Mohamed Razib Bin Ahmad Din v Amli Kredit Sdn. Bhd. (Dahulunya Dikenali Sebagai Ready Cash Sdn. Bhd.) (WA-24NCvC-1313-03/2026)

Dalam Perkara Kaveat Pemegang Lien No. Perserahan 9721/2023 bertarikh 19/06/2023 ke atas Hakmilik Strata No. Hakmilik PN 79847/M5/4/465 No.Lot 44394, Sek 14, Bandar Ampang, Daerah Hulu Langat, Negeri Selangor ("Harta tersebut"); Dalam Perkara Kaveat Persendirian No Pendaftaran 00B47704/2024 bertarikh 24/07/2024 ke atas Harta tersebut; Dalam Perkara Perintah Jualan bertarikh 11/12/2024 yang dikeluarkan oleh Mahkamah Tinggi Malaya di Kuala Lumpur dibawah Saman Pemula No.WA- 24NCVC-4437-11/2024; Dalam Perkara Mengenai Seksyen 327 Kanun Tanah Negara 1965; Dalam Perkara Aturan 7 Kaedah 2 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012; Antara MOHAMED RAZIB BIN AHMAD DIN [No. K/P: 690421-02-5531] ...PLAINTIF Dan AMLI KREDIT SDN BHD [202001036805/1393126-W] ... DEFENDAN (Dahulunya dikenali sebagai READY CASH SDN. BHD.) GROUNDS OF DECISION Introduction

1. The Torrens system regulates land law in Malaysia as codified under the National Land Code 1965 (hereinafter referred to as "NLC 1965") , where registration is everything. Chapter 1 of Part 19 NLC 1965 provides for the registration of a caveat to protect/preserve one's rights over land. It also provides for the removal of a caveat by a party aggrieved by such entry of caveat. This was one such case.

2. The Plaintiff herein filed these Originating Summons seeking inter alia an order to remove a private caveat registered by the Defendant on a piece of land held under Hakmilik Strata No. Hakmilik PN 79847/M5/4/465 No. Lot 44394, Sek 14, Bandar Ampang, Daerah Hulu Langat, Negeri Selangor (hereinafter referred to as the "said land"), bearing registration No. 00B47704/2024 dated 24th July 2024.

3. Having heard learned Counsel for the parties submit with the aid of their written submissions, I had on $ 8^{\mathrm{th}} $ June 2026 allowed the Plaintiff's application and ordered the removal of the private caveat entered by the Defendant.

4. The Defendant has since filed a Notice of Appeal against the decision and I will therefore herein below set out the salient background facts, the parties' rival contentions and the reasons for my decision. Background Facts

5. The Plaintiff is a secured creditor having registered a lien holder's caveat on the said land on $ 1 9 ^{th} $ June 2023 as reflected in the land search dated $ 2 0 ^{th} $ June 2023 (Exhibit "R-1" in Enclosure 2) and the land search dated $ 5 ^{th} $ January 2026 (Exhibit "J-6" in Enclosure 5)

6. The Defendant, on the other hand, is a private limited company offering money lending services. The Defendant is a registered moneylending company under the Moneylenders Act 1951 (hereinafter referred to as "1951 Act") and hence subject to the Moneylenders (Control and Licensing) Regulations 2003 (hereinafter referred to as "2003 Regulations").

7. On 19th June 2023, the registered owner of the said land, i.e. Siti Khadijah binti Abdul Murad (hereinafter referred to as "Siti Khadijah"), had entered into a moneylending agreement with the Defendant herein for the sum of RM120,000.00. Based on the said agreement, the said land was to be charged in favour of the Defendant as security for the sum loaned.

8. The Defendant avers that Siti Khadijah had lodged a police report on 19th June 2023 stating that the original title to the said land had gone missing on 1st April 2023 (Exhibit "J-5" in Enclosure 5).

9. On 6th November 2023, the Defendant via their solicitors Messrs J.Azmi & Associates, issued a notice of demand cum recall to Siti Khadijah for the outstanding loan sum with interest of RM127, 129.69 owed as at 19th October 2023.

10. On $ 30^{\mathrm{th}} $ January 2024, the Defendant through the same solicitors issued a further notice of demand cum recall to Siti Khadijah for the outstanding sum of RM134,046.01 owed as at $ 19^{\mathrm{th}} $ January 2024.

