03.11.2025, Puan Timbalan Pendakwa Raya telah memaklumkan kepada mahkamah bahawa ada perkembangan baru untuk kes ini dan ada kemungkinan untuk Borang 28A Kanun Tatacara Jenayah (‘KTJ’) dimasukkan. Kes seterusnya telah ditangguhkan ke 6.11.2025 untuk Fakta dan Hukuman. [3] Seterusnya pada 06.11.2025, Timbalan Pendakwa Raya (‘TPR’) telah memaklumkan kepada Mahkamah bahawa terdapat satu Pertuduhan Pilihan ditawarkan kepada Tertuduh dan memohon supaya Pertuduhan Pilihan seperti berikut dibacakan kepada Tertuduh: Pertuduhan Pilihan: BAHAWA KAMU BERSAMA SEORANG LAGI YANG MASIH BEBAS, PADA 26/7/2023 JAM LEBIH KURANG 4.30 PETANG BERTEMPAT DI REM SAWIT LOT 4648 JALAN PARIT KAMPUNG DENDANG 32700 BERUAS, DI DALAM DAERAH MANJUNG, DI DALAM NEGERI PERAK TELAH MENCURI WANG TUNAI RM4,800.00 MILIK OO CHONG HING (NO. KPT: 541030-08-5597). OLEH ITU, KAMU TELAH MELAKUKAN SUATU KESALAHAN YANG BOLEH DIHUKUM DIBAWAH SEKSYEN 379 KANUN KESEKSAAN DAN DIBACA BERSAMA SEKSYEN 34 AKTA YANG SAMA. HUKUMAN APABILA DISABITKAN, HENDAKLAH DIPENJARAKAN SELAMA TEMPOH TIDAK MELEBIHI TUJUH TAHUN ATAU DIDENDA ATAU KEDUA-DUANYA, DAN BAGI KESALAHAN KALI KEDUA ATAU YANG KEMUDIAN BOLEHLAH DIKENAKAN PENJARA DAN BOLEHLAH JUGA DIKENAKAN DENDA ATAU SEBAT. Setelah Pertuduhan Pilihan dibacakan kepada tertuduh dalam Bahasa Melayu, Tertuduh telah mengaku salah terhadap Pertuduhan Pilihan tersebut, faham sifat dan akibat pengakuan dan telah mengaku tanpa syarat. [4] Antara lain, pihak pendakwaan telah mengemukakan sebagai exhibit, Fakta Kes (Exhibit P1), Laporan Polis Bruas Rpt. 591/23 (Exhibit P2), Laporan Polis Sitiawan Rpt. 7168/23 (Exhibit P4), Laporan Polis Bruas 596/23 (Exhibit P5), Laporan Polis Bruas 597/23 (Exhibit P6), 9 keping Gambar Tempat Kejadian (Exhibit P9(A)-(I)), 4 keping Gambar Barang Kes (Exhibit P10(A)-(D)), 3 keping Gambar Pegun CCTV (Exhibit P11(A)-(C)), dan Laporan Forensik CCTV (Exhibit P12). Kesemua exhibit yang dikemukakan oleh pihak pendakwaan telah diakui oleh Tertuduh. Mahkamah berpuas hati dengan pengakuan salah Tertuduh dan mendapati Tertuduh salah dan sabit kesalahan sepertimana dalam Pertuduhan Pilihan. [5] Dalam rayuan mitigasi, Peguam Tertuduh telah menyatakan bahawa Tertuduh berumur 37 tahun dan menanggung isterinya yang berusia 30 tahun dan tidak bekerja. Isteri Tertuduh berpenyakit diabetes dan sekarang masih menggunakan ubat insulin. Tertuduh adalah sole breadwinner kepada isteri dan anak mereka berusia 1 tahun 8 bulan. Tertuduh juga menanggung bapa beliau yang tidak bekerja berumur 63 tahun dan berpenyakit darah tinggi dan kencing manis dan ibunya yang berusia 53 tahun berpenyakit darah tinggi. Selain itu Tertuduh juga menanggung adiknya yang berusia 22 tahun dan tidak bekerja akibat kemalangan yang membuatkan kakinya patah dan tidak boleh berjalan secara normal. Tertuduh pula hanya kerja kampung dengan gaji tidak menentu dengan pendapatan RM50/- sehari. Peguambela juga berhujah bahawa pengakuan salah Tertuduh telah menjimatkan masa dan kos mahkamah dan Tertuduh kesal dan tidak akan mengulangi perbuatan ini lagi. Selain itu, dihujahkan juga bahawa Tertuduh telah direman sebelum ini selama 7 hari dan ini telah membuatkan Tertuduh berasa kesal terhadap kesalahan ini. Peguambela juga menghujahkan bahawa ada seorang lagi yang masih bebas dan bukan Tertuduh sahaja yang terlibat dalam kes ini dan Tertuduh tidak mengambil sebarang wang tunai hasil jenayah dalam kes ini kerana telah diambil oleh seorang lagi yang masih bebas tersebut. Dalam pada itu dihujahkan juga bahawa Tertuduh bukanlah mastermind dalam kes ini dan beliau hanya mengikut sahaja seorang lagi individu yang masih bebas itu. Maka Peguambela telah pohon untuk hukuman denda paling minima dalam lingkungan yang munasabah dikenakan terhadap Tertuduh memandangkan ini adalah kesalahan pertama Tertuduh dan tiada rekod lampau dikemukakan. Peguambela