Mohammad Nor Shafiee Bin Shamsudin Tigong v 1. ) Hasmadi Bin MD Said (MC-A71KJ-2-10/2023)

KERAJAAN MALAYSIA ... DEFENDANTS GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT

This case involves the Plaintiff's claim arising from a road accident that occurred on 23.5.2022, at approximately 12pm noon in front of the junction of Sekolah Menengah Kebangsaan Seri Pengkalan (“SMK Seri Pengkalan”), Alor Gajah District, Melaka. The accident involved motorcycle No. WLC 2243 ridden by the Plaintiff and motorcycle No. VDM 4067, ridden by the First Defendant and owned by the Second and Third Defendants.

During the trial:

the Plaintiff called two witnesses to support their case:

PW1 — Insp. Mohd Azmin bin Ismail (Investigating Officer); and

(ii) PW2 — the Plaintiff;

the Defendants, on the other hand, called five witnesses to testify:

DW1 — Nurul Natika (Manager of AR Kristal Enterprise);

(ii) DW2 — the First Defendant;

(iii) DW3 — Mohd Nazri bin Mat Rais (Supervisor of the team stationed at the Alor Gajah Fire and Rescue Station);

(iv) DW4 — Mohd Hakim bin Awaluddin (Assistant Director of the Engineering Division, Melaka Fire and Rescue Department); and

DW5 — Rosnita Binti Ramli (Assistant Accountant at the Melaka Fire and Rescue Department).

After a full trial and careful consideration of the submissions from both parties, this court dismiss the Plaintiff’s entire claim and allow the Defendants' counterclaim, with costs. These grounds outline the reasoning for this court’s decision.

The Plaintiff lodged a police report (P6) and given his statement to the Investigating Officer, Insp. Azmin (PW1). The Plaintiff stated that he was riding motorcycle No. WLC 2243 from his residence in Taman PDRM, Alor Gajah, heading to his workplace at Gerai Cendol Kampung Hulu, Melaka.

The Plaintiff claimed to have been riding straight in the left lane (Lane A1-A2) at a speed of 40 km/h. Upon reaching the area in front of SMK Seri Pengkalan, Alor Gajah, a motorcycle with registration No. VDM 4067, traveling from the opposite direction, suddenly turned into the junction on the Plaintiff’s left-side. Due to the short distance, the Plaintiff was unable to avoid the collision, resulting in his motorcycle hitting the left side of the other motorcycle.

According to the Plaintiff, he was riding straight in the left lane toward the Pengkalan traffic light. Near the traffic light junction, the Plaintiff intended to turn left. He further explained that at this junction, it was not necessary to wait for the traffic light to turn green, as turning left was not controlled by the traffic signal. During the examination-in-chief, the Plaintiff marked an “X” on a photograph of the scene [Exhibit P2(12)] to indicate the location of the accident. In summary, the Plaintiff’s version of events is that while traveling along the road in front of SMK Seri Pengkalan, Alor Gajah, motorcycle No. VDM 4067 ridden by the First Defendant, suddenly turned right into a junction without signalling. This caused a collision, where the Plaintiff’s motorcycle was struck by the First Defendant’s motorcycle.

On 23.5.2022, at approximately 11.37 a.m., a public complaint was received regarding a fire at an electrical pole in front of SMK Seri Pengkalan. The First Defendant, along with the Operations Team, was dispatched to the scene of the accident involving a motorcycle, a van and a fire engine. The First Defendant, accompanied by the Operations Team, proceeded toward SMK Seri Pengkalan from the Alor Gajah Fire Station with the siren sounding and beacon lights activated as soon as they departed from the fire station.

The First Defendant was riding motorcycle No. VDM 4067 with the siren sounding and the beacon lights was on. Upon reaching the intersection, the First Defendant turned right after signalling the intent to turn right to enter SMK Seri Pengkalan. Before making the right turn, the First Defendant ensured it was safe to do so, observing that other vehicles had stopped and were giving way to him. While the First Defendant was making the right turn, the motorcycle No. WLC 2243 ridden by the Plaintiff, collided with the rear left side of motorcycle No. VDM 4067, causing it to fall to the right side of the road where the collision occurred.

