Mohamad Sukry bin Tamsuri v ACP Ng Siew Hiang (WA-25-611-12/2022)

1.

LEMBAGA TATATERTIB POLIS DIRAJA MALAYSIA BUKIT

3.

KERAJAAN MALAYSIA ... RESPONDENTS

Three applications for judicial review were heard by this court on 1.12.2025, namely by the Applicant in the present case and the Applicants Mohd Aidil Hakim Bin Mohamad Zubir and Mohd Izawan Bin Wan Chik against the same Respondents in Application for Judicial Review Nos. WA-25-610-12/2022 and

These applications relate to disciplinary charges brought against the Applicants pursuant to the same police reports in which allegations of substance abuse were levelled against them.

The reliefs sought by the Applicants are similar, among others, for –

(a) a declaration that the punishment of –

(i) dismissal imposed on the Applicants pursuant to Regulation 38(g) of the Public Officers (Conduct and Discipline) Regulations 1993 (‘1993 Regulations’) and/ or Regulation 38(g) of the Public Officers (Conduct and Discipline) (Amendment) Regulations 2002 (‘2002 Regulations’) in respect of the 1st Charge and 2nd Charge; and

(b) an order of certiorari to quash R1’s and R2’s decision conveyed through the letter dated 30.8.2022, which imposed the punishment of dismissal on the Applicants pursuant to Regulation 38(g) of the 1993 Regulations and/ or the 2002 Regulations for the 2nd Charge and 6th Charge; and

(c) an order of mandamus directing the Respondents to –

(i) accept, reinstate and place the Applicants back into service as a public officer, namely as Police Corporals in the Royal Malaysia Police (‘RMP’), without any reduction in rank;

After having considered the cause papers and oral and written submissions by the parties, I had given my broad grounds of decision on 27.2.2026 whereby the three applications were dismissed.

The Applicant in the instant case has filed a Notice of Appeal on 10.3.2026.

These are my full grounds of judgment for purposes of the Applicant’s appeal. Background Facts

The Applicant joined the RMP in early 2011 as a Constable. At the time of his dismissal, the Applicant served as a Corporal.

On 30.6.2020, a team from the Narcotics Criminal Investigation Department, Pulau Pinang (‘JSJN’) conducted a raid at the Lucky Frozen factory premises, Sungai Klung, Bayan Baru, Pulau Pinang. During the raid, the Applicant was instructed to undergo urine screening tests. The initial urine screening test did not show any drug misuse.

The Applicant’s urine sample was sent to the Pathology Department, Kuala Lumpur Hospital on 1.7.2020. On 9.10.2020, the results from the Drug and Research Laboratory confirmed that the Applicant’s urine sample contained Mitragynine or otherwise commonly known as air ketum.

The results of the investigation conducted thereafter were submitted to ACP Hj. Che Mohd Azemin bin Hj. Che Lah (‘ACP Azemin’), Chairman of the Disciplinary Board, who had delegated powers to impose a punishment other than dismissal or reduction in rank in accordance with specific functions, powers and duties under P.U.(A) 441/2000 for determining violations of Regulation 35 of the 1993 Regulations.

After considering the report of disciplinary breach, on 29.1.2021, ACP Azemin determined that the disciplinary breach committed by the Applicant was of a nature that warranted the punishment of dismissal or reduction in rank under Regulations 37 and 38 of the 1993 Regulations.

On 10.5.2021, ACP Azemin referred the Applicant’s case to R1 under Subregulation 35(2) of the 1993 Regulations.

On 12.5.2021, R1 as Chairman of R2 found that a disciplinary offence was committed which could result in dismissal or reduction in rank under Regulation 37 of the 1993 Regulations. By a letter of even date, (‘Show Cause Letter’), which was received by the Applicant on 2.6.2021, the Applicant was informed of the disciplinary charges as follows:

(a) 1st Charge: The Applicant was found to have disobeyed Arahan Ketua Polis Negara No. 142 – Larangan Terlibat Dalam Penyalahgunaan Bahan-Bahan Racun in that the Applicant’s Pathology Report dated 9.10.2020 confirmed that the Applicant’s urine specimen, collected on 30.6.2020, contained Mitragynine which is a disciplinary offence of being insubordinate under Regulation 4(2)(i) of the 1993 Regulations. The said Regulation reads: “4(2) Seseorang pegawai tidak boleh –