11. On 17th September 2024, the Plaintiff via Kuala Lumpur Sessions Court Civil Suit No. WA-A52NCC-707-02/2024 obtained Judgment against Siti Khadijah (Exhibit "R-2" in Enclosure 2) with the following orders made therein: a. Defendan membayar kepada Plaintiff wang sebanyak RM245,000.00 yang terhutang setakat 6 Februari 2024; b. Faedah ke atas RM280,000.00 pada kadar 8.0% setahun dari tarikh 1 September 2022 sehingga 25 Jun 2023; c. Faedah ke atas RM270,000.00 pada kadar 8.0% setahun dari tarikh 26 Jun 2023 sehingga 6 Februari 2024; dan d. Faedah ke atas RM245,000.00 pada kadar 8.0% setahun dari tarikh 7 Februari 2024 sehingga 16 September 2024 dan seterusnya faedah ke atas RM245,000.00 pada kadar 5.0% setahun dari tarikh penghakiman (17 September 2024) sehingga penyelesaian penuh.

12. In the meantime, on 24th July 2024 i.e more than one (1) year after the loan agreement with Siti Khadijah, the Defendant registered a private caveat on the said land as reflected in Form 19B and Surat Akuan, both dated 25th June 2024, filed pursuant to Section 323 NLC 1965 (Exhibit "R-4" in Enclosure 2). This private caveat is reflected in the land search dated 5th January 2026 (Exhibit "J-6" in Enclosure 3).

13. The Plaintiff avers that Siti Khadijah had failed and/or refused to comply with the Court Order dated 17th September 2024, and as a result, the Plaintiff proceeded to obtain a Court Order for sale of the said land on 11th December 2024 vide Kuala Lumpur High Court Originating Summons No. WA-24NCVC-4437-11/2024 and a further Court Order dated 23rd July 2025 vide Kuala Lumpur High Court, Execution No.WA-38-921-04/2025 respectively for the sale of the said land via public auction to realise the judgment sum owed to the Plaintiff (Exhibit "R-3" in Enclosure 2).

14. The Plaintiff further avers that the public auction scheduled on $ 23 ^{rd} $ September 2025 in relation to the land was unsuccessful as there were insufficient bidders who were interested in bidding on the said land, which the Plaintiff contends was attributed to the private caveat registered by the Defendant.

15. It is significant to note that the Defendant had filed an application to intervene in the abovementioned execution proceedings in Suit No. WA-38-921-04/2025 but had on 29th April 2026, filed a Notice of Discontinuance pursuant to Order 21 rule 2 of the Rules of Court 2012 ("ROC 2012") (Exhibit "R-6" in Enclosure 6).

16. Thereafter, the Plaintiff commenced the application herein seeking to remove the private caveat registered by the Defendant on the said land primarily on the basis that the Defendant does not have a caveatable interest. The Parties Contentions The Plaintiff

17. The Plaintiff in support of his application to remove the private caveat on the said land, contends/submits as follows: a. that the Plaintiff had registered the lien holder's caveat on the said land prior to the registration of the private caveat by the Defendant; b. that the Plaintiff is an aggrieved party and has a caveatable interest in the said land, having obtained Judgment and the subsequent Court Orders for the sale and auction of the said land; c. that the Defendant has no caveatable interest in the said land; d. that the Defendant has failed to prove the registration of any charge in respect of the said land i.e there is no memorandum of deposit of title/memorandum of charge; e. that the Defendant is therefore an unsecured creditor and does not have a right in rem; f. that the said agreement between the Defendant and Siti Khadijah dated 19th June 2023 was unstamped and thus contrary to the provisions under Section 52 of the Stamp Act 1949 (hereinafter referred to as "1949 Act"); and g. that the remedy for the Defendant against Siti Khadijah with respect to the default of payment under the loan agreement dated 19th June 2023 is purely monetary. The Defendant

18. The Defendant in opposing the Plaintiff's application to remove the private caveat, contends/submits as follows: a. that the Defendant has a caveatable interest in the said land after having entered into a loan agreement with the registered owner, Siti Khadijah on 19th June 2023 with the said land being charged as security for the loan sum of RM120,000.00; b. that the Plaintiff does not have a caveatable interest in the said land; c. that the Plaintiff is not an aggrieved person and does not have the requisite locus standi to commence this present action; d. that the Defendant has no knowledge of the transaction between the Plaintiff and Siti Khadijah and that its private caveat was registered bona fide; e. that the Plaintiff's loan to Siti Khadijah which formed the basis of the Judgment obtain in the Sessions Court was illegal; f. that the original land title of the said land was missing as reflected in the police report lodged by Siti Khadijah on $ 1 9^{th} $ June 2023; g. that the Defendant would be severely prejudiced if this application were allowed; and h. that the Plaintiff's claim ought to be dismissed and the status quo of the Defendant's private caveat remain. Analysis

