Mohamad Rafiuddin Bin Zakaria v 1. ) Nurul Izzah Binti Andah (JF-A72NCvC-12-02/2025)

NURUL IZZAH BINTI ANDAH …DEFENDAN

SAHID BIN ABD HAMID (NO KP: 760612-01-6989)  ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN  29/01/2026 12:46:53 JF-A72NCvC-12-02/2025 Kand. 40 Pengenalan 1) Ini merupakan rayuan yang difailkan oleh Defendan-Defendan terhadap keputusan Mahkamah yang diberikan pada 25.11.2025 di mana Mahkamah telah membenarkan tuntutan Plaintif seperti berikut :- a) Defendan-Defendan secara bersesama membayar kepada Plaintif jumlah sebanyak RM90,280; b) Faedah atas jumlah penghakiman pada kadar 5% setahun daripada tarikh penghakiman sehingga penyelesaian penuh: dan c) Kos mengikut skala. Ikatan-ikatan dokumen yang dirujuk sewaktu perbicaraan 2) Ikatan pliding A 3) Ikatan-ikatan dokumen yang dipersetujui Bahagian A B 4) Ikatan-ikatan dokumen yang dipersetujui Bahagian B C 5) Isu-isu untuk dibicarakan D 6) Fakta-fakta yang dipersetujui E 7) Ringkasan kes Plaintif F 8) Ringkasan kes Defendan-Defendan G 9) Senarai saksi-saksi Plaintif H 10) Senarai saksi-saksi Defendan-Defendan I 11) Penyataan saksi WSSP1 12] Penyataan saksi WSSP2 13) Penyataan saksi WSSD1 14) Penyataan saksi WSSD2 15) Penyataan saksi WSSD3 Saksi-saksi yang dipanggil sewaktu perbicaraan 16) Mohd Yakin Bin Masti SP1 17) Mohd Rafiuddin Bin Zakaria SP2 18) Sahid Bin Abd Hamid SD1 19) Nurul Izzah Binti Andah SD2 20) Norshafarina Binti Jainal SD3 Beban Pembuktian Plaintif [21] Undang-undang adalah mantap dan jelas di mana beban pembuktian dalam suatu tuntutan sivil adalah terletak pada bahu Plaintif sepanjang perbicaraan kes. Perkara ini diperuntukkan di bawah Seksyen 101 Akta Keterangan 1950 seperti berikut:-

Whoever desires any court to give judgment as to any legal right or liability, dependent on the existence of facts which he asserts, must prove that those facts exist.

When a person is bound to prove the existence of any fact, it is said that the burden of proof lies on that person. [22] Mahkamah merujuk kepada kes Tan Kim Khuan v Tan Kee Kiat (M) Sdn Bhd) (1998) 1 MLJ 697 di mana YA Augustine Paul J memutuskan seperti berikut:- “It is settled law that the burden of proof rests throughout the trial on the party on whom the burden lies. Where a party on whom the burden of proof lies has discharged it, then the evidential burden shifts to the other party (see UN Pandey v Hotel Marco Polo Pte Ltd [1980] 1 MLJ 4; Wong Chong Chow v Pan-Malaysian Cement Works Bhd [1980] 2 MLJ 75 and Johara Bi bte Abdul Kadir Marican v Lawrence Lam Kwok Fou & Anor [1981] 1 MLJ 139). What shifts is the responsibility of adducing evidence to discharge that burden (see International Times & Ors v Leong Ho Yuen [1980] 2 MLJ 86). When the burden shifts to the other party, it can be discharged by cross-examination of witnesses of the party on whom the burden of proof lies or by calling witnesses or by giving evidence himself or by a combination of the different methods. No adverse inference can be drawn against that party for failure to give evidence himself. If he does not adduce any evidence when the burden has shifted to him, he will fail. If the party on whom the burden lies fails to discharge it, the other party need not call any evidence. In that event, it will not avail him to turn round and say that the respondent has not established his. In such circumstances, as the Privy Council observed in Raja Chandranath Roy v Ramjai Mazumdar 6 BLR 303, the respondent can say: 'It is wholly immaterial whether I prove my case or not. You have not proved yours' (see Selvaduray v Chinniah [1939] MLJ 254). On the question of the failure of a claimant in interpleader proceedings to discharge the burden of proof on him, useful reference may be made to Sigma Air Conditioning Sdn Bhd v World Wide Agencies (M) Sdn Bhd [1980] 1 MLJ 179 where Mohd Azmi J (as he then