after being given a reasonable opportunity of being heard. He is, in addition, entitled to protection from sufficient compliance with the rules of natural justice and the disciplinary procedure provided therefor: see Mohd bin Ahmad v Yang Di Pertua Majlis Daerah Jempol, Negeri Sembilan & Anor [1997] 2 MLJ 361. If the public officer succeeds in so impugning, any order of punishment, an order of dismissal, can be S/N yFCmDyohUmp5R2CtcE//g declared invalid or void, and such order being so declared void, is deemed not to have been made at all or is deemed to have been only purportedly made previously. But if the public officer fails to so impugn, any order of punishment remains and there should be no further review on such order of punishment. It cannot be denied further that the disciplining of a public officer by his department head is part of the function of the executive branch of the government and any usurpation by a court will be viewed with something very much more than disfavour even though the Judiciary is the judicial branch of the government as well as an institution which belongs to the people. To repeat, a court intervenes only on the nature and manner of accusation against a public officer as distinct from a consequential punishment as explained above. Just like a professional body being the best tribunal to judge the seriousness of misconduct of its members, in a similar vein, an employer, including a government, is the best person to judge similarly the seriousness of misconduct of an employee. [28] The principles enunciated in Ng Hock Cheng (supra) were cited with approval in Kerajaan Malaysia v Tay Chai Huat [2012] 3 MLJ 149 where the Federal Court held that: The courts have very limited review powers over administrative determinations of public bodies and are constrained to confirm the findings in disciplinary hearings … The courts cannot interfere merely because it may come to different conclusions on facts on the same basis of the same evidence. S/N yFCmDyohUmp5R2CtcE//g [29] Thus, the apex courts have ruled that the courts are not concerned with and will not interfere with the conclusions of the disciplinary authority, so long as the right procedures have been followed. In exercising its powers of review, it is not for the court to substitute the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority with its own punishment. [30] Consequently, the question of whether the punishment imposed was appropriate and proportionate to the offence, is one that is best left to the disciplinary authority. Duty to give reasons for the decision [31] Although this ground appeared to have been abandoned as no submissions were advanced by the Applicant on this ground, nonetheless for the sake of completeness, I shall deal with it. [32] The Applicant contends that when the 1st Respondent decided ot dismiss him, he ought to have been informed as to the reasons. This would assist him in deciding whether or not to appeal. [33] I am of the view that the Applicant’s contention has no merit. The Court of Appeal’s decision in Suriwong International Sdn Bhd v Menteri Kewangan Malaysia & Ors [2025] 3 MLJ 842 on the duty to give reasons is particularly instructive. It held, [92] The applicable principles may be summarised as follows. There is no duty of general application that requires reasons to be given an administrative decision. However, such a duty may arise on a case to case basis and depending on the facts and circumstances surrounding S/N yFCmDyohUmp5R2CtcE//g the exercise of a power. Where a statute expressly provides that no reason need be furnished, then effect ought ordinarily be given to such provision and a duty would be precluded from arising. Conversely, the absence of a statutory provision creating an obligation to give reasons will not prevent such a duty from being implied by law. Reasons provided ex post facto are to be disregarded by the courts. [93] If the decision in question was a straightforward one, then no duty to give reasons would arise, but where it was — to utilise the phrase used by Abang Iskandar JCA in Pembinaan Batu Jaya v Pengarah Tanah dan Galian Selangor — mired in circumstances that would invite deeper rationalisation, then it would become incumbent upon the decision-maker to explain the decision. Similarly, if all known facts and circumstances appear to point overwhelmingly in favour of one outcome but a different decision was given, then the decision must be explained. … [96] The juridical basis of the duty to provide reasons stems from the concept of fairness. In the final analysis, the court is to ask itself, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, has the applicant been treated unfairly by the decision-maker? If no unfairness has arisen by reason of the failure to give reasons, then the remedies prayed for ought rightly be refused. [34] The Applicant was informed of the particulars of the alleged disciplinary offences the 2nd Show Cause Letter. He was then given an opportunity to make representations. In respect of the 1st charge, he tendered his apology for having committed the disciplinary breach. In view of these facts, he cannot complain of not being treated fairly. That being the case, the duty to give reasons does not arise. S/N yFCmDyohUmp5R2CtcE//g Conclusion [35] Premised on the foregoing reasons, the Applicant has not established a case for review of the decision to dismiss him. In the circumstances, the application for judicial review must necessarily be dismissed. The Applicant is to pay the Respondents costs of RM 3,000.00. Dated: 12th February 2026 -sgd-Alice Loke Yee Ching Judge High Court Kuala Lumpur Counsel for Applicant: Pn. Razila binti Rashid Tetuan Razila Rashid & Partners Counsel for Respondents: Ng Wee Li (Federal Counsel) Jabatan Peguam Negara S/N yFCmDyohUmp5R2CtcE//g