adalah pencegahan kemalangan dan pihak pengurusan di setiap peringkat perlu memahami tentang kepentingan pencegahan kemalangan di mana ia 15 merupakan sebahagian daripada tugas utama. Majikan perlulah berpengetahuan tentang aspek keselamatan pekerja serta mampu memantau aktiviti-aktiviti yang dijalankan.

Oleh itu tanggungjawab majikan adalah termasuk untuk menyediakan dasar keselamatan pekerjaan yang merupakan pernyataan bertulis mengenai dasar am mengenai keselamatan dan langkah-langkah keselamatan pekerjaan; menggaji atau melantik seorang pegawai yang kompeten untuk menentukan keselamatan pekerjaan terjamin; dan juga untuk menyedia dan menyelenggara satu sistem kerja yang selamat. Dari masa ke semasa pihak majikan juga perlu mengadakan latihan keselamatan dan membekalkan kelengkapan atau alat-alat keselamatan yang sesuai dan berkesan. …..

Pihak Defendan selaku majikan kepada Plaintif juga tidak dapat membuktikan bahawa segala barang-barang keselamatan yang kononnya tersimpan di dalam lori yang dipandu oleh Plaintif sememangnya ada disimpan di lori tersebut sebelum atau pada waktu kemalangan tersebut. Walaupun Defendan, melalui SD2, cuba untuk mengemukakan bukti bahawa alat-alat keselamatan tersebut memang disimpan di dalam lori tersebut, namun ada percanggahan di dalam kenyataan kedua-dua saksi Defendan tersebut kerana SD1 telah menyatakan bahawa segala alat-alat keselamatan yang kononnya disimpan di dalam lori yang dipandu oleh Plaintif masih digunakan oleh SD2 sebagai pengganti pemandu lori tersebut kecuali baju ‘vest’ kuning yang diberikan kepada SD2 kerana ia telah ditukar dengan satu lagi baju ‘vest’ kuning yang baru. SD2 pula berkata bahawa semuanya adalah kononnya ala-alat keselamatn yang digunapakai oleh beliau semenjak mengambil alih tugas Plaintif di Syarikat Defendan……. 16 (Plaintiff’s written submission at page(s) 5-6)

Again, these were never pleaded in his statement of claim or reply to the defence. Based on this reason alone, the claim under this cause of action shall not succeed.

Secondly, even if I was wrong in so holding, the circumstances of this case showed that the accident occurred was not due to the defendant’s failure to provide safe system of work.

The facts clearly showed that the accident purely happened as a result of the excavator belong to the defendant’s customer which suddenly knocked down the defendant from the back.

What is required is that there be a relationship between the plaintiff unloading the used tyres and the very alleged act or omission on the part of the defendant which gives rise to liability. Unfortunately, I found none in the present case as it was too remote.

The plaintiff in this case had 5 years’ experience working with the defendant as a lorry driver. The occasion of the accident was the first time in his life experience.

Based on the evidence, it was my finding thatthe plaintiff was an experienced and trained lorry driver. He had in his possession a 17 driver pass issued by a big company known as Lafarge (see P2 at page 15 of the plaintiff’s bundle of document). According to SD1, this pass was only issued after a person had successfully undergone safety training conducted by the said company.

Apart from the above I also found that the plaintiff knew his job’s description. He knew what he supposed to do in loading and unloading processes (see Q&A no(s). 6, 8 and 11). What was happened on the respective date was very unfortunate and so sudden.

It was somewhat bizarre to only raise at this stage that he was not given training andsafety appliances such as safety helmet and safety vest by the defendant when there was no evidence at the first place showing that the plaintiffdid not know what to do in the respective circumstances and that he was looking for that appliances before the unloading process (see Q&A no. 12 of the plaintiff’s witness statement). I am clearly of opinion that the claim was a mere after-thought.

It is the plaintiff who claim to prove. He could not then expect the evidence from the defendant to fill in the blanks as he may choose to establish the plaintiff’s case. 18 Whether the plaintiff’s action was barred by section 31 of the Employees’ Social Security Act, 1969 (“the SOCSO Act”)

I now turn to consider the above said crucial question.

Section 31 of the SOCSO Act provides: An insured person or his dependants shall not be entitled to receive or recover from the employer of the insured person, or from any other person who is the servant of the employer, any compensation or damages under any other law for the time being in force in respect of an employment injurysustained as an employee under the Act: Provided that the prohibition in this section shall not apply to any claim arising from motor vehicle accidents where the employer or the servant of the employer is required to be insured against Third Party Risks under Part IV of the Road

The words “employment injury” in the above said provision is defined under section 2 (6) of the same Act as a personal injury to an employee caused by accident or an occupational disease arising out and in the course of his employment in an industry to which this Act applies. 19

Here, it is pertinent to note that the plaintiff was the insured person under the SOCSO Act.He was the contributor to the same. This was an undisputed fact.

At the time of the accident, the plaintiff was performing his duty to unload the used tyres to the site belonging to the defendant’s customer at the defendant’s instruction There was also no dispute.

In view of the injuries sustained in the course of his employment, the plaintiff had benefitted from SOCSO. This was admitted by the plaintiff himself. So too the Social Security Organisation (“PERKESO”). PERKESO had confirmed the compensation received by the plaintiff under the Act via letter dated 18 July 2017 (see D10 at page 1 of the defendant’s bundle of document) (see also D11(a) and D11(b) at page(s) 10 and 11 of the same bundle).

Based on the above considerations, the plaintiff is therefore precluded from making this claim against the defendant by virtue of the first part of section 31 of the SOCSO Act.

Before 1 May 1997, section 31 was read together with section 42 of the same Act. Section 42 provides: 20 When a person is entitled to any benefit provided by this Act, he shall not be entitled to receive any similar benefit admissible under the provisions of any other law

However, by virtue of the Employees’ Social Security (Amendment) Act 1997 (Act A981) section 42 was deleted. The second part of section 31 i.e. the proviso, was inserted.

For this I would like to refer to the Hansard of the House of Representatives dated 16 December 1996 where thehonourable minister had tabled the Employees’ Social Security (Amendment) Bill 1996 for the second and third readings. With regards to the provisoof section 31, this is what the honourable minister had to say: Tuan Yang di-Pertua, izinkan saya menghuraikan pindaan-pindaan penting yang dicadangkan dalam rang undang-undang ini. Fasal 3 mencadangkan pindaan kepada seksyen 31 Akta Keselamatan Sosial Pekerja 1969 untuk membenarkan orang berinsurans yang ditimpa bencana kerja disebabkan oleh kemalangan kenderaan motor atau orang tanggungannya menuntut pampasan atau ganti rugi daripada majikan orang berinsurans atau pengkhidmat majikan orang berinsurans itu yang dikehendaki diinsuranskan terhadap Risiko-Risiko Pihak Ketiga di bawah

In view of the above, the next issue to consider is: Whether the plaintiff is covered by the proviso tosection 31 of the SOCSO Act? I will answer it in the negative.

First, the claim herein was not made under the said proviso.

Secondly, the plaintiff was knocked down by an excavator. An excavator is not a motor vehicle as defined under section 2 of the Road Transport Act, 1987 (“RTA”).

Section 2 of the RTA defines the words “motor vehicle” as a vehicle of any description, propelled by means of mechanism contained within itself and constructed or adapted so as to be capable of being used on roads, and includes a trailer.

With regards the word “vehicle” it refers under the same Act as a structure capable of moving or being moved or used for the 22 conveyance of any person or thing and which maintains contact with the ground when in motion.

Here, as the name suggests, the function of an excavator is to excavate and not to carry or used for carrying any person or goods (see Arab Malaysian Credit Bhd v Har Yoke Ling [1998] MLJU 2 and Andy’s Earth Works Pty Ltd v Verey [2012] NSWCA 3).

That being the case, I do not see that the plaintiff was entitled to rely on the said proviso.

Therefore, the other issue regarding quantum of damages need not be considered.

However, had the Act not precluded the plaintiff from claiming against the defendant, my findings on liability and quantum remain unchanged in view of my decision in respect of the first issue. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the alleged trust monies received from Zurich Insurance Malaysia (“Zurich”) issued in the name of the defendant?

As said in the beginning, the plaintiff proceeded this action against the defendant based on two (2) causes of action. 23

The first was a claim in negligence for breach of duty of care to provide a safe system of work. The second cause of action which I am dealing now is based on the alleged trust monies.

Before I proceed to consider the issue on the alleged trust monies, I need to address a question that came to my mind:whether section 31 of the SOCSO Act also bar the plaintiff from being entitled to the compensation paid by Zurich to the defendant for the said injury?

Looking back at section 31, my answer is yes.

Section 31 clearly prohibits the plaintiff from receiving or recovering from the defendant damages under any other law (this cover the common law which definitely involves the law of trusts (see Tan Peng Loh v Lee Aik Fong & Anor [1982] 1 MLJ 74 FC)).

In this case, the damages the plaintiff was seeking for was in the form of compensation paid by Zurich to the defendant.

Even though the monies were paid out of the injury sustained by the plaintiff, the prohibition is clear and express. The plaintiff was barred from claiming the same because section 31 says so.