juga menambah bahawa Tertuduh tidak mendatangkan apa-apa kecederaan kepada pengadu dalam kes ini. [6] Dalam hujahan pemberatan, TPR secara ringkasnya telah memohon untuk satu hukuman setimpal dengan mengambil kira kerugian yang dialami oleh mangsa dan kepentingan awam. Tiada rekod kesalahan lampau dikemukakan oleh TPR. [7] Dalam mempertimbangkan hukuman terhadap Tertuduh, Mahkamah terikat dengan prinsip sepertimana dijelaskan oleh Mohamed Azmi SCJ dalam kes Supreme Court Mohamed Abdullah Ang Swee Kang lwn Pendakwa Raya [1987] 2 CLJ 405; [1987] CLJ (Rep) 209 di m/s 214: In assessing the length of custodial sentence, the court must look at the overall picture in perspective by considering, firstly, the gravity of the type of offence committed; secondly, the facts in the commission of the offence; thirdly, the presence or absence of mitigating factors, and, fourthly, the sentences that have been imposed in the past for similar offences to determine the trend of sentencing policy, if any. The fact that a sentence of imprisonment is imposed as deterrence does not justify the sentencer in passing a sentence of greater length than what the facts of the offence warrant ... A sentencer must give sufficient discount for all extenuating circumstances pertaining to the degree of culpability or criminality involved, which must necessarily vary from case to case apart from other mitigating factors. Unless there is a proper reason for withholding such credits, failure to do so may result in the sentencer not exercising his or her discretion judicially in assessing the level of custodial sentence. Mahkamah telah mengambil kira segala rayuan mitigasi Tertuduh yang dihujahkan dan sedar bahawa Tertuduh telah menjimatkan kos dan masa Mahkamah (Sau Soo Kim [1975] 2 MLJ 134, Melvani v. PP [1971] 1 MLJ 137; PP v. Sulaiman bin Ahmad [1993] 1 MLJ 74, PP v. Ravindran & Ors [1993] 1 MLJ 45) di samping insaf dan kesal di atas perbuatannya. Walaupun begitu, Mahkamah juga perlu mengambil kira kepentingan awam dalam kes ini (Loh Hock Seng & Anor v. PP [1979] 1 LNS 48; [1980] 2 MLJ 13; PPv. Oo Leng Swee & Ors [1981] 1 LNS 109; [1981] 1 MLJ 247) dan fakta bahawa mangsa telah mengalami kerugian akibat kesaahan ini adalah satu faktor yang perlu diberikan perhatian yang sewajarnya oleh Mahkamah. Dalam hemat Mahkamah suatu hukuman dalam bentuk denda adalah mencukupi untuk mencerminkan kepentingan awam dalam kes ini setelah dipertimbangkan fakta kes, exhibit yang dikemukakan dan peranan Tertuduh dalam kes ini. Oleh yang demikian Mahkamah telah menjatuhkan hukuman denda RM12,000/- gagal bayar 8 bulan penjara. Mahkamah berpendapat bahawa sabitan dan hukuman yang telah dikenakan terhadap Tertuduh ini adalah wajar dan setimpal atas alasan-alasan seperti berikut: a) Hukuman yang dijatuhkan adalah berdasarkan peruntukan undang-undang Seksyen 379 Kanun Keseksaan memperuntukkan hukuman penjara selama tempoh yang boleh sampai tujuh tahun atau denda atau kedua-duanya, dan untuk kesalahan kedua atau seterusnya hendaklah dihukum penjara dan boleh juga didenda atau sebat. Maka hukuman denda yang telah dikenakan terhadap Tertuduh di dalam kes ini adalah mematuhi peruntukan di bawah Seksyen 379 Kanun Keseksaan. b) Perancangan Rapi untuk melakukan kesalahan Walaupun Tertuduh di dalam kes ini tidak mempunyai sebarang rekod kesalahan lampau, namun tindak-tanduk Tertuduh dalam kes ini jelas menunjukkan satu perancangan rapi dibuat untuk melakukan kesalahan ini. Fakta Kes (P1) menunjukkan bahawa pada 26/7/2023 jam lebih kurang 4.30 petang, semasa pengadu yang berumur 68 tahun 8 bulan (P2), berada di Rem Sawit Lot 4648 Jalan Parit Kampung Dendang 32700 Beruas, Manjung, Perak, telah didatangi oleh Tertuduh dan rakannya yang masih bebas untuk berjumpa dengan bos Rem Sawit. Rakannya telah mengajak pengadu untuk berbincang di dalam pejabat di