19. The law on the removal of a private caveat is well settled. Any person or body who is aggrieved by the existence of a private caveat on the land may apply at any time to the Court for an Order for the removal of the caveat pursuant to Section 327 NLC 1965, which reads as follows: "327 Removal of private caveat by the court

(1) Any person or body aggrieved by the existence of a private caveat may at any time apply to the Court for an order for its removal, and the Court (acting, if the circumstances so require, ex parte) may make such order on the application as it may think just."

20. From the above, it can be seen that the prerequisite requirement of any application for the removal of a private caveat under Section 327 NLC 1965 is that the application must be made by a person or a body 'aggrieved' by the existence of the said private caveat.

21. Further, upon an application by a person so aggrieved by the existence of the private caveat, the onus lies on the caveator to satisfy the Court that there are sufficient grounds in fact and law for the said private caveat to continue to remain on the land.

22. On the present facts, it is undisputed that the Plaintiff is a secured creditor having registered the lien holder's caveat on the said land on 19th June 2023.

23. On the issue of whether the Plaintiff is an aggrieved person pursuant to Section 327 NLC 1965, an applicant need not be a person who has a registrable interest entitling them to apply for the removal of the caveat, as it need only be a person aggrieved by the existence of a private caveat. In my considered view, the Plaintiff as a lienholder who has obtained an Order for Sale of the said land is one who is aggrieved by the Defendant's private caveat.

24. It is also not disputed that the Plaintiff's lien holder's caveat was registered prior to the Defendant's private caveat and the issue as raised by the Plaintiff is thus whether an earlier lien-holder's caveat registered pursuant to Section 330 NLC 1965 has priority over a later private caveat.

25. In this regard, reference is made to the case of Chiew Sze Sun v Muthiah Chettiar [1983] 1 MLJ 390 which was referred to by the Court of Appeal in the case of Wong Kok Leong & Anor v RHB Bank Berhad (2014) MLJU 1135 where Abdul Razak J held as follows: "But the next question that need be asked is much more fundamental. It is whether a lien-holder's caveat has priority over a private caveat where one is created earlier than the other. In this respect it is relevant to observe the provisions of section 330(5) which says:— "A lien-holder's caveat shall, so long as it continues in force, have the like effect as that specified in subsections (2) to (5) of section 322 in relation to private caveats, but as if the references in the said subsection (5) to the person or body at whose instance the caveat was entered were references to the person or body for the time being entitled to the benefit of the lien; and subsections (6) and (7) of the said section 322 shall also apply in relation to lien-holder's caveats as they apply in relation to private ones." The effect of saying in section 330(5) that a lien-holder's caveat shall have the like effect as a private caveat is clearly thus in my humble view to substitute the words "private caveat" for the words "lien-holder's caveat" in cases and instances where they appear in section 322. Thus it necessarily follows that by the necessary application of section 322(2) which is directly relevant to our problem it would prohibit the private caveat from being entered on the register document of title as against the lien-holder's since the lien-holder's caveat was created earlier than the private caveat."

26. On the present facts, it can be seen that the Plaintiff had registered a lien holder's caveat on the said land on 19th June 2023 and subsequently the Defendant had registered a private caveat on the said land on 24th July 2024. Thus, applying the cases of Wong Kok Leong (supra) and Chiew Sze Sun (supra) to the present facts, this Court is of the considered view that the Plaintiff's earlier lien holder's caveat has priority over the Defendant's private caveat.

27. Notwithstanding, one of the Defendant's main contentions in these proceedings is that the Plaintiff's loan to Siti Khadijah which formed the basis of the Judgment obtained in the Kuala Lumpur Sessions Court was illegal as the Plaintiff is not a licensed money lender.

28. In this regard, the Defendant refers to several cases such as Triple Zest Trading & Suppliers & Ors v Applied Business Technologies Sdn Bhd [2023] 6 MLJ 818; Mohamad Suffian bin Jantan Amat Mispar Iwn Ready Cash Sdn Bhd [2024] MLJU 3498 as well as Tamalarsi a/p Arumugam v Ready Cash Sdn Bhd [2024] MLJU 322. The Defendant highlights that they are a licensed moneylender pursuant to the 1951 Act whereas the Plaintiff is an individual who is not and who had given a loan to Siti Khadijah in his personal capacity. The Defendant therefore contends that any agreement or loan transaction between the Plaintiff and Siti Khadijah is rendered null and void ab initio due to illegality. The Defendant further contends that the Plaintiff ought to furnish in these proceedings the proof of payment of the loan sum to Siti Khadijah and the agreement/transaction between the Plaintiff and Siti Khadijah.

29. Strictly speaking, and in my considered view, it is unnecessary to determine the Defendant's submission on illegality. However, as the point was extensively argued, I shall briefly explain why it does not assist the Defendant.

30. As highlighted earlier, the Plaintiff is a secured creditor having registered the lien holder's caveat on the said land. The original title to the said land has always been and continues to be with the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff has also enforced the lien holder's caveat and obtained the Court Orders dated $ 1 1 ^{th} $ December 2024 and $ 2 3 ^{rd} $ July 2025 respectively, for the sale of the said land via public auction to realise the Judgment sum owed to the Plaintiff pursuant to the Court Order / Judgment dated $ 1 7 ^{th} $ September 2024.

31. This Court also notes that the earlier Judgment obtained in the Kuala Lumpur Sessions Court still stands and has not been set aside. In my view, those orders remain valid and subsisting. Until and unless they are set aside by the Court which granted them or on appeal, this Court is bound to proceed on the footing that they are effective.

32. Significantly, and as highlighted earlier, the Defendant had filed an application to intervene in the Kuala Lumpur High Court Execution No. WA-38-921-04/2025 but had on 29th April 2026 inexplicably withdrawn such application. The Defendant thus had an opportunity to assert its alleged proprietary interest directly in the judicial sale proceedings. Having elected to discontinue that application, it is difficult to reconcile that conduct with its present insistence that it possesses an interest sufficiently proprietary to justify maintaining a private caveat.

33. This Court expresses no concluded view on the legality or otherwise of the underlying loan transaction. That issue, if properly raised, falls to be determined in the appropriate proceedings. For present purposes, the Plaintiff relies upon subsisting judicial Orders which have neither been stayed nor set aside and therefore remain effective and cannot be collaterally impeached in these proceedings. This Court herein is only concerned with an application under Section 327 NLC 1965 to remove a private caveat.

34. Moving on to the issue of the principles that guide this Court when considering an application to remove a private caveat. It is trite law that when faced with such an application, this Court must first answer the following questions, namely: a. Does the Defendant have a caveatable interest in the said land? b. Are there any serious issues to be tried? and c. Where does the balance of convenience lie, i.e. is it in favour of removing the private caveat or allowing the same to remain in favour of the Defendant?

35. In determining the first issue of whether the Defendant has a caveatable interest, it is apt that I refer to the locus classicus case of Luggage Distributors (M) Sdn Bhd v Tan Hor Teng & Anor [1995] 1 MLJ 719; [1995] 3 CLJ 520, where Gopal Sri Ram JCA (as he then was) enunciated as follows: "To paraphrase s 323(1)(a) of the Code, a private caveat may be entered at the instance of any person or body who claims either:

(1) the title to land; or

(2) any registrable interest in Land. The parameters of caveatability under s 323(1)(a) are therefore circumscribed by these words: 'title' and 'registrable interest'. It is only one who makes a claim to either of these in land may enter a private caveat. Although the words 'title' and 'registrable interest' are not defined by the Code, their meaning may be gathered from the scheme of the Code and from the indefeasibility provision, namely, s 340(1). The latter points to a bifurcation between title (the equivalent of the English fee simple) and registrable interests, that is, leases, charges and easements. In my judgment, the position that obtains under the Code, so far as is relevant to the present appeal, may be stated in the following way. The Code creates three categories of interests in land. They are as follows. Category 1: Registrable interests in land. Only certain interests are capable of registration. Within this are two subcategories, namely:

36. Reference is also made to the Federal Court case of Nanyang Development (1966) Sdn. Bhd. v. How Swee Poh 145 where it held that the burden is on the caveator to satisfy the Court that it has a registerable interest in the land and that it is just for the caveat to remain.

