Mims Career Sdn Bhd v 1. ) Armand Mikhayl Yeoh Abdullah (WA-22NCC-833-11/2024)

ARMAND MIKHAYL YEOH ABDULLAH (No. K/P: 730222-10-5399)

SHARINA BINTI MOHAMED SULTAN (No. K/P: 700505-10-6554)

MARY ELIZABETH A/P S. SANDANASAMY (No. K/P: 550709-08-6048)

Al-JEFFRY AZRAYL BIN ARMAND MIKHAYL YEOH ABDULLAH (No. K/P: 981208-56-5539)

NATASHA SHEREEN BINTI ARMAND MIKHAYL YEOH (No. K/P: 010309-14-1362)

SANTHYA MARIA A/P RAMANADO (No. K/P: 880615-10-5238)

ELIZABETH JESSIE MARY POOLE … DEFENDAN - (No. K/P: 471015-10-6168) DEFENDAN JUDGMENT [1] This is the Plaintiff’s application in Enclosure 3 for a Mareva injunction against the 1st to 4th Defendants (“this Application” or “Enclosure 3”). Page 2 of 23 A] SALIENT BACKGROUND FACTS [2] The parties are not in dispute regarding the essential factual background. The Plaintiff obtained an arbitral award against the 1st to 3rd Defendants (“Principal Defendants”) on 16.3.2020 (“the Award”), which was subsequently enforced/registered as a judgment of the Court on 7.12.2021 (“Enforcement Judgment”). The Award has been affirmed through all levels of court up to the Federal Court. [3] Following registration of the Award, the Plaintiff sought to enforce the Enforcement Judgment against the Principal Defendants through Judgment Debtor Summons (“JDS”) proceedings commenced on 26.5.2022. During the course of these JDS proceedings, it was discovered that the Principal Defendants had transferred assets to the 4th to 7th Defendants, with these transfers occurring largely before the Award was made in March 2020, and a few occurring after the Award but prior to its registration in December 2021. For instance, property for the 4th Defendant was purchased in June 2019, well before the Award was made. [4] While the overall pattern of transfers involved the 4th to 7th Defendants and other recipients, the Plaintiff seeks to recover assets from all the Defendants (1st to 7th Defendants) through this fresh action (the present act), alleging fraudulent dispositions and constructive trusts, whilst simultaneously seeking Mareva injunctive relief against only the 1st to 4th Defendants. B] THE PLAINTIFF’S CLAIM [5] The reliefs the Plaintiff seeks against the Defendants in this action based on its Statement of Claim can be summarised as follows: Against the 1st Defendant: i) An account and inquiry regarding the disposition of RM29,266,690.68 from the 1st Defendant’s Public Bank Account and all gifts, settlements, or inheritance allegedly made between 16.1.2018 and 16.3.2023. Page 3 of 23 ii) Declarations that recipients of such gifts hold them on constructive trust for the 1st Defendant. iii) Orders for immediate payment of monetary gifts to the Plaintiff toward settlement of the Award (the Final Award) and Judgment Sum (the Enforcement Judgment incorporating the Award plus accumulated interest and costs), or alternatively declarations that such gifts be subject to execution. Against the 2nd to 5th Defendants i) Declarations that the transfer of property at No. 25 Jalan 12/17, Petaling Jaya, Selangor to the 5th Defendant be declared void for fraudulent disposition and restored to the 2nd Defendant, with associated restoration costs borne by the 2nd and/or 5th Defendants. ii) Alternatively, declarations that the 5th Defendant holds the said property on constructive trust for the Second Defendant. iii) Declarations that the property be subject to execution for the Award and Judgment Sum. Against the 2nd and 7th Defendants i) Declarations that the transfer of the Pinggiran Golf Property at No. 8 Pinggiran Golf, Saujana Resort, Shah Alam, Selangor to the 7th Defendant be declared void for fraudulent disposition and restored to the 2nd Defendant, with associated costs borne by the 2nd and/or 7th Defendants. ii) Alternatively, declarations that the 7th Defendant holds the said property on constructive trust for the 2nd Defendant. iii) Declarations that the property be subject to execution for the Award and Judgment Sum. Against the 3rd Defendant i) Declarations that the transfer of the Pinggiran Golf Property at No. 8 Pinggiran Golf, Saujana Resort, Shah Alam, Selangor to the 7th Defendant be declared void for fraudulent disposition and restored to the 2nd Defendant, with associated costs borne by the 2nd and/or 7th Defendants. Page 4 of 23 ii) Alternatively, declarations