Mohammad Yusyairi Bin Saidin v Pendakwa Raya (K-06A(M)-22-09/2017)

The Appellant was charged before the Alor Setar High Court with the following offence: “Bahawa kamu pada 21 hb. September 2014, di antara jam lebih kurang 2.30 pagi hingga jam 7.00 pagi 21hb. September 2014 di KM 10 Tempat Rehat dan Rawat Gunung Inas, Jalan Balin-Pengkalan Hulu, di dalam Daerah Baling, Dalam Negeri Kedah Darul Aman telah membunuh Hasma Norlela binti Zaini (No. Kad Pengenalan: 610417-08-6312) dan dengan itu kamu telah melakukan satu kesalahan yang boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 302 Kanun Keseksaan.”

At the end of the trial, the appellant was found guilty and convicted of the offence charged. He was sentenced to suffer the death penalty.

The appeal before us was in respect of the said conviction and sentence. We dismissed the appeal after due consideration of issues raised and submissions made in support thereof. We affirmed the order of conviction and sentence by the High Court. We now give our reasons. 3

Briefly, on 21.09.2014, at about 7.30 am, Kpl Hasanan Bin Hj Abd Aziz (PW4) received a call from one Zulkifle Bin Saad (PW1) informing him that there was a dead female body found lying on her stomach at the R& R Gunung Inas, Jalan Baling-Pengkalan Hulu, Baling, Kedah.

He immediately lodged a report and informed his superior, ASP Md Nadzir Bin Osman (PW12), who was the Chief of the District’s Crime Department.

When PW12 arrived at the crime scene, he found a naked female body as reported, lying on her stomach with multiple stab wounds but with no identification document.

A post-mortem on the body confirmed that the cause of death was a stab wounds to the neck. There were about 17 stab wounds all over the deceased’s body.

A further investigation revealed that the deceased was reported missing since 20.09.2014 by her son, Mohammad Syahibul Shafiq bin Baharuddin (PW7) who lodged a police report vide Grik Report No. 2699/14 (P64). The deceased was confirmed as Hasma Norlela Binti Zaini by PW7 who went to identify the body.

According to PW7, he had last seen his mother on 20.09.2014 at about 11.15 p.m. when she returned home to change her rain-soaked cloth. After changing her cloth, he saw his mother entering 4 into a black car being Perodua Kenari through the front passenger side which was parked near their house. The car then was driven away. PW7 also testified that the black Perodua Kenari seized from the accused’s house was similar to the one he saw fetching his mother that night.

The deceased’s friend, Robayah Binti Daud (PW3) testified that she met the deceased on 20.09.2014 at 8.00 p.m. when she fetched the deceased to her restaurant. She however did not realize when the deceased left the restaurant thereafter.

On the 24.09.2014, the appellant was arrested by Insp Abdul Aziz Mat Resop (PW9) in front of the 4th Battalion of Border Regiment Camp, Grik Perak. The appellant was wearing his army uniform when he was arrested. PW9 then brought the appellant back to his house and asked him to change into normal clothing.

PW9 testified that:

He saw a black Perodua Kenari bearing registration no WMJ 8029 (P 82) parked in front of the house when he reached the appellant’s house. The said Perodua Kenaris’s door was unlocked. When he opened the door, he could smell blood.

(ii) Upon questioning, the appellant informed PW9 that he had burned the deceased’s cloth and personal items. He had washed the shoes that he wore on the night that he was with the deceased and put it under 5 a refrigerator. The appellant also showed PW9 the location of his shoes and the deceased’s CIMB ATM Card. The card was found on a dressing table in one of the rooms in the house.

(iii) The appellant then led PW9 and his team to the place where he had burned the deceased’s cloth and personal items. At the burning site, PW9 found one mobile phone and a green bracelet, both with burning marks. [13] The Chemist, Asfarina Binti Jamal Mohideen (PW2) testified that the blood traces in the black Perodua Kenari, a knife (P18A) and other exhibits were proven to be containing the deceased’s DNA. They are: “(i) Satu profil DNA perempuan diperolehi daripada pita pelekat “1” dan kesan darah pada tisu “E1”, jam “E2”, ranting kering “6”, kapas kesat “8” dan “N5”, keratan kuku “12” dan “13”, sarung kotak tisu “N6”, kusyen kereta “7” serta alas kaki “N8” yang kepadanan di antara satu sama lain dan dengan profil DNA yang didapati daripada kesan specimen darah “16” (dilabel sebagai “Hasma Norlela Binti Zaini”), ini menunjukkan bahawa DNA yang dikenal pasti tersebut berasal daripada sumber yang sama.

(ii) Satu profil DNA lelaki diperolehi daripada kesan DNA surih pada hulu pisau “N12” yang berpadanan dengan profil DNA yang didapati daripada spesimen darah “N24” (berlabel “Mohammad Yusyairi Bin Saidin”), ini menunjukkan bahawa 6 DNA yang dikenal pasti tersebut berasal daripada sumber yang sama.

(iii) Satu profil DNA separa (pada 14 lokus) diperolehi daripada kesan darah pada kapas kesan “N11” yang berpadanan dengan profil DNA yang didapati daripada kesan spesimen darah “16” (dilabel sebagai “Hasma Norlela Binti Zaini”). Ini menunjukkan bahawa DNA yang dikenal pasti tersebut konsisten berasal daripada sumber yang sama.

(iv) Satu profil DNA campuran (sekurang-kurangnya dua individu) diperolehi daripada kesan darah pada jam tangan “N20” yang mana penderma kesan spesimen darah “16” (dilabel sebagai “Hasma Norlela Binti Zaini”) dan penderma spesimen darah “124” (berlabel “Mohammad Yusyairi Bin Saidin”) masing-masing adalah konsisten sebagai penyumbang major dan penyumbang minor kepada profil DNA campuran ini.

Kesan darah yang terdapat pada sarung kotak tisu “N6” kusyen kereta “N7” serta alas kaki “N8” yang telah diambil oleh ASP Chong Kean Hean (SP11) daripada dalam kereta Produa Kenari nombor pendaftaran WMJ 8029 milik Mohammad Yusyairi Bin Saidin adalah berpadanan dengan profil DNA simati Hasma Norlela Binti Zaini.

(vi) Profil DNA separa diperolehi daripada kesan darah pada kapas kesat “N11” yang telah diambil oleh SP11 dari dalam kereta Mohammad Yusyairi Bin Saidin (di bahagian bumbung sebelah dalam kereta) adalah berpadanan dengan profil DNA simati Hasma Norlela Binti Zaini.

(vii) Profil DNA campuran (sekurang-kurangnya dua individu) diperolehi daripada kesan darah pada jam tangan “N20” yang dirampas oleh SP9 semasa sedang dipakai oleh Mohammad Yusyairi Bin Saidin ditangan kanannya adalah konsisten simati 7 Hasma Norlela binti Zaini dan Mohammad Yusyairi Bin Saidin sebagai penyumbang major dan penyumbang minor kepada profil DNA campuran tersebut.” [14] The Pathalogist, Dr. Mohd Suhani bin Mohd Noor (PW5) testified that the following injuries were found on the deceased: “(i) kesan melecet di bahagian dahi dan pipi kanan;

(ii) luka tikaman berukuran 1.4 cm di tepi kanan muka, satu luka tikaman dan hirisan cetek di sekitar bahagian tepi leher;

(iii) terdapat 4 luka tikaman ukuran di antara 1.5 cm hingga 6 cm di sekitar bawah dagu kanan dan di sebelah kanan atas leher;