In brief, the First Defendant was riding motorcycle No. VDM 4067 from the direction of the Alor Gajah Fire Station toward SMK Seri Pengkalan. Whereas, the Plaintiff's motorcycle approached from the direction of Jalan Bukit Bulat/Machap Umboo heading toward SMK Seri Pengkalan on the left side of the road. Upon arriving at the location, the First Defendant made a right turn to enter SMK Seri Pengkalan. Motorcycle No. WLC 2243, coming from the direction of Pengkalan, collided with the rear left side of the First Defendant's motorcycle, causing the First Defendant to fall to the right side of the road.

(I) LIABILITY

This court determined that the Plaintiff was 100% liable for the accident based on the following reasons. It is well-established in law that when faced with conflicting versions of events, the court must decide which version is more probable, considering the circumstances of the case. To further clarify the legal position, establishing proof on the balance of probabilities means demonstrating that an event was more likely than not to have occurred. There is no requirement for the Plaintiff to prove with absolute certainty 100% that the First Defendant's negligent act caused the accident. The Plaintiff only needs to show that it was at least 51% likely to have been the case, as supported by the case of Elizabeth Chin Yew Kim v Dato Ong Gim Huat (sued as public officer of Hospital Lam Wah Ee) and Other Appeals [2017] 1 MLJ 328, CoA.

The Plaintiff’s Delay in Lodging the Police Report (P6)

In the current case, the Plaintiff delayed lodging the police report significantly. The Plaintiff only lodged the report (P6) on 2.10.2022, despite the accident occurring on 23.5.2022. During re-examination, the Plaintiff claimed that he was unwell and that no police officer called him to lodge the report. However, the Plaintiff was not hospitalized. The Defendants argued that this explanation was unreasonable, considering the circumstances. Moreover, there is no legal obligation for the police to summon anyone involved in an accident to file a report.

The excessive delay on the Plaintiff’s part (PW2) in lodging the police report raises the contention that it may have been an afterthought and does not reliably reflect what transpired at the material time. This Court is of the considered view that a police report serves as a contemporaneous record of corroborating what was said and alleged to have occurred in an accident. However, the extended delay in this instance indicates a high probability that crucial details of the accident had faded from the Plaintiff's memory. A long delay in lodging a report also leaves room for fabrication. In other words, a police report should be made at the earliest convenient time, as highlighted in the case of Tengku Mahmood v Public Prosecutor [1974] 1 MLJ 110, ARCJ.

This Court also referred to the police report (D5) filed by the First Defendant on 24.5.2022, approximately one day after the accident. In the said police report (D5), the First Defendant stated that he had sounded the siren and activated the beacon lights on his motorcycle, and that the Plaintiff’s motorcycle of No. WLC2243, coming from the direction of Pengkalan, collided with the rear left side of his motorcycle. This Court observed that the First Defendant’s police report, made only one day after the incident, retained all essential and relevant details of the accident while his memory was still fresh. Therefore, this Court found the First Defendant’s police report to be clearer and more credible than the Plaintiff’s police report which was filed much later (Ruslan bin Ahmad v Shamsudin bin Spani [2024] MLJU 3152, HC).

This Court is also guided by Sahari Bin Masrom v PP [2009] 2 MLJ 859, HC, which emphasizes that an unexplained delay can diminish the evidentiary value of a police report. As such, The principle in this case underscore the importance of timely and adequately explained reports to maintain their credibility and usefulness in judicial proceedings. This Court noted that the evidential value of a police report lies in its role in demonstrating the consistency of the complainant’s conduct and assertions in court. Such a police report can only be used to establish credibility and consistency with the testimony provided in court as corroboration. Importantly, a police report must be made voluntarily and at the earliest convenient time. Lodging a report after a significant lapse of over four months, as in the current case, raises concerns of fabrication and diminishes its reliability. Additionally, no “reasonable” explanation was provided by PW2 to justify the delay. In this context, the significant lapse of time, coupled with the absence of a sufficiently cogent explanation from the Plaintiff himself (PW2), renders the police report (P6) here of minimal evidentiary value.

Evidences of the Witnesses 16. It is appropriate to examine the other available evidences, given the conflicting accounts provided by both sides, before reaching a definitive conclusion. The test applied, as endorsed by the Court of Appeal in San Seong Choy & Ors v Yuson Bien [1963] MLJ 235, is that in cases where conflicting versions are presented, that the photographs, plans and measurements of the scene, as well as the nature of the damage to each vehicle, provide the most reliable guide by which such evidence can be tested. The same principle was further reinforced in Lee Ewe Teik v Ariffin Hussain [1990] 2 CLJ (Rep) 332, HC, stating that when there are opposing versions of how the collision occurred.

