Mohamad Redzuan Bin MD Anuar (DC-82D-6-08/2023)

The accused, a police officer, was charged under s. 15(1)(a) of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 [Act 234] ("the Act"), punishable under s. 15(1) and read together with s. 38B of the Act. The charge framed against the accused is reproduced hereunder: "Bahawa kamu pada 26/06/2020 jam lebih kurang 01:10 pagi, bertempat di tandas pejabat Narkotik IPD Tanah Merah, di dalam Daerah Tanah Merah, dalam Negeri Kelantan, telah menggunakan kepada diri kamu sendiri dadah berbahaya jenis Methamphetamine. Oleh yang demikian kamu telah didapati melakukan kesalahan dibawah seksyen 15(1)(a) ADB 1952 yang boleh dihukum di bawah Seksyen 15(1) Akta yang sama dan dibaca dibawah seksyen 38B ADB 1952.”

The accused pleaded not guilty to the charge and claimed trial. At the close of the prosecution’s case, I found that no prima facie case has been made out against the accused. Accordingly, I ordered the accused to be acquitted and discharged without being called to enter his defence. Dissatisfied with the decision, the prosecution appealed.

The prosecution called six witnesses and their roles are as follows:

L/KPL Zainesius Zaidin (“SP1”): 24-hour standby police officer at the Narcotics Office, IPD Tanah Merah (“Narcotics office”) who later assisted SP4 during the collection of the urine sample.

Syed Ahmad Nazmi Syed Mohamed (“SP2”): Government science officer who analysed the sample.

Siti Nor Bayah binti Abdullah (“SP3”): Lab technologist who received the sample from SP5.

DSP Zamnri bin Mustaffa @ Dollah (“SP4”): Senior police officer who supervised the urine sample collection and effected the arrest.

KPL/D Nor Hidayu Che Mohamad (“SP5”): Officer who transported the sample to the Pathology Department at Hospital Raja Perempuan Zainab II (“Pathology Department”).

INSP Tanapalan A/L Krishna (“SP6”): Investigating officer. [4] On 26.06.2020, at approximately 12:50 a.m., SP4 together with three officers from the Integrity and Standard Compliance Department (JIPS) stopped (tahan) the accused at the Tanah Merah Police Station compound (“Police compound”). SP4 identified himself as a police officer and escorted the accused to the Narcotics office for a urine test. [5] At approximately 1:10 a.m., at the Narcotics office, SP4 provided a urine bottle (Serial No: 0113317) to the accused. SP1 and SP4 then escorted the accused to the restroom, where the sample was furnished. The test conducted by SP4 returned positive result for Methamphetamine. Following this, the accused was arrested. The bottle was then sealed, labelled, and documented by SP4 in the presence of the accused. [6] Next, the sealed urine sample was handed over by SP4 to SP6, with the transfer recorded in Exhibit P9 (Borang serah/terima barang kes). SP6 confirmed receiving it in good condition and photographed its appearance, serial number and the accused’s particulars (Exhibits P1A–C). [7] On 07.07.2020, SP6 handed the bottle to SP5, who transported it to the Pathology Department. SP2 and SP3 confirmed receiving the bottle in good condition, with the seal intact and the serial number matched with Exhibit P2 (Borang Permintaan Ujian Pengesahan dadah). SP2 then conducted a confirmatory analysis, which revealed that the urine sample tested positive for both Amphetamine and Methamphetamine, as reflected in the pathology report (Exhibit P3). [8] The prosecution submitted that all procedural requirements under s. 31A of the Act were duly complied with, namely:

The accused was lawfully arrested and thus an “arrested person” within the meaning of s. 31A;

The urine test was ordered by SP4, a senior police officer above the required minimum rank of Sergeant;

The collection process was duly supervised; and

The analysis was conducted by SP2, a qualified science officer, as required under s. 31A(1AA). [9] Accordingly, the prosecution contended that the presumption under s. 37(k) of the Act applies. As dangerous drugs were detected in the accused’s sample following the test under s. 31A, he is presumed to have consumed the drug unless proven otherwise. Relying on this presumption, the prosecution submitted that prima facie case has been made out and urged this court to call upon the accused to enter his defence. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS OF THIS COURT Legality of the accused’s arrest [10] The main issue in this case is whether the accused was, at the material time, an “arrested person” within the meaning of s. 31A of the Act, to render the collection of the urine sample lawful. The relevant provision is reproduced hereunder: “31A Examination of arrested person by a medical officer

When any person is arrested on a charge of committing an offence against this Act-

which is of such a nature; or

which is alleged to have been committed under such circumstances, as give reasonable grounds for believing that an examination of his person will afford evidence as to the commission of an offence against this Act, it shall be lawful for a medical officer acting at the request of any police officer not below the rank of Sergeant, or any other officer in charge of a police station, or any officer of customs, and for any person acting in aid of a medical officer and under his direction, to make such an examination or examinations of the person arrested as may be reasonably necessary in order to ascertain the facts which may afford such evidence, and to use or cause to be used such force as may be reasonably necessary for that purpose.