was) said at p 181:”, [23] Seterusnya, tahap pembuktian dalam kes sivil adalah di atas imbangan kebarangkalian. Prinsip ini dijelaskan di dalam kes U N Pandey v. Hotel Marco Polo Pte Ltd [1978] 1 LNS 223; [1980] 1 MLJ 4, seperti berikut:- 'In civil cases, as much as in criminal cases, a party must prove his case before the burden of proof shifts to the other side. In a criminal case, the prosecution's burden is a heavy one. In a civil case, it is on a balance of probabilities. But the proof is that the balance must be tilted by the Plaintiff before the Defendant makes his case. It would be a desirable practice in our courts to allow a submission of no case to answer at the end of the Plaintiff's case, without putting the Defendant to his election, whether to call evidence or not, if his submission fails. Such a practice will ensure not only that there is a thorough preparation of the case before trial, but also a careful presentation of it at the hearing. Altogether the practice will bring about a saving of costs for the parties.' [24] Imbangan kebarangkalian telah didefinisikan oleh G.D Nokes di dalam tulisannya, An Introduction to Evidence, Edisi Ke-4, halaman 489 & 490, yang bererti:- 'Suatu keterangan yang sampai ke suatu tahap atau darjah kemungkinan yang munasabah; dan tahap atau darjah kemungkinan ini lebih tinggi daripada keterangan pihak lawan, yang mana tahap atau darjah ini diputuskan oleh seorang yang munasabah dan adil.' 25) Setelah mengambil kira panduan undang-undang sebagaimana yang dihuraikan di perenggan-perenggan di atas, Mahkamah memutuskan Plaintif telah membuktikan kesnya di atas imbangan kebarangkalian. Tuntutan Plaintif 26) Tuntutan Plaintif adalah berkaitan dengan sebuah rumah teres satu tingkat yang beralamat di No, 12284, Jalan Terukur 12, Bandar Putra, 81000 Kulaijaya, Johor. 27) Proses jual beli hartanah tersebut telah dipersetujui dengan bekas isteri Plaintif bertindak selaku pembeli dan Defendan Pertama hanya bertindak sebagai penjamin kepada pinjaman perumahan bagi hartanah tersebut. 28) Harga keseluruhan bagi hartanah tersebut adalah RM145,000 di mana Plaintif telah membayar RM25,000 sebagai deposit pembelian ke atas hartanah tersebut. 29) Pemilik asal bagi hartanah tersebut yang merupakan SP1 dalam kes ini telah mengesahkan telah menerima jumlah keseluruhan harga jualan sebanyak RM145,000. 30) Setelah proses jual beli hartanah tersebut selesai, hasrat pihak-pihak tidak tercapai apabila hartanah tersebut didaftarkan atas nama Defendan Pertama. 31] Setelah itu, atas akujanji dan representasi Defendan-Defendan bahawa hartanah tersebut akan ditukar milik kepada bekas isteri Plaintif, Defendan-Defendan seterusnya meminta Plaintif untuk membuat bayaran pinjaman perumahan hartanah tersebut. 32) Plaintif telah membayar ansuran pembiayaan dengan Public Islamic Bank Berhad sebanyak RM600 sebulan bermula daripada 20 Mei 2012 hingga April 2022, berserta dengan bayaran cukai tanah dan cukai pintu bagi hartanah tersebut. 33) Tuntutan Plaintif adalah berkenaan keseluruhan pembayaran deposit pembelian hartanah, pembayaran ansuran bulanan berserta dengan pembayaran cukai pintu dan cukai tanah ke atas hartanah tersebut yang berjumlah RM90, 280.00 Pembelaan Defendan-Defendan 34) Defendan-Defendan tidak menerima sebarang bayaran tetapi tidak terhad kepada deposit RM25,000 daripada Plaintif. 35) Defendan-Defendan tidak pernah menikmati hartanah tersebut dari Mei 2012 sehingga April 2022. Sekiranya ada, ansuran adalah berjumlah 120 bulan iaitu bernilai RM144,000 dan bukan RM64,800. 36) Segala tuntutan Plaintif terhadap Defendan-Defendan tidak pernah dinikmati oleh Defendan-Defendan di mana Plaintif perlu menuntut dari pihak yang betul. 37) Defendan-Defendan tidak mendapat sebarang keuntungan sama ada dari segi undang-undang atas dari segi realiti dalam transaksi pindahmilik hartanah tersebut.

