Mohd Azwan Bin Azlan Manimaran (NB-83-145-09/2023)

Tertuduh telah tidak mengaku bersalah apabila pertuduhan dibacakan dan masih mengekalkan pengakuan tidak bersalah sepanjang perbicaraan dijalankan. Pertuduhan kepada tertuduh adalah seperti berikut: “Bahawa kamu pada 19/5/2018 jam lebih kurang 0945 hours, di KM 1, Jalan Juaseh-Terusan, di dalam daerah Kuala Pilah, dalam negeri Negeri Sembilan, sebagai penumpang motosikal No: RQ 6294 telah menunggang kenderaan tersebut di atas jalan dengan cara yang bahaya tanpa mengambil perhatian tentang segala hal dan telah menyebabkan kemalangan jalan raya dengan sebuah motosikal No: NAX 4147, dan seterusnya menyebabkan kematian kepada penama: Wong Lai, Kpt No: [Type the document title] 2 | P a g e 460319-05-5001 dan oleh yang demikian kamu telah melakukan satu kesalahan yang boleh dihukum di bawah Seksyen 41(1) Akta Pengangkutan Jalan 1987 (Akta 333).

Semasa perbicaraan, pihak pendakwaan telah memanggil seramai 7 orang saksi iaitu:- SP1: Wong Mai Chan (waris kepada si mati) SP2: Hairul Azizi bin Izli (pemandu motokar NCL 7678) SP3: Muhammad Zaid bin Zolkipli (doktor bagi laporan perubatan) SP4: Sahri bin Sulaiman (pemilik motosikal RQ 6294) SP5: Muhammad Zahazry bin Zaharudin (pemeriksa kenderaan PUSPAKOM) SP6 : Shamsul Bahar bin Sutarman (jurufoto) SP7 : Muhammad Helmi bin Hussin (pegawai penyiasat kes)

Di dalam kes pendakwaan, SP2 merupakan saksi yang dikatakan telah menyaksikan kejadian ini. Berdasarkan keterangan SP telah memberitahu bahawa dia telah melihat satu kemalangan jalan raya. Kemalangan jalan raya ini melibatkan dua buah kenderaan iaitu sebuah motosikal jenis Yamaha (no. pendaftaran: RQ 6294), (dirujuk sebagai M1) dengan sebuah lagi motosikal jenis Honda (no. pendaftaran: NAX 4147), (dirujuk sebagai M2). [Type the document title] 3 | P a g e

SP1 pula merupakan waris anak kepada mangsa di dalam kes ini. Berdasarkan keterangan yang telah dikemukakan di Mahkamah, SP1 membuat laporan polis setelah dimaklumkan oleh jirannya bernama Ah Hua. SP1 juga menjelaskan bahawa segala maklumat diperoleh daripada Ah Hua merupakan kata-kata daripada Encik Hairul iaitu SP2 di dalam kes ini. SP1 juga menjelaskan bahawa dia tidak berada di tempat kejadian ketika kemalangan tersebut berlaku.

SP7 merupakan pegawai penyiasat kes ini. Berdasarkan keterangan SP7, siasatan yang telah dijalankan juga berdasarkan maklumat daripada saksi bebas iaitu SP2. Peranan pihak pendakwaan di akhir kes pendakwaan 6. Di akhir kes pendakwaan, adalah tanggungjawab Mahkamah untuk memutuskan samada pihak pendakwaan berjaya membuktikan prima facie seperti diperuntukkan di bawah Seksyen 180 Kanun Tatacara Jenayah, di mana dibaca seperti berikut :

When the case for the prosecution is concluded, the court shall consider whether the prosecution has made out a prima facie case against the accused.

If the court finds that the prosecution has not made out a prima facie case against the Accused, the court shall record an Order of acquittal. [Type the document title] 4 | P a g e

If the court finds that a prima facie case has been made out against the Accused on the offence charged the court shall call upon the Accused to enter on his defence.

Dalam konteks ini, Mahkamah perlu mengambil kira semua bukti pada tahap tertinggi dalam menentukan samada pendakwaan berjaya membuktikan prima facie kes di akhir kes pendakwaan. Di dalam kes PP vs Sukumaran a/l Sudram [1999] 4 MLJ 426 menjelaskan prinsip berikut Simply put the standard proof of prima facie case is now a prima facie evidence and not conclusive or beyond reasonable doubt evidence. A prima facie case is made out where there is sufficient credible prima facie evidence establishing each essential ingredients of the offence for a supposition of guilt if it is not answered by the Accused