For the purpose of preservation of evidence, it shall be lawful for a police officer not below the rank of Sergeant or an officer of customs to require an arrested person to provide a specimen of his urine for the purposes of an examination under subsection (1) if it is not practicable for the medical officer or the person who is acting in aid of or on the direction of a medical officer to obtain the specimen of the urine within a reasonable period.” [11] A plain reading of the above provision makes it clear that a urine sample may only be lawfully obtained from a person who has first been arrested. This is a statutory precondition that must be strictly complied with. Failure to meet this threshold amounts to procedural irregularity that undermines both the legality and validity of the evidence obtained (see Hasrulfahmy Samsuddin v. PP [2017] 1 LNS 52). [12] I am mindful of the well-established legal principle in Malaysian jurisprudence, derived from the common law cases of Kuruma v. R [1955] AC 197 and R v. Sang [1980] AC 402, that evidence obtained illegally is nonetheless admissible, provided it is relevant. Be that as it may, such a principle cannot override clear and express statutory requirements. [13] Where a statute expressly prescribes the procedure for collecting evidence, as in s. 31A of the Act, non-compliance renders the resulting evidence to be excluded and/or expunged. In this respect, I am guided by the decision of the Court of Appeal in Aizuddin Syah Ahmad v. PP [2019] 3 CLJ 318, where it was held that: “[13] When an Act sets out a particular procedure, that procedure must be meticulously followed and common law cases cannot override the provision of the Act as well as the supremacy of the Constitution. [14] In the instant case, the Act specifically states how the evidence must be procured. Courts however, on many occasions have thrown out evidence when it was obtained in breach of specific provision of the Act. For example, confessions statement under s. 113 of the repealed Criminal Procedure Code. (See Janab's Key To Criminal Procedure Code, 3rd edn, pp. 431 to 448). [15] We have read the appeal records and the able submission of learned counsel for the appellant as well as the learned Deputy Public Prosecutor. After giving much consideration, we took the view that the appeal must be allowed. Our reasons inter alia are as follows:

In the instant case, it is not in dispute that there was a breach of s. 31A(1A) of DDA 1952. The said breach cannot be overcome by the principles set out in the common law case of R v. Karuma as well as R v. Sang.

A provision of criminal statute must be strictly followed failure will amount to breach of rule of law.