Inspector Azmin (PW1) was called to the witness stand to provide evidence in his capacity as the investigating officer. PW1, in the course of investigating the road accident, presented findings from his investigation. PW1 testified that he visited the scene of the incident on 23.5.2022, at 12.00 p.m. According to PW1, the Plaintiff was riding from the direction of bottom to top, as shown in the sketch plan (P1), while the First Defendant was coming from the top to bottom direction and turned left at the junction, as indicated in the same sketch plan (P1). Based on PW1's investigation, he reached the following conclusions for this court’s assessment:

17.1 PW1 marked “B” on the sketch plan (P1) to indicate a friction mark, which was identified as the point of initial collision between the two motorcycles, while mark “C” indicated the location of scattered vehicle debris. The First Defendant stated that the accident occurred at the location marked as "X" in the sketch plan, and DW3 also confirmed that the accident happened at the same location marked as "X". DW3 was present at the scene and was riding on the back of the First Defendant’s motorcycle at the time of the incident. This Court found that the point marked "X" was closer to the front SMK Seri Pengkalan compared to point "B." This lends greater credibility to the First Defendant's version, as it aligns with the nature of the impact. The First Defendant’s motorcycle sustained damage to its left rear section, supporting the conclusion that their account is more inherently probable. Additionally, the location where the Plaintiff's motorcycle fell was also near the front junction of SMK Seri Pengkalan, at the roadside, well before A1-A2 in the sketch plan. If the accident had occurred at point “B”, it would be expected that the positions of both motorcycles to be within A1-A2 lane in the sketch plan (A1). However, this was not the case. The sketch plan of the accident scene (P1) is reproduced below to aid in understanding this court’s decision: -

17.2 Further, PW1 could not confirm whether the siren was sounding or the beacon lights were activated at the time of the accident because, upon arrival, the engines of both motorcycles and the fire truck had already been turned off. PW1 noted that when he arrived at the scene, the First Defendant had already been taken to the hospital, while the Plaintiff remained at the scene. This Court is mindful that PW1, the investigating officer, was not present at the scene when the accident occurred and did not obtain statement from any other eyewitness. At the time of the incident, more than one fire vehicle was dispatched to the scene. According to the testimonies of DW2 (the First Defendant) and DW3, they activated the siren and beacon lights, and exercised caution while driving. DW2 stated that he waited until it was safe and was given the right of way before making a right turn. The siren and beacon lights were used to alert the public of the emergency and to request a clear path. Referring to the facts of this case, this court found that the Defendants successfully demonstrated that the siren and beacon lights were indeed activated, as previously stated. It was because the Plaintiff, during cross-examination, agreed that the traffic light at the material time was green as he passed through the junction. The Court does not overlook the Plaintiff's argument that he did not need to wait for the traffic light to turn green, as left turns were not controlled by the traffic light. However, the Plaintiff himself recalled seeing the green traffic light at the time. If this is accurate, the First Defendant had ensured it was safe to make the right turn and that other vehicles had stopped to give way to the First Defendant. The activation of the siren and beacon lights successfully drew the attention of other vehicles, even under the green light conditions. These factors support the acceptance of the First Defendant's version of events; and

17.3 At the time of the accident, the Plaintiff did not hold a valid driving license and his motorcycle also lacked valid road tax. Initially, PW1 stated that he proposed the First Defendant be issued a summons under Rule 3(2)(b) of LN 166/59. However, after discussions with the District Traffic Chief and the Deputy Public Prosecutor, it was recommended that the case be classified as "No Further Action" (NFA). Subsequently, upon further review by the prosecution's office, it was decided to place the case under "Kemas Untuk Simpan" (KUS) until the resolution of the civil claim here. PW1 was directed to revisit the investigation paper after the civil case concluded, in other words no final decision had yet been reached. PW1 confirmed that his stand remained unchanged as to his original recommendation which was to issue a summons to the First Defendant.

The Plaintiff’s counsel argued that it is an undisputed fact that the Plaintiff was riding straight, while the First Defendant turned across the opposite lane at the time of the accident. The Plaintiff’s route was a straight road with no bends. It was highlighted by the Plaintiff’s counsel that the First Defendant did not mention stopping before making the right turn in either the police report (D5) or the witness statement. Therefore, the Plaintiff’s counsel contended that the cause of the accident was the First Defendant’s failure to yield the right of way to the Plaintiff and ensure the turn was safe before proceeding. The Plaintiff’s counsel thereafter referred to Rule 3(2)(b) of the Road Traffic Rules 1959 (LN 166/59), which requires a driver or rider on the road to yield the right of way to oncoming traffic traveling straight ahead before making a turn across that traffic.

Based on the evidences of the witnesses before this court, the accident occurred in front of a school where traffic was heavy. PW1 confirmed that the area was crowded with vehicles on the day of the incident. The First Defendant and DW3 testified that they had been given the right of way before making the turn. Both the First Defendant and DW3 stated that they did not see the Plaintiff’s motorcycle when they were about to turn. However, upon re-examination, the First Defendant mentioned that at the time of turning, the Plaintiff’s motorcycle was not at the scene, and they were unsure of where it came from or how fast it was traveling.

DW3, the operations supervisor in the fire engine team, testified that the fire engine and the First Defendant’s motorcycle were approximately 10 feet apart. Due to the close distance and the higher vantage point of the fire engine, DW3 had a clear view of how the accident occurred. Regarding the Plaintiff’s motorcycle, DW3 stated that it only became visible when the accident occurred. The Plaintiff’s motorcycle suddenly appeared, speeding from the left of the First Defendant’s motorcycle as the latter was nearing the intersection. During cross-examination, DW3 explained that they had stopped for about 10 to 15 seconds and only proceeded after ensuring both lanes were safe before the First Defendant and the other fire vehicles entered the road leading to the reported fire at an electrical pole in front of SMK Seri Pengkalan.

The Defendants argued that the Plaintiff was riding at an excessive speed. The Senior Federal Counsel on behalf of the Defendants also submitted that the Plaintiff was thrown off his motorcycle during the accident. Considering the location of the incident at a school zone where all drivers are required to drive below the speed limit of 40 km/h. If the Plaintiff had been riding at a slower speed, he could have avoided the accident or, at the very least, would not have been thrown off the motorcycle if the accident still occurred. The Defendants also addressed the issue of right of way. They referred to Rule 9 of the Road Traffic Rules 1959 (LN 166/1959), which states that fire engines on urgent duty have the right of way over all other traffic, provided they announce their approach by sounding a distinctive siren, bell, or two-tone horn, provided that such priority shall not relieve the driver of such a vehicle of their liability under civil law or the provisions of any law relating to dangerous, careless or inconsiderate driving.

At the material time, the First Defendant, along with DW3 and other fire brigade personnel, was on official duty responding to a fire incident. DW2 and DW3 testified that they had received a call regarding a electrical pole fire in front of SMK Seri Pengkalan. This testimony was corroborated by PW1, who confirmed evidence of the fire impact in front of the school area. The evidence regarding the fire aligns with the Call Card (CAD), marked as D12, which indicated a report of a fire and listed the fire vehicles dispatched to the scene. The duty of the court to assess the inherent probability or improbability of a version based on a set of facts requires a thorough evaluation and assessment of the totality of both oral and documentary evidences to determine the truth. Ultimately, the task is not just to decide whom to believe but to ascertain whose version is more inherently probable. This principle was articulated in Chong Keow @ Chong Seaw Oon (suing The Administrator of The Estate of Wong Kooi Tai @ Wong Foo Keak-Deceased) v Shaari Yaacob [1988] 1 CLJ 325, HC.

This Court found the defendants' version to be inherently probable, based on significant evidences highlighted by PW1 himself regarding the movement of traffic at the accident scene and the nature of the damages sustained by both motorcycles. In road accident cases, such evidence of damages part of the vehicle is crucial in determining liability (Hua Marketing Sdn Bhd & Anor v Jellas Nyotet [2007] 1 LNS 423, HC). What stands out in the current case is the extensive damage to the Plaintiff’s motorcycle (No. WLC 2243), which was severely crushed at his front part, compared to the damage sustained by the First Defendant’s motorcycle (No. VDM 4067). The First Defendant’s motorcycle suffered damage only to the left rear section, as reflected in the Puspakom report on page 49 of Bundle C, marked as D11. The report specifically noted that the left rear box bracket was bent and the left rear box was dented. This Court found that the damages observed are inconsistent with the Plaintiff’s version of the accident and instead support the First Defendant’s account. It is evident that the First Defendant began his turn towards the SMK Seri Pengkalan, out of lane A1-A2, after ensuring that no vehicles were using the straight road heading towards the junction of traffic light, at the material time. Whilst, the Plaintiff claimed that he was riding straight and had the right of way towards the junction, turning left at the traffic light to Kampung Hulu. This is not a general situation here where the First Defendant reasonably expected a safe and unhindered turn to the emergency scene after ensuring that no vehicles coming.

