Mohamed Haniff Bin Khatri Abdulla v 1. ) Parti Pribumi Bersatu Malaysia (WA-22NCvC-497-07/2021)

1.

TAN SRI DATO’ HAJI MAHIADDIN BIN MD YASIN [Dalam Kapasitinya Sebagai Pemegang Jawatan

DATO’ SERI HAMZAH ZAINUDIN [Dalam Kapasitinya Sebagai Pemegang Jawatan

DATO’ MOHAMED SALLEH BAJURI [Dalam Kapasitinya Sebagai Pemegang Jawatan Bendahari Agung Parti Pribumi Bersatu Malaysia] … DEFENDAN-DEFENDAN 27/10/2025 14:41:05 WA-22NCvC-497-07/2021 Kand. 154

The Plaintiff’s claim against the Defendants is for payment of fees to the amount of RM12.5 million for legal services rendered to the Defendants which they have failed to pay to date.

The case proceeded to a full trial with both parties relying on oral as well as documentary evidence. Brief facts

The amount of fees claimed by the Plaintiff was derived from various services rendered to the Defendants which included the setting up and the registration of the 1st Defendant as a political party, heading the legal bureau of the 1st Defendant which included holding various meetings, filing court actions and generally giving legal advice when required by the Defendants.

The Plaintiff sent a bill to the Defendants detailing out the various services rendered. The Defendants however did not either acknowledge or respond to the legal bill prompting the Plaintiff to file this action.

The Defendants defense apart from disputing the appointment of the Plaintiff as their legal advisor contended that whatever services rendered by the Plaintiff was on a voluntary basis with no promise of payment. The issue

In the Court’s view the appointment of the Plaintiff was a non-issue as the evidence clearly proved that the Plaintiff was actively involved in the setting up of the 1st Defendant regardless of the fact that there were others involved in the formation. The documentary evidence tendered also proved without a doubt that the Plaintiff had represented the Defendants in the filing of legal suits as well as corresponding with the authorities. Ample evidence was also submitted to prove the various meetings were held in relation to the legal bureau of the 1st Defendant which the Plaintiff headed.

The actual and real issue in this case is whether there is an agreement between the Plaintiff and the Defendant to pay for the legal services rendered. Even section 116 of the Legal Profession Act 1976 (“LPA”) which is relied upon by the Plaintiff envisages an agreement whether written or oral to pay. Section 116 of the LPA states as follows:

Subject to the provisions of any written law, an advocate and solicitor or a limited liability law partnership may make an agreement in writing with his or its client respecting the amount and manner of payment for the whole or any part of the advocate and solicitor's or the limited liability law partnership's costs in respect of contentious business done or to be done by such advocate and solicitor or such limited liability law partnership, either by a gross sum, or otherwise, and either at the same rate or at a greater or lesser rate than the rate at which the advocate and solicitor or the limited liability law partnership would otherwise be entitled to be remunerated. Agreement to pay

For the issue of agreement between the parties to pay the Court sought guidance from the Contracts Act 1950 (“the Act”) which clearly stipulates what are the agreements between the parties that amounts to an enforceable contract.

Under the Contracts Act 1950 any agreement must be initiated with a proposal by the proposer which is to be communicated to the person to whom it is to be proposed. Section 3 of the Act states as follows: The communication of proposals, the acceptance of proposals, and the revocation of proposals and acceptances, respectively, are deemed to be made by any act or omission of the party proposing, accepting, or revoking, by which he intends to communicate the proposal, acceptance, or revocation, or which has the effect of communicating it.

Under section 101 of the Evidence Act 1950 the burden is on the Plaintiff to prove that there was a proposal by him to render legal services upon the payment of fees which was not only communicated but also accepted by any of the Defendants. Section 101 of the Evidence Act provides as follows:

Whoever desires any court to give judgment as to any legal right or liability, dependent on the existence of facts which he asserts, must prove that those facts exist.

When a person is bound to prove the existence of any fact, it is said that the burden of proof lies on that person. ILLUSTRATIONS

A desires a court to give judgment that B shall be punished for a crime which A says B has committed. A must prove that B has committed the crime.

In this case the Plaintiff has clearly failed to discharge the burden of proof as there was no evidence from the Plaintiff who testified as the sole witness in this case, that he had offered his services to the Defendants for the payment of a fee and this offer of service for a fee was accepted by the Defendants.

The acceptance by the Defendants must be in accordance with section 7 of the Act which stipulates that: In order to convert a proposal into a promise the acceptance must-

be absolute and unqualified;

be expressed in some usual and reasonable manner, unless the proposal prescribes the manner in which it is to be accepted. If the proposal prescribes a manner in which it is to be accepted, and the acceptance is not made in that manner, the proposer may, within a reasonable time after the acceptance is communicated to him, insist that his proposal shall be accepted in the prescribed manner, and not otherwise; but, if he fails to do so, he accepts the acceptance.

In this case the Plaintiff failed to prove that the Defendant had accepted any proposal to pay him fees for the service rendered. In fact the first time the Plaintiff made any intimation or proposal for fees was when he sent a bill for his services, and this was in the words of the Plaintiff after the ‘ Sheraton Move’. The bill was received by the Defendants but was not responded to.

The 2nd Defendant explained that the Defendants did not respond to the bill as there was no agreement in the first place for payment of any fees. This explanation by the Defendants clearly reflects a conduct to the fact that there was never any agreement to pay any fees.

Conduct of a party is a relevant fact to be considered by the Court in determining the existence of any agreement to pay. Section 8 of the Evidence Act 1950 states:

Any fact is relevant which shows or constitutes a motive or preparation for any fact in issue or relevant fact.

The conduct of any party, or of any agent to any party, to any suit or proceeding in reference to that suit or proceeding, or in reference to any fact in issue therein or relevant thereto, and the conduct of any person an offence against whom is the subject of any proceeding, is relevant if the conduct influences or is influenced by any fact in issue or relevant fact, and whether it was previous or subsequent thereto. Explanation 1 - The word "conduct" in this section does not include statements unless those statements accompany and explain acts other than statements; but this explanation is not to affect the relevancy of statements under any other section of this Act. Explanation 2 - When the conduct of any person is relevant any statement made to him or in his presence and hearing which affects his conduct is relevant.

From the evidence all that the Plaintiff could prove is that he had provided legal services to the Defendants and the Defendants had accepted the services. However, the Plaintiff failed to prove that the Defendants had accepted the service with a promise to pay a fee as a consideration. Services pro bono

Merely providing services is insufficient to render the agreement into an enforceable contract to pay. For an agreement to amount to an enforceable contract section 10(1) of the Act stipulates that:

All agreements are contracts if they are made by the free consent of parties competent to contract, for a lawful consideration and with a lawful object, and are not hereby expressly declared to be void.

The definition of consent under the Act is “Two or more persons are said to consent when they agree upon the same thing in the same sense.”

The Plaintiff contends that the only consideration envisaged in the agreement to provide the legal service is for payment of fees, as there are no other reasons to provide the services. This is strengthened by the fact that the Plaintiff had no political aspirations as he was not even an ordinary member of the 1st Defendant nor was he vying for any political gratification or position.

The 2nd Defendant on the hand contended that there was a shared sentiment shared by many to form the 1st Defendant and they volunteered their help without any payment. A lawyer Rosli Dahlan (SD1) of the same standing as the Plaintiff also testified that he had rendered his legal service pro bono so did many others. In SD1’s interaction with the Defendant at no time payment was discussed. SD1 strenuously denied that the Plaintiff had spoken about fees to be charged in a conversation with him.

Between the 2 versions of the evidence the Court found the evidence of the Defendants to be more probable. This finding was bolstered by the Plaintiff’s own admission that he only billed for payment after the “Sheraton Move” which caused him to be dissatisfied and be disappointed with the Defendants. To the Court this evidence indicates that earlier the Plaintiff had rendered his services voluntarily on a pro bono basis.

As a conclusion the Court finds that although the Plaintiff had provided extensive services to the Defendants, the services were rendered without any expectation of payment. The Plaintiff’s claim in this case is an afterthought in retaliation of the “Sheraton Move”.

In pursuance of the above findings the Court dismissed the Plaintiff’s claim with a cost of RM150, 000. Dated: 24.10.2025 sgd DATO’ HAJI AKHTAR BIN TAHIR Judge High Court of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur PARTIES For the Plaintiff: Nama Peguamcara: Muhammad Firdaus Bin Shaik Alauddin Tetuan Zharif Nizamuddin No. 22-2, Plato, Jalan USJ Heights 1/1C, 47500 Subang Jaya, Selangor Darul Ehsan. For the Defendant: Nama Peguamcara: Shu Ivy Tetuan Chetan Jethwani & Company 25, Persiaran Bukit Tunku, Taman Tunku, 50480 Kuala Lumpur, Wilayah Persekutuan Kuala Lumpur.