37. It is also trite law that the onus lies with the Defendant to satisfy this Court that the grounds stated in Form 19B are sufficient in law to support a caveat, failing which the caveat must be removed without the necessity of going any further.

38. In determining this first issue, reference needs to be made to the Form 19B dated 25th June 2024 (Exhibit "R-4" in Enclosure 2), which is reproduced as follows:

40. Further, the Defendant expressly stated in paragraph 1(b) of Form 19B that "oleh yang demikian, sementara menantikan pinjaman disempurnakan pihak kami ingin memasuki satu Kaveat Persendirian untuk menjaga kepentingan pihak kami." Similar averments were made in the Surat Akuan to that effect. Quite

39. A perusal of the above Form 19B will reveal that the Defendant registered a private caveat on the said land on the basis that the Defendant had provided an offer to loan Siti Khadijah the sum of RM120,000.00 and that payment had been made to her. It is pertinent to note at this juncture that nowhere in the said Form 19B does the Defendant ever mention that the said land was security or a charge for the loan given. clearly, nowhere does it state that any further action was taken or was going to be taken by the Defendant to effect the registration of the security or charge on the said land. This is further fortified by the fact that the Defendant has never adduced any contemporaneous documents in the form of a memorandum of deposit of title/memorandum of charge in respect of the same.

41. The Court is bound by the reasons stated in the Form 19B and having perused the same, this Court is concerned with the legal basis actually relied upon by the caveator when lodging the caveat. The sufficiency of a caveatable interest must be assessed primarily on the basis upon which the caveat was lodged. Affidavit evidence may explain but cannot fundamentally transform the juridical basis asserted in the Form 19B. Based on the contents of the Form 19B, this Court agrees with the Plaintiff's submission that it fails to disclose a caveatable interest in the land and at best, the Defendants's interest is a monetary one, to wit, a repayment of the loan.

42. The Defendant in their Affidavit in Opposition annexed thereto the moneylending agreement dated 19th June 2023 between them and Siti Khadijah but the Plaintiff raises the issue that it has not been stamped pursuant to Section 52 of the 1949 Act and is therefore inadmissible.

43. In this regard, the Plaintiff relies on the case of Malayan Banking Bhd v Agencies Service Bureau Sdn Bhd & Ors [1982] 1 MLJ 198 where the Federal Court held as follows: "Thus it is clear that as to an instrument falling under any of these three categories the prohibition against admissibility is absolute. Unless it is stamped before or at the time of its execution as provided in section 41 there is no way in which it could be admitted under proviso (a) to section 52(1). In other words the prohibition is absolute or goes to the root or validity of the instrument. It is for this reason that in the case of Navaradnam v Suppiah Chettiar [1973] 1 MLJ 173 no issue was raised or could possibly be raised that a promissory note rejected for lack of stamping should be impounded and admitted on payment of proper stamps. Proviso (a) to section 52(1) simply does not cover such document. In the present case, however, the guarantee exhibit P2 is not a document which falls under any of the three categories mentioned in subsection. (1) of section 47, and that being the case, exhibit P2 could be admitted in evidence in accordance with proviso (a) to section 52(1) on payment of a penalty of $25 under section 47 of the Ordinance."

44. It is unnecessary for this Court to determine conclusively the effect of the absence of stamping. Even assuming in the Defendant's favour that the agreement is admissible and enforceable, the Defendant, in my considered view still fails to establish a caveatable interest to register or maintain the private caveat on the said land.

45. In this regard, the Plaintiff highlights and contends that the Defendant has failed to prove the registration of any charge on the said land, or make any reference/ or produce any memorandum of deposit of title/memorandum of charge. In response, the Defendant contends that Siti Khadijah had lodged a police report on $ 19^{\mathrm{th}} $ June 2023 stating that the original title to the said land had gone missing on 1 $ ^{st} $ April 2023. At its highest therefore, the evidence demonstrates an intention that the property was intended eventually to stand as security for the loan. An intention to create a charge is not itself a registrable interest in land. The Defendant is therefore required to demonstrate facts capable of giving rise to a proprietary or registrable interest recognised under the NLC 1965. On the evidence produced before this Court, I conclude that the Defendant has failed to do so.