(iv) terdapat 5 luka hirisan berukuran antara 3-8 cm di sebelah hadapan leher serta satu luka tikaman berukuran 4 cm;

terdapat 2 luka tikaman serta luka hirisan yang berukuran 5.5 cm hingga 8 cm di sebelah kanan bahagian pangkal leher;

(vi) terdapat luka hirisan cetek serta kesan melecet kecil di sekitar tulang selangka kiri;

(vii) terdapat satu luka tikaman berukuran 3 cm di buah dada kiri dan kesan melecet pada buah dada kanan;

(viii) terdapat 3 luka hirisan berukuran 2-2 cm di bahu kanan dan di bahagian atas lengan kanan;

(ix) terdapat kesan lebam di lengan kanan bawah dan luka hirisan di tangan; dan

ada kesan melecet di bahagian bawah belakang badan. 8 [15] According to PW5, the 4 stabs wound at paragraph (iii) above were grave and serious and he confirmed that the cause of death of the deceased was stab wounds to the neck. PW5 further stated that the injuries were due to repeated blunt trauma by sharp-edged object like the knife (P18A) which was seized from the appellant’s house. Finding of Trial Judge at End of Prosecution Case [16] At the close of the prosecution’s case, the learned trial judge had considered the elements to be proven by the prosecution for offence of murder. For ease of reference, the gist of the learned trial judge’s grounds can be summarized below: “(a) Hasma Norlela Binti Zaini (simati) telah mati

Jelas daripada keterangan saksi-saksi pendakwaan terutama melalui keterangan saksi SP7 iaitu anak simati, identiti simati telah dikenal pasti sebagai Hasma Norlela Binti Zaini sepertimana pertuduhan. SP5 iaitu Dr. Mohd Suhani Bin Mohd Noor di dalam keterangan lisannya dan juga laporan postmorterm mengesahkan identiti simati melalui pegawai penyiasat SP12 yang juga mengenal pasti identiti simati melalui pengesanan cap jari (P46). Isu identiti ini juga tidak dicabar oleh pihak pembelaan. Oleh itu, identiti simati tidak menjadi isu di dalam kes ini.

Simati mati akibat kecederaan yang dikenakan ke atasnya oleh tertuduh, 9

Diteliti keseluruhan keterangan saksi pendakwaan, tiada keterangan terus berkaitan penglibatan tertuduh dengan kematian simati. Pendakwaan bergantung kepada keterangan ikut keadaan (circumstantial evidence) dan keterangan berbentuk maklumat yang diberikan oleh tertuduh yang membawa kepada penemuan fakta (Seksyen 27 Akta Keterangan 1950).

(ii) Pihak pendakwaan merujuk kepada keterangan SP9 serta dokumen, P68, P70, P71, P74, P75 dan P76 untuk mahkamah menerima masuk daripada tertuduh sendiri dalam bentuk maklumat yang membawa kepada penemuan fakta. Antaranya barang yang dirampas ialah kad ATM CIMB yang berada di atas meja solek di dalam bilik tertuduh adalah dalam keadaan tidak tersorok dan terdedah. Gelang P35A dijumpai di tempat pembakaran sampah.

(iii) Walau bagaimanapun, jika diteliti keterangan lisan SP9, serta catatan di P68 dan laporan P27 terdapat perbezaan yang nyata. Catatan tangan SP9 di P68 serta keterangan lisan SP9 tidak sama dengan laporan polis P70 yang dibuat oleh SP9 dan tiada penjelasan diberikan oleh SP9 kenapa ayat “dalam dan seluar dalam mangsa alat makeup” di dalam P68 tidak terdapat dalam P70.

(iv) Memandangkan terdapat percanggahan berkaitan maklumat yang diberikan oleh tertuduh antara keterangan lisan serta P68 dan P70, maka keterangan berkaitan maklumat di bawah Seksyen 27 Akta keterangan tidak diterima masuk (kes Amathevelli P. Ramasamy v PP (2009) 3 CLJ 109). 10

Walaupun maklumat yang diberikan oleh tertuduh tidak diterima masuk sebagai keterangan, tetapi ia tidak menjejaskan keterangan saksi-saksi pendakwaan berkaitan kelakuan tertuduh di bawah Seksyen 8 Akta Keterangan 1950 (kes Amathevelli P. Ramasamay (supra).