that the 7th Defendant holds the said property on constructive trust for the 2nd Defendant. iii) Declarations that the property be subject to execution for the Award and Judgment Sum. Against the 6th and 7th Defendants i) Declarations that the transfer of property at 14 Jalan 12/15, Petaling Jaya, Selangor to the 6th Defendant be declared void for fraudulent disposition and restored to the 3rd Defendant, with associated costs borne by the 3rd and/or 6th Defendants. ii) Alternatively, declarations that the 6th Defendant holds the said property on constructive trust for the 3rd Defendant. iii) Declarations that the property be subject to execution for the Award and Judgment Sum. Against the 4th Defendant i) Declarations that RM300,000 transferred by the 1st Defendant to the 4th Defendant is held on constructive trust for the 1st Defendant. ii) Orders for immediate payment of the said sum to the Plaintiff toward settlement of the Award and Judgment Sum. iii) Declarations that the property at Parcel No. A1-15-01, Damansara (“The 4th Defendant’s Property”) is held on constructive trust for the 1st Defendant. iv) Declarations that the 4th Defendant’s Property be subject to execution for the Award and Judgment Sum. Against the 5th Defendant i) Declarations that the property at Parcel No. A1-16-3A, Damansara (“The 5th Defendant’s Property”) is held on constructive trust for the 1st Defendant. ii) Declarations that the 5th Defendant’s Property be subject to execution for the Award and Judgment Sum. Page 5 of 23 Against the 7th Defendant i) Declarations that RM7,700,005 transferred by the 1st Defendant to the 7th Defendant is held on constructive trust for the 1st Defendant. ii) Orders for immediate payment of the said sum to the Plaintiff toward settlement of the Award and Judgment Sum. General Relief Against the 1st to 3rd Defendants i) Discovery and/or tracing orders as necessary in aid of the above reliefs. ii) General, aggravated and/or exemplary damages. C] THE RELIEFS SOUGHT IN THIS APPLICATION [6] The Mareva injunction sought in this Application is only against the 1st to 4th Defendants in which the Plaintiff seeks: i) Asset freeze orders preventing the removal or disposal of assets, up to the value of RM16 million, applicable to assets both within and outside Malaysia. ii) Disclosure orders requiring the 1st to 4th Defendants to affirm and file affidavits disclosing all assets worldwide, including their value, location, and details of financial accounts and investment portfolios, within 7 days. iii) An order to specifically restrain the 4th Defendant’s property at Parcel No. A1-15-01, Damansara. D] THE TRUE NATURE OF THIS APPLICATION IS A POST-JUDGMENT MAREVA INJUNCTION [7] The central issue before this Court is the true nature of this Application. While the Plaintiff maintains that this Application is a pre-judgment Mareva injunction in a fresh tracing action, the Page 6 of 23 Defendants contend that it is, in substance, a post-judgment Mareva application in aid of execution (George Pathmanathan A/L Michael Gandhi Nathan v. Portcullis International Ltd & Ors [2017] MLJU 1223; Shim Yen Lin v. Cedric Wong King Ti [2021] 11 MLJ 350). [8] The 1st to 3rd Defendants contend that the relief sought is expressly connected to the enforcement of a separate judgment obtained in a different suit against unrelated parties. This characterisation bears the hallmarks of a post-judgment Mareva injunction. [9] The Plaintiff reiterated its position that this Application is a pre-judgment Mareva injunction application, and it is not in aid of the execution of the Award/Enforcement Judgment, but is based on a new cause of action premised upon constructive trust and conspiracy to defraud. [10] However, this position is inconsistent with the Plaintiff’s Written Submissions in Enclosure 41 which states, inter alia, as follows: i) Paragraph 2, where the Plaintiff states: “When the Plaintiff sought to enforce the HC Registration Order through garnishee and judgment debtor summons proceedings, cogent evidence was uncovered demonstrating that D1 to D3 had actively dissipated their assets to others, including the 4th to 7th Defendants ("D4" to "D7"), to frustrate the Final Award.” (own emphasis added) ii) Paragraph 3, where the Plaintiff, with reference to the Statement of Claim, states: “Premised upon the above, the Plaintiff filed this action on the grounds of fraudulent disposition and constructive trusteeship against D1 to D7 to recover such assets as was dissipated by D1-D3 to frustrate the Final Award and the HC Registration Order.” (own emphasis added) iii) Paragraph 23, where the Plaintiff states: “When the above is taken as a whole, there is cogent prima facie evidence that D1-D3 had, contrary to their testimony in the JDS Proceedings, taken Page 7 of 23 steps to fraudulently dispose their assets or provided such assets to third parties, including D4, as constructive trustees to defeat the Final Award.” (own emphasis added) iv) Paragraph 26.2, where the Plaintiff submits that the 4th Defendant’s business activities constitute: “prima facie evidence of knowing involvement in D1-D3's scheme to defeat the Final Award.” (own emphasis added) v) Paragraph 28, where the Plaintiff concludes: “Finally, we submit that by D1-D3's previous conduct, and by the prima facie case against D1-D4 of fraudulent disposition or involvement, engagement and facilitation of D1-D3's dishonest scheme to defeat the Final Award, an inference can at this point be reasonably drawn of their lack of probity, justifying the inference of a risk of dissipation should Encl. 3 not be allowed.” (own emphasis added) [11] The above statements are consistent with the Plaintiff’s Statement of Claim and affidavits filed in support of Enclosure 3. [12] Therefore, despite the Plaintiff’s characterisation of this Application as a pre-judgment Mareva application, I find that the substance and purpose of the Application reveal that it is, in reality, a post-judgment Mareva application presented under the guise of a pre-judgment one. The following, inter alia, supports this conclusion: i) This Application is expressly tied to enforcement of the Award registered as a judgment on 7.12.2021 (Enforcement Judgment). ii) As highlighted earlier, the Plaintiff has repeatedly submitted that the Principal Defendants dissipated assets in order “to defeat” the Award and Enforcement Judgment. iii) Therefore, the relief sought in this Application is to preserve assets for satisfaction of an existing judgment debt. Page 8 of 23 iv) The Plaintiff’s current claim is based on constructive trust and conspiracy, which are essentially enforcement mechanisms intended to recover assets connected to the existing judgment, i.e. the Enforcement Judgment. To put it simply, the constructive trust claim arises from the allegation that the Principal Defendants dissipated assets in order to avoid satisfaction of the Award, which was subsequently registered. v) This Application comes after extensive JDS proceedings where the very same asset transfers were discovered and examined. vi) In the present action the Plaintiff is seeking to recover those very assets. Post-Judgment Mareva Injunction Requirements [13] For the grant of a post-judgment Mareva injunction, the established test requires the Plaintiff to demonstrate that: i) There is a real risk of the debtor dissipating assets with intention to deprive the creditor of satisfaction of the judgment debt; ii) The injunction must act as an aid to execution. (George Pathmanathan (supra); Shim Yen Lin (supra)) Pre-Judgment Mareva Injunction Requirements [14] For the grant of pre-judgment Mareva injunctions, the Plaintiff musts satisfy the following 3 conjunctive criteria: i) That the Plaintiff has a good arguable case on the merits; ii) That the Defendant has assets within the jurisdiction; and iii) That there is a real risk that the defendant will dissipate or remove those assets to frustrate the satisfaction of any judgment. Page 9 of 23 (Mareva Compania Naviera SA v. International Bulkcarriers SA [1975] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 509 and Aspatra Sdn Bhd & 21 Others v. Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Bhd & Anor [1988] 1 MLJ 97) [15] As can be seen from the above, there are significant differences in the criteria for post-judgment and pre-judgment Mareva injunctions, which I will address below. Key Distinctions Between a Post-Judgment Mareva and Pre-Judgment Mareva Injunction [16] I have summarised the key distinctions between post-judgment and pre-judgment Mareva injunctions in the comparison table below: No.

Purpose To preserve the defendant’s assets pending trial to protect potential future judgment To Aid enforcement of existing established judgment where claim already proven

Legal Standard General risk of asset dissipation or removal to frustrate any judgment (Mareva Compania (supra)) Intentional dissipation with specific intent to deprive creditor of judgment satisfaction (Hitachi Leasing (Singapore) Pte Ltd v. Vincent Ambrose and another [2001] 1 SLR(R) 762); Jtrust Asia Pte Ltd v. Group Lease Holdings Pte Ltd and others [2021]

Threshold Balance of convenience between parties’ respective hardships (Bumi Armada Navigation Sdn Bhd v. Mirza Marine Sdn Bhd [2015] MLJU 953) Necessity - injunction must be essential for enforcement, not merely convenient (Jtrust Asia (supra))

Court where the application is made Any competent court with jurisdiction over the matter where the action is filed and pending trial Court where original judgment was obtained (Asma Baizura bt Mohamad Omar & Anor v. Pengiran Dato’ Awang Daud bin Awang Putra & Anor [2023] MLJU 474)

Procedural Origin Fresh standalone application in pending litigation As an extension of pre-judgment Mareva injunction granted before trial (Orwell Steel (Erection and Fabrication) Ltd v. Asphalt and Tarmac (UK) Ltd [1984] 1 WLR 1097; Dopag Dosiertechnik und Pneumatik AG v. Gamel Nasir Taib & Ors [2017] 10 MLJ 31; Sun Electric Pte Page 11 of 23 Ltd v. Menrva Solutions Pte Ltd [2020] SGHC 18)

Timing of the application Before final judgment while claim is still being determined After final judgment has been obtained but before/during execution

“Good Arguable Case” Test “more than being barely capable of serious argument, but not necessarily one that the Judge believes has got more than a fifty per cent chance of success” (S&F International Limited v. Trans-Con Engineering Sdn Bhd [1985] 1 MLJ 62; [1985] 2 CLJ 228; Biasamas (supra)) Not applicable – liability has been established and judgment obtained 8. Available Alternatives Limited - main protection is the potential injunction Multiple enforcement mechanisms available (JDS, writs of execution, etc.)