The concept of the right of way is a fundamental traffic rule that determines which vehicle has the right to proceed first in a given situation. While the Plaintiff generally had the right of way, the nature of the damages to both motorcycles suggests that the First Defendant, despite being granted traffic priority, cannot be entirely absolved of riding in a manner that may not have been fully considerate or careful. Based on the evidenceS and the sketch plan (P1), the accident occurred outside the A1-A2 lane, indicating that the First Defendant’s motorcycle had ensured the road was clear before initiating the turn. However, the Plaintiff, arriving later, had an unobstructed view of the First Defendant’s motorcycle making the turn on a straight road without curves. The Plaintiff failed to exercise due caution, resulting in a collision with the rear section of the First Defendant’s motorcycle. In such situation, a motorcycle traveling straight does not automatically take precedence over one already in the process of turning into a junction, especially when the turn has been initiated by the First Defendant. It was the Plaintiff’s responsibility to ensure that the First Defendant’s motorcycle had completely entered the junction in front of SMK Seri Pengkalan before proceeding straight. The Plaintiff’s failure to do so, leading to the collision, places the primary responsibility for the accident on him.

Generally, a turning rider might bear liability if the damage to their motorcycle occurred at the front, as it would suggest that the other vehicle held the primary right of way. However, in the current case, the damage to the First Defendant’s motorcycle, VDM4067, was to the left rear section. This strongly indicates that the First Defendant had nearly completed the turn before the collision occurred. In this context, the Plaintiff had a duty to maintain proper vigilance and lookout while riding straight. Upon seeing the rear section of the First Defendant’s motorcycle already turning into the junction near SMK Seri Pengkalan for the emergency response to a electrical pole fire, it was foreseeable for the Plaintiff to exercise caution. However, for the First Defendant, whose focus was on maneuvering forward, it would have been nearly impossible to avoid the accident by checking behind him for another vehicle. The First Defendant’s attention had to remain on the road ahead, not on monitoring potential impacts from behind, which were beyond his control or anticipation.

Therefore, this court found that the plaintiff failed to prove, on the balance of the probabilities, his claim against the defendants. As such, the counter claim is allowed where the defendant to claim from the Plaintiff 100%.

QUANTUM OF DAMAGES (BASED ON 100% LIABILITY)

Plaintiff’s claim (if there is an appeal)

Although the Plaintiff's claims were dismissed with costs, for the purpose of completeness in the current case, this Court has assessed the quantum of damages as follows:- General Damages No. General Damages Plaintiff’s submission Defendants’ submission Court’s Award 1. Cerebral Concussion (medical report from Hospital Alor Gajah) RM6,000 RM5,000 RM6,000 (refer to

Closed Displaced Fracture Distal End Left Radius and Ulna RM30,000 RM25,000 RM25,000 (refer to Azri Ayub v Shanmugam Balakrishnan & Satu Lagi; Ayub Othman (Pihak Ketiga) [2011] 1

Multiple laceration wounds over facial regions RM10,000 RM2,500 (combine)

Deep Laceration wounds over Left Upper Lip RM8,000 (facial laceration includes wound over lip, refer to Razali @ Mohd Leey Subeh v Safwa Global Venture (M) Sdn Bhd & satu lagi [2024] PILRU 22) TOTAL GENERAL DAMAGES RM49,000 Special Damages The Plaintiff claims special damages as follows. No. Special Damages Plaintiff’s submission Defendants’ submission Court’s Award 1. Travel expenses for family members visiting the Plaintiff at Hospital Alor Gajah RM100 Objection Dismissed 2. JPJ search Receipt of RM10 No objection Granted – RM10 3. PDRM fee Receipt of RM10 No objection Granted – RM10 TOTAL SPECIAL DAMAGES

If, this case is appealed and the High Court is not with this trial court’s findings on the issue of liability, the following is the court’s award regarding the quantum of damages of the Plaintiff’s claim:-

General damages of RM49,000;

Special damages of RM20;

Interest at the rate of 5% per annum upon general damages from the date of the service of the writ until date of judgment;

Interest at the rate of 2.5% per annum upon special damages from date of accident until the date of delivery of judgment;

Interest at the rate of 5% per annum upon the total judgment sum from the date of this judgment until full and final settlement; and

Cost is according to scale costs as provided under O59 r23(1) of the Rules of Court 2012.