This is a fit and proper case for the urine sample to be excluded and/or expunged from the evidence. By doing so, there will not be any incriminating evidence sufficient to convict the accused." (Emphasis added) [14] As s. 31A requires a person to be lawfully arrested before a urine sample may be obtained, I must now determine whether the accused was, at the material time, under arrest when the sample was collected. This is a pivotal question, as it affects both the lawfulness of the sample collection and validity of the evidence obtained. If the sample was unlawfully collected, and thereby rendered Exhibit P3 to be excluded and expunged from the record, the prosecution would be left with no incriminating evidence to support a conviction. [15] In his police report (Exhibit P4), SP4 used the word "tahan" to describe his initial interaction with the accused. In police practice, "tahan" often refers to a temporary stop or detain, whereas "tangkap" refers to a formal arrest involving a deprivation of liberty with the intention of subjecting a person to a criminal investigation. This distinction is critical in determining whether the accused was, at the material time, an “arrested person” under the Act. [16] During cross-examination, SP4 agreed that the accused was not handcuffed after he had introduced himself at the Police compound and further agreed that this was because the accused had not yet been placed under arrest. In examination-in-chief, when asked where the arrest took place, SP4 replied, “Ibu Pejabat Narkotik IPD Tanah Merah”. This testimony, corroborated by Exhibit P4, supports the inference that the accused was not yet arrested at the Police compound but only later, after the urine sample was collected at the Narcotics office. [17] Be that as it may, while no actual arrest occurred at the material time, the principle of constructive arrest may still be applicable, particularly where the facts and circumstances demonstrate a restriction of liberty, either by way of police authority, conduct, or words that effectively amounts to a submission to arrest. Although neither party referred to it, I find the case of PP v. Mohd Safwan Husain [2017] 7 CLJ 685; [2017] 5 MLJ 255 to be a useful precedent to guide me through in determining whether the accused was under a constructive arrest at the material time. [18] In Mohd Safwan Husain (supra), the Court of Appeal held that the question of whether an arrest, actual or constructive, has occurred, depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. The court also emphasised that the power of arrest under the Act must be exercised pursuant to s. 31, not s. 31A. This provision requires an arresting officer to have a reasonable belief, based on prior information or suspicion, that the person has committed or is committing an offence under the Act. [19] In that case, the police acted on prior information concerning the respondent’s drug abuse and planned a raid on the same day the respondent was scheduled for duty to ensure his presence at the police station. Upon arrival, SP2 (the arresting officer) identified himself as a Narcotics Sub-Inspector and informed the respondent that their presence is to arrest him, collect his urine sample, and conduct a drug test. SP2 confirmed that the respondent was the sole focus of the operation and that no other individuals were present at the station during the material time. [20] The Court of Appeal held that, although the respondent cooperated throughout, he was nevertheless under arrest, constructively, when he was detained and instructed to provide a urine sample, as his liberty at that point had already been restricted by SP2 and his team. This finding was supported by SP2’s police report, which confirmed that the operation was initiated based on prior information and that the respondent had been the intended target. [21] By contrast, in the present case, there is no evidence of any prior information or suspicion that would justify an arrest under s. 31 of the Act. Unlike in Mohd Safwan Husain (supra), where the arresting officer acted on prior information, targeted the respondent, and informed him of the intent to arrest and obtained his urine sample, no such communications and circumstances exists here. The officers in the present case did not identify the accused as a suspect prior to the collection of the urine sample, nor did they communicate any intent to arrest him. [22] Although the law does not strictly require the police to inform a person of their intention to arrest, the presence or absence of such communication, in my view, remains relevant when assessing whether an actual or constructive arrest has occurred. In this case, the lack of any communication indicating an intent to arrest, coupled with the absence of prior information or suspicion, severely undermines the assertion that the accused was lawfully arrested under s. 31 prior to the sample being taken. [23] It is not disputed that SP4 accompanied the accused into the restroom where the urine sample was furnished. SP4 explained that this was to ensure the sample was not mixed with any other substance. While this may reflect standard procedure to maintain the integrity of the sample, I do not consider this act alone sufficient to prove that the accused had already been arrested at the material time, particularly in the absence of any prior information or suspicion against him. [24] Similarly, although the evidence shows that the accused was escorted by SP1 and SP4 to the restroom, such conduct—without any prior information or suspicion—does not, on its own, constitute an arrest. Having considered all the surrounding facts and circumstances, I am of the respectful view that mere compliance with police instructions does not, by itself, amount to an arrest. [25] I am mindful that no authorities were cited by either party in their written submissions to assist this court in arriving at the above finding. Thus, I found it necessary to conduct independent legal research to ensure that my finding is just and firmly grounded in law. In this