(i) Ingkar perintah atau berkelakuan dengan apa-apa cara yang boleh ditafsirkan dengan munasabah sebagai ingkar perintah.”. If found guilty, the Applicant can be punished under Regulation 38 of the 1993 Regulations; and

(b) 2nd Charge: The Applicant gave false testimony during an official investigation on 2.11.2020 to ASP Azali bin Ahmad at Pejabat Cawangan Siasatan/ Perundangan/ Kajian Kes, Jabatan Integriti dan Pematuhan Standard, Bukit Aman that the Applicant had never consumed air ketum, which is a disciplinary offence of being insubordinate under Regulation 4(2)(i) of the 1993 Regulations and punishable under Regulation 38 of the same Regulations. The Applicant was given 21 days from the date of receipt of the Show Cause Letter to submit his written representation with the grounds to exculpate himself.

By the letter dated 21.6.2021 addressed to R1, the Applicant requested five documents (‘Said Documents’) to enable him to submit “representasi yang mantap”. The five documents are as follows: “3. …

3.1 Percakapan semua saksi yang ada di dalam kertas siasatan Tatatertib 3.2 Laporan Kimia 3.3 Laporan Perubatan 3.4 Semua dokumen dan bukti yang digunakan dalam pertuduhan saya 3.5 Percakapan saya …”. In the same letter, the Applicant also applied for an extension of time (‘EoT’) of three weeks to submit his representation, calculated from the date of receipt of the Said Documents.

Subsequently, R1 vide the letter dated 29.7.2021 (‘29.7.2021 Letter’), which was received by the Applicant on 16.8.2021, approved the EoT requested by the Applicant and the Applicant’s request to obtain the said documents. Among the contents of the 29.7.2021 Letter is as follows: “2. Permohonan anda untuk penangguhan menjawab representasi dan mendapatkan dokumen berkaitan bagi tujuan membuat representasi atas pertuduhan tatatertib yang dikenakan terhadap anda telah diluluskan setelah dikaji dan diteliti mengikut peruntukkan undang-undang yang berkuatkuasa.

Lembaga Tatatertib dengan ini memberi anda 21 hari mulai dari tarikh surat ini diterima untuk mendapatkan apa-apa dokumen yang anda kehendaki dai pihak Lembaga Tatatertib.

Sehubungan itu, anda boleh berhubung dengan pegawai kes ASP Chua Sze Ye, Cawangan Siasatan/Perundangan/Kajian Kes, Jabatan Integriti dan Pematuhan Standard di talian 03-22667158 untuk mendapatkan dokumen-dokumen berkenaan.

Adalah diingatkan sekiranya anda tidak mendapatkan dokumen-dokumen berkenaan dari pihak Lembaga Tatatertib selepas tamatnya tempoh 21 hari, Lembaga Tatatertib akan beranggapan anda tidak berminat untuk mendapatkan dokumen-dokumen berkenaan.”.

The Respondents alleged that the Applicant failed to submit his representation and to attend to the Integrity and Standards Compliance Department (‘JIPS’) to obtain the Said Documents.

The Applicant then applied for second EoT to submit his representation and to obtain the Said Documents vide the letter dated 2.9.2021 which reads: “Berhubung dengan perkara tersebut, sila kemukakan dokumen-dokumen berikut kepada saya pada kadar segera :-

Lapuran Polis Bayan Baru Rpt:3475/2020,

Keputusan Air Kencing pertama yang dilakukan oleh Polis;

Rakaman percakapan Polis yang telah mengambil Sampel air kencing penama, saksi-saksi lain yang terlibat dan Penama;

Gambar Botol Air kencing ;

Pengesahan tentang seal dan test strip yang telah digunakan;

Pengesahan tarikh luput Test trip tersebut;

Laporan Pathologist;

Senarai penama dan keputusan air kencing yang telah diambil pada hari dan masa air kencing penama dikutip;

Semua dokumen-dokumen yang relevan dalam kes ini. …”.

R1, vide the letter dated 27.9.2021 (‘27.9.2021 Letter’), which was received by the Applicant on 21.10.202, stated, among others, the following: “2. Permohonan anda untuk penangguhan menjawab representasi dan mendapatkan dokumen berkaitan bagi tujuan membuat representasi atas pertuduhan tatatertib yang dikenakan terhadap anda telah diluluskan setelah dikaji dan diteliti mengikut peruntukkan undang-undang yang berkuatkuasa.