(vi) Keterangan SP7 yang menyatakan bahawa pada 20.09.2014 jam lebih kurang 11.00 malam ibunya telah balik ke rumah untuk menukar pakaian dan keluar semula pada jam lebih kurang 11.15 malam menaiki sebuah kereta jenis Perodua Kenari berwarna hitam yang diparkirkan di hadapan sebuah hotel berdekatan rumahnya. SP7 juga apabila ditunjukkan gambar kereta Produa Kenari telah mengesahkan bahawa kereta tersebut adalah sama dengan kereta yang dinaiki ibunya pada malam tersebut.

(vii) SP9 yang merampas kereta Perodua Kenari tersebut daripada tertuduh. Semasa membuka pintu telah terhidu bau hanyir darah. SP11 dari Unit Forensik PDRM telah mengambil 4 contoh swab disyaki darah dari empat tempat berlainan dalam kereta tersebut dengan menggunakan empat batang kapas kesat berasingan. SP12 Pegawai Penyiasat yang telah menerima empat swab disyaki darah menyerahkan kepada SP2, Pegawai Sains di Jabatan Kimia Pulau Pinang untuk dianalisis. Hasil analisis mendapati kesan darah yang diperolehi dari kusyen tempat duduk penumpang hadapan serta kesan darah pada kotak tisu dan alas kaki getah yang diambil dari dalam kereta Perodua Kenari WMJ 8029 disahkan terdapat DNA simati (rujuk laporan kimia P4). Oleh itu, kesimpulan yang boleh dibuat bahawa barang kes milik simati yang 11 dijumpai di rumah dan di perkarangan rumah tertuduh serta keterangan kelakuan dan keterangan ikut keadaan menjurus kepada penglibatan tertuduh dalam mendatangkan kecederaan dan menyebabkan kematian ke atas simati.

Perbuatan tertuduh tergolong dalam kategori yang dinyatakan di bawah Seksyen 300 Kanun Keseksaan:

SP5 mengesahkan bahawa kecederaan yang bersifat maut di perenggan (iii) laporan post-morterm (P46) adalah bersifat maut kerana ia menyebabkan kecederaan kepada salur darah menyebabkan berlaku pendarahan yang teruk. Kecederaan tikaman ini telah menembusi bahagian belakang halkum iaitu vena hampir putus. Oleh itu, kecederaan yang dialami simati pada lazimnya cukup untuk menyebabkan kematian menurut limb (c) Seksyen 300 Kanun Keseksaan.” [17] Having found that the prosecution had made out a prima facie case, the learned trial judge called upon the appellant to enter his defence. The Defence [18] The defence advanced by the appellant was that he had no intention to kill the deceased and that the death of the deceased was accidental. [19] In his evidence given under oath, the appellant narrated the events leading to a quarrel. According to the appellant, he and the deceased used to date. The deceased had persistently asked him to 12 marry her. He always refused as he was not ready. Moreover, he is a married man. [20] On that fateful night, he fetched the deceased from her house using his black Perodua Kenari and brought her to R&R Gunung Inas upon the deceased’s request. The deceased wanted to discuss about the same marriage issue again. However, the discussion sparked into a heated argument between them. He alleged that the deceased had attacked and choked him with her hand preventing him from breathing. [21] In an act of self-defence, he reached out for a knife, which he always kept in a compartment at the driver’s door for security purposes, and unconsciously he began to stab the deceased. According to the appellant, the deceased was a strong woman, twice his size. He claims that he never intended to kill the deceased but just wanted to defend himself. Finding of the Trial Judge at the Conclusion of the Trial [22] The learned trial judge had made a specific finding of facts as follows: “(a) Tertuduh tidak menafikan menikam simati tetapi membangkitkan pembelaan di bawah S.96 Kanun Keseksaan iaitu hak tertuduh untuk pertahanan persendirian (right of private defence).