46. The Defendant also submits that its private caveat should be allowed to remain so as to maintain status quo. However, there are no current present proceedings between the Defendant and Siti Khadijah or for that matter, with the Plaintiff herein in relation to any dispute relating to the said land. As such, and with respect, I am unable to fathom what status quo is to be maintained. On the contrary, to leave things as they stand would lead to a situation where the land cannot be auctioned.

47. Thus, having regard to the evidence before this Court, I am of the considered view that based on all the facts and circumstances as well as the grounds contained in Form 19B, they are insufficient in law to support maintaining the Defendant's private caveat registered on the said land.

48. Having found that the Defendant has failed to satisfy this Court that there are sufficient grounds in fact and law for the said private caveat to continue remaining on the said land, the private caveat must be removed without having to go any further. [See the case of Pasupathi a/l Sithamparam v Adam bin Abdullah [2019] 2 MLJ 254].

49. As such, this Court will not proceed further to deal with the remaining two issues, i.e. (a) whether there are any serious issues to be tried and (b) where the balance of convenience lies, i.e. whether it is in favour of removing the private caveat or allowing the same to remain in favour of the Defendant.

50. Before I conclude, I will also deal with one aspect of the Defendant's submissions and that was their reliance on two decisions of the High Court involving them also relating to issues of their private caveats there and those are the decisions in Tamalarsi (Supra) and Mohamad Suffian (supra). The Defendant highlights that in both of those cases, other applications to remove their private caveats were dismissed.

51. However, I am of the view that neither of those cases assist the Defendant as the facts in those cases are materially different. In neither cases there did the applicant have a lienholders caveat and various Court Orders as the Plaintiff herein does. In Tamalarsi, the Court was of the view that the Defendant's caveat should remain so as to maintain status quo pending the resolution of many serious issues which required the involvement of the vendor. In the case of Mohamad Suffian, the Court there found that there was insufficient evidence adduced by the applicant on the debt or sale which led to a conclusion that he was not an aggrieved party entitled to make such an application. That was the only basis upon which the application was dismissed and the Learned High Court Judge in that case had gone on to state at paragraph 46 of the Judgment that her decision was based purely on the basis of the applicant not being an aggrieved party and that she was not making any finding whatsoever on whether the Defendant had a caveatable interest. Conclusion

52. As such, based on the facts and circumstances of this case, the Court orders that the Defendant's private caveat be removed and the Defendant be prohibited from entering any further caveat on the said land.

53. The Plaintiff also sought an order for damages to be assessed. This Court saw no basis to make such an order. The Plaintiff's complaint that there were no bidders at the auction due to the existence of the caveat is purely speculative in the Court's view. There could be various reasons for there being no bidders. As such, in my considered view, an assessment of damages would serve no useful purpose.

54. Finally, as for costs, this Court was of the view that based on the facts of this case, there should be no order as to costs. Dated: 14th July 2026 ANAND PONNUDURAI Judge High Court Kuala Lumpur Counsel(s): En. Abby Saifuzzam from Messrs Mahyudinnzainal & Puteri for the Plaintiff. Puan Zati Khairiah Ghazali from Messrs zati Khairiah & Partners for the Defendant. Cases referred to: Chiew Sze Sun v Muthiah Chettiar [1983] 1 MLJ 390 Wong Kok Leong & Anor v RHB Bank Berhad [2014] MLJU 1135 Triple Zest Trading & Suppliers & Ors v Applied Business Technologies Sdn Bhd [2023] 6 MLJ 818 Mohamad Suffian bin Jantan Amat Mispar Iwn Ready Cash Sdn Bhd [2024] MLJU 3498 Tamalarsi a/p Arumugam v Ready Cash Sdn Bhd [2024] MLJU 322 Luggage Distributors (M) Sdn Bhd v Tan Hor Teng & Anor [1995] 1 MLJ 719; [1995] 3 CLJ 520 Nanyang Development (1966) Sdn. Bhd. v. How Swee Poh [1970] 1 MLJ 145 Malayan Banking Bhd v Agencies Service Bureau Sdn Bhd & Ors [1982] 1 MLJ 198 Pasupathi a/l Sithamparam v Adam bin Abdullah [2019] 2 MLJ 254 Legislation(s) referred to: Moneylenders Act 1951 Moneylenders (Control and Licensing) Regulations 2003 National Land Code 1965, Sections 323, 327 and 330 Rules of Court 2012, Order 21 rule 2 Stamp Act 1949, Section 52