Pembayaran-Pembayaran yang dilakukan oleh Plaintif bukan dilakukan kepada Defendan-Defendan secara terus. Dapatan Mahkamah Isu Pertama Samada Plaintif membayar deposit pembelian hartanah, ansuran pembiayaan dengan Public Islamic Bank Berhad berserta dengan bayaran cukai tanah dan cukai pintu bagi hartanah yang dikenali sebagai HSD 23323, PTD 79335, Mukim Senai, Daerah Kulaijaya, Johor dengan kesemuanya berjumlah RM90,280.00? 39) Deposit pembelian hartanah i) Berdasarkan kepada fakta yang dipersetujui, Plaintif dan Defendan Pertama telah bersetuju berkenaan proses jual beli hartanah tersebut dimana dengan bekas isteri Plaintif bertindak selaku pembeli dan Defendan Pertama bertindak sebagai penjamin kepada pinjaman perumahan yang akan dimohon bagi maksud pembiayaan pembelian hartanah tersebut. Fakta ini dapat dilihat pada perenggan 7 Fakta yang Dipersetujui (E). Maka, adalah fakta yang tidak dipertikaikan bahawa niat, hasrat dan persetujuan di antara Plaintif dan Defendan Pertama bahawa bekas isteri Plaintif adalah pembeli ke atas hartahah tersebut dan Defendan Pertama sebagai penjamin sahaja. ii) Namun, niat dan hasrat antara kedua-dua pihak ini tiidak tercapai apabila Defendan Pertama telah menjadi pemilik kepada keseluruhan bahagian hartanah tersebut. Fakta ini juga telah dipersetujui diantara pihak-pihak sebagaimana yang dapat dilihat pada perenggan 3 Fakta Yang Dipersetujui

(E). iii) Walaupun Defendan Pertama menjadi pembeli/pemilik hartanah tersebut, keterangan dari Plaintif menunjukkan deposit hartanah tersebut berjumlah RM25,000 dibayar oleh Plaintif dan bukannya Defendan-Defendan. Sepanjang perbicaraan berlangsung, fakta ini tidak pernah disangkal oleh Defendan-Defendan. Berikut merupakan keterangan SP2 sewaktu pemeriksaan balas :- S: Boleh terangkan kepada Mahkamah RM25,000 tersehut deposit pembelian dibayar kepada siapa? J: Saya bayar pada Tetuan Asiah Maka, jelas terbukti bahawa Plaintif yang telah membayar deposit untuk pembelian hartanah tersebut. 40) Pembayaran ansuran bulanan dengan Public Islamic Berhad i) Terdapat keterangan dari SD3 iaitu bekas isteri Plaintif yang telah mengesahkan bahawa Plaintif telah membuat ansuran bulanan tersebut. Berikut merupakan keterangan SD3 sewaktu pemeriksaan balas:- S: Seterusnya Puan, Puan setuju tak kalau saya katakan bahawa dalam tempoh Puan menduduki rumah ini iaitu 2012 sehingga lah Puan keluar meninggalkan rumah ini, bayaran ansuran bulanan, cukai pintu, telah dibayar oleh bekas suami Puan, setuju atau tidak? J: Setuju ii) Plaintif juga telah mengemukakan penyata bulanan akaun Maybank Plaintif dari 31.3.2012 sehingga 31.3.2021 untuk membuktikan pembayaran ansuran pembiayaan bank. Defendan-Defendan tidak pernah mempertikaikan setiap pembayaran ansuran bulanan tersebut malah perkara ini diakui sendiri oleh SD3 iaitu bekas isteri Plaintif. iii) Defendan Pertama juga telah memberikan keterangan bahawa Plaintif dan bekas isteri Plaintif (SD3) telah membuat pembayaran terhadap hartanah tersebut. Namun, SD3 telah mengesahkan bahawa kesemua pembayaran ansuran bulanan terhadap hartanah tersebut telah dijelaskan oleh Plaintif sendiri. 41) Pembayaran cukai tanah dan cukai pintu i) Plaintif juga berjaya membuktikan fakta ini dengan mengemukakan resti bayaran cukai tahun 2022 yang ditandakan sebagai P4. P4 telah diletakkan di bahagian A. Undang-undang adalah mantap bahawa dokumen- dokumen yang diletakkan di bahagian A merupakan dokumen-dokumen yang dipersetujui ketulenan dan kebenaran kandungannya. ii) Secara keseluruhannya, isu ini sememangnya memihak kepada Plaintif di mana berjaya dibuktikan bahawa pembayaran deposit, ansuran bulanan, cukai pintu dan cukai tanah ke atas hartanah tersebut telah dibuat oleh Plaintif. Isu Kedua Sama ada Defendan-Defendan perlu membayar Plaintif RM90,280.00? 42) Keterangan yang ada di hadapan Mahkamah ini menunjukkan Plaintif yang telah membayar deposit, ansuran bulanan, cukai tanah dan cukai pintu terhadap hartanah tersebut bukannya Defendan-Defendan. Justeru, Mahkamah mendapati Defendan-Defendan wajar membuat pembayaran wang sejumlah RM90,280.00 kepada Plaintif. Dapatan Mahkamah ini adalah selaras dengan alasan-alasan seperti berikut :- a) Walaupun Defendan Pertama merupakan peminjam perumahan dan pemilik hartanah tersebut, ansuran bulanan bagi hartanah tersebut telah dibayar oleh Plaintif yang mana ianya diakui sendiri oleh SD3 yang merupakan saksi Defendan. b) Defendan-Defendan mengakui tidak pernah membuat pembayaran ansuran bulanan bagi hartanah tersebut sehingga Februari 2022. c) Berdasarkan kepada laporan polis (P1), laporan tersebut menyatakan setelah Plaintif dan SD3 bercerai, mereka berhasrat untuk menjual rumah tersebut dan memaklumkan niat mereka kepada Defendan-Defendan dan mereka berjanji membuat “reloan” bagi hartanah tersebut tetapi sehingga laporan tersebut dibuat tiada tindakan sedemikian diambil oleh Defendan-Defendan. Mahkamah mendapati bahawa P1 telah diletakkan di bahagian A dalam Ikatan Dokumen Bersama dan kandungan laporan polis tersebut juga adalah sama seperti yang dipildkan dalam penyataan tuntutan Plaintif. Undang-udang adalah mantap sekiranya sesuatu dokumen diletakkan di bahagian A bermaksud pihak-pihak bersetuju terhadap kandungan dan ketulenan dokumen-dokumen tersebut. Dalam hal ini, rujukan dibuat terhadap kes Pearl Streams Sdn Bhd v Beverly Heights Resources Sdn Bhd & Anor and another appeal [2025] MLJU 3126, di mana Mahkamah Rayuan memutuskan seperti berikut :- [47] Having regard to the matters referred to above, we decided to follow the decision of the Court of Appeal in Tiow Weng Teong (supra) and Thiagarajan (supra). In our view, once a document is placed in Part A, the contents as well as the truth is deemed to be proved. If the parties agree to place a document in Part A, it means that the maker need not be called because the authenticity of the documents is not in dispute. If there is a dispute as to the contents and/or its truth, it has to be placed in Part B. Placing it in Part C means that the authenticity, contents, and its truth are not admitted. The maker of the document must be called, and the contents must be proved. In the present case, we find that placing the SPA, DMC, the letters, e-mails and cheques in Part A was fatal to the Defendant’s case. [48] We agree with the Plaintiff’s submission that if the Defendants decided to take a different stance in the trial, contradicting their placement of the document, it was a self-inflicted error of their own making. It is a profound self-contradiction that will not find favour in legal parlance. Maka, dengan meletakkan laporan polis di bahagian A, jelas terbukti terdapat representasi dari Defendan-Defendan bahawa penerimaan manfaat pembayaran ansuran ke atas hartanah tersebut oleh Plaintif akan dipulangkan kepada Plaintif melalui “reloan” tersebut. Namun, perkara ini tidak pernah dilakukan oleh Defendan-Defendan. d) Mahkamah juga mendapati kredibiliti SD1 sangat meragukan. Keterangan SD1 menyatakan beliau langsung tidak mengetahui bahawa beliau adalah pemilik hartanah tersebut adalah tidak boleh dipercayai. Hal ini disebabkan beliau telah menandatangani Borang 16A yang jelas menyatakan SD1 adalah pemilik hartanah tersebut yang telah mencagarkan hartanah tersebut kepada Public Islamic Bank Berhad. Sebagai seorang guru sekolah, adalah