Lembaga Tatatertib dengan ini sekali lagi memberi anda 21 hari mulai dari tarikh surat ini diterima untuk mendapatkan apa-apa dokumen yang anda kehendaki dari pihak Lembaga Tatatertib.

Sehubungan itu, anda boleh berhubung dengan pegawai kes ASP Chua Sze Ye, Cawangan Siasatan/Perundangan/Kajian Kes, Jabatan Integriti dan Pematuhan Standard di talian 010-2310352 untuk mendapatkan dokumen-dokumen berkenaan.

Adalah diingatkan sekiranya anda tidak mendapatkan dokumen-dokumen berkenaan dari pihak Lembaga Tatatertib selepas tamatnya tempoh 21 hari, Lembaga Tatatertib akan beranggapan anda tidak berminat untuk mendapatkan dokumen-dokumen berkenaan dan anda dikehendaki mengemukakan representasi tanpa dokumen-dokumen berkenaan. …”.

On 9.11.2021, the Applicant submitted his written representation to R1 (‘Representation Letter’) whereby his explanation –

(a) to the 1st Charge was – “4. …

(i) Bahawa sesungguhnya saya menafikan Pertuduhan Pertama yang dikenakan terhadap saya dengan tegasnya;

(v) Bahawa sesungguhnya botol pertama sampel air kencing saya iaitu No.0051751 telah diambil untuk dibuat saringan awal dan ternyata keputusannya ada negatif. Manakala, botol kedua sampel air kencing saya telah dibawa ke makmal untuk ujian patologi;

(b) to the 2nd Charge was – “6. …

(i) Bahawa sesungguhnya saya menafikan Pertuduhan Kedua yang dikenakan terhadap saya dengan tegasnya;

(v) Bahawa sesungguhnya saya sewajarnya diberikan peluang perbicaraan yang adil untuk membela diri saya sendiri, mencabar kesahihan laporan tersebut, mengemukakan sebarang bukti-bukti kukuh serta memanggil saksi-saksi yang relevan, sekiranya perlu;

Selanjutnya, walau apa jua alasan pihak Tuan untuk menjatuhkan sebarang hukuman terhadap saya seperti yang termaktub di dalam Peraturan 38, Peraturan-Peraturan Pegawai Awam (Kelakuan dan Tatatertib) 1993, saya dengan hormatnya memohon pertimbangan daripada pihak Tuan untuk satu perbicaraan yang adil dapat dijalankan dengan mengemukakan bukti-bukti kukuh serta memanggil saksi-saksi yang relevan, sekiranya perlu. Sekiranya di akhir perbicaraan tersebut pihak Tuan mendapati saya bersalah untuk kedua-dua pertuduhan, yang mana adalah dinafikan, maka segala hukuman yang diputuskan perlulah tertakluk kepada prinsip mitigasi. …” (emphasis added).

By the letter dated 30.8.2022, which was received by the Applicant on 21.9.2022, R1 informed the Applicant of the following: “2.

Oleh yang demikian, pada menjalankan kuasa-kuasa yang diwakilkan oleh Suruhanjaya Pasukan Polis melalui Suratcara Pewakilan Kuasa P.U.(B)441/2000 bertarikh 14 Disember 2000, Lembaga Tatatertib telah memutuskan iaitu:-

3.1. Anda didapati bersalah terhadap Pertuduhan Pertama dan dikenakan hukuman Buang Kerja mengikut Peraturan 38(g) Peraturan-Peraturan Pegawai Awam (Kelakuan dan Tatatertib) 1993.

3.2. Anda didapati bersalah terhadap Pertuduhan Kedua dan dikenakan hukuman Amaran mengikut Peraturan 38(a) Peraturan-Peraturan Pegawai Awam (Kelakuan dan Tatatertib) 1993.

Adalah juga dimaklumkan bahawa Lembaga Tatatertib telah memutuskan iaitu hukuman terhadap anda seperti yang tersebut di atas berkuatkuasa mulai tarikh hukuman dijatuhkan iaitu pada 17 Ogos 2022.”.

The Applicant wrote to R1 on 11.10.2022 to appeal against the punishment imposed wherein he stated, among others, that: “5. Selain daripada itu, saya telah meminta dokumen-dokumen berkenaan pertuduhan ini di mana saya percaya jika dibekalkan perkara tersebut dan diadakan perbicaraan semestinya saya dapat membuktikan yang saya adalah tidak bersalah dengan lebih efektif.