Rem Sawit tersebut. Apabila di dalam pejabat, Tertuduh telah mencuri sejumlah wang di dalam pejabat dan mencuri duit pengadu yang bernilai RM4,800.00. Malah Tertuduh dan rakannya kemudian telah mengunci pengadu di dalam pejabat tersebut. Dalam hal ini dirujuk kepada kes Kesavan Senderan v PP [1999] 1 CLJ 343 dimana Y.A. Abdul Wahab Patail J telah memutuskan seperti berikut di m/s 376 kes tersebut: “These cases only illustrate that while there are common general principles in fixing sentence, the judge fixing sentence must look at each case individually. He must consider firstly, the nature and seriousness of the particular offence; secondly, the deliberateness with which and the circumstances in which the offence was committed; thirdly, to give a discount for genuine regret; and fourthly, the balance between the public interests in deterrence not only of the accused but of others, and of enabling the accused a chance to turn over a new leaf. Given that some offences may in their commission and circumstances be more serious than others, a sentence of 40% to 50% of the maximum sentence would be an appropriate median point to start with. It would sufficiently reflect the legislature's intent as to the nature and seriousness of the offence. The second consideration comes next. In the event that the circumstances show that the commission of the offence was very much planned, it would warrant a sentence higher than that 40% to 50% of the maximum sentence. So also if the offence is committed against an infant, a child, the weak and defenceless and the old. If the offence was committed accidentally, it would warrant a substantial reduction from that median point. As to the third consideration, a valid factor is whether an accused person is genuinely contrite and regrets what he has done. There are many ways to show such regret. It could be shown by cooperation with investigation, pleading guilty and making amends with the victim of the offence. Cooperation and pleading guilty saves considerable public money and time in investigation and prosecution as well as the time of the court. The public interest in such money and time being saved is considerable since the limited resources could then be utilised or directed to where it is most needed. In cases where a victim is involved, the making of amends with the victim, such as payment of compensation, would contribute substantially to the public's perception and acceptance that justice has been done. In such circumstances a very substantial reduction from the median point would be warranted. Thus on a plea of guilty alone, a discount of 20 to 30% from the sentence that would otherwise have been passed is warranted. The fourth consideration is more tenuous. It would have to be a fine balance between the need for deterrence of others from committing similar offences, and a consideration of the likelihood of the offender from committing the same offence again. Regarding the latter, the age of the offender, that he is first offender, that he has responsibilities of which he may have become even more aware since the specter of imprisonment hung over him and similar circumstances come into consideration. But these matters on their own are secondary to the main issue, which is the balance between the public interest in deterrence and enabling the convict to turn over a new leaf. It goes without saying that where all these factors are generally the same between two cases, it should result in almost identical sentences. That would demonstrate uniformity. That uniformity of sentencing principle would also be demonstrated by the fact that differing circumstances would result in differing sentences. It is trite that the medicine must not only fit the disease but also the patient.” C) Pengakuan bersalah Tertuduh Walaupun faktor pengakuan salah adalah satu