regard, I have considered the judgment of Noorin Badaruddin J (now JCA) in PP v. Jarizal Jasni [2023] 8 CLJ 951; [2024] 7 MLJ 193, where Her Ladyship held as follows: “[29] It is of the considered view that the respondent cannot be said to be under constructive arrest just because he was escorted to the washroom by SP4 to give his urine sample because the facts and circumstances of the case did not reveal that this is a situation where the police had suspected the respondent or any of the 143 individuals at the premise having already consumed drugs and it was therefore imperative that the urine sample be obtained immediately before all traces of the drug disappear from their bodies. This is not the case where at the time the respondent was instructed to give his urine sample, he was arrested on a charge of committing an offence against the DDA or alleged to have been committed under such circumstances, as to give reasonable grounds for believing that an examination of his person will afford evidence as to the commission of an offence against the DDA. [30] This court finds the facts and circumstances of the case shows that this is a random examination conducted by the police during a raid and arrest would only take place if evidence of offence under s. 15(1)(a) of the DDA was obtained. The respondent was only suspected to have committed an offence against the DDA after he has given his urine sample and hence the arrest only took place thereafter.” (Emphasis added) [26] In my view, the decision in Jarizal Jasni (supra) is applicable, as the facts are closely similar to the present case. In both cases, the accused and the respondent were not suspected of any offence under the Act prior to the collection of the urine sample. The court held that merely being escorted by the police or complying with their instructions, in the absence of prior suspicion, does not amount to a constructive arrest. [27] On the totality of the evidence adduced, I further find that there is nothing to suggest that the accused was physically restrained, deprived of liberty, or prevented from leaving by any of the officers involved. Apart from SP1 and SP4, the evidence does not reveal that the remaining three JIPS officers played any active role beyond escorting the accused to the Narcotics office. Their roles during the sample collection and testing were never explained, and no further involvement on their part was established. [28] In my view, their presence appears to have been purely logistical. There is no indication that they acted as guards, blocked any exit, or otherwise conducted themselves in a manner that would lead a reasonable person to believe that the accused was not free to leave. In the absence of any evidence as to their specific roles or whether they remained present throughout the process, I am unable to conclude that their presence, if any, amounted to a deprivation of liberty. Accordingly, I am unable to conclude that a constructive arrest, within the meaning of s. 31 of the Act, had taken place in this case. [29] In drawing the above conclusion, I am guided by the Federal Court decision in Sia Soon Suan v. Public Prosecutor [1966] 1 MLJ 116, which reminds this court to be careful not to make findings that are not clearly supported by the prosecution’s evidence. It was held: “Nevertheless, the requirements of strict proof in a criminal case cannot be relaxed to bridge any material gap in the prosecution evidence. Irrespective of whether this court is otherwise convinced in its own mind of the guilt or innocence of an accused, its decision must be based on the evidence adduced and nothing else. This is axiomatic. The directions that we give a jury are no less to be hearkened to by ourselves.” (Emphasis added) [30] Based on SP4’s evidence, it is clear that the accused was only placed under arrest after the urine sample had been collected and tested. I therefore infer that, prior to the urine test, the accused was not treated as a suspect. The test appears to have been conducted randomly, without any specific target (prior information) or suspicion. Hence, the arrest took place only after the incriminating result was obtained—and not before. [31] In these circumstances, I am of the considered view that the accused was not placed under actual nor constructive arrest prior to the collection of the urine sample. In the absence of compelling evidence to support a finding of constructive arrest, and where the facts allow for more than one inference, I must adopt the inference most favourable to the accused (see PP v. Mohd Radzi Abu Bakar [2006] 1 CLJ 457). [32] I take the respectful view that the principle of constructive arrest must be applied carefully and must be supported by clear evidence indicating an actual deprivation of liberty as shown in Mohd Safwan Husain (supra). It is important to distinguish between a real restriction on a person’s liberty and a situation where that person is merely following police instructions. This distinction becomes highly relevant in cases such as this, where there was no prior information or suspicion to justify an arrest under s. 31 of the Act as shown in Jarizal Jasni (supra). [33] While this court is mindful of its place in the judicial hierarchy, I take the respectful view that the requirement of prior arrest, whether actual or constructive, before a urine sample may be lawfully obtained from the accused, must be applied strictly in order to uphold the legislative safeguards provided under the Act. To treat mere cooperation or compliance with police instructions as amounting to an arrest—absent any prior information or suspicion—would, in my view, be inconsistent with the legal framework intended. This safeguard exists to prevent potential misuse, particularly in a command-structure environment where subordinates may feel obligated to follow instructions regardless of legality. The law must therefore be applied with care and precision to prevent such circumstances. [34] In light of the foregoing, I find that the statutory precondition under s. 31A of the Act was not fulfilled, as the accused’s arrest was not effected pursuant to s. 31 when the sample was taken. The sample collection was therefore unlawful, and the presumption under s. 37(k) cannot be invoked. In line with the decision in Aizuddin Syah Ahmad (supra), such a breach cannot be cured by resorting to common law principles of admissibility. Accordingly, Exhibit P3 must be excluded and expunged from the record. [35] Without Exhibit P3, the remaining evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction if the accused were called to enter his defence but elected to remain silent. Therefore, on this ground alone, the accused must be acquitted and discharged. [36] In the event the High Court finds that I erred on this issue and in excluding Exhibit P3, I will, for the sake of completeness, proceed to address the other issues below. Conflicting testimony and delay affecting the chain of custody [37] The prosecution sought to establish that the chain of custody of the urine sample remained intact from collection to analysis. Each witness— SP4, SP6, SP5, SP3, and SP2—confirmed that the sample was sealed, properly labelled, and matched the serial number, with no evidence of tampering. The prosecution relied on Gunalan Ramachandran & Ors v. PP [2004] 4 CLJ 551, where the Court of Appeal held that a minor gap in the chain would not invalidate the evidence if the seal remained intact and the serial number matched. [38] Since the prosecution takes the position that a minor gap is allowed, it is important to closely examine what caused the gap in the first place. In this case, I find that the gap does not involve a minor or technical lapse. Instead, it arises from material discrepancies and an unexplained delay in the testimonies of SP5 and SP6. These discrepancies concern how the urine sample was handled, stored, and delivered, and raise real concerns as to whether the chain of custody was properly maintained throughout. [39] For this reason, I am guided by the later decision of the Federal Court in Gunalan Ramachandran & Ors v. PP [2006] 1 CLJ 857, which held that discrepancies in witness testimony must be assessed based on whether they relate to material aspects of the case. Where they do, such discrepancies cannot be lightly disregarded, as they may seriously affect the overall value of their testimony. With this guidance in mind, I now proceed to examine the evidence of the relevant witness in detail. [40] In her witness statement (PSP5), SP5 stated that on 07.07.2020, she received the accused’s urine sample from SP6 and transported it, along with 20 other samples, to the Pathology Department. However, during cross-examination, she admitted that the sample was, in fact, handed to her by an on-duty narcotics officer, not by SP6 as she claimed. This material contradiction undermines the reliability of her earlier testimony and raises serious doubt as to who actually handed over the sample. The uncertainty in this chain of events suggests a possible break in the chain of custody, which may compromise the integrity of the sample. [41] More critically, neither SP5 nor SP6 explained what transpired during the handover to this unnamed officer, specifically, as to how the sample was handled, where it was stored, and who maintained custody of the sample at the material time. The prosecution did not call this officer as a witness, nor was any further explanation drawn out from SP5 or SP6 to address this gap. This gap remains unexplained at this stage, raising a material doubt about the continuity of the chain of custody. [42] A further discrepancy arises in the testimonies of SP5 and SP6 regarding the sample’s transportation and delivery to the Pathology Department. In her witness statement, SP5 stated that she transported the accused’s urine sample alone, accompanied only by the designated police driver (pemandu pasukan). SP6, on the other hand, claimed that he personally accompanied SP5 and jointly delivered the sample. This testimony directly contradicts SP5’s version. While Exhibit P2 and SP3 testimony support SP5’s version as the officer responsible for transporting and delivered the sample, SP6’s version is uncorroborated and appears to have been offered merely to fill the evidential gap identified earlier. [43] Given these contradictions, it is necessary to consider how courts are to approach police testimony in such circumstances. In Kesavan Krishnan lwn. Pendakwa Raya & Satu Lagi Rayuan [2015] 6 CLJ 163, the Court of Appeal held that the general rule that police testimony should be prima facie accepted by the court cannot be applied universally and without exception. Its acceptance depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. While courts may accept police testimony even in the absence of independent corroboration, such evidence still need to be critically assessed to determine its accuracy and credibility like any other ordinary witness. Where material discrepancies are present, the court must treat such testimony with caution. [44] In light of these conflicting versions between SP5 and SP6, I find that the prosecution has failed to present consistent and reliable evidence regarding the continuity, handling and transfer of the urine sample. These discrepancies are not minor, as they affect witness credibility and cast serious doubt as to who had custody of the sample at the relevant times. In the absence of coherent testimony or any independent corroboration, the prosecution has not satisfactorily discharged its burden of establishing that the chain of custody was properly maintained, resulting in a break that undermines the reliability of the sample. [45] Having addressed that issue, I now turn to another material gap in this case, namely, the unexplained delay in delivering the sample to the pathology Department. Timely handling of such biological evidence is essential to preserve its integrity, and any unexplained delay raises concerns that further undermine the reliability of the prosecution’s case. [46] SP1, SP4, and SP6 confirmed that the accused’s urine sample was collected on 26.06.2020. However, both SP5 and SP6 stated that the sample was only delivered to the Pathology Department on 07.07.2020. During cross-examination, when learned counsel for the accused inquired of SP6 to explain this 12-day delay, he candidly admitted that he had no explanation. When the prosecution sought clarification from SP6 during re-examination, he refused to offer any explanation, stating that the matter had not been raised during examination-in-chief. As a result, this delay remains unexplained at the close of the prosecution’s case. [47] Aside from his bare assertion that the sample was kept in his room refrigerator, SP6 did not produce any documentary or photographic evidence to show where or how the sample was stored during that period. Other than his claim that the sample remained under his custody, he did not give further evidence regarding the storage conditions, the security measures taken (such as locks), or whether any third party had access to it. In this absence, I find that there is a genuine risk of tampering, contamination, or unauthorised access, all of which materially undermine the reliability of the sample as evidence. [48] In my view, given SP6’s failure to explain the delay, and considering that the prosecution’s insistence that the sample remained sealed and untampered, it was incumbent upon the prosecution to produce the physical bottle in court. This would have enabled this court to verify whether the bottle remained sealed and untampered as claimed. [49] When considered collectively—the material discrepancies between SP5 and SP6, the unexplained 12-day delay, the absence of proof of proper storage, and the failure to produce the physical bottle in court—I find that the prosecution has failed to establish a clear and reliable chain of custody for the accused’s urine sample. This failure raises serious doubt as to whether the sample remained secure, uncontaminated, and untampered throughout the relevant period. [50] The need to produce the physical bottle became more critical when considered alongside the inconsistency between the preliminary test result and the confirmatory analysis in Exhibit P3, which will be addressed in the next part of this judgment. This inconsistency further reinforces the concern that the integrity of the sample may have been compromised, raising doubt as to whether it actually came from the accused. [51] In these circumstances, the statutory presumption under s. 37(k) of the Act cannot be safely invoked, as the prosecution has failed to establish that the chain of custody remained intact from collection to analysis. Accordingly, the accused is entitled for an acquittal. Inconsistency in the identity of the drugs in question [52] Recognising that Exhibit P3 did not explicitly state the legal classification of the detected substances, the prosecution called SP2 to give oral evidence. In his witness statement (PSP2), SP2 stated that both Amphetamine and Methamphetamine are listed as dangerous drugs under Part III of the First Schedule to the Act. Relying on the Federal Court decision in Muhammed bin Hassan v. PP [1998] 2 MLJ 273, the prosecution submitted that SP2’s testimony satisfied the best evidence rule, as his testimony constituted primary evidence, while Exhibit P3 serves merely as corroboration. [53] I accept the prosecution’s submission that SP2’s testimony satisfied the best evidence rule. Be that as it may, the central issue here is not about the legal classification of the substances, but rather the inconsistency between the results of the preliminary and confirmatory tests. The preliminary test detected only Methamphetamine, which forms the basis of the charge. The confirmatory test, however, detected both Amphetamine and Methamphetamine. [54] In my view, both Amphetamine and Methamphetamine are distinct substances. It was therefore incumbent upon the prosecution to explain why Amphetamine, which was not detected from the preliminary test result, was subsequently detected in the confirmatory test. No such explanation was offered, nor was any clarification sought from SP2. [55] This unexplained inconsistency becomes more significant when viewed in light of SP4’s testimony. During cross-examination, SP4 agreed that five types of test strips were used for the preliminary test, Methamphetamine, Amphetamine, Ketamine, THC, and Benzodiazepine. However, only Methamphetamine returned a positive result, while Amphetamine and the remaining substances were all negative. This result is inconsistent with Exhibit P3, which detected both Amphetamine and Methamphetamine in the sample. [56] In the absence of any clarification, the court is left in doubt as to whether the sample analysed by SP2 was, in fact, the same sample taken from the accused. When considered together with the earlier concerns regarding the chain of custody, this unresolved inconsistency casts serious doubt on the integrity of the sample itself (see Mohd Azmeer Yusnar bin Romli v. Pendakwa Raya [2020] MLJU 1905; Syafiq Syazwan bin Abdul Jalil v. Pendakwa Raya [2017] MLJU 591). [57] Given these circumstances, the benefit of the doubt must be accorded to the accused. Accordingly, an order for acquittal must ensue. CONCLUSION [58] Therefore, upon a maximum evaluation of the prosecution’s evidence and for the reasons stated, I find that the prosecution has failed to establish a prima facie case against the accused. Accordingly, I order that the accused to be acquitted and discharged without being called to enter his defence. [59] While several issues were raised by learned counsel for the accused, I have confined my findings to those that are dispositive of the matter. Other issues not specifically addressed were either immaterial to the outcome or sufficiently dealt with in the course of this judgment. Dated: 11th July 2025 (TUN FAEZ FIKHRIE BIN TUN ASRUL SAINI) Magistrate Magistrate’s Court Tanah Merah PARTIES For the prosecution : Siti Hajar binti Mazlan Deputy Public Prosecutor Kelantan Legal Advisor’s Office For the accused : Nor Hafizah binti Abdullah