(iii) establish that it warrants further consideration during the substantive stage. [15] Founded on these principles, this court will consider this application to commence leave for judicial review. Objection by the Attorney General [16] It was submitted by learned Senior Federal Counsel that when the Attorney General appears at leave stage, the Attorney General appears not for the respondent, but in the capacity as Attorney General. [See: Kijal Resort Sdn Bhd v. Pentadbir Tanah Kemaman & Anor [2016] 1 MLJ 544] [17] Senior Federal Counsel submitted that the role of Attorney General at the leave stage is to assist the court in sieving out frivolous applications by appraising the court of any particular features of the case that would disqualify leave being granted. [18] In this application for leave to commence judicial review proceedings, the applicant is seeking to challenge the Public Prosecutor’s decision to apply for an acquittal and discharge of the second respondent in a criminal case against the second respondent. [19] The Attorney General is objecting to this application for leave to commence judicial review proceedings on the grounds that the Impugned Decision is not amenable to judicial review. [20] In support of this argument, learned Senior Federal Counsel submitted that post the Federal Court decision in Sundra Rajoo a/l Nadarajah v. Menteri Luar Negeri, Malaysia & Ors [2021] 5 MLJ 209, the exercise of the Attorney General/Public Prosecutor’s discretion under Article 145(3) of the Federal Constitution is susceptible to judicial review, but only in the narrowest circumstances and subject to a higher and move stringent threshold of scrutiny. [21] In coming to this position, the Federal Court had considered the cases of Teh Cheng Poh v. Public Prosecutor [1979] 1 MLJ 50; Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374 and Lim Kit Siang v. Dato’ Seri Dr. Mahathir Mohamad [1987] 1 MLJ 383. [22] In Teh Cheng Poh (supra), the Privy Council reviewed whether the Public Prosecutor had lawfully exercised discretion in prosecuting an offence under subsection 57(1) of the Internal Security Act 1960 (ISA). Lord Diplock ruled that the Public Prosecutor had the authority to choose among the ISA, the Arms Act 1960, and the Firearms (Increased Penalties) Act 1971 for prosecution. As no evidence suggested misuse of this discretion, the charge against the appellant was upheld. [23] In Ramalingam Ravinthran v. Attorney General [2012] 2 SLR 49 the Singapore Court of Appeal’s stated: “24 … Relevant factors for the Prosecution’s consideration in making prosecutorial decisions include the available evidence, public interest considerations, the personal circumstances of the offender, the offender’s degree of culpability, etc. Where these factors apply differently to different offenders, this would justify differential treatment between them. The only qualifications stated in Teh Cheng Poh are that there must be no bias on the Prosecution’s part and irrelevant considerations must not be taken into account. BA-25-73-12/2023 25 In applying the aforesaid criteria to the facts of Teh Cheng Poh, the Privy Council observed (at 56) that “there [was] no material on which to found an argument that in the instant case [the Malaysian AttorneyGeneral] exercised [the prosecutorial discretion] unlawfully”. In other words, the Privy Council stated that a mere allegation that the Malaysian Attorney-General had exercised his prosecutorial power unlawfully, unsupported by evidence, could not engage Art 8(1) of the Malaysian Constitution. Although the actual outcome in Teh Cheng Poh was ultimately based on other grounds, it was implicit in this finding that if the appellant had somehow been able to produce evidence that the Attorney-General of Malaysia had not given unbiased consideration to his case or had taken into account irrelevant considerations in deciding to charge him with a capital offence, Art 8(1) of the Malaysian Constitution would have been infringed. 26 Hence, Teh Cheng Poh stands for the principle that (in our local context) the Attorney-General may not exercise his prosecutorial power under Art 35(8) of the Constitution in breach of Art 12(1) (or, for that matter, in breach of any other fundamental liberty set out in Pt IV of the Constitution) – but, if the offender alleges such a breach has occurred in his case, the burden lies on him to produce evidence of the alleged breach. … 27 That the burden of proof lies on the offender in this regard is a wholly trite proposition that is reflected in s 103(1) of the Evidence Act, which states that “[w]hoever desires any court to give judgment as to any legal right or liability, dependent on the existence of facts which he asserts, must prove that