faktor yang harus dipertimbangkan oleh Mahkamah dalam mempertimbangkan hukuman yang boleh dikenakan terhadap seseorang pesalah namun begitu, ianya masih terpulang kepada budibicara sesuatu Mahkamah itu dan bukanlah satu peraturan automatik. Mahkamah ini berpendapat, pengakuan bersalah Tertuduh telah sedikit sebanyak menjimatkan masa dan kos semua pihak yang terlibat di dalam kes ini dan perkara ini telah pun diberi pertimbangan sebelum hukuman dikenakan. Walau bagaimanapun, faktor pengakuan salah ini perlulah diimbangkan dengan keseriusan kes berasaskan faktanya serta faktor kepentingan am. Dalam hal ini dirujuk kepada kes Mahkamah Rayuan Bachik Abdul Rahman v PP [2004] 2 CLJ 572 di mana YA Hakim Mahkamah Rayuan Augustine Paul JCA menyatakan seperti berikut di m/s 583-584: " The learned judge appears to have taken the view that credit should be given in every case where a person pleads guilty. The position in law is that it is generally accepted that an accused person should be given credit or discount for pleading guilty (see Sau Soo Kim v. PP [1975] 2 MLJ 134; PP v. Sulaiman bin Ahmad [1993] 1 MLJ 74; PP v. Ravindran & Ors [1993] 1 MLJ 45). The discount that is given is normally a reduction of the sentence by about a third of what would otherwise have been imposed (see Mohamad Abdullah Ang Swee Kang v. PP [1987] 2 CLJ 405; [1987] CLJ (Rep) 209; PP v. Muhari bin Mohd Jani & Anor [1999] 8 CLJ 430; Christopher Khoo Ewe Cheng v. PP [1998] 3 CLJ 705). However, this is not a strict rule as the court may, in the exercise of its discretion, refuse to grant any discount in an appropriate case (see Zaidon Shariff v. PP [1996] 4 CLJ 441; Lee Say & Ors v. PP [1985] 2 CLJ 155; [1985] CLJ (Rep) 683). Its application in favour of an accused depends on the facts and circumstances of each case (see Wong Kai Chuen Philip v. PP [1991] 1 MLJ 321). Thus, as lucidly explained by Charles JA in Leigh Nicholas Donnelly v. R [1997] 91 A Crim R 550 at p. 554: A court’s attitude towards the fact of a plea of guilty is expected to act as an encouragement to enter such a plea. The issue with which the court is to be concerned is what weight should be given to it in the circumstances The circumstances in which a guilty plea will not have any weight are varied. The severity of the offence committed may outweigh the mitigating effect of a guilty plea (see Loh Hock Seng & Anor v. PP [1979] 1 LNS 48; [1980] 2 MLJ 13; PP v. Oo Leng Swee & Ors [1981] 1 LNS 109; [1981] 1 MLJ 247). Where public interest demands effect of a guilty plea must also give way (see Gim Gek Yong v. PP [1995] 1 SLR 537; PP v. Govindnan a/l Chinden Nair [1998] 2 CLJ 370). A guilty plea cannot also be a powerful mitigating factor when effectively no defence to the charge is available to the accused (see PP v. Low Kok Wai [1988] 2 CLJ 105; [1988] 2 CLJ (Rep) 268). If a plea of guilty is made too late in the trial it may also cease to have mitigating effect (see PP v. Dato' Nallakaruppan Solaimalai [1992] 2 CLJ 596). The absence of mitigating factors in favour of the accused like, for instance, the existence of previous convictions may also deprive the guilty plea of its effect. There can therefore be no automatic rule that a guilty plea on its own entitles an accused to a lesser punishment (see PP v. Tia Ah Leng [2000] 5 CLJ 614). Be that as it may, where there is a departure from the general rule the reason for not treating the guilty plea as a mitigating factor must be reflected in the grounds of judgment (see Tan Lay Chen v. PP [2000] 4 CLJ 492)." c) Keseriusan kesalahan/ Gravity of the Offence Mahkamah berpendapat kesalahan yang dilakukan oleh Tertuduh ini merupakan salah satu kesalahan serius yang sering berlaku di kalangan masyarakat dan memohon untuk hukuman seringan-ringannya. Faktor bahawa mangsa adalah seorang warga emas berumur 68 tahun dan berseorangan semasa insiden berlaku di siang hari, langsung tidak menghalang Tertuduh daripada melakukan kesalahan ini. Dalam hal ini dirujuk kepada kes Mahkamah Rayuan Pendakwaraya v Mohamed Danny Mohd Jedi [2018] 5 CLJ692, dimana Y.A. Mohamed Zawawi Salleh HMR (pada ketika itu) memutuskan seperti berikut di m/s 700: “[14] It is trite law that a sentence must be proportionate to both the seriousness of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender. The concept of proportionality was explained in the Canadian Supreme Court Case of R v. Ipeelee [2012] SCC12. [2012] 1 SLR 433 in paragraph 37 as follows: “Proportionality in the sine qua non of a just sanction. First, the principle ensures that a sentence reflects the gravity of the offence. This is closely tied to the objective of denunciation. It promotes justice for victims and ensure public confidence in the justice system…Second, the principle of proportionality ensures that a sentence does not exceed what is appropriate, given the moral blameworthiness of the offender. In this sense, the principles serves a limiting or restraining functioning and ensures justice for the offender.” [15] The protection of society is one of the important purposes of punishment under the principle of proportionality. In Channon v. The Queen [1978] 20 ALR 1, 5, the court stated: The necessary and ultimate justification for criminal sanctions is the protection of society from conduct which the law proscribes. Punishment is the means by which society marks its disapproval of criminal conduct, by which warning is given of the consequences of crime and by which reform of an offender can sometimes be assisted. Criminal sanctions are purposive, and they are not inflicted judicially except for the purpose of protecting society; nor to an extent beyond what is necessary to achieve that purpose. [16] In the same vein, in Sumer Singh v. Surajbhan Singh v. Others [2014] 7 SCC 323, the Supreme Court of India, while elaborating on the duty of the court in imposing sentence for an offence, ruled that it is the duty of the court to impose adequate sentence, for one of the purposes of imposition of requisite sentence is protection of society and legitimate response to the collective conscience. The paramount principle that should be the guiding laser beam is that the punishment should be proportionate. It is the answer of law to social conscience. In a way, it is an obligation to the society which has reposed faith on the court of law to curtail the evil. d) Kepentingan Awam Kesemua rayuan dalam mitigasi oleh Tertuduh dalam kes ini telah diimbangi dengan fakta kes dan kepentingan awam. Dalam pandangan Mahkamah, kepentingan awam adalah satu perkara yang amat penting untuk diimbangi dalam hukuman yang dijatuhkan terhadap seseorang Tertuduh kerana sesuatu hukuman terhadap Tertuduh tersebut bukan sahaja untuk pemulihan Tertuduh namun adalah untuk kebaikan masyarakat juga. Di dalam kes Mahkamah Tinggi PP v. Loo Choon Fatt [1976] 2 MLJ 256 Hashim Yeop A. Sani J. telah mendapati seperti berikut di m/s 257-258: ““…In respect of sentencing there can be only general guidelines. No two cases can have exactly the same facts to the minutest detail. Facts do differ from case to case and ultimately each case has to be decided on its own merits. In practice sentences do differ not only from case to case but also from court to court. All things being equal these variations are inevitable if only because of the human element involved. But, of course, there must be limits to permissible variations. The principles to be applied in imposing sentence however are the same in every case. The High Court sitting in exercise of its revisionary powers will not normally alter the sentence unless it is satisfied that the sentence of the lower court is either manifestly inadequate or