Urgency Requirement Must demonstrate current risk of asset dissipation requiring immediate protection Must show current necessity despite existing enforcement options Page 12 of 23 [17] The essential difference between pre-judgment and post-judgment Mareva injunctions can be summarised as follows: i) pre-judgment Mareva injunctions are to preserve a defendant’s assets pending the determination of a claim, while post-judgment injunctions assist in enforcing an established judgment. ii) The former protects potential rights (if the applicant obtains judgment in his in favour), while the latter enforces established rights, but only when conventional enforcement mechanisms are insufficient and the injunction is necessary to prevent deliberate frustration of the judgment. The Fundamental Flaw in this Application [18] Based on the above, this Application suffers from a fundamental conceptual flaw. It attempts to obtain post-judgment relief (preservation of assets for enforcement of an existing judgment) through the mechanism of a pre-judgment application in a fresh action. This is procedurally improper and legally untenable. [19] In the case of a post-judgment Mareva injunction, the proper procedure requires: i) Bringing the application before the court in which the judgment was obtained; ii) Satisfying the legal test applicable to a post-judgment Mareva injunction application; iii) Demonstrating that the injunction is sought in aid of execution of the judgment. [20] The Plaintiff cannot circumvent these requirements by fashioning this Application as a pre-judgment Mareva injunction through a fresh action, while in substance seeking relief that is effectively in aid of execution of an existing judgment. Page 13 of 23 [21] On this ground alone, the Application may be dismissed. However, for the sake of completeness, I will address the requirements that must be satisfied for the granting of a pre-judgment Mareva injunction, as asserted by the Plaintiff. E] PRE-JUDGMENT MAREVA INJUNCTION: WHETHER THE REQUIREMENTS ARE MET [22] Even if this Application is accepted as a pre-judgment Mareva application, as asserted by the Plaintiff, the issue is whether the necessary requirements for such an injunction have been satisfied. i) Good Arguable Case Analysis [23] The Plaintiff relies on the following cases to support its claim and cause of action against the Defendants: i) P.J.T.V. Denson (M) Sdn Bhd & Ors v. Roxy (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd [1980] 2 MLJ 136 (FC); ii) Tan Sri Dato’ (Dr) Rozali Ismail & Ors v. Chua Lay Kim & Ors [2016] 3 CLJ 84 (COA). [24] The main similarity between the present action, PJTV (supra), and Tan Sri Dato’ (Dr) Rozali (supra) is that they all involve the filing of a fresh suit arising from property transfers by the defendants, based on allegations that the transfers were made with the intention of defeating the respective plaintiffs’ claims. [25] The main difference between the present case and PJTV (supra) and Tan Sri Dato’ (Dr) Rozali (supra) is that, unlike in those two cases, where the fraudulent transfers occurred solely after judgment was obtained, the alleged asset dispositions in the present case took place both during the arbitration proceedings (2018–2019) and after the Award was delivered (December 2020 – February 2021). Further, the alleged disposition of assets in present case all occurred before the Enforcement Judgment. Page 14 of 23 [26] A further difference is that in the present case, the Plaintiff conducted extensive enforcement proceedings (including garnishee proceedings and JDS) in the original court where the Enforcement Judgment was granted, and is now seeking a Mareva injunction in a fresh suit. This is unlike PJTV (supra) and Tan Sri Dato’ (Dr) Rozali (supra), where no such enforcement proceedings were initiated in the original courts, nor were any subsequent Mareva injunction applications filed. [27] Despite these differences, I generally accept that the Plaintiff’s pleaded case satisfies the criteria of a “good arguable case” in that it is “more than being barely capable of serious argument, but not necessarily one that the Judge believes has got more than a fifty per cent chance of success” (S&F International (supra)). [28] The threshold to establish a good arguable case is not very high and the Plaintiff only needs to demonstrate that they have a fair chance of success and in this regard, they do not need to show that their case is so strong as to warrant summary judgment or that he has a strong prima facie case (Biasamas (supra)). ii) Assets Within Jurisdiction [29] The 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Defendants, being Malaysian citizens, have not disputed that they have assets within the jurisdiction. [30] In this regard the Court of Appeal in The Customs and Tax Administration of The Kingdom of Denmark v. Saling Capital Ltd & Ors and other appeals [2022] 1 MLJ 316, held as follows: “[31] From the evidence adduced, we are of the considered view that there is clear evidence to show that the Mareva respondents are domiciled and/or have business dealings within Malaysia and are therefore likely to have assets within the jurisdiction. (own emphasis added) (see also Lien Hoe Sawmill Co. Sdn Bhd v. Yap Sing Hock & Ors [1992] 2 CL J (Rep) 727 at pages 731 and 732) [31] Therefore, this requirement has been satisfied. Page 15 of 23 iii) Risk of Dissipation [32] The risk of dissipation is arguably the most significant factor in a Mareva injunction application. It forms the central basis upon which the Plaintiff seeks this injunction. [33] In support of its contention that there is a real risk of asset dissipation by the 1st to 4th Defendants, the Plaintiff asserts the following: i) The Plaintiff discovered alleged fraudulent asset dispositions by the Principal Defendants following their discovery disclosures in the JDS proceedings on 10.6.2024 and 28.8.2024; ii) The dissipation of assets occurred both prior to and following the Award, involving movement of assets from 2018 to 2021 (before the Enforcement Judgment); iii) Through this Application, the Plaintiff seeks to prevent further dissipation of assets aimed at evading satisfaction of the Award and the Enforcement Judgment. [34] The chronology of the alleged asset dissipation is as follows: i) Before the Award: Between 15.3.2018 and 7.8.2020, involving 13 transactions; ii) After the Award: Between 26.11.2020 and 13.1.2021, involving 3 transactions. [35] Importantly, there were no dissipation of assets after the Award was registered on 7.12.2021. [36] The following timelines are material to my analysis of the risk of asset dissipation: i)

