the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established, ie there must be a complete chain of evidence that will not leave any reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and it must show that, within all human probability, the act must have been done by the accused.” [42] Both conditions are satisfied in the present case. The cumulative circumstances - the Appellant's undisputed position behind SP3, the unchallenged evidence that the other occupants were asleep on the bed, SP3's observation of those occupants still on the bed when he rose after the incident, and the face-to-face encounter identifying the Appellant at the door - form a complete and unbroken chain of evidence that is incompatible with the Appellant's innocence and incapable of explanation upon any hypothesis other than guilt. Ground 4 of the Petition is dismissed. Issue 3: Corroborating Evidence — SP1, SP2, and SP7 [43] The Appellant submits, by Grounds 5, 6, and 7 of the Petition, that the learned Sessions Court Judge erred in accepting the evidence of SP1 (the victim's elder sister), S/N BqffxkOWbkizC7IKP/rxsQ SP2 (the victim's elder brother), and SP7 (the victim's mother) as corroboration. The Appellant contends, as a general proposition, that none of these witnesses was present at the scene of the offence and none of them witnessed the act alleged in the charge. In relation to SP7 specifically, the Appellant challenges the learned Sessions Court Judge's reliance on SP3's complaint to his mother, recorded as “abang itu anu dia dengan jari”, arguing that SP3 never confirmed having used those words to SP7, and that SP7's evidence to that effect is therefore unverified hearsay that ought not to have been accepted or relied upon. In relation to SP1, the Appellant further contends that portions of her evidence are similarly tainted by hearsay, in that they contain statements communicated to her by SP3 which SP3 did not confirm in identical terms. [44] This submission conflates two distinct issues which must be kept separate: first, whether a witness may give relevant and admissible evidence notwithstanding that they did not witness the offence; and second, whether the evidence in question in fact constitutes impermissible hearsay. It is well settled that the first question must be answered in the affirmative. The law does not limit corroboration to direct eyewitness testimony of the criminal act. [45] As Spenser Wilkinson J stated in Public Prosecutor v Mardai [1950] 16 MLJ 33, a court in a sexual offence case may be satisfied if corroboration consists of a subsequent complaint by the complainant himself, “provided that the S/N BqffxkOWbkizC7IKP/rxsQ statement implicated the accused and was made at the first reasonable opportunity after the commission of the offence.” The principle is thus well established that evidence of complaint, the fact that a complaint was made and its general tenor, may, in appropriate circumstances, constitute corroboration even where the maker of the complaint is the victim himself, reported through the medium of a third-party witness who personally heard the complaint. The question that remains is whether the evidence of SP1, SP2, and SP7 satisfies the legal requirements of corroboration and whether any portion of it is inadmissible. [46] The applicable definition of corroboration in the legal sense was stated with clarity by Ong Hock Thye FJ in Ah Mee v Public Prosecutor [1967] 1 MLJ 220, a decision of the Federal Court, where his Lordship held: “…corroboration in a legal sense connotes some independent evidence of some material fact which implicates the accused person and tends to confirm that he is guilty of the offence.” [47] The conduct of the victim after the event and his prompt complaint to a family member are capable of forming corroborating evidence within this definition, particularly when those events are consistent with the victim's account of the offence. Applied to the facts of the present case, the relevant question is whether the testimony of SP1, SP2, and SP7 respectively constitutes independent evidence of a material fact that implicates the Appellant and tends to confirm his guilt. I am satisfied, for the reasons set out S/N BqffxkOWbkizC7IKP/rxsQ below, that each of these witnesses provided such evidence. [48] I turn first to SP7's evidence. The Respondent correctly submits that SP7's evidence concerning the complaint made by SP3 is not hearsay evidence of the truth of its contents. It is evidence of a relevant fact, specifically, SP3's conduct and demeanour after the incident. SP3 disclosed to SP7 that “abang tu anu dia dengan jari.” SP7 also gave evidence that SP3 refused to sleep in the Appellant's room again after the incident, a refusal which was itself consistent with SP3's account of what had been done to him by the Appellant. [49] The learned Sessions Court Judge found that this voluntary complaint fell within section 8(2), illustration (j) of the Evidence Act 1950 as conduct of SP3 after the incident constituting a relevant fact. That finding is correct in law. The complaint is not received to prove the truth of its contents as if SP7 were narrating what the Appellant did; it is received to establish the fact and nature of the complaint itself, namely that SP3 made a complaint at all, that he made it at the first reasonable opportunity, that it named a body part consistent with his in-court testimony, and that it was accompanied by a physical refusal to return to the scene. These are matters within SP7's direct personal observation. The Respondent rightly argues that SP7's evidence required no confirmation from SP3 to be S/N BqffxkOWbkizC7IKP/rxsQ admissible, for it was not hearsay: it was something SP7 heard herself and directly witnessed. [50] As for the Appellant's argument that SP3 did not confirm having used those exact words to SP7, the learned Sessions Court Judge was not obliged to reject SP7's evidence merely because SP3 did not reproduce the exact conversation in identical terms. Two witnesses who recount the same event are not expected to use verbatim language; it is the substance and consistency that the court must evaluate. SP3 testified that he had told his mother about the incident. SP7 testified to what SP3 said and to SP3's physical conduct thereafter. The substance of what SP3 communicated to his mother, namely that someone had interfered with his anus using a finger, is consistent across both testimonies. The learned Sessions Court Judge was entitled to accept both accounts as credible and consistent with each other. There was no material inconsistency of the kind that would warrant the rejection of SP7's evidence. [51] I turn next to the evidence of SP1. SP1 is the elder sister of SP3 and the complainant in this case. On 28.12.2019, while SP1 was travelling with SP3 to return him to their father's home, SP3 disclosed the incident to SP1 and told her: “Abang Bangla tu masukkan jari ke dalam bontot kita.” When SP1 asked which “Abang Bangla” he was referring to, SP3 stated that it was the abang Bangla who was always with him. SP1 observed that SP3 appeared “takut-takut” — visibly fearful — whilst recounting the incident, and she S/N BqffxkOWbkizC7IKP/rxsQ noted that approximately one week had elapsed since the offence when SP3 made this disclosure. [52] Upon hearing this, SP1 immediately brought SP3 to the police station and lodged police report P3 (Taman Universiti 6910/19). It is plain that SP1's evidence is not hearsay in any impermissible sense. Her evidence goes to what SP3 said directly to her, which she personally heard; to SP3's visible emotional state at the time; and to her own immediate act of bringing SP3 to lodge a police report. The Appellant's characterisation of this as “unverified hearsay” is misconceived. The fact that the disclosure was not reproduced by SP3 in identical terms at trial does not render SP1's firsthand observation of the complaint and SP3's demeanour inadmissible; those observations are the direct, personal evidence of SP1 herself. The High Court in Mohd Rasul Mat Lasi v PP [2021] 1 LNS 1737 recognised that the conduct of the victim after the incident constitutes corroborating evidence supporting the victim's testimony. SP1's observations of SP3's demeanour and SP3's spontaneous disclosure are precisely the kind of post-incident conduct and complaint that falls within that principle. [53] SP2's evidence, for its part, is focused principally on the sleeping arrangements in the Appellant's room on the material night, which are facts largely undisputed by both parties. SP2 confirmed that SP3 slept between the Appellant and SP2 on the floor, with SP2 to the right of SP3 S/N BqffxkOWbkizC7IKP/rxsQ and closer to the door, while two other male occupants slept on the bed. This evidence is admitted and corroborates the physical arrangement described by SP3. It provides independent support for the established fact that only the Appellant was positioned immediately behind SP3 throughout the night, consistent with the opportunity for the act as found by the learned Sessions Court Judge. This evidence is observational