Walauapapun, saya mengambil perkara ini sebagai pengajaran kepada hidup saya sebagai anggota polis supaya lebih berhati-hati dalam memilih kawan dan dalam menjalani kehidupan seharian. Saya telah berada di tempat yang salah dan pada masa yang salah yang membuatkan saya turut terpalit di dalam hal berkaitan ini.

Sepanjang saya berkhidmat sebagai anggota polis sejak tahun 2011, saya tidak pernah terlibat dengan sebarang tindakan disiplin tambah lagi dikenakan sebarang tindakan tatatertib. Saya juga masih menanggung kedua ibu bapa saya yang sudah lanjut usia dan mereka bergantung harap kepada saya sepenuhnya. Tindakan buang kerja terutamanya yang dikenakan terhadap saya bukan saja memberikan kesan yang negatif kepada saya bahkan kesan yang lebih teruk turut dihadapi oleh ibu bapa saya yang telah lanjut usia. Bapa saya, Tamsuri bin Bikan hanya seorang petani yang kini tidak lagi berupaya untuk bekerja manakala ibu saya Rosilah binti Yatim juga dalam keadaan yang sama.

Saya juga merasakan hukuman buang kerja bagi pertuduhan pertama adalah terlalu berat untuk saya memandangkan jika benarpun pertuduhan tersebut, saya tidak pernah dikenakan sebarang tindakan disiplin mahupun tatatertib dan ini adalah kali pertama saya dikenakan tindakan tatatertib sepanjang saya berkhidmat sebagai anggota polis.

Saya juga bersedia jika Tuan berpendapat suatu perbicaraan perlu dibuat bagi saya mempertahankan diri saya dengan lebih efektif.

Oleh yang demikian, saya memohon Tuan supaya dapat mempertimbangkan semula dapatan dan hukuman yang dikenakan terhadap saya. Jika Tuan masih merasakan saya adalah masih bersalah sepertimana pertuduhan yang dikenakan terhadap saya, saya dengan rendah diri memohon agar Tuan dapat mempertimbangkan hukuman bagi Pertuduhan Pertama yang dikenakan terhadap saya iaitu buang kerja. Saya dengan rendah diri memohon agar saya hanya diberikan amaran bagi pertuduhan tersebut atau mana-mana hukuman yang lebih ringan.”.

Vide the letter dated 29.11.2022 from Jabatan Integriti dan Pematuhan Standard, Polis Diraja Malaysia, Bukit Aman as quoted below, the Applicant’s appeal was rejected: “RAYUAN TERHADAP HUKUMAN TATATERTIB BERTARIKH 30 OGOS 2022 Perkara diatas adalah dirujuk dan surat anda bertarikh 11 Oktober 2022 adalah juga berkaitan.

Rayuan telah dikemukakan oleh anda dalam surat yang tersebut bagi hukuman tatatertib yang telah dijatuhkan oleh Lembaga Tatatertib (LTT) bertarikh 30 Ogos 2022. Dukacita dimaklumkan, permohonan anda untuk hanya diberikan hukuman amaran sahaja atau mana-mana hukuman yang lebih ringan tidak dapat dipertimbangkan kerana hukuman buang kerja yang telah dijatuhkan oleh LTT adalah muktamad.

Setelah LTT membuat keputusan dan keputusan itu telah disempurnakan, LTT telah functus officio serta tidak berbidangkuasa lagi untuk meminda atau mengubah keputusannya atau mempertimbangkan sebarang rayuan kerana LTT Polis Diraja Malaysia tidak diperuntukkan dengan bidang kuasa rayuan.

Sekiranya seseorang pegawai atau anggota polis terkilan atau tidak berpuas hati, tertakluk kepada kebenaran Mahkamah, mereka boleh memfailkan permohonan Semakan Kehakiman di Mahkamah Tinggi mengikut Aturan 53 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 dalam tempoh tiga bulan dari tarikh alasan permohonan itu mula-mula berbangkit atau mula-mula diberitahu kepada mereka. …”.

The Applicant subsequently filed the application for judicial review in this Court on 21.12.2022 whereby leave was granted on 7.2.2023. The Legal Principles

The case authorities relied upon by the learned Federal Counsel (‘FC’) in submitting on the applicable legal principles are similar to the cases which were cited for the respondents in Mohammad Izzuddin Bin Zulkifly v Suruhanjaya Pasukan Polis & 2 lagi (Application for Judicial Review No. WA-25-390-12/2023). In that case, this Court had summarised the key legal principles in the following manner: “20. In Nor Azlinda bt Mohd Abdullah v Jawatankuasa Tatatertib Kumpulan Bukan Eksekutif (JKTKBE) Tabung Haji & Ors [2026] MLJU 580, this Court said: “33. The legal principles which can be discerned from the case authorities as cited by the parties in the instant application may be summarised as follows:

(a) judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision was made. The High Court does not sit in its appellate jurisdiction, but rather, in its supervisory jurisdiction. The Court is more concerned with the decision-making process and not the decision itself. The Court is not entitled on an application for judicial review to consider whether the decision itself, on the merits of the facts, was fair and reasonable. The Court is merely to quash the decision of the relevant authority, if required, and not to substitute the decision with what it thinks is the correct decision [see Harpers Trading (M) Sdn Bhd v National Union Of Commercial Workers [1991] 1 MLJ 417 (SC), Michael Lee Fook Wah v Menteri Sumber Tenaga Manusia Malaysia & Anor [1998] 1 CLJ 227 (CA) and Ketua Pengarah Hasil Dalam Negeri v Alcatel-Lucent Malaysia Sdn Bhd & Anor [2017] 2 CLJ 1 (FC)]; …”.

The renowned passage from the judgment by Lord Diplock in Council of Civil Service Unions & Ors. v. Minister for Civil Service [1985] 1 AC 374 at pp 410 and 411 on judicial review of administrative actions, and as adopted by the Federal Court in R Rama Chandran v The Industrial Court Of Malaysia & Anor [1997] 1 MLJ 145, reads: “Judicial review has I think developed to a stage today when without reiterating any analysis of the steps by which the development has come about, one can conveniently classify under three heads the grounds upon which administrative action is subject to control by judicial review. The first ground I would call “illegality”, the second “irrationality” and the third “procedural impropriety”. By “illegality” as a ground for judicial review I mean that the decision-maker must understand correctly the law that regulates his decision-making power and must give effect to it. Whether he has or not is par excellence a justiciable question to be decided, in the event of dispute, by those persons, the Judges, by whom the judicial power of the state is exercisable. By “irrationality” I mean what can by now be succinctly referred to as ‘Wednesbury unreasonableness’ (Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223). It applies to a decision which is so outrageous in its defiance of logic or of accepted moral standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the question to be decided could have arrived at it. I have described the third head as “procedural impropriety” rather than failure to observe basic rules of natural justice or failure to act with procedural fairness towards the person who will be affected by the decision. This is because susceptibility to judicial review under this head covers also failure by an administrative tribunal to observe procedural rules that expressly laid down in the legislative instrument by which its jurisdiction is conferred even where such failure does not involve any denial of natural justice.” [see too, Minister of Home Affairs, Malaysia v. Persatuan Aliran Kesedaran Negara [1990] 1 CLJ (Rep) 186 (SC)].

The well-established Wednesbury principle of reasonableness as explicated in Associated Provincial Picture Houses v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223 specifies that a decision is unlawful where the decision-maker has –

(a) taken into account matters which ought not to have been considered;

(b) failed to take into account matters which ought to have been considered; or

(c) reached a conclusion so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could ever have arrived at it.

In subsequent decisions by the Federal Court, we are reminded that not every case is amenable to the Rama Chandran approach and it all depends on the factual matrix and/ or the legal modalities of the case. In Ranjit Kaur a/p S Gopal Singh v. Hotel Excelsior (M) Sdn Bhd [2010] 6 MLJ 1, it was held, among others, that: “[16] The Rama Chandran decision has been regarded or interpreted as giving the reviewing court a license to review without restrain decisions for substance even when the said decision is based on finding of facts. However, post Rama Chandran cases have applied some brakes to the courts’ liberal approach in Rama Chandran. The Federal Court in the case of Kumpulan Perangsang Selangor Bhd v Zaid Noh [1997] 1 MLJ 789; [1997] 2 CLJ 11 after affirming the Rama Chandran decision held that there may be cases in which for reason of public policy, national interest, public safety or national security the principle in Rama Chandran may be wholly inappropriate.” (see too, Kumpulan Perangsang Selangor Selangor Bhd v Zaid Noh [1997] 1 MLJ 789, Petroliam National Bhd v Nik Ramli Nik Hassan [2004] 2 MLJ 288 and Alam Venture Sdn Bhd & Anor v. Abdul Aziz Abdul Majid & Ors [2015] 5 CLJ 1).

In reviewing decision of disciplinary authorities, the courts have very limited review powers over administrative determinations of public bodies and are constrained to confirm the findings in disciplinary hearings. The courts cannot rehear the case by reweighing and reassessing the evidence since weighing and assessing the evidence is the function of the disciplinary authority. The courts cannot interfere merely because it may come to different conclusions on facts on the same basis of the same evidence. The courts will only intervene where there was a fundamental procedural flaw, namely, where there has been an error in the process or there was procedural irregularity in the decision-making proceedings leading to the public officer’s dismissal (see Kerajaan Malaysia & Ors v Tay Chai Huat [2012] 3 MLJ 149).

As regards the issue on whether an officer has exculpated himself from the disciplinary charges against him by his written representation, it is for the disciplinary authority, and not the courts, to decide on this matter (see Public Services Commission Malaysia & Anor v Vickneswary a/p RM Santhivelu (substituting M Senthivelu a/l R Marimuthu, deceased) [2008] 6 MLJ 1).”. Grounds of Application

Based on the Applicants’ written submission, the grounds of application for judicial review by the Applicants were confined to the following:

(a) a serious miscarriage of justice occurred as the Applicant was not provided with the Said Documents. Consequently, the Applicant was denied the opportunity to mount an adequate defence in respect of the charges against him; and

(b) the Applicant made a request for an oral hearing but this was denied by R1 and R2 without any reasons being given. Findings and Decision of the Court 1st Ground: Whether a serious miscarriage of justice occurred as the Applicant was not provided with the Said Documents

As can be seen from the 29.7.2021 Letter and 27.9.2021 Letter, the Applicant was asked to liaise with ASP Chua Sze Ye (‘ASP Chua’) to obtain the Said Documents.

In paragraph 15.2 of his Affidavit In Reply (‘AIR’, encl.15), the Applicant affirmed that “… saya juga telah berusaha untuk menghubungi ASP Chua Sze Ye termasuk dengan cara bertulis sebagai bukti bahawa saya telah cuba untuk menghubunginya namun telah tidak mendapat maklum balas untuk saya hadir secara fizikal bagi tujuan semakan dokumen;”.

The burden to prove the efforts made by the Applicant to meet or to call ASP Chua lie on the Applicant.

ASP Chua’s office telephone number was provided in the 29.7.2021 Letter while his mobile phone number was mentioned in the 27.9.2021 Letter to facilitate the Applicant in contacting ASP Chua. If the Applicant had truly attempted to contact ASP Chua, the Applicant should have been able to produce evidence such as call logs showing calls made by the Applicant to ASP Chua.

In my considered view, the Applicant has not discharged the burden of proof as no written correspondence, for example, a letter, an e-mail or a message and/ or a call log was exhibited. Thus, the burden of proof did not shift to the Respondents to produce affidavit evidence from ASP Chua to rebut the Applicant’s contentions.

As the Applicant did not produce a shred of evidence to show effort on his part to obtain the Said Documents from ASP Chua, it was not open to the Applicant to now claim that he has been denied the right to the same. The Applicant’s allegation in his AIR was a bare averment and unsupported by any contemporaneous evidence.

Paragraph 5 of the 27.9.2021 Letter clearly states that if the Applicant fails to obtain the Said Documents from R2 after the expiry of the 21-days period, R2 would deem that the Applicant was not interested in obtaining the same, and the Applicant would be required to submit his representation without the Said Documents.

Moreover, in the Representation Letter, the Applicant never raised any issue or complaint on the allegation as regards the purported failure by the Respondents to supply the Said Documents. This demonstrates that the Applicant himself was aware of his own failure to avail himself of the opportunity to obtain the Said Documents.

In the final analysis, the 1st ground in support of the application appears to be nothing more but an afterthought. 2nd Ground: Whether the Applicant should have been afforded an oral hearing

The Applicant relied heavily on the authority of Vijayarao a/l Sepermaniam v Suruhanjaya Perkhidmatan Awam Malaysia [2018] 6 AMR 321 (see paragraphs 55 - 80 in the judgment) in submitting that the law as currently adopted by the courts is more inclined in favour of affording a right to be heard orally to an officer facing disciplinary proceedings if there is a request made by him to the disciplinary authority.

On the other hand, the FC naturally cited the cases of Vickneswary (supra) and Lembaga Tatatertib Perkhidmatan Awam Hospital Besar Pulau Pinang & Anor v Utra Badi A/l K Perumal [2001] 2 MLJ 417 for the proposition that it was for R2 to decide whether to afford an oral hearing to the Applicant or otherwise and that Article 135(2) of the Federal Constitution does not require that the Applicant be given an oral hearing.

In the judgment of the Federal Court in Vijayarao’s case, as delivered by Ramly Ali FCJ, the meaning of “a reasonable opportunity to be heard” and whether it connotes an oral hearing was explained in the following excerpts from the judgment: “[59] What amounts to a reasonable opportunity to be heard under Article 135(2) of the Federal Constitution must be determined by the nature of the matter in issue. Arifin Zakaria CJ in Tay Chai Huat (supra) had expressed his observation that “…if the right to be heard under Article 135(2) is to have any real meaning, the circumstances of each case must be fully considered before the court could come to the conclusion whether or not such right has been properly observed by the disciplinary authority”. … [61] The issue before us now is whether the words “opportunity of being heard” connotes an oral hearing. [62] This court in Utra Badi (supra) had held that “the right to be heard given by Article 135(2) of the Federal Constitution does not require that the person concerned be given an oral hearing and it could not be argued that the failure to give an appellant an oral hearing was a denial of justice …what is important is that the officer concerned should have a full opportunity of stating his case before he is dismissed” (see also Najar Singh v Government of Malaysia [1974] 1 MLJ 138 and Zainal bin Hashim v Government of Malaysia [1979] 2 MLJ 276). [63] In the case of Vickneswary (supra), this court had held to the effect that the disciplinary authority ought not to have granted the officer concerned an opportunity to be heard orally. It was also ruled in that case that in deciding whether to refer the matter to the committee of inquiry, the disciplinary authority would have to consider the written representation of the officer i.e. whether his written representation exculpated himself from the charges preferred against him. [64] In short, both decisions in Utra Badi (supra) and Vickneswary (supra) affirmed the rule that the right to be heard under Article 135(2) of the Federal Constitution did not require the officer concerned be given an oral hearing. [65] However, this court in Utra Badi (supra) in deciding that the right to be heard under Article 135(2) of the Federal Constitution did not connote an oral hearing, did mention that “what is important is that the officer concerned should have a full opportunity of stating his case before he is dismissed”. [66] Depending on the facts and circumstances of each case, a full opportunity of stating the officer’s case before his dismissal may be by way of written representations only; or both written as well as oral representations; or oral representations only. Article 135(2) of the Federal Constitution does not expressly provide whether it should be by way of written representations only or oral hearing only or both. … [68] This Court in Chai Kok Choi (supra) had inter alia stated that an oral hearing might have been necessary if the officer concerned had not admitted committing the offence he was charged with; but if the officer had admitted the offence in reply to the show-cause letter, then oral hearing would no longer be necessary. Cases may arise where, in the light of peculiar facts, an oral hearing is necessary and appropriate and the failure or refusal to afford such an oral hearing may result in the officer being prejudiced and the decision arrived at being declared a nullity or quashed (see also Raja Abdul Malek Muzaffar Shah bin Raja Shahruzzaman v Setiausaha Suruhanjaya Pasukan Polis & 2 Ors [1995] 1 AMR 855; [1995] 1 MLJ 308). [69] Zulkefli FCJ (now PCA) in Yusof b Sudin (supra) was of the view that the principle in Utra Badi (supra) that the refusal to afford an officer an oral hearing in a disciplinary proceedings was not contrary to law, was a general principle and restricted to its own facts. His Lordship said: It is my view that the principle in Utra Badi's case is a general principle and restricted to its own facts. It does not cover situation where the officer in his representation letter gives an exculpatory statement and make a special request for an oral hearing under the said General Orders 1980. In such a situation this court is in a position to review and extend the general principle in the case of Utra Badi by stating the exception to this general rule. [70] In that case (Yusof b Sudin), the majority decision held that “when there was a request by the public officer for an oral hearing after he had denied all the charges against him by furnishing credible evidence in his representation letter, then by virtue of General Order 26(5) of the 1980 (“the GO”), the officer should be afforded an oral hearing to satisfy the requirement of Article 135(2) of the Federal Constitution which states that a reasonable opportunity of being heard be given before any member of such a service was dismissed or reduced in rank”. [71] In short, “a reasonable opportunity of being heard” or “a right to be heard” as required under Article 135(2) of the Federal Constitution may include an oral hearing, particularly when the officer concerned had requested for it after he had denied all the charges and he seemed to have exculpated himself of the charges against him. … [79] From the authorities referred to above, we are of the considered view that the law as currently adopted by the courts is more inclined in favour of affording a right to be heard orally to an officer facing disciplinary proceedings if there is a request made by him to the disciplinary authority. As correctly expressed by Richard Malanjum CJ (Sabah & Sarawak) in Yusof b Sudin: “Accordingly I agree with my learned brother Zulkefli bin Ahmad Makinudin FCJ that ‘when there is a request by the public officer for an oral hearing after he had denied all the charges and appears to have exculpated himself by furnishing credible evidence in his representation letter, then by virtue of Order 26(5) of the General Orders 1980, the officer should be afforded an oral hearing to satisfy the requirement of Article 135(2) of the Federal Constitution…’. And like my learned brother I too allow this appeal and grant the relief as given by him”. (emphasis added)”.

From my understanding of the above judgment, there appears to be a requirement for the applicant to show that he has exculpated himself by credible evidence in the representation letter. Before I delivered my decision, I invited both learned counsels for the Applicant and the Respondents to further submit on Vijayarao’s case in the context of the instant application.

The Applicant’s counsel placed emphasis on the fact that the police report dated 30.6.2020 states that the test strip test shows that the Applicant’s urine was negative for all types of drugs. The FC countered this argument by referring to the Respondents’ AIR where it was averred that the Ujian Makmal dan Penyelidikan, Jabatan Patologi, Hospital Kuala Lumpur on 9.10.2020 confirmed that the Applicant’s urine sample contained Mitragynine.

The Applicant’s counsel then contended that the Applicant had raised the possibility of the urine samples being mixed up in the Representation Letter. Based on my reading of the Representation Letter, I do not think that the Applicant has expressly said so.

Applying the legal principles as elucidated in Vijayarao’s case, particularly in paragraphs 71 and 79 of the judgment, to the instant application, in my opinion, not only must there be a request by the Applicant for an oral hearing after he had denied all the charges, but it must also appear that he has exculpated himself by furnishing credible evidence in his Representation Letter.

Based on the Representation Letter, I agree with the FC’s submission that the Applicant has not exculpated himself by furnishing credible evidence in the Representation Letter. Therefore, the Applicant has not established a right to be heard which includes an oral hearing.

The Applicant was given a full opportunity of stating his case by way of written representation which, in the circumstances of this case, was reasonable and sufficient.

After considering the representations submitted for the 1st Charge and the 2nd Charge, and after reviewing the Applicant’s representation comprehensively and carefully, R2 found that the Applicant had failed to exonerate himself from both Charges.

In the upshot, the Applicant has not convinced this Court that there was merit in the 2nd ground in support of the application. Other Grounds of Application

For the sake of completeness, as regards the other grounds which were raised in the Statement pursuant to O. 53, r. 3(2) of the Rules of Court 2012 that –

(a) the Respondents did not comply with the procedures as prescribed under the 2002 Regulations, I find that this contention is unfounded and the Applicant was given a reasonable opportunity of being heard;

(b) R2 failed to consider the Applicant’s representations, the Court finds that R2 did in fact consider the Applicant’s representations and found that these did not exculpate him from the Charges against him. It was for the disciplinary authority, and not the Court, to decide on whether the Applicant, in his Representation Letter, has exculpated himself [see Vickneswary’s case (supra)]; and

(c) the punishment imposed against the Applicant was disproportionate and does not warrant the punishment of dismissal, R2 as the disciplinary authority is the best judge of the seriousness of the Applicant’s misconduct and the punishment to be imposed (see Ng Hock Cheng v Pengarah Am Penjara & Ors [1998] 1 MLJ 153). Conclusion

Premised on the aforesaid considerations, the Court finds that R2’s decision was not tainted with illegality, irrationality or procedural impropriety. Therefore, the application was dismissed with costs of RM2,000.00 to be paid by the Applicant to the Respondents. DATED: 18.3.2026 (ALIZA SULAIMAN) JUDGE HIGH COURT IN MALAYA KUALA LUMPUR (BKK1) Solicitors for the Applicant: Manoharan Malayalam (Hariharan Manoharan with him) Messrs. M Manoharan & Co. Solicitors for the Respondents: Mohammad Solehheen Bin Mohammad Zaki Federal Counsel Civil Division Attorney General’s Chambers