15.3.2018 – 13.1.2021 – transfers took place. ii)

7.12.2021 - Award registered as judgment (Enforcement Judgment). Page 16 of 23 iii) 17.12.2021 - Plaintiff demanded payment of Judgment Sum. iv) 14.2.2022 - Garnishee applications filed (against the 1st Defendant’s Public Bank accounts and the 3rd Defendant’s HSBC accounts). v)

29.3.2022 - Additional garnishee application (against the 3rd Defendant’s HSBC accounts). vi) 26.4.2022 - Garnishee Order Absolute obtained against the 1st Defendant. vii) 26.5.2022 - Garnishee Order Absolute obtained against the 3rd Defendant. viii) 26.5.2022 - JDS proceedings commenced. ix) 22.8.2022 - 1st to 3rd Defendants’ first examination before the Senior Assistant Registrar. x)

29.9.2022 - Continued examination and discovery orders granted. xi) 16.3.2023 - Instalment Payment Orders granted. xii) 10.6.2024 & 28.8.2024 - production of financial documents by the 1st to 3rd Defendants in compliance with the orders made during the JDS proceedings. xiii) 23.11.2024 - This action and this Application were filed. [37] The foregoing chronology is crucial to my analysis, as it demonstrates the following: i) Significant delay: The alleged dissipation of assets occurred some 3 to 6 years before this Application was filed. Further, the Plaintiff had more than 2 years, from May 2022 when the JDS commenced, to seek this Mareva injunction, but chose not to do so. ii) Knowledge of transfers: The asset transfers were discovered during the JDS proceedings in 2022, yet this Application was only filed over 2 years later in 2024. Page 17 of 23 iii) Lack of urgency: This timeline undermines the Plaintiff’s argument that there is any present or imminent risk of dissipation. iv) Abuse of process concerns: The Plaintiff has exhausted several avenues to enforce the Enforcement Judgment, including initiating garnishee and JDS proceedings. It appears that, dissatisfied with the outcomes of these proceedings, the Plaintiff then chose to file this fresh action and seek a Mareva injunction, which the Plaintiff could have applied for in the Enforcement Judgment Court. [38] Having regard to the circumstances of the present matter, the delay in bringing this Application is significant (material) and substantially weakens the Plaintiff’s claim of an imminent risk of asset dissipation by the Defendants. The materiality of any delay is a crucial consideration in a Mareva injunction application and has the potential to vitiate the application (Alor Janggus Soon Seng Trading Sdn Bhd & Ors v. Sey Hoe Sdn Bhd & Ors [1995] 1 MLJ 241; The Customs and Tax Administration of The Kingdom of Denmark (supra)). [39] The Plaintiff contends that there is a lack of probity on the part of the 1st to 3rd Defendants, principally based on the allegation that the asset dissipation occurred to avoid the Award and the Enforcement Judgment. However, this argument conflates two distinct issues: the current Application is presented as a pre-judgment Mareva injunction, whereas such an allegation is typically relevant only in a post-judgment Mareva injunction context. Regardless of the approach, the Plaintiff is hindered by this fundamental flaw in the Application. I have addressed this earlier in this Judgment. [40] In this regard, the following passage from the Court of Appeal decision in Menk Sdn Bhd v. Joerg Hugo Schmidt [2009] 4 CLJ 795; [2009] 3 MLJ 205 clearly sets out the requirements that a plaintiff or applicant must satisfy for the grant of a pre-judgment Mareva injunction: “[31] Inexplicably, apart from the above excerpt, nothing was discussed about the danger of disposal of the assets defeating a judgment, a requirement that must be established as laid down by the Aspatra Sdn Bhd case. It is trite law Page 18 of 23 that in order to succeed in a Mareva injunction application, dissipation of assets per se is incomplete unless the applicant also successfully establishes the fact that the dissipation are preemptive acts that would lead to an intentional stultifying of any judgment that may be obtained. The two ingredients must go hand in hand.” (own emphasis added) [41] Therefore, the Plaintiff’s ground in support of this Application, namely, that the Principal Defendants dissipated assets “to avoid” the Award or the Enforcement Judgment, is untenable. It does not constitute a pre-emptive act justifying a pre-judgment Mareva injunction, but rather appears to relate to post-Award/Enforcement Judgment conduct aimed at aiding enforcement. This is particularly so given that the alleged asset dissipation all occurred prior to the Enforcement Judgment. [42] In a pre-judgment Mareva application, no judgment has yet been obtained. Accordingly, this Application fails to satisfy the requirements set out in Menk (supra). [43] As held in Petowa Jaya Sdn. Bhd. v. Binaan Nasional Sdn. Bhd [1988] 2 MLJ 261 and Ang Chee Huat v. Engelbach Thomas Joseph [1995] 2 MLJ 83: “The risk of dissipation was not just a mere possibility, but almost a certainty” (own emphasis added) [44] In the circumstances, I find that the Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that there is a “real” risk of the 1st to 4th Defendants dissipating their assets (S&F International (supra); Itramas Technology Sdn. Bhd. v. Maju Holdings Sdn. Bhd. & Ors [2020] MLJU 1663; [2020] CLJU 1487); [2021] MLRHU 559). iv) Balance of Convenience [45] A significant concern arises in relation to the overlap between this action and the earlier JDS proceedings, which have already been concluded. In those proceedings, the Plaintiff obtained extensive discovery orders, which the Court of Appeal specifically observed Page 19 of 23 would “invariably involve some element of tracing.” Pursuant to those orders, the Principal Defendants disclosed bank statements and financial records covering the period from 2017 to 2022. [46] The Plaintiff has already pursued various enforcement avenues in respect of the Enforcement Judgment, including the JDS and garnishee proceedings. This Application for a Mareva injunction appears to be an extension of its recovery efforts and gives rise to a multiplicity of proceedings. [47] Accordingly, the balance of convenience weighs against the grant of this Application (Bumi Armada (supra)). iv) The 4th Defendant [48] The 4th Defendant is, at most, a passive recipient, not an active dissipator. The Plaintiff seeks to impose an asset freeze on an individual who owes no legal obligation to the Plaintiff and against whom no allegation of intention to dissipate assets has been made. [49] The Plaintiff has not established any real or specific risk of dissipation by the 4th Defendant himself. Instead, it relies on a theory of “liability by association,” premised solely on the fact that he is the son of the judgment debtors. Such reasoning is legally insufficient. [50] Furthermore, the 4th Defendant voluntarily undertook not to deal with the property pending the outcome of this Application, a conduct which is inconsistent with any risk of dissipation. It is also relevant that he has held the property for a considerable period without any indication or attempt to dispose of it. [51] The consequences of granting a Mareva injunction against the 4th Defendant would be severely disproportionate, particularly given that he is a 27-year-old junior professional: i) A blanket freeze on all accounts would impair his ability to meet basic living expenses and professional commitments; ii) The reputational stigma attached to a Mareva injunction would jeopardise his standing within his profession and compromise his personal integrity; Page 20 of 23 iii) The requirement for worldwide asset disclosure would amount to an unjustified invasion of privacy. [52] For someone at the outset of his career, the harms outlined above would be enduring and difficult to remedy. Hence, the balance of convenience clearly favours a refusal of this Application, in particular against the 4th Defendant. F] CONCLUSION [53] In addition to the grounds already stated, I observed from the oral submissions during the hearing of this Application that the Plaintiff’s primary focus is on the property held by the 4th Defendant. However, with respect, a Mareva injunction is not the appropriate remedy against the 4th Defendant for the reasons I have previously outlined. It appears to me that the Plaintiff is, in effect, seeking an interlocutory prohibitory injunction under the principles established in American Cyanamid Co v. Ethicon Ltd [1975] 1 All ER 504. Such an injunction requires the Plaintiff to demonstrate, among other things, a serious question to be tried, the adequacy of damages as a remedy, and the balance of convenience. Notably, the requirement to show adequacy of damages does not apply in the context of a Mareva injunction application. [54] For the reasons stated, this Application is dismissed with costs in favour of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Defendants. Dated this 12th day of June, 2025 -SGD- (WAN MUHAMMAD AMIN BIN WAN YAHYA) Judge High Court of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur (Commercial Division (NCC 3)) Page 21 of 23 COUNSEL FOR THE PLAINTIFF Tan Shang Neng (Ricci Oly Ting together with him) Messrs Tan Shang Neng E-12-06 & E-12-07, Plaza Mont Kiara, No. 2 Jalan Kiara, 50480 Kuala Lumpur Tel: 03-64130912 Emel: general@tanshangneng.com COUNSEL FOR THE 1ST, 2ND, 3RD, 6TH AND 7TH DEFENDANTS Mohd Rezan Ezra Bin Muhammad Mosinal (Nathalie Annette Kee Xuan Li and Ivan Teng Jun Hong together with him) Messrs Thomas Philip 5-1, Jalan 22A/70A, Wisma CKL, Desa Sri Hartamas, 50480 Kuala Lumpur Tel: 03-62015678 Emel: tp@thomasphilip.com.my COUNSEL FOR THE 4TH AND 5TH DEFENDANTS Pavitra Pillai (Sara Binti Jailany together with her) Messrs M David Morais No. 274, Lorong Maarof, Bukit Bandaraya 50490 Kuala Lumpur Tel: 03-20962006 Emel: pavitra.pillai@morais.com.my