and direct; it is not hearsay of any description. [54] Having carefully considered the submissions of both parties, I am satisfied that the learned Sessions Court Judge was entitled to consider and rely upon the evidence of SP1, SP2, and SP7 in the manner she did. None of the three witnesses gave inadmissible hearsay evidence. Each gave admissible, relevant evidence from their own firsthand observation of SP3's conduct, complaint, and demeanour after the incident, or of the circumstances in the room on the material night. Their evidence collectively constitutes independent corroboration within the meaning stated in Ah Mee. Grounds 5, 6, and 7 of the Petition are dismissed. Issue 4: Medical Evidence — SP6 and the Issue of Constipation [55] The Appellant advances two related grounds under Grounds 8 and 9 of the Petition. First, the Appellant submits that the learned Sessions Court Judge selectively accepted SP6's evidence and thereby misdirected herself on the S/N BqffxkOWbkizC7IKP/rxsQ issue of constipation. The Appellant contends that SP6's evidence contained material capable of forming inferences favourable to the Appellant, specifically, that the anal fissure could have been caused by constipation rather than by any act of the Appellant, and that the learned Sessions Court Judge wrongly shifted the burden to the defence to establish that SP3 suffered from constipation. [56] Second, and relatedly, the Appellant presses a specific argument arising from the circumstance that a “new fissure at 5 o'clock” was detected only during the second examination conducted on 29.12.2019 at 5.15pm, having not been present during the first examination conducted on the same date at 12.30pm. The Appellant urges this court to draw one of two inferences from this: first, that the “new fissure” was caused by external penetration by a person other than the Appellant, since the Appellant could not have been with SP3 during the interval between the two examinations; and second, that the “new fissure” was caused by constipation, which in turn proves that SP3 did in fact suffer from constipation. The Appellant further submits that in the circumstances, there was no obligation on trial counsel to put the issue of constipation to SP6 as a factual proposition, on the footing that SP6 himself had raised constipation as a possible cause, thereby rendering any such further suggestion unnecessary. [57] I reject these grounds. It is necessary to examine SP6's evidence with some care. SP6, Dr Jeremiah Joseph John S/N BqffxkOWbkizC7IKP/rxsQ a/l Henry, conducted two medical examinations of SP3 on 29.12.2019, approximately one week after the incident on 23.12.2019. The first examination was conducted at 12.30pm. SP6's findings during that examination, as recorded in the medical report P10 and confirmed in his examination-in-chief, disclosed erythematous skin at the 5 to 7 o'clock region near the anus. When queried in examination-in-chief, SP6 explained that this finding referred to inflammation possibly caused by external pressure or force. [58] The second examination was conducted at 5.15pm on the same date, under anaesthesia, as SP3 had complained of pain during the first examination. The findings of the second examination were: “fecal swelling around the anus, mild inflammation from 5 to 7 o'clock and present new fissure at 5 o'clock. Then speculum examination was performed the finding was no obvious tear, no bleeding, no ulcer, anal swab was taken again for DNA spermatozoa. The second examination was conducted by Ms Quah.” When asked in examination-in-chief to explain the meaning of “new fissure at 5 o'clock”, SP6 replied: “In this case new fissure at 5 o'clock refer to breach in skin integrity.” When pressed to elaborate, SP6 stated: “With regard to this, the fissure that was found possibly due to external penetration or arising from constipation.” Critically, the medical history recorded by SP6 showed expressly that SP3 was able to pass stool without difficulty and had no prior history of constipation. S/N BqffxkOWbkizC7IKP/rxsQ [59] Against this evidential backdrop, the Appellant's inference-based argument concerning the “new fissure at 5 o'clock” does not withstand scrutiny. The Appellant's proposition — that because the fissure was not observed during the first examination, it must have been caused either by an unknown third party or by constipation — rests on speculation rather than evidence. SP6 was cross-examined on this very matter. Defence counsel posed the following question: “From the time of the incident that had taken