Defendants’ Counterclaim and Conclusion 29. As decided earlier regarding liability, this court found that the Defendants had successfully proven the Plaintiff’s negligence on the balance of probabilities. Accordingly, in the current case, this court granted an award for the repair cost of the First Defendant's motorcycle, No. VDM 4067. The Defendants counterclaimed against the Plaintiff for the repair costs of the motorcycle amounting to RM9,694.00 as special damages.

In claims for special damages, the exact loss must be specifically pleaded, as the precise amount of damages must be clear before the trial, since it has already occurred and thus become crystallized, where it can be measured with complete accuracy. It is crystal clear that the purpose is to alert the Plaintiff and provide notice of what they need to address at trial (Sam Wun Hoong v Kader Ibramshah [1980] 1 MLRA 712; [1981] 1 MLJ 295, Federal Court). In the current case, the accident occurred on 23.5.2022, but the repair process for the motorcycle only began on 1.11.2023. The Plaintiff submitted, referring to Exhibit D14 (Pembelian Terus: Pelawaan Tawaran Harga), that the significant delay before the motorcycle was repaired raises concerns about whether the repairs were limited solely to damages caused by the accident. Among the parts replaced was the front fork costing RM3,430.00, which was not mentioned in the Vehicle Inspection Certificate (pages 49-50, Bundle C). Additionally, damage to the front fork was not documented in the Malaysian Vehicle Accident Report prepared by the Public Works Department, Melaka (pages 52-55, Bundle C).

Hence, the Plaintiff’s counsel further contended that the Defendants could not substantiate that the replacement of the front fork costing RM3,430.00 was a result of the accident. In this context, the Plaintiff proposed that this amount be disallowed, leaving RM6,264.00 as the reasonable repair cost. It was noted that the Defendants had opened a tender for the repairs, which was awarded to AR Kristal Enterprise. Although there were differing terminologies calling the damaged component part of the motorcycle No. VDM 4067 in the Technical Damage Report, the Puspakom Report and the Quotation from AR Kristal Enterprise, DW4 clarified that these technical terms referred to the same issues. SD5 also confirmed that a payment of RM9,694.00 was made by the government for the repairs to the said First Defendant’s motorcycle. This payment was deposited with AR Kristal Enterprise, as verified by DW1, and was documented in the iGFMAS Payment Details (Exhibit D18), which bore a “paid” stamp.

Therefore, regarding the repair costs of RM9,694.00, this court found that the Defendants have successfully proven the special damages on a balance of probabilities. The reasons for this finding are due to the total repair costs claimed by the Defendants in the counterclaim amounting to RM9,694.00 were supported by a quotation prepared by AR Kristal Enterprise as verified by DW1, the manager of the AR Kristal Enterprise; and, DW4, the Assistant Director of the Engineering Division of Melaka Fire and Rescue Department, who testified about the motorcycle's damages and the costs required to make it roadworthy again. Upon consideration of the available evidences of the witnesses, this court concludes that the quotation relied upon by the Defendants provided sufficient details and presented an accurate picture of the actual repairs required, which were appropriately and specifically pleaded.

Premised on the above, this Court allowed the Defendants’ counterclaim as follows: a) Special damages of repair costs of the motorcycle No. VDM 4067 in the sum of RM9,694.00; b) Interest at the rate of 2.5% per annum upon special damages from date of accident until the date of judgment; c) Interest at a rate of 5% per annum upon the sum from the date of judgment until the date of full and final settlement; and d) Cost is according to scale costs as provided under O59 r23(1) of the Rules of Court 2012. Dated this 27 January 2025 SGD ------------------------------ TEOH SHU YEE MAGISTRATE MAGISTRATES’ COURT AT ALOR GAJAH FOR THE PLAINTIFF : En. Thangaraj & Pn. Thiruchelvi TETUAN M. THANGARAJ & CO. FOR THE DEFENDANTS : SFC Puan Zairani binti Tugiran PEJABAT PENASIHAT UNDANG-UNDANG