Tertuduh hanya perlu membuktikan atas imbangan keberangkalian bahawa tindakan tertuduh menikam simati serta 13 menyebabkan kecederaan lain adalah untuk mempertahankan dirinya daripada dicekik oleh simati.

Daripada keterangan, adalah jelas bahawa tiada saksi mata yang melihat bagaimana kejadian ini berlaku. Hanya keterangan daripada tertuduh yang menyatakan bahawa dia dicekik oleh simati hingga menyebabkannya tidak dapat bernafas lalu mengambil pisau yang berada di dalam poket pintu sebelah pemandu dan menikam simati untuk melepaskan diri dari cekikan simati.

Adalah jelas simati hanya menggunakan tangan untuk mencekik leher tertuduh. Keterangan tertuduh yang menyatakan bahawa simati berbadan besar daripadanya tidak bermakna kekuatan simati melebihi tertuduh kerana tertuduh seorang anggota tentera dan sentiasa menjalani latihan kecerdasan serta latihan fizikal. Umur tertuduh pula 36 tahun semasa kejadian berbanding umur simati 53 tahun. Ini membuktikan tiada wujud bahaya kepada nyawa atau kecederaan besar kepada diri tertuduh sama ada secara sebenar atau jelas.

Daripada keterangan tertuduh, tiada tindakan yang diambilnya untuk menyelamatkan diri atau melepaskan diri melainkan mencapai pisau yang berada di dalam poket bahagian pintu hadapan pemandu dan menikam simati bertubi-tubi. Tertuduh boleh saja menolak atau menendang simati dan membuka pintu di bahagian pemandu, keluar untuk melepaskan diri daripada cekikan simati atau menikam di bahagian tangan simati yang mencekik lehernya tetapi tertuduh telah menikam di bahagian vital iaitu leher simati bukan satu tapi 4 kesan luka tikaman yang mengakibatkan kematian simati. Oleh itu, tertuduh tiada justifikasi di dalam keadaan ini untuk menikam simati bertubi-tubi di bahagian vital. 14

Mengambil kira keseluruhan keterangan saksi, keterangan ikut keadaan dan keterangan pakar dan saintifik adalah diputuskan bahawa tertuduh telah gagal untuk membuktikan atas imbangan keberangkalian atas haknya untuk mempertahankan diri. Dengan menikam simati sebanyak 17 tikaman serta tikaman yang dibuat ke atas bahagian penting tubuh menunjukkan bahawa tertuduh telah melangkau hak mempertahankan diri. Oleh itu, tertuduh gagal untuk menimbulkan keraguan munasabah ke atas kes pendakwaan.” [23] Consequently, the learned trial judge found that the prosecution had proved its case beyond reasonable doubt. The Appeal [24] The learned counsel canvassed only one issue before us, namely whether the defence of private defence applies. Learned counsel submitted that the Appellant had never intended to kill the deceased. Instead he just wanted to defend himself when the deceased violently attacked him and choked him with her hand preventing him from breathing. Thus, the appellant is entitled to seek shelter under the general exception housed in section 96 of the Penal Code. Our Finding [25] Section 96 of the Penal Code reads as follows: - “Nothing is an offence which is done in the exercise of the right of private defence.” 15 [26] It is pertinent to observe that “private defence” is not defined in the Code itself. We are in agreement with judgment of this court in Daud Passarin v PP [2016] 10 CLJ 32 where the following was stated: - “Suffice to say that the right of self-defence is not a carte blanche right to unnecessarily inflict bodily harm or injury onto others at the slightest opportunity. Indeed the law has set out strict parameters within which that right may be invoked and when it should cease to be pursued by the accused person. Among others, in the context of this case before us, there must exist the necessity to take away a person's life. As such, that right of self-defence does not extend to inflicting more harm than is necessary. Section 102 of the Penal Code expressly stipulates: The right of private defence of the body commences as soon as a reasonable apprehension of danger to the body arises from an attempt or threat to commit the offence, though the offence may not have been committed; and it continues as long as such apprehension of danger to the body continues. [32] Essentially it is but a shield, and only in grave circumstances can it legitimately partake or assume, as it were, the role of a sword. The exercise of that right is therefore fully circumscribed. It is a right born out of necessity in the form of self-help to protect oneself from harm's or danger's way.” [27] It must be remembered however that the right of private defence does not “extend to the inflicting of more harm than is necessary for the purpose of defence” per Ajaib Singh in Public Prosecutor v Ngoi Ming Sean [1982] 1 MLJ 24. 16 [28] We are also in agreement with the position stated in the case of Public Prosecutor v Dato' Balwant Singh (No 2) [2003] 3 MLJ 395 as follows:- “The provisions of law that I have referred to must be read together. In Malaysian law, the right of private defence under the Penal Code is much wider than that under English law (see Musa bin Yusof v Public Prosecutor [1953] MLJ 70). The right of private defence commences as soon as there is reasonable apprehension of danger to the body of a person and this right continues for so long as such apprehension of danger to his body or life exists (see Public Prosecutor v Ngoi Ming Sean [1982] 1 MLJ 24; Ya bin Daud v Public Prosecutor [1997] 4 MLJ 322). It must, however, be noted that the [2003] 3 MLJ 395 at 445right has a limitation (see Public Prosecutor v Lee Poh Chye & Anor [1997] 4 MLJ 578). If a person either has time to have recourse to seek the protection of a public authority (see Public Prosecutor v Ngoi Ming Sean) or inflicts more harm than is necessary for the purpose of defending his life and limb then such a right will no longer be available (see Lee Thian Beng v Public Prosecutor [1972] 1 MLJ 248). In this regard, it must be noted that whilst it is true that no man can be expected to assess with scientific accuracy the precise amount of force that is necessary to defend himself from an attack, any retaliation in the exercise of private defence should not exceed what is reasonably necessary to avert the assailant's attack (see Mallal's Penal Law, p 134). Thus, an accused person should not be allowed to put his superiority to such use so as to beat up the assailant (see Public Prosecutor v Lee Twe Jeat [1994] 3 SLR 219) but merely to defend himself. However, it must be noted that a man who is about to be attacked does not have to wait for his assailant to strike the first blow (see Beckford v R (1987) 3 All ER 425). He need not wait till he is actually attacked or inflicted with injury in order to react (see Govindan v State of Kerala (1960) 47 AIR 258). He is not obliged to run away; the law 17 does not require a citizen to behave like a coward (see Mohd Khan v State of Madhiya Pradesh (1972) Cri LJ 661 of 662). If he is unable to escape, he may turn round and attack (see Public Prosecutor v Yeo Kim Bok [1971] 1 MLJ 204). He need not cooly reflect on his right or measure his blows before defending himself. Thus when a person is attacked by a stick it is impossible to calculate the force of the blow before he can act (see Iman Din v Emperor (1925) AIR Lahor 514). The law does not require that the person should have exercised a calm and cool judgment and that he should weigh his acts in golden scales (see State of UP v Ram Swarup (1974) Cri LJ 1035; Jai Dev v State of Punjab AIR 1963 SC 612; Wassan Singh v State Punjab (1996) Cri LJ 878). The person does not have to be inflicted with serious injury before the exercise of the right of private defence can begin (see Ya bin Daud v Public Prosecutor; Beckford v R [1987] 3 All ER 425). A person is not bound to modulate his defence step by step before the right to defend himself can begin (see Sitaram v Emperor (1925) 26 Cri LJ 587 At 589). He can make sure that his defence is effective. Thus, a person having reasonable grounds to believe the existence of imminent danger can use a gun in self-defence (see R v Collin Chisom (1963) 47 Cr App R 130; Bhagwan Swarop v State of MP

Cri LJ 777). He may inflict injuries on his aggressor for the purpose of defence as well as for preventing further aggression. Therefore, if there is an apprehension of further violence the right of private defence comes in (see Re Amnu Pujary (1942) 43 Cri LJ 753). It is not only the injuries already inflicted but the injuries the attacker might inflict if the defender does not exercise his right of self-defence that must be taken into consideration (see Public Prosecutor v Yeo Kim Bok [1971] 1 MLJ 204). Thus, a person is not obliged to wait until the attack upon him is repeated (see R v Conlon

69 Crim R 92). Even if the aggressor is disarmed but there is a possibility of him wrestling the weapon from the defender the latter has a right to use violence. The fact that the aggressor was unarmed while the accused was armed with a revolver cannot affect 18 the right of private defence (see Public Prosecutor v Ngoi Ming Sean). When an injury is inflicted upon a person by a stick he can use his gun to defend himself (see Bhagwan Swarop v State of MP

Cri LJ 777). In Public Prosecutor v Yeo Kim Bok [1971] 1 MLJ 204, it was held that a reasonable apprehension of danger and the right of private defence in relation to that fear extended to even the killing of the aggressor. The person who is facing a reasonable apprehension of danger to his body or life is not obliged to retreat but may pursue his adversary till he finds himself out of danger, and if in a conflict between them, he happens to kill, such killing is justifiable (see R v Mc Innes [1971] 3 All ER 295; Musa bin Yusof v Public Prosecutor; Ya bin Daud v Public Prosecutor). In any case where a plea of self-defence has been raised, the prosecution has to show beyond reasonable doubt that the accused did not act in self-defence and even if the prosecution succeed the other possible issues will remain, including whether there was the necessary intent to constitute the crime of murder (see Palmer v R [1971] 1 All ER 1077 of 1085; Tony ak Beliang v Public Prosecutor [2003] 1 CLJ 482; Kesha v State of Rajasthan (1993) Cri LJ 3674). This means that even if the court is left in reasonable doubt about the existence of the right of private defence there must be an order of acquittal (see Zecevic v DPP (1987) 162 CLR 645). The test of a reasonable cause of apprehension of death or of grievousness is an objective test (see Ya bin Daud v Public Prosecutor; Soosay v Public Prosecutor [1993] 3 SLR 272). The burden of proving the defence of private defence is upon the accused on a balance of probabilities a (see Public [2003] 3 MLJ 395 at 446 Prosecutor v Teo Eng Chen & Ors [1988] 1 MLJ 156; Ya bin Daud v Public Prosecutor; Mohd Ramzani v State of Delhi

Cri LJ 1010; State of UP v Ram Swarup (1974) Cri LJ 1035; Lee Thian Beng v Public Prosecutor).” 19 [29] We have perused the evidence in detail and we are satisfied that there is sufficient material to support the charge and we agreed with the finding of the learned trial judge that the appellant had not discharged the burden placed on him to establish the act of self-defenced. On the totality of evidence, we are of the considered view that the learned trial judge was correct to hold that the act was done with the intention of causing bodily injury which injuries were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. [30] To conclude, we find there is no merit in the appeal and the conviction is safe. [31] Accordingly, we dismissed the appeal. Dated: 28th September 2020 sgd AHMAD NASFY HAJI YASIN Judge Court of Appeal Malaysia Putrajaya 20 Counsel/Solicitors For the Appellant: Yagoo Subramaniam (messrs. Yagoo & Associates (Penang)) For the Respondent Nurshafini binti Mustafha Deputy Public Prosecutor (Attorney General’s Chambers)