grossly excessive or illegal or otherwise not a proper sentence having regard to all the facts disclosed on the record or to all the facts which the court ought to take judicial notice of, that is to say, that the lower court clearly has erred in applying the correct principles in the assessment of the sentence. It is firmly established practice that the court will not alter a sentence merely because it might have passed a different sentence … “…One of the main considerations in the assessment of sentence is of course the question of public interest. On this point I need only quote a passage from the judgment of Hilbery J. inRex v Kenneth John Ball 35 CrAppR 164 as follows:– "In deciding the appropriate sentence a court should always be guided by certain considerations. The first and foremost is the public interest. The criminal law is publicly enforced, not only with the object of punishing crime, but also in the hope of preventing it. A proper sentence, passed in public, serves the public interest in two ways. It may deter others who might be tempted to try crime as seeming to offer easy money on the supposition, that if the offender is caught and brought to justice, the punishment will be negligible. Such a sentence may also deter the particular criminal from committing a crime again, or induce him to turn from a criminal to an honest life. The public interest is indeed served, and best served, if the offender is induced to turn from criminal ways to honest living. Our law does not, therefore, fix the sentence for a particular crime, but fixes a maximum sentence and leaves it to the court to decide what is, within that maximum, the appropriate sentence for each criminal in the particular circumstances of each case. Not only in regard to each crime, but in regard to each criminal, the court has the right and the duty to decide whether to be lenient or severe." Presidents and Magistrates are often inclined quite naturally to be over-sympathetic to the accused. This is a normal psychological reaction to the situation in which the lonely accused is seen facing an array of witnesses with authority. The mitigation submitted by a convicted person will also normally bring up problems of family hardship and the other usual problems of living. In such a situation the courts might perhaps find it difficult to decide as to what sentence should be imposed so that the convicted person may not be further burdened with additional hardship. This in my view is a wrong approach. The correct approach is to strike a balance, as far as possible, between the interests of the public and the interests of the accused. Lord Goddard L.C.J. in Rex v Grondkowski [1946] 1 All ER 560 561 offered some good advice when he said:– "The judge must consider the interests of justice as well as the interests of the prisoners. It is too often nowadays thought, or seems to be thought, that the interests of justice means only the interests of the prisoners …"”. [8] Dalam mempertimbangkan hukuman dalam kes ini, mahkamah sedar bahawa Tertuduh merupakan penanggung tunggal keluarganya, dan telah pun mempertimbangkan umur Tertuduh serta kapasiti pendapatan Tertuduh dan telah menjatuhkan satu hukuman yang difikirkan amat wajar setelah diimbangi dengan prinsip-prinsip hukuman yang lain. [9] Berdasarkan alasan-alasan di atas, Mahkamah ini berpendapat bahawa sabitan dan hukuman yang telah dikenakan terhadap Tertuduh di dalam kes ini adalah munasabah dan setimpal. Bertarikh pada 31 Disember 2025 (JEAN SHARMILA JESUDASON) Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen Jenayah (4) Ipoh, Perak Tarikh Keputusan: 6 NOVEMBER 2025 Pihak-pihak: Bagi pihak Pendakwa Raya – Pn. Nor Arfahanim Azureen binti Arfanuddin (Timbalan Pendakwa Raya Negeri Perak) Bagi pihak Tertuduh – Mohamad Khazali bin Yin (Tetuan Mahinderjit, meor & Associates)