Mohamed Arifin Shah Bin Nazeer Ali v Tribunal Tuntutan Pengguna Malaysia Putrajaya (WA-25-310-08/2025)

TRIBUNAL TUNTUTAN PENGGUNA MALAYSIA

TUAN ABDUL RASHID BIN DAUD Presiden Tribunal Tuntutan Pengguna Malaysia ... RESPONDENTS

On 20.8.2025, the Applicant filed an ex-parte Notice of Application (‘NoA’) and an Affidavit In Support (‘AIS’) in encls. and 2, respectively, for the following orders:

leave to commence judicial review proceedings pursuant to O. 53 of the Rules of Court 2012 (‘RC 2012’) against the decision of the 1st Respondent (‘R1’) dated 28.5.2024 which dismissed the Applicant’s claim (‘said Decision’);

extension of time (‘EoT’) pursuant to O. 53, r. 3(6) of the RC 2012 for the application to be filed outside the prescribed time limit;

certiorari to quash the said Decision on the grounds that the same is unlawful, ultra vires and contrary to the principles of natural justice;

declaration that the said Decision is null and void;

general damages in the sum of RM10,000.00 or any other amount as the Court deems appropriate;

costs of this action to be borne by the Respondents; and

such other reliefs as the Court deems appropriate.

During the first Case Management (‘CM’) on 22.9.2025, the Deputy Registrar (‘DR’) directed the Applicant of the following:

that the cause papers were not in order because encl. should have been filed under the category of “Afidavit Sokongan” instead of “Notis Permohonan (Ex-Parte)”. The Applicant was to re-file the AIS and to file the Statement as required under O. 53, r. 3(2), RC 2012. Encl. 2 was struck out;

that the cause papers have to be served on the Attorney General’s Chambers (‘AGC’) in accordance with O. 53, r. 3(3), RC 2012 and an Affidavit of Service was to be filed;

that the 2nd Respondent (‘R2’) was wrongly named and the Applicant has to file an application and an AIS to amend R2’s name to Fokus Sentral Sdn Bhd (‘FSSB’); and

the Applicant has to take the necessary action as directed before the hearing date on 5.11.2025.

On 5.11.2025, the Applicant and the learned Federal Counsel (‘FC’) appeared before me. The FC informed the Court that the AGC was only served with encl. 1; the Statement has not been filed; the AGC requires all the cause papers in order to decide whether to object to the application for leave to commence judicial review proceedings; and R1’s decision was made on 28.5.2024 i.e. more than three months as stipulated under O. 53, r. 3(6), RC

2012.

The Applicant stated that he had approached a few lawyers but none wanted to help him; he had filed the “Afidavit Sokongan Tambahan” and “Afidavit Penyampaian Pertama” in encls. 6 and 7, respectively; and that he faced problems with the filing and extraction of documents. I advised the Applicant to see the DR as regards the last matter which he raised. The Applicant was directed to serve the “Afidavit Sokongan Tambahan” and Statement to the AGC. A CM date on 21.11.2025 was fixed for the AGC to revert on whether it will object to the leave application.

For the record, between 4.10.2025 and 7.11.2025, the Applicant had sent various e-mails to the DR and the e-courts helpdesk on his grievances with, among others, the filing of his cause papers. The Applicant had cited O. 63A, r. 4, RC 2012 in relation to his application to be a registered user which the Technical Specialist had, on 7.11.2025, explained to him by e-mail that the EFS account system can only be accessed by law firms which are registered with the Malaysian Bar Council and by registered agencies. The current system does not have a function which allows temporary access to the EFS account by individuals or members of the public who represent themselves in court cases. The filing of cause papers or documents by such individuals have to be made physically at the Service Bureau Counter. The DR gave the same response to the Applicant vide the e-mail dated 13.11.2025.

Evidently the Applicant was not satisfied with the explanations and chose to escalate his complaint to the Chief Registrar of the Federal Court and the Registrar of the High Court (albeit the names mentioned in the e-mail dated 13.11.2025 are incorrect).

At the CM on 21.11.2025, the FC informed that the Attorney General (‘AG’) will be objecting to the leave application and requested for time to file the written submission. The Applicant again raised issues with the filing and extraction of documents in the e-filing system and alleged that there was tampering with the “Afidavit Sokongan Tambahan” which he had filed in encl. 6. The Applicant applied for hard copies to be given to the Court as he said that he does not know what documents are in the Court Management System. To allay the Applicant’s concerns, and there being no objection by the FC, I allowed the Applicant’s application.

The hearing of the AG’s objection was held on 19.12.2025. After having considered the cause papers, namely the NoA in encl. and “Afidavit Sokongan Tambahan” in encl. 6 (as per the hard copy which was submitted by the Applicant to the Court), and the oral and written submissions of the parties in encls. 11 and 15, I decided to accept the AG’s objections and consequently, the Applicant’s application for leave to commence judicial review proceedings was dismissed.

The Applicant is dissatisfied with my decision and he has filed a Notice of Appeal on 30.12.2025.

These are my full grounds of judgment for the decision.

The Applicant bought a Toyota Yaris 1.5E, Car Registration No.: VHD2420 (‘said Car’) on 24.12.2021 at Toyota Bangi, Section 7, Bandar Baru Bangi. The Applicant had problems with the said Car since it was purchased.

The Applicant then filed a claim before R1 on 15.3.2024 against FSSB, the authorised Toyota car dealer, in respect of alleged defects and mechanical problems encountered after the purchase of the said Car.

On 28.5.2024, after a full hearing of the Applicant’s claim, R1 dismissed the Applicant’s claim.

Subsequently, on 18.9.2024, the Applicant alleged that he discovered several pages of his Statement of Claim (‘SoC’) filed in his claim before R1 were missing.

On 23.9.2024, the Applicant filed Civil Suit No.: BH-A77-104- 09/2024 (‘Suit 104’) at the Kajang Magistrates’ Court against Pos Malaysia Berhad claiming the sum of RM5,000.00 for the purported negligence of the defendant’s employees in not following the standard operating procedure and causing the loss of the Applicant’s A.R. Card (see p 238, encl. 6). As a result, the Applicant could not produce the A.R. Card to R1 as proof of service.

The Applicant had lodged several police reports, namely –

Kajang/004420/24 on 30.1.2024 against Toyota Bangi Section 7, Magna Viable Sdn Bhd surrounding the complaints on the said Car (see p 115, encl. 6);

Cheras/016545/24 on 9.6.2024 against Service Centre PDC Automobile Sdn. Bhd. concerning what happened when he sent the said Car to be checked on 5.6.2024 (see p 387, encl. 6); and

Presint 7/012111/24 on 13.10.2024 and Presint 7/012195/24 on 15.10.2024 regarding the alleged missing pages from the SoC in the proceedings before R1. It is observed that the allegation made against R1 of “pihak yang tidak bertanggungjawab telah sengaja menghilangkan muka surat tertentu itu daripada Penyata Tuntutan asal” is akin to the accusations made as to the filing of the Applicant’s cause papers in this Court (see pp 147 and 148, encl. 6).

In Kelab Pembina-Pembina Selangor (Selangor Builders’ Club) v Ketua Pengarah Hasil Dalam Negeri (Application For Judicial Review No.: WA-25-113-05/2025), this Court said: “24. The learned SFC had cited several case authorities which have expounded on the role of the AG and these may be summarised as follows:

under O. 53 of the RC 2012, the application for judicial review must be served on the AG because judicial review is a principal tool of public law applicable to public bodies. As the guardian of public interest, the AG is a nominal party in all judicial review applications. This is to ensure that the AG vets all judicial review applications in order to ascertain if his participation is warranted. The AG’s function is to safeguard public authorities or public institutions from unwarranted litigation and to deter ill-founded claims that might otherwise paralyse the administration of public functions. This role serves to balance access to judicial review with the need for efficient governance [see Peguam Negara Malaysia v Nurul Izzah bt Anwar & Ors [2017] 4 MLJ 656 (CA) and Messrs Tai Choi Yu & Co, Advocates (suing as a firm and Tai Choi Yu as sole proprietor) v Arifin bin Zakaria & Anor [2020] 5 MLJ 207 (CA)];

if the AG elects to appear at the leave stage, he does so, not as a representative of the respondent, but in his own right as the AG, in discharging his public duty [see Kijal Resort Sdn Bhd v Pentadbir Tanah Kemaman & Anor [2016] 1 MLJ 544 (FC)];

as the leave stage is not concerned with the merits of the judicial review application, the AG is not required under the law to file any affidavit in reply (‘AIR’). The AG’s role is to assist the court in sieving out frivolous applications by showing whether the applicant has an arguable case and has met the threshold for leave for judicial review as explicated by the Court of Appeal in Dato’ Sri Mohd Najib bin Tun Hj Abdul Razak v Attorney General & Ors [2020] 3 MLJ 114 as follows: “[33] A court hearing a judicial review application must determine whether ‘prima facie there is a genuine case for review’. It is accepted that the threshold requirement is low, for leave will only be refused where an application is:

frivolous and vexatious or hopeless;

made by busybodies with misguided or trivial complaints of administrative errors;

misconceived;

unarguable or groundless;

where there is a more appropriate alternative procedure; or

where an application for judicial review is an inappropriate procedure.” (see too, Peguam Negara Malaysia v Chin Chee

if, for instance, the applicant is a busybody; the application is made out of time or against a person or body that is immunised from being impleaded in legal proceedings; or the subject matter of the review is one which by settled law is non-justiciable, and the court is satisfied that the threshold is not met, the application for leave should be refused and dismissed in limine [see Tang Kwor Ham & Ors v Pengurusan Danaharta Nasional Bhd & Ors [2006] 5 MLJ 60 (CA)]”.

The AG’s role at the leave stage of judicial review is not to defend the said Decision but rather to ensure that the threshold criteria for judicial review are met. The AG’s involvement does not create an obligation to contest or verify evidence; it merely grants the AG a procedural right to be heard in determining whether the threshold for leave has been met.

The Federal Court in WRP Asia Pacific Sdn Bhd v. Tenaga Nasional Berhad [2012] 4 CLJ 478 at p 488 said: “[12] … At the leave stage, on a quick perusal of the material available, if the court thinks that subsequently at the substantive hearing stage an arguable case may be disclosed, and the relief sought may be granted, leave should be granted (IRC v. National Federation of Self-Employed and Small Businesses Ltd [1982] AC 617). In Malaysia, the Federal Court in Mohd Nordin Johan v. The Attorney-General, Malaysia [1983] 1 CLJ 130; [1983] CLJ (Rep) 271 when allowing the appeal, opined that ‘the point taken was not frivolous to merit refusal of leave in limine and justified argument on a substantive motion for certiorari’. Without the need to go into depth of the abundant authorities, suffice if we state that leave may be granted if the leave application is not thought of as frivolous, and if leave is granted, an arguable case in favour of granting the relief sought at the substantive hearing may be the resultant outcome. A rider must be attached to the application though ie, unless the matter for judicial review is amenable to judicial review absolutely no success may be envisaged.”.

The FC submitted for the AG that leave for judicial review should be refused by the court on the following grounds:

the application in encl. 1 was filed out of time and the EoT sought by the Applicant should be refused;

the Applicant failed to name FSSB as a party in encl. although the application will affect FSSB;

the relief of damages; and

the irregularity of the application under O. 53, RC 2012.

Upon consideration of encls. 1, 6, 11 and 15, I found that the objections raised by the AG which were determinative of the leave application are as follows: 1st Objection: Whether the application in encl. 1 was filed out of time and the EoT should be refused

O. 53, r. 3(6) of the RC 2012 prescribes a specific time limit in respect of applications for judicial review as follows: “(6) An application for judicial review shall be made promptly and in any event within three months from the date when the grounds of application first arose or when the decision is first communicated to the applicant.”.

The said Decision was first communicated to the Applicant on 28.5.2024. Based on the above said provision, the application for judicial review must be filed within three months of that date i.e. by 28.8.2024. However, the NoA was filed only on 20.8.2025, way past the prescribed period in O. 53, r. 3(6) of the RC 2012.

The timeline in O. 53, r. 3(6) of the RC 2012 must be strictly adhered to. The courts have dismissed applications for leave for judicial review on the ground that the applications were out of time and hence, the courts have no jurisdiction to hear the same (see Wong King Hoong & Anor (suing for themselves and on behalf all of the occupants of Kampung Bukit Koman, Raub, Pahang) v Ketua Pengarah Jabatan Alam Sekitar & Anor [2013] 4 MLJ 161, Pengarah Kastam Negeri Johor & Anor v Kedai Makan Kebun The (Sutera Utama) Sdn Bhd & Ors and another appeal [2014] 4 MLJ 377 and Datin Seri Rosmah bt Mansor v Peguam Negara/Pendakwa Raya Malaysia & Ors [2022] 10 CLJ 63).

Based on his written submission, the Applicant conceded that there was a delay in the filing of the NoA but he was ready and under a duty to explain the reasons for the delay, namely as follows: “Asas utama Permohonan Semakan Kehakiman di bawah Aturan 53, Kaedah 2(4) KKM 2012 dimohon oleh mana-mana orang terjejas ke atas keputusan mana-mana pihak kuasa awam, tanpa mengira kuantiti atau nilai kerugian. … Saya memohon maaf dengan jujur dan ikhlas atas kelewatan bukan disengajakan dan akui bahawa permohonan ini difailkan selepas had masa 3 bulan bersama 90 hari.”.

In his oral submission, the Applicant said that he had lodged police reports but there no investigation was carried out by the police and no decision was forthcoming. Despite several calls being made, no details were given to him.

Turning to the Applicant’s justifications in seeking an EoT for the filing of the application, O. 53, r. 3(7) of the RC 2012 provides that: “(7) The Court may, upon an application, extend the time specified in rule 3(6) if it considers that there is a good reason for doing so.”.

The importance of the requirement for an applicant to show the court a good reason to justify the granting of an EoT is to prevent parties in breach of the limitation rules from having the unfettered right to EoT which would defeat the purpose and object of the rules of limitation of period (see Tengku Anoomshah bin Tengku Zainal Abidin v Collector Land Revenue, North East District, Penang & Anor [1995] 3 CLJ 434).

The Applicant proffered four “good reasons” in his written submission (see too, paragraphs 1 - 10 of the AIS), which are summarised as follows:

discovery of missing critical documents, namely, the missing pages of the SoC in the proceedings before R1, which formed the foundation of the Applicant’s claim, on 18.9.2024. These raised issues concerning the integrity, professionalism and responsibility of the opposing party as a service centre and body and paint workshop. Before the said Decision, the Applicant had reminded the Respondents through the submission of Additional Documents (Substantial Evidence) that Issue 10, which was in the missing part of the SoC, remained unanswered by FSSB. Two police reports were lodged on 13 and 15 October 2024, and subsequently the Applicant received an official letter dated 4.2.2025 from the Investigating Officer;

prolonged vehicle problems which constitute the core of the claim or the central and serious issue in this case;

difficulty in obtaining legal representation and financial assistance. Despite the Applicant’s financial hardship and instability, the lawyers whom he consulted were not optimistic as to his ability to pay legal fees. The Applicant’s attempts to obtain legal aid from legal foundations and consumer NGOs were also rejected due to their internal standard operating procedures; and

personal responsibilities involving Syariah legal matters relating to the Applicant’s marriage, which constitutes a strong precedent.

The Applicant prayed for EoT to be given so that his case may be heard on its merits as –

the application was not frivolous or vexatious;

there exists a clear arguable case;

the delay was curable by EoT supported by good reasons;

he has locus standi and was not a busybody; and

the subject matter is amenable to judicial review.

In my considered view, the reasons advanced by the Applicant do not satisfactorily account for a period of almost one year of inaction, and nor do they justify the Applicant’s prolonged failure to assert his rights. In particular, –

the Applicant had ample opportunity from 29.5.2025 to file the judicial review application but instead, he focused on attributing fault to other irrelevant parties. Judicial review is the only remedy available to the Applicant under the law to challenge the said Decision. Accordingly, the Applicant should not have delayed in filing the NoA. Somehow, the Applicant had time to pursue other remedies such as by filing Suit 104, only to have it dismissed, indicating that the Applicant failed to prove that Pos Malaysia Berhad had acted negligently in the performance of its duties;

even though the Applicant was not represented by a solicitor, he was nevertheless able to file encls. 1 and 2, and subsequently other encls. The Applicant also knows of the case authorities as mentioned in paragraph 11 of the AIS: “… a. Dalam Ketua Pengarah Kastam v Ho Kwan Seng [1972] 2 MLJ 152, bahawa kelewatan permohonan semakan kehakiman boleh dimaafkan dengan alasan munasabah; b. Dalam Rama Chandran v The Industrial Court of Malaysia & Anor [1997] 1 MLJ 145, Mahkamah Persekutuan mengesahkan kesukaran praktikal litigant in person sebagai justifikasi kelewatan di bawah Aturan 53; c. Dalam Syarikat Kenderaan XYZ v PUSPAKOM [2019] MLJU 123, di mana semakan kehakiman dibenarkan sebagai remedi terakhir bagi percanggahan dokumentasi.”, albeit as pointed out by the FC, in Ketua Pengarah Kastam v Ho Kwan Seng (supra), the Court primarily addressed the rules of natural justice rather than a consideration of EoT in the context of a judicial review application and the same can be said of R Rama Chandran’s case (supra). The citation provided for Syarikat Kenderaan XYZ is actually for the case of Freight Mark (M) Sdn Bhd v Bumi Asia Auto Sdn

granting the Applicant an EoT in these circumstances would permit an abuse of the court’s process arising from an application that is frivolous and vexatious.

In the upshot, I did not think there was a good reason to allow the Applicant’s application for EoT to file the NoA. 2nd Objection: Whether the Applicant failed to name FSSB as a party in encl.

The Applicant asserted that, under O. 53, r. 2(4) of the RC 2012, judicial review is available to any person who is adversely affected by a decision of a public authority and that FSSB is “sebuah syarikat besar mempunyai kekuatan besar” capable of applying to be heard pursuant to O. 53, r. 6 and to intervene under O. 53, r. 8(1) of the RC 2012.

The Applicant accused the FC of being bias in zealously protecting the interest of a private company rather than taking a neutral stance in assisting the Court.

It is undeniable that the Applicant’s claim before R1 was against FSSB. Therefore, any decision by this Court with regards to the NoA will affect FSSB. FSSB should be named as party in the NoA to allow it to answer or oppose the Applicant’s application.

The fact that the Applicant has failed to name FSSB as a party in encl. 1 was irrefutable. Hence, there was merit in the AG’s 2nd objection. 3rd Objection: Whether the application under O. 53, RC 2012 was irregular

The Applicant submitted that any procedural irregularities arose from his status as a litigant in person and lack of familiarity with the RC 2012, and that such irregularities were curable and should not bar access to justice. The Applicant referred to O. 2, rr. 1 and 2, RC 2012 to support his contention that technical errors were excusable and cannot form the basis of a preliminary objection. The Applicant further argued that the issues raised by the FC, which were not on the merits of the case, amount to an attempt “untuk melangkaui peringkat prosedur yang betul”.

O. 53, r. 3(2) of the RC 2012 states that “(2) An application for leave must be made ex-parte to a Judge in Chambers and must be supported by a statement setting out the name and description of the applicant, the relief sought and the grounds on which it is sought, and by affidavits verifying the facts relied on.”.

In this case, the Applicant failed to regularise the application by filing the cause papers as required under the above quoted provision separately and in the proper form. Instead, all the cause papers were filed as part of the “Afidavit Sokongan Tambahan” in encl. 6.

Further, the Applicant failed to state the impugned decision which was being challenged in the intitulement of the NoA.

In these circumstances, I accepted the AG’s objection on the ground of non-compliance with O. 53, r. 3(2) of the RC 2012 and that these irregularities were not curable under the provisions as mentioned by the Applicant.

Based on the aforesaid considerations, the AG’s objection was allowed. DATED: 7.1.2026 (ALIZA SULAIMAN) JUDGE HIGH COURT IN MALAYA KUALA LUMPUR (BKK1) The Applicant in person.