place where you actually came up with the diagnosis of alleged sodomy to the time of examination of the patient, could there be a possibility of any inflammation caused by the patient himself by forcing his stool through bowel movement?” [60] SP6's reply was: “With regards to the question, from the time the incident took place till the point upon the first examination, there is possibility of inflammation that occurred at the anus second to the fissure that had occurred. However, repeative external force or penetration can also lead to the occurrence of fissure and also inflammation.” [61] The significance of SP6's answer lies not merely in the theoretical acknowledgement of constipation as a possibility, but in the affirmative qualification that repeated external force or penetration can equally cause both fissure and inflammation. Furthermore, the inference that an unidentified third party caused the “new fissure” in the interval between the two examinations was never substantiated by any evidence whatsoever, and was no S/N BqffxkOWbkizC7IKP/rxsQ more than a hypothesis unsupported by any factual foundation. [62] The Appellant’s argument that there was no obligation to put the constipation hypothesis to SP6 as a factual proposition, on the basis that SP6 had himself mentioned it, is equally untenable. The cross-examination of SP6 went no further than eliciting a theoretical concession that constipation could be a possible cause of anal fissure; it never established, or attempted to establish, as a fact that SP3 was in truth suffering from constipation at the material time. The distinction is critical. It is one thing to elicit from a medical witness that a particular condition might theoretically account for certain findings; it is another matter entirely to establish the factual premise upon which that theoretical possibility could bear on the case. In this regard, the learned Sessions Court Judge correctly applied the principle stated by the High Court in Ahmad Junaidi bin Mohamed Yusoff v Public Prosecutor [2022] MLJU 2519, where it was held: “[31] Despite the doctors stating that the medical examination was not conclusive, nevertheless they had assessed PW5's condition and given weight to what he had told them, that is, PW5's complaint was consistent with the history. Going through the cross-examination of the 3 doctors whom were called by the prosecution, the defence only asked PW3 and PW7 whether the injuries could have been caused by constipation and which the witnesses answered in the affirmative. But it was never suggested to these witnesses that PW5 suffered from constipation. Therefore, I am of the view that the SCJ had properly considered these evidence in concluding that there was corroboration of PW5's evidence in S/N BqffxkOWbkizC7IKP/rxsQ the form of the medical evidence adduced by the prosecution.” [63] Moreover, and significantly, the issue of constipation was not put to SP3 himself during cross-examination, nor was it raised before SP7, SP3's mother, as an explanation for the pain SP3 was observed to be experiencing. The failure of the defence to put the constipation hypothesis to any witness as a factual assertion across the entirety of the trial is telling. [64] The Appellant’s counsel acknowledged in written submissions that trial counsel did not suggest to SP6 that SP3 suffered from constipation. The Appellant sought to justify this by arguing that since SP6 had mentioned constipation as a possible cause, no further suggestion was necessary. This argument is misconceived. The obligation to put a material factual proposition to a witness is a fundamental requirement of the adversarial process. Its purpose is to afford the witness the opportunity to confirm or deny the factual premise being advanced. [65] Where, as here, a defence hypothesis, namely that SP3 was in fact constipated, is never placed before any witness as an actual fact, that hypothesis remains entirely without evidential foundation. It cannot be elevated from a theoretical possibility to a live issue capable of raising a reasonable doubt merely by reference to a general concession that the condition could theoretically exist. The Respondent correctly submits that the principle in Ahmad S/N BqffxkOWbkizC7IKP/rxsQ Junaidi applies squarely: the facts of the present case are precisely analogous to those in that case, in that the defence was content to ask whether constipation could have caused the injuries without ever asserting that the complainant actually suffered from constipation. The learned Sessions Court Judge was therefore entirely correct in her treatment of this issue, and no misdirection can be identified. [66] The learned Sessions Court Judge was equally entitled to accept SP6's evidence as providing corroboration of SP3's testimony. The medical evidence was not, as alleged, selectively applied. SP6's findings were properly evaluated in the full context of the evidence, including the medical history which expressly recorded that SP3 had no prior history of constipation. The Respondent correctly submits that the anal fissure detected on 29.12.2019 is consistent with SP3's account of penetration having occurred approximately one week earlier on 23.12.2019. This consistency constitutes proper corroborative value. SP6's evidence that the findings were consistent with penetration and pressure being applied to the anal area lends objective medical support to SP3's testimony. [67] In the absence of any established factual premise for the constipation hypothesis, and having regard to the totality of SP6's evidence, I am satisfied that the learned Sessions Court Judge's finding that the medical evidence corroborated SP3's account was one that was available to S/N BqffxkOWbkizC7IKP/rxsQ her on the evidence and discloses no error of law or fact. Grounds 8 and 9 of the Petition are accordingly dismissed. Matters of Overall Assessment: Credibility of SP3 and the Defence [68] Having addressed the specific grounds, I wish to make several observations that bear on the overall safety of the conviction. [69] The learned Sessions Court Judge's finding that SP3 was a credible and truthful witness is a finding of fact that this appellate court will not disturb. The Court of Appeal in Sahrul Mazlee bin Mohd Khalid v Public Prosecutor affirmed that an appellate court must exercise particular caution before interfering with credibility findings of a trial judge who had the benefit of observing the demeanour of witnesses. In this case, the credibility finding was underpinned by the additional procedural safeguard of a competency inquiry under section 133A of the Evidence Act 1950, during which the learned Sessions Court Judge observed SP3 directly and found him capable of understanding questions and giving rational answers. [70] Section 18 of Act 792 provides that a conviction for an offence under the Act may be founded on the uncorroborated evidence of a child victim, provided that evidence is unusually convincing. The Court of Appeal in Public Prosecutor v Mohamad Malek Ridhzuan Che Hassan S/N BqffxkOWbkizC7IKP/rxsQ [2024] 8 CLJ 359 explained that “unusually convincing” means evidence so convincing that the prosecution case is proved beyond reasonable doubt on that evidence alone. The learned Sessions Court Judge found that SP3's testimony met this standard. She noted that the specificity and detail of SP3's account, including the physical sensation of penetration, the pressing, the wiping of a liquid after each insertion, and the number of repetitions, could not reasonably have been fabricated by a nine-year-old child. This finding was within the scope of her fact-finding function, and I find no reason to interfere with it. [71] In any event, SP3's evidence was corroborated by his prompt complaint to SP7, by SP7's evidence of that complaint, by SP3's conduct immediately after the incident (his refusal to sleep at the Appellant's room again), and by the medical findings of SP6 consistent with penetration and pressure. The cumulative effect of these pieces of evidence leaves only one reasonable conclusion in accordance with the principles of Sunny Ang v Public Prosecutor [1966] 2 MLJ 195. [72] As to the defence, the Appellant's testimony amounted to a bare denial. He admitted the sleeping arrangements. He denied doing anything to SP3. The Court of Appeal in Mr Losali v Public Prosecutor [2011] 4 MLJ 694 held unequivocally that “[t]he bare denial cannot in law raise a reasonable doubt.” The learned Sessions Court Judge was therefore correct to conclude, applying the standard in Mat v S/N BqffxkOWbkizC7IKP/rxsQ PP, that the Appellant's explanation did not raise a reasonable doubt and was not believed. I am satisfied that the learned Sessions Court Judge correctly applied the test in Balachandran v PP at the prima facie stage and correctly applied the Mat v PP standard at the end of trial. SENTENCE [73] The Appellant also appeals against sentence. The sentence imposed was eight years' imprisonment from the date of conviction and five strokes of the rattan, together with an order for rehabilitation counselling under section 26 of Act