Aspatra Sdn Bhd & 21 Others v. Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Bhd &

Asma Baizura bt Mohamad Omar & Anor v. Pengiran Dato’ Awang Daud bin Awang Putra & Anor [2023] MLJU 474

Alor Janggus Soon Seng Trading Sdn Bhd & Ors v. Sey Hoe Sdn Bhd & Ors [1995] 1 MLJ 241

Ang Chee Huat v. Engelbach Thomas Joseph [1995] 2 MLJ 83

American Cyanamid Co v. Ethicon Ltd [1975] 1 All ER 504

Bumi Armada Navigation Sdn Bhd v. Mirza Marine Sdn Bhd [2015]

Dopag Dosiertechnik und Pneumatik AG v. Gamel Nasir Taib & Ors [2017] 10 MLJ 31

George Pathmanathan A/L Michael Gandhi Nathan v. Portcullis

Hitachi Leasing (Singapore) Pte Ltd v. Vincent Ambrose and another [2001] 1 SLR(R) 762)

Itramas Technology Sdn. Bhd. v. Maju Holdings Sdn. Bhd. & Ors [2020] MLJU 1663; [2020] CLJU 1487); [2021] MLRHU 559

Jtrust Asia Pte Ltd v. Group Lease Holdings Pte Ltd and others [2021]

Lien Hoe Sawmill Co. Sdn Bhd v. Yap Sing Hock & Ors [1992] 2 CL

Mareva Compania Naviera SA v. International Bulkcarriers SA [1975] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 509

Menk Sdn Bhd v. Joerg Hugo Schmidt [2009] 4 CLJ 795; [2009] 3

Orwell Steel (Erection and Fabrication) Ltd v. Asphalt and Tarmac (UK) Ltd [1984] 1 WLR 1097

P.J.T.V. Denson (M) Sdn Bhd & Ors v. Roxy (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd [1980] 2 MLJ 136

Petowa Jaya Sdn. Bhd. v. Binaan Nasional Sdn. Bhd [1988] 2 MLJ 261

Shim Yen Lin v. Cedric Wong King Ti [2021] 11 MLJ 350

Sun Electric Pte Ltd v. Menrva Solutions Pte Ltd [2020] SGHC 18

S&F International Limited v. Trans-Con Engineering Sdn Bhd [1985] 1 MLJ 62; [1985] 2 CLJ 228

Tan Sri Dato’ (Dr) Rozali Ismail & Ors v. Chua Lay Kim & Ors [2016]

The Customs and Tax Administration of The Kingdom of Denmark v. Saling Capital Ltd & Ors and other appeals [2022] 1 MLJ 316