mustahil untuk beliau menandatangani apa-apa dokumen tanpa memahami dan membacanya. e) Defendan-Defendan hanya menafikan tiada sebarang perjanjian wujud di antara pihak-pihak berkenaan hartanah tersebut. Defendan-Defendan tidak memplidkan sebarang pembelaan bermerit selain daripada penafian kosong semata-mata. f) Keterangan SD1 yang telah menyatakan hartanah tersebut telah disewa kepada Plaintif tidak pernah diplidkan dalam penyataan pembelaan. Undang-undang adalah begitu jitu bahawa pihak-pihak dalam suatu tindakan adalah terikat dengan pliding masing-masing dan tidak dibenarkan menyimpang daripadanya. Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam kes He-Con Sdn Bhd v Bulyah bt Ishak & Anor (as administrators for the estate of Nor Zainir bin Rahmat, the deceased) and another appeal [2020] 4 MLJ 662 telah memutuskan seperti berikut ;- [65] It is trite that parties are bound by their pleadings, or the lack of it. What a party does not plead, he cannot lead facts or issues on the non-pleaded fact. Again, Samuel Naik’s case is instructive on this point. Learned Justice Ramly Ali FCJ writing on behalf of the apex court in the Samuel Naik case said as follows in the matter of the pleading point: Parties are bound by their pleadings and are not allowed to adduce facts and issues which they have not pleaded. Where a vital point is not raised in the pleadings it cannot be allowed to be argued and to succeed on appeal. [67] Indeed, the courts should only consider the pleaded case of the parties before them. In Cheong Heng Loong Goldsmiths (KL) Sdn Bhd & Anor v Capital Insurance Bhd and another appeal [2004] 1 MLJ 353; [2004] 1 CLJ 357, it was said, that: But once a defendant takes that course, he must stand and fall on his pleaded case. He cannot simultaneously put forward an unpleaded case of justification for his conduct. Maka, berpandukan kepada nas undang-undang di atas, adalah tidak wajar untuk Mahkamah mengambil kira pembelaan Defendan-Defendan yang tidak pernah diplidkan. g) Peguam Defendan-Defendan berhujah bahawa bayaran ansuran bulanan, bayaran cukai pintu dan cukai tanah bukannya dibuat kepada Defendan-Defendan merupakan satu hujahan yang tersalah arah dari segi undang-undang. Mahkamah mendapati bayaran-bayaran tersebut dibuat bagi tujuan untuk menjelaskan obligasi pinjaman/bayaran Defendan Pertama kepada Bank dan pihak berkuasa tempatan dan secara langusng telah mengurangkan dan melepaskan liabitili hutang/bayaran Defendan Pertama kepada bank dan pihak berkuasa tempatan, Oleh yang demikian, D1 telah menerima manfaat (enriched) atas perbelanjaan Plaintif walaupun bayaran-bayaran tersebut dibuat kepada pihak ketiga. h) Mahkamah mendapati setiap bayaran ansuran dibuat oleh Plaintif telah mengurangkan baki hutang Defendan Pertama kepada Bank dan melepaskan Defendan daripada kewajipan membayar ansuran bulanan tersebut. Oleh yang demikian, Defendan Pertama telah menerima manfaat kewangan secara langsung melalui pelepasan liabiliti hutang, walauoun wang tersebut tidak dimasukkan secara terus dalam akaun peribadi Defendan Pertama. Maka, berpandukan kepada prinsip “restituition” pembayaran-pembayaran tersebut harus dipulangkan kepada Plaintif. Prinsip “restituition” telah diperuntukkan di bawah Seksyen 71 Akta Kontrak 1950.seperti berikut :- Obligation of person enjoying benefit of non-gratuitous act 71. Where a person lawfully does anything for another person, or delivers anything to him, not intending to do so gratuitously, and such other persons enjoys the benefit thereof, the latter is bound to make compensation to the former in respect of, or to restore, the thing so done or delivered.