Dalam konteks ini, Mahkamah turut merujuk kes Balachandran v PP di mana Mahkamah perlu membuat penilaian bukti-bukti yang dibawakan oleh pihak pendakwaan dengan teliti dan memenuhi elemen jenayah seperti yang dituduh kepada Tertuduh. Di dalam kes Balachandran v PP [2005] 1 CLJ 85 the Federal Court dinyatakan seperti berikut: “The test at the close of the prosecution would therefore be. Is the evidence sufficient to convict the Accused if he remains silent? If the answer is in the affirmative then a prima facie case has been made out”. [Type the document title] 5 | P a g e

Oleh itu, sekiranya Mahkamah mendapati pihak pendakwaan telah membawa bukti dan berjaya memenuhi kehendak dan elemen jenayah pertuduhan, adalah memadai untuk Mahkamah mensabitkan Tertuduh. Di dalam kes PP v Mohd Radzi Bin Abu Bakar [2006] 1 CLJ 457 menjelaskan prinsip pembuktian kes prima facie seperti berikut: “… ask yourself the question: If I now call upon the Accused to make his defence and he elects to remain silent am I prepared to convict him on the evidence now before me? If the answer to the question is “Yes” then a prima facie case has been made out and the defence should be called. If the answer is “No” then a prima facie case has not been made out and the Accused should be acquitted”.

Justeru itu, di dalam kes ini, pihak pendakwaan hendaklah memenuhi elemen di dalam Seksyen 41 (1) Akta Pengangkutan Jalan Raya 1987 seperti berikut:

(1) Mana-mana orang yang memandu suatu kenderaan motor di jalan dengan melulu atau dengan kelajuan atau dengan cara, setelah mengambil perhatian tentang segala hal keadaan (termasuk jenis, keadaan dan saiz jalan, dan kesesakan lalu lintas yang dijangkakan yang ada atau mungkin ada di jalan itu) merbahaya kepada orang awam, menyebabkan kematian mana-mana orang, melakukan kesalahan dan apabila disabitkan hendaklah dihukum penjara selama tempoh tidak kurang daripada lima (5) tahun dan tidak lebih daripada [Type the document title] 6 | P a g e sepuluh (10) tahun dan denda tidak kurang daripada dua puluh ribu ringgit dan tidak lebih daripada lima puluh ribu ringgit. Dengan ini pihak pendakwaan mestilah membuktikan bahawa; a) mana-mana orang memandu suatu kenderaan dengan melulu atau membahayakan; b) dan tindakan ini menyebabkan kematian kepada seseorang.

Di dalam kes Mat Atan Ahmad v PP [2021] 1 LNS 2075 di mana Mahkamah Tinggi telah menjelaskan seperti berikut:- .. in Ramiah v Public Prosecutor [1972] 2 MLJ 258, for a conviction under Section 34A of the Road Traffic Ordinance 1958, which is the antecedent of Section 41(1) of the Road Transport Act 1987, following the principle of law set out in R v Gosney [1971] 3 All ER 220, the Court held that two things must be established by the prosecution. Firstly, there must be a situation created by the accused which, viewed objectively, is dangerous. As “dangerous driving” is not defined by the statute, it is for the court to come to a decision on the evidence and reported cases can only serve as illustration. Secondly, the prosecution must prove that when creating such a situation the appellant must be at fault. “Fault involves a failure; a falling below the care and skill of a competent and experienced driver, in relation to the manner of driving and to the relevant circumstances”. [Type the document title] 7 | P a g e Prima facie kes 12. Di dalam kes ini, kes telah dirayu ke Mahkamah Tinggi oleh pihak pendakwaan dan YA Mahkamah Tinggi telah mengarahkan OKT untuk membela diri.

Justeru itu, Mahkamah ini tidak akan membincangkan berkaitan adakah pihak pendakwaan berjaya membuktikan prima facie kes kerana Mahkamah Tinggi telah pun memutuskan bahawa wujudnya prima facie di dalam kes ini pada 18 Julai 2023.

Kes di peringkat pembelaan Dalam peringkat pembelaan, pihak Defendan hanya memanggil satu saksi sahaja iaitu OKT sendiri. OKT telah memberikan keterangan secara bersumpah di kandang saksi.

Dalam keterangan OKT, Nahkamah telah meneliti beberapa isu penting dalam membuat pertimbangan.

Pertama berkaitan keterangan OKT sama ada bersifat konsisten atau afterthought. Dalam isu ini, Mahkamah telah meneliti keterangan OKT. OKT pada awal pemeriksaan utama menjelaskan bahawa dia dapat melihat Si Mati pada jarak 10 hingga 15 meter. Namun pada pemeriksaan balas, OKT mengubah keterangan di mana dia dapat melihat Si Mati pada jarak 30 hingga 40 meter. [Type the document title] 8 | P a g e Berdasarkan keterangan ini, tandaan P di mana OKT melihat mangsa (Si Mati) adