(g) of the Evidence Act 1950. [15] The prosecution’s case against the appellant in this instant appeal hinges upon the alleged sale of cannabis which was negotiated between the appellant and SP4. Pursuant to that negotiation, the impugned drugs was delivered for sale to SP4 at the scene. It is clear, therefore, the appellant had committed an offence of drug trafficking as defined in section 2 of the DDA 1952. [16] The evidence on record clearly shows that the key to the Proton Iswara car bearing registration No. KBC 6334 was seized from the appellant’s right hand during the raid by SP6. There was also no one else present at the material time. [17] The act of the appellant in showing exhibits P20 – P39 (compressed dried plant material suspected to be cannabis wrapped with transparent plastic found in the boot of the car) to SP4 entitled the learned trial Judge to infer that the appellant had knowledge of the impugned drugs. Such an inference can also be supported by the following evidence – the appellant attempted to flee upon hearing SP6 introduced himself as a policeman and the ensuing struggle between the appellant and SP6 and Corporal Salleh before the appellant was apprehended. [18] In the circumstances of the case, in our view, the owner of the Proton Iswara car bearing registration No. KBC 6334 was not a material witness to unfold the prosecution’s case. In Raghubir Singh v State of U.P. Air 1971 SC 2156, the Indian Supreme Court had this to say – “Material witnesses considered necessary by the prosecution for unfolding the prosecution story alone need be produced without unnecessary and redundant multiplication of witnesses. The appellant's Counsel has not shown how the prosecution story is rendered less trustworthy as a result of the non-production of the witnesses mentioned by him. No material and important witness was deliberately kept back by the prosecution. Incidentally we may point out that the accused too have not considered it proper to produce those persons as witnesses for controverting the prosecution version.”. [19] It is trite law that where the prosecution’s evidence is overwhelming, the mere fact that the prosecution had failed to produce certain witness is insufficient to invoke the presumption of adverse inference under section 114(g) of the Evidence Act 1950 against the prosecution. [20] It should be borne in mind that provided there is no oblique motive, the prosecution has a discretion whether or not to call a particular witness and also has a discretion specifically not to call a witness in whom it does not believe to be a witness of truth. That discretion, however, must be guided by the prosecution’s duty to discharge its burden of proof. As was stated by Salleh Abas LP in Abdullah Zawawi v P.P [1985] 2 MLJ 16 – “Although the prosecution has the right not to call every witness from whom a police statement has been taken, the question is how far does that right extend. The practice of making available a witness or witnesses from whom statements have been taken is to prevent the defence from commenting upon the honesty of the prosecution and thus invoking the often-quoted presumption of adverse inference under section 114 (g) of the Evidence Act 1950. But where the prosecution evidence falls short of proving a prima facie case at the end of its case, the right not to call such witness/ witnesses and to make him/them available to the defence will be of no avail. … the prosecution’s right not to call a witness from whom statements have been taken must always be guided by its duty to discharge the onus of proof.”. [21] The first ground of appeal, must, therefore, fail. Ground (b) [22] Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that there is doubt whether the word “buah” meant “ganja”. According to learned counsel, learned D.P.P never put to the appellant in cross-examination that the word “buah” was used in place of “ganja”. [23] In fact, in cross-examination of the appellant by learned D.P.P at page 156, AR, Volume 2, the appellant categorically stated that his negotiation with SP4 was concerning “buah” – TPR: (PUT) Sebenarnya daripada awal sekali, mula-mula awak call Pak Ndak, awak ada discuss pada 12.1.2014, awak ada discuss nak jual buah? SD1: Ya, saya tak ingat tarikh. TPR: Awak tetapkan harga buah, awak sendiri cakap jual buah tu pada harga RM2,100.00, satu kilo? SD1: Ya, benar.”. [24] With respect, the submission is misconceived and not supported by evidence on record. It is common knowledge that over the years, a wide variety of drug slang has been created and modified, in an effort to obscure sale and trade of illicit drugs from law enforcement officers. (See Drug Slang Code, DEA Intelligence Report, May 2017). We entertained no doubt that in this instant appeal, the expression “buah” was used as a code word for cannabis. [25] The learned trial Judge rejected the appellant’s submission on this issue. His Lordship’s reasons in rejecting the submission were expressed as follows – “[91] The defence of the accused was that the fruits or “buah” referred to in his conversations with SP4 were in fact medicinal herbs. However, from the inception of the meetings and the negotiations between SP4 and the accused with regard to the quantity and price of the “buah”, there was no evidence or indication that the “buah” referred to medicinal herbs. From a consideration of all the circumstances the expression “buah” was used as a code word for cannabis. This fact was also testified to by SP4 in evidence. [92] Further, during the course of the prosecution case, no suggestions were advanced that the expression “buah” referred to expensive traditional medicinal herbs, Alfalfa, and the like. This omission rightly entitles the defence version on this point to be categorised as an afterthought. [93] If the version of the defence were true, and the sale transaction was for the supply of medicinal herbs, the question then arises as to why such a transaction was shrouded in so much secrecy. If the sale transaction was regarding medicinal herbs, it would have been carried out openly. If the subject matter of the transaction was of a legal nature, it could and would most conveniently have been carried out at the stall where the accused ran his business. [94] The manner of setting up the final meeting between the accused and SP4 was preceded by meetings and SMS’s between them. Upon a consideration of the mode employed by the accused for SP4 to view the “buah” or cannabis including the request to view the “flash roll money”, it can be inferred that the transaction to be carried out was not for the sale of something as innocuous as herbs. [95] Several features of the defence version does not stand up to curial scrutiny in this regard. The evidence of the defence was that the transaction for the sale of the medicinal herbs amounted to RM40,000.00 and while some herbal medication may not be altogether cheap, the amount said to be involved here is excessive. Why was there also a need to view the money first before transacting in such an innocuous transaction? Further, if the transaction was about the sale of medicinal herbs which is not an item prohibited by law, why was there a need to say that a particular place was unsafe and to then change venue to the area beside the mosque at Cherok Tok Kun?”. Conclusion [26] We do not find any reason to interfere with the decision of the learned trial Judge. The prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant had engaged in trafficking of the impugned drugs as defined under section of 2 of the DDA