A, a tradesman, leaves goods at B’s house by mistake B treats the goods as his own. He is bound to pay A for them.

A saves B’s property from fire. A is not entitled to compensation from B, if the circumstances show that he intended to act gratuitously.” Rujukan dibuat terhadap kes Tanjung Teras Sdn Bhd v. Kerajaan Malaysia [2015] 9 CLJ 1002; [2015] MLJU 2161, di mana Mahkamah Rayuan memutuskan seperti berikut :- [31] Section 71 is the statutory embodiment of the common law principle of quantum meruit, which provides for a just compensation as the measure of the work done as opposed to contractual damages (see: Siow W ong Fatt, Craven-Ellis v. Cannons Ltd [1936] 2 K B 403, Delpuri-Harl Corp JV Sdn Bhd v. Perbadanan Kemajuan Negeri Selangor [2014] 1 LNS 1075; Spatial Ventures Sdn Bhd v. Twintech Holdings Sdn Bhd [2013] 1 LNS 729; [ 2014] 8 MLJ 14). [32] Liability under s. 71 is not based on any existing contract between the parties. Rather it is based on the equitable principle of conscionable conduct and restitution to prevent unjust enrichment by one party at the expense of another party (see: Ramkrishna Shankarrao v. Rangoobai and anr AIR [1959] Bom 519; (1958) 60 BOMLR 459, Abu Mohammed v. Mohammed Kunju Lebba (1995) DMC 316 and Pallonjee Eduljee and Sons v. the

39 BOMLR 835). [33] In Craven-Ellis v. Cannons Ltd, it was held that: The obligation to pay reasonable remuneration for the work done when there is no binding contract between the parties is imposed by a rule of law and not by an inference of fact from the acceptance of service. [34] In Ramkrishna Shankarrao v. Rangoobai, it was held as follows: From a bare reading of the section, it is clear that even if there is no contract for the performance of certain work and if the Plaintiff has done that work, without intending to do that work gratuitously, and the Defendant has enjoyed the benefits thereof, then the Defendant is bound to compensate the Plaintiff in respect of such work. The equitable principle underlying Section 70 of the Contract Act is that there should be no undue enrichment of one party at the cost of another. It is based on the principle of restitution which prevents unjust enrichment by one party. The learned Counsel for the Appellant invited my attention to some reported decisions on this point. In: [1968] 3 SCR 214, Mulachand v. State of MP, it was held that the contract in that case was not a valid one. However, the relief was granted by invoking Section 70 of the Indian Contract Act. It was pointed out that under Section 70 of the Contract Act the juristic basis of the principle under this section is not founded on any contract or tort but it is based on quasi-contract. In: [1970] 3 SCR 415, P Dhunji Shaw Poona Municipality the plaintiff was supplying goods to the Municipality for which there was no contract but it was held that under Section 70 of Contract Act when a person lawfully delivers to another and not intending to do so gratuitously is entitled to return of the goods or the payment of the value of the goods. Similarly, in: In: [1970] 3 SCR 415, P Dhunji Shaw v. Poona Municipality the plaintiff was supplying goods to the Municipality for which there was no contract but it was held that under Section 70 of Contract Act when a person lawfully delivers to another and not intending to do so gratuitously is entitled to return of the goods or the payment of the value of the goods. Similarly, in: [1978] 3 SCR 571, Md Ishaq v. Iqbal & Md Ali & Company it was also a case of Plaintiff’s supplying some goods to the Defendants and there was no contract. The court spelt out an implied contract by conduct of the parties. That means there was supply of goods by the Plaintiff and its acceptance by the Defendants. Even in the present case, the Plaintiff has done some additional work and the Defendant has accepted and enjoyed the benefits of the same. Similarly, in: [1980] 3 SCR 893 Union of India v. JK Gas Plant the Supreme Court applied the principle underlying Section 70 of the Contract Act and granted the relief even though there was no valid contract. It was held that since the Defendant has enjoyed the benefit of the work done by the Plaintiff, he is bound to pay the full value of the goods. [35] In Abu Mohammed v. Mohammed Kunju Lebba the court held as follows: The Section indicates that there is no distinction between the grant of a benefit to another on request and a grant without request. In both cases the person who enjoyed the benefit has liability to recompense the grantor of the benefit and the only exception is that when the grant was intended as a gratis, the recipient has no legal liability. It is now well settled that Section 70 is much wider in scope than the principles adumbrated in common law (vide Gajapathy Krishna Chandra Sreenivasa, AIR [1915] Mad 95). [36] In Pallonjee