Although the car was still registered in SP4's name, the appellant had taken possession of the vehicle for his own use. The appellant's defence [11] The appellant chose to give evidence under oath. He intended to call Dewa as a witness, but Dewa could not be located. The prosecution objected to the appellant's request for Dewa's cautioned statement. The appellant then proceeded to call two witnesses: his mother (SD2) and his sister (SD3). [12] The appellant claimed that the car belonged to SP4. On the afternoon of the day he was arrested, he sent a message via WhatsApp to SP4 requesting to borrow the car. SP4 sent the car at approximately 12:10 p.m. The appellant arrived on a motorcycle, left his bike there, and then, together with SP3, drove to Taiping in the car to look for motorcycle spare parts. At 4:30 p.m., the appellant returned the car to the location where SP4 had left it earlier, which was near SP3’s house. He then went home to shower and later returned to the car to repair its speakers. He claimed that the car had been moved from the spot where he had left it earlier. The appellant had called SP6 and Dewa to help repair the car's speakers, asserting that both SP6 and Dewa entered the car. [13] The appellant claimed that a black plastic bag was on the floor of the driver's seat and that SP2 took approximately 4 to 5 minutes to locate it. He also stated that the car was not locked and that he had no idea who the drugs belonged to. Additionally, the appellant pointed out that the cigarette butts found in the Livita bottle and the apparatus used for smoking syabu contained the DNA of several unknown individuals. He contended that the smoking apparatus belonged to SP4, who had admitted to being discharged from the army for smoking syabu. In summary, the appellant argued that the car belonged to SP4 and that he had no knowledge of the drugs found in it. Regarding the smoking apparatus, the appellant claimed that his DNA was present because he had merely handled the object and did not use it to consume syabu. [14] SD2 testified that the appellant does not own a car and only has a motorcycle. She also stated that the appellant was always at home. SD3 corroborated this, asserting that the appellant does not own a car and that she has never seen him driving one. The court's findings at the end of the Defence's case [15] The court considered SD2 and SD3 as interested witnesses, as they were closely related to the appellant. The High Court was of the opinion that their testimonies were geared towards exculpating the appellant from the charge and were not corroborated. [16] The court concluded that the appellant's defence was simply a denial and that he had not met the burden of disproving the statutory presumption of trafficking. After observing SP4's demeanour, the court accepted his explanation that, although he had smoked syabu using an apparatus similar to the one found in the car, he did not use that specific apparatus to consume the drug. The court determined that the appellant had physical access to the car, as the car keys were in his pocket at the time of his apprehension. Additionally, the court noted that SP3, SP4, and SP6, who were acquaintances of the appellant, stated that the car belonged to him. [17] The High Court concluded that the issues raised by the appellant in his defence were merely afterthoughts. Specifically, SP3 was not asked during cross-examination whether the appellant had accompanied him to Taiping to look for spare parts. Additionally, the court noted that SP6 was never questioned in cross-examination about whether they were present to repair the car's speakers. [18] The High Court held that the appellant had failed to rebut the statutory presumption of trafficking and had also failed to raise any reasonable doubt on the prosecution's case against him. The appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment and 12 strokes of whipping. The appeal [19] The learned counsel for the appellant argued that the High Court did not properly evaluate the evidence from SP2 and SP5, and criticized the court for asserting that there was no reason for the police to lie. SP5 (L/Cpl Muhammad Ashrof bin Ku Zaberi), was one of the officers involved in apprehending the appellant. However, there was no effort made to demonstrate why the testimonies of SP2 and SP5 should be considered doubtful. [20] Additionally, it was argued that the High Court failed to acknowledge that the car was accessible to others. The court's conclusion that the appellant had custody and control of the vehicle at the time of arrest was deemed incorrect. The learned counsel pointed out that five other DNA samples belonging to unknown individuals were found in the car, one on a bottle used to consume syabu and four on cigarette butts located in a Livita bottle. The presence of these five unknown DNA samples contradicts the finding that the appellant had custody and control of the car. [21] Furthermore, it was asserted that, in the absence of contrary evidence, the High Court should have assumed that the DNA belonged to SP4, rather than completely excluding SP4 from consideration. The counsel suggested that if a DNA test were conducted on SP4, it would likely show that the unidentified DNA found in the bottle belonged to SP4. The counsel maintained that the High Court erred in concluding that the prosecution had established a prima facie case. [22] The appellant's counsel argued that the High Court made an error by not considering several key factors regarding the car. The appellant contended that he had only borrowed the car and did not own it. It was submitted that under section 117(1) of the Road Transport Act 1987, particulars appearing in the register are prima facie evidence of the ownership of a vehicle. [23] It was also contended that the High Court erred in giving scant regard to the appellant's contention that he had gone to Taiping with SP4 and had parked the car in a specific spot, and that the vehicle was no longer at that spot when he returned later. In summary, it was asserted that the High Court selectively chose evidence that was favourable to the prosecution and erred in concluding that the appellant had not raised a reasonable doubt. Findings [24] SP2, SP5, and two other police officers were conducting their rounds to ensure the public's compliance with the RMO. For this reason, they approached the appellant, SP6, and Dewa. SP2 and SP5 testified that they found car keys in the appellant's jeans pocket, which were then used to unlock the car. SP2 later observed a black plastic bag containing drugs on the driver's seat. We find no evidence that undermines the credibility of SP2 and SP5 based on their testimonies. The High Court thoroughly evaluated their testimonies in conjunction with other evidence. The Federal Court in Md Zainudin bin Raujan v. Public Prosecutor [2013] 4 CLJ 21 held: "Assessing credibility is difficult and is best left to the trial judge who has the audio-visual advantage of a witness in action." [25] SP2 and SP5, as police officers, are expected to perform their duties with honesty. Doubting their credibility would require more than just a superficial accusation of dishonesty. In Md Zainudin bin Raujan(supra) the Federal Court ruled that there is no need for the evidence provided by the police officer to be corroborated, even when the prosecution relied solely on that officer's testimony. In this instance, both SP5 and SP6 confirmed that the black plastic bag was retrieved from the appellant's car. This corroborates SP2's statement that the black plastic bag containing the drugs was found in the appellant's vehicle. [26] Learned counsel for the appellant put much emphasis on the possibility that other individuals had access to the car based on the DNA found on the cigarette butts and other items. The presence of cigarette butts in the Livita bottle may indicate that other people were in the car. However, these individuals could have been in the car hours or even days before the appellant was apprehended. This fact is irrelevant, as these other individuals were not present in the car at the time in question. When the appellant was stopped, he was the only one with access to the vehicle, as the car keys were found on him. SP6 testified that both he and Dewa had never entered the car; they were only working on the headlights. Additionally, the car was locked when SP2 used the keys found on the appellant to open the door. The High Court correctly concluded that the drugs were solely in the appellant's possession, as he was the only person who had access to the car at that time. [27] Regarding the ownership of the car, SP4 clearly explained why the car's registration remains under his name. However, even though the ownership is in SP4's name, this fact does not exonerate the appellant, as the crucial issue is who actually used the car. SP4 testified that the appellant had used the vehicle and that he had borrowed it only once, about two weeks prior to the appellant's arrest. Additionally, SP4 stated that the appellant was present in the car with him during that time. This testimony went unchallenged. [28] In his defence, the appellant claimed that he had gone to Taiping with SP4 before his arrest. We concur with the High Court's finding that the appellant's defence appears to be an afterthought, as this claim was never presented to any of the prosecution's witnesses, including SP4. Another point establishing that the appellant was the sole user of the car is the fact that SP4 handed over two sets of car keys to the appellant. [29] On the matter of the apparatus, SP4 admitted that he had smoked Syabu using a device similar to the one found in the car. However, he did not claim to have used that specific apparatus. This distinction is important because the appellant's counsel seems to imply that SP4 had smoked Syabu with the apparatus found in the car. [30] We are therefore satisfied that the High Court had correctly concluded that the prosecution had proven a prima facie and subsequently find that the appellant had failed to raise any reasonable doubt in his defence. Conclusion [31] The legal principle governing appeals in criminal cases on factual issues is well settled, in that the Court of Appeal will not intervene unless the weight of the evidence is clearly inconsistent with the conviction; Lai Kim Hon & Ors v PP [1980] CLJU 197. We find that the High Court analysis of the evidence were sound and the findings made justified. We find no credible reasons to interfere with the findings of the High Court. We therefore find the conviction safe and affirm it. [32] As for the sentence, the High Court in exercising its discretion opted not to pass the death sentence and instead sentenced the appellant to life imprisonment and twelve strokes of whipping. This is the minimum sentence that the High Court could pass which means that the appellant’s appeal on the sentence must fail. [33] The appellant’s appeals are therefore dismissed. Dated: 26 September 2025 -sgd- (MOHAMED ZAINI MAZLAN) JUDGE COURT OF APPEAL PUTRAJAYA WILAYAH PERSEKUTUAN Counsel for the Appellant : Ravee a/l Ponusamy & Anis Sabrina binti Mokhtar Messrs P. Ravee & Co Counsel for the Respondent : Dhuya Syazwani Izyan binti Mohd