Even if I was wrong on this, I am not convinced that the plaintiff was still entitled on the basis of trust. 24

It was submitted for the plaintiff:

Plaintif dengan jelasnya ingin menyatakan bahawa nama Plaintif tertera sebagai “insured” atau orang yang diinsurankan di dalam polisi insuran tersebut dan ini secara langsungnya bermaksud bahawa Plaintif merupakan benefisiari yang berhak untuk menerima dan menyimpan indemnity di bawah polisi insurans tersebut. Dalam pada itu, walaupun atau sekiranya Defendan dinamakan sebagai benefisiari di dalam polisi insurans tersebut-ini tidak bermaksud bahawa Defendan secara otomatik berhak untuk menuntut dan menyimpan wang pampasan yang dibayar oleh Zurich Insurance Malaysia Berhad. Reliance was placed on the Court of Appeal decision in Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Bhd v Mohamed bin Salleh [2000] 2 MLJ 412.

Based on the above said authority, it was further submitted:

Berdasarkan kepada kenyataan di atas-adalah jelas dan muktamad bagi Plaintif berhujah bahawa satu amanah tersirat (implied trusts) wujud berkenaan dengan wang pampasan yang dibayar oleh Syarikat Insurans tersebut. Ini juga menjelaskan bahawa Defendan adalah pemegang amanah (trustee) manakala Plaintif merupakan benefisiari yang sebenar polisi insurans tersebut. Oleh yang sedemikian Plaintif menyatakan bahawa wang pampasan yang berjumlah RM100,000 yang dibayar oleh Syarikat Insurans telah dipegang oleh Defendan sebagai pemegang amanah kepada Plaintif. 25 Hujahan ini juga perlu digunapakai kepada segala bayaran yang telah dibuat; sedang dibuat dan bayaran yang akan dibuat pada masa yang akan datang.

As for the plaintiff’s claim that he was deprived of the benefit and indemnity under the policy insurance, again, the plaintiff failed to plead those facts in his pleadings to formulate a complete cause of action on an implied trust against the defendant.

On top of the said failure, the only evidence made available to this court in support of the claim was P9 which consists of premium due notice dated 6 April 2015 issued by Zurich to the defendant, official receipt no. FA*20150041221 dated 19 May 2015 issued by Zurich to the defendant and a copy of cheaque no. 946972 issued in the name of the defendant (see page(s) 1-3 of the Bundle C).

There was no insurance policy document or contract employment ever produced by the plaintiff to enable this court to analyse its terms and conditions to verify his claim.

In the case cited by the plaintiff i.e. Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Bhd v Mohamed bin Salleh [2000] 2 MLJ 412, the respondent was the employee to the appellant. He met with an accident and was badly injured resulted into permanent disability. At the material time, the appellant had a policy insurance with MNI that covered various risks in respect of its employees. According to the appellant, the respondent 26 could not recover any sums under the group insurance policy because of the doctrine of privity of contract. However, for the respondent, it was argued that his case was based on the contract of employment and not depending upon the said doctrine. In dismissing the appeal, Gopal Sri Ram JCA (as he then was) had this to say: In our view there is, on the facts of this case, no necessity to resort to the device of a constructive trust. We are satisfied that this is a straightforward case of a breach of contract. The appellant has no answer to the respondent’s claim for money due to him under his contract of service…

In Anuar bin Ismail v Tan Sri Tan Chin Tuan & Anor [1992] 1 MLJ 155, the case cited by the defendant, the court there had before it the relevant insurance policy dated 28 October 1981. Based on the said policy, His Lordship had this following finding: The position on this point, as correctly pointed out by learned counsel for the second defendant, is on all fours with the decision in Green v Russell which had held that an employee under a group accident policy taken out by the employer was not entitled to any sum payable under the policy either at common law, because he is not a party to the contract, or in equity, because on a true construction of the policy the employer had not constituted himself a trustee for his employees. It must be observed that the similar endorsement as regards ownership of the policy in this case was included in the policy in that case. The facts of Bowskill v Dawson & Anor are therefore distinguisble. … 27 … On the point of the plaintiff’s injury not falling under the ambit of the insurance cover alone, despite the consideration of all the other points raised, the only conclusion that I could make and which I made was that the plaintiff’s claim against both defendants ought to be dismissed with costs.

Reverting to present case, although there was no dispute with regards the followings:

the plaintiff was not a party to the contract of insurance. It was the defendant.

the plaintiff never paid any premium under the said insurance, the defendant did, It was impossible for this court to determine the claim without the relevant insurance policy agreement and/or contract of employment in hand.

The claim is hereby dismissed for want of material facts in the pleadings and for want of evidence to support the claim. Conclusion 80. Having regard to the above, the plaintiff’s claim was dismissed with costs at ………………….. subject to allocator. 28 Dated this 15 May 2018 t.t.

Mr Sheelan Arjunan for the Plaintiff (Messrs Sheelan Arjunan & Suresh Raman)

Mr Gurdit Singh a/l Kesar Singh for the Defendant (Messrs Sharif & Khoo)