Eduljee and Sons v. the Lonavala City Municipality the Bombay High Court held, inter alia, as follows: ... The important point to notice is that in a case falling under s. 70 the person doing something for another or delivering something to another cannot sue for the specific performance of the contract, nor ask for damages for the breach of the contract, for the simple reason that there is no contract between him and the other person for whom he does something or to whom he delivers something. So, where a claim for compensation is made by one person against another under s. 70 it is not on the basis of any subsisting contract between the parties but on a different kind of obligation. The juristic basis of the obligation in such a case is not founded upon any contract or tort but upon a third category of law, namely, quasi contract or restitution. In Fibrosa v. Fairbairn [1943] AC 32 Lord Wright has stated the legal position as follows: ... any civilised system of law is bound to provide remedies for cases of that has been called unjust enrichment or unjust benefit, that is, to prevent a man from retaining the money of, or some benefit derived from, another which it is against conscience that he should keep. Such remedies in English Law are generally different from remedies in contract or in tort, and are now recognised to fall within a third category of the common law which has been called quasi-contract or restitution.

In Nelson v. Larholt [1948] 1 KB 330 Lord Denning has observed as follows: It is no longer appropriate to draw a distinction between law and equity. Principles have now to be stated in the light of their combined effect. Nor is it necessary to canvass the niceties of the old forms of action. Remedies now depend on the substance of the right, not on whether they can be fitted into a particular framework. The right here is not peculiar to equity or contract or tort, but falls naturally within the important category of cases where the court orders restitution if the justice of the case so requires.

Applying the principle to the present case, it is manifest that the appellant would have been entitled to compensation under s. 70 of the Indian Contract Act if he had adduced evidence in support of his claim. [37] Section 70 of the Indian Contract Act referred to in the three Indian cases is in pari materia with s. 71 of our Contracts Act. [38] In the light of the decided authorities cited above on the jurisdic basis behind s. 71 of our Contracts Act, it is thus clear that the learned SFC’s submission that there is no obligation on the part of the plaintiff to pay the defendant for the super structure work done because there was no privity of contract between the parties does not hold any water. [47] Having regard to the juristic basis behind s. 71 which is premised on the equitable principle of restitution, good conscience and prevention of unjustment enrichment, we hold as a matter of fact that at the time the super structure work was done by the defendant, it was done for the plaintiff as the ultimate owner of the project and the plaintiff was the direct beneficiary of the project. The defendant had intended to be paid for carrying the works. The fact that the defendant would receive payment from JP and not the plaintiff did not alter the fact that the defendant never intended the work to be done gratuitously. The second condition ought to have been found in favour of the defendant. [48] We now come to the fourth condition. In this regard, we are again of the view that the learned High Court Judge erred in holding that as the whole project was not completed and the plaintiff had to appoint a new contractor to complete the project, the plaintiff had not benefited from the defendant’s work. [49] It must be borne in mind that the defendant was only appointed as a sub-contractor to construct the super structure work while the construction of the entire project was the responsibility of JP .” (Emphasis added) Berdasarkan kepada nas-nas undang-undang yang dirujuk, jika seseorang itu menerima bayaran/manfaat bukan atas suatu pemberian secara sukarela atau hadiah, beliau harus memulangkan semula kepada orang yang memberinya untuk mengelakkan sebarang perolehan kekayaan secara tidak adil. Berbalik kepada kes di hadapan Mahkamah ini, Mahkamah mendapati pihak bank hanya bertindak sebagai saluran pembayaan. Penerima manfaat sebenar adalah Defendan Pertama kerana Defendan Pertama memperoleh kelebihan apabila hutangnya dilunaskan menggunakan wang Plaintif. Maka, pembayaran-pembayaran tersebut harus dipulangkan kepada Plaintif kerana beliau tidak berniat untuk membayarnya secara sukarela. Kesimpulan 43) Berdasarkan kepada alasan-alasan yang dinyatakan di atas, Mahkamah telah membenarkan tuntutan Plaintif. Bertarikh 22.1.2026 Disediakan oleh, tt Salini a/p Retanam