those facts exist”. In constitutional challenges to the prosecutorial discretion based on an alleged breach of one or more of the fundamental liberties enshrined in the Constitution, it is only when enough evidence is adduced to show a prima facie breach that the evidential burden will be shifted to the Attorney-General to justify his prosecutorial decision.” [Emphasis added] [24] In Teh Cheng Poh (supra) and Ramalingam (supra), it was established that any challenge to the Public Prosecutor’s exercise of discretion requires evidence that the discretion was exercised unlawfully. In the landmark Sundra Rajoo (supra) case, the Federal Court, led by the Chief Justice, considered this principle, emphasizing that it should align with traditional grounds for judicial review as defined in Council of Civil Service Unions (supra). The court further underscored that the Public Prosecutor must exercise discretion in good faith, professionally, lawfully, and with regard to public interest, as reinforced in Lim Kit Siang (supra). [25] Drawing from these principles, the Federal Court concluded that the Public Prosecutor’s discretion under Article 145(3) cannot be unrestricted, as that would undermine the rule of law. However, making it entirely open to judicial review with a low threshold for leave could breach the separation of powers and harm public interest. To maintain a balance among these interrelated factors, a two-step threshold test was established. In this regard, the Federal Court in Sundra Rajoo (supra) held as follows: “[96] The AG/PP by constitutional design has access to the police, investigation papers and other core decisive material which ultimately factor into his decision to charge or not to charge a person or to otherwise discontinue proceedings. The AG/PP is the guardian of public interest and so he factors not just the law and legal principles but also matters relevant to public policy and national security. The courts, also by constitutional design, do not have the same benefit. Such design is inherent in the mechanism of our adversarial system which is grounded or rooted in the doctrine of separation of powers. Some degree of judicial deference to executive discretion of the AG/PP is necessary so as not to stymie our justice system. [97] Deference does not however translate to complete surrender. Ours is a system built on constitutional supremacy where accountability, separation of powers and rule of law take centre stage. Much headway has been made in our constitutional jurisprudence to curate the fine balance between policy considerations on the one side, and the adjudication and supervision of the legality of State action by the judicial branch – on the other. This gradual shift from unfettered discretion to restricted supervision is apparent from the judgment of this court in Peguam Negara Malaysia v. Chin Chee Kow & Another Appeal [2019] 4 CLJ 561; [2019] 3 MLJ 443 (“Chin Chee Kow”). … [109] That said, we accept that at stake in all review cases is the notion that the courts must be cautious not to run awry of the fine dividing line of the doctrine of separation of powers. In this regard, while the AG/PP’s powers are reviewable, the AG/PP’s discretion under art. 145(3) of the FC, as a matter of policy, remains subject to a higher threshold of scrutiny…” [Emphasis added] [26] The Federal Court in Sundra Rajoo (supra) emphasised the Public Prosecutor’s discretion under Article 145(3) is cloaked with a strong presumption of legality. Pertaining to this, the Federal Court held as follows: “[113] In all challenges against the decisions of the AG/PP exercising his powers under art. 145(3) of the FC, the position is that his decisions are cloaked with the presumption of legality. The onerous burden lies on the challenging party to overcome the strong presumption of legality with compelling prima facie evidence of grounds to review the AG/PP’s decision within the recognised reasons for judicial review.” [Emphasis added] [27] The Federal Court then developed a two-step threshold test that must be met at the leave stage for any application challenging the strong presumption of legality in the Public Prosecutor’s discretion under Article 145(3) as reproduced below: “[114] Based on the foregoing authorities, it can be surmised that any challenge must therefore pass a two-step threshold which must be satisfied at the leave stage of any application for judicial review. [115] Firstly, the burden of proof lies on the applicant. The applicant will have to show that he has a legal basis to challenge the decision of the AG/PP. This refers to the traditional grounds of judicial review and other bases implicitly recognised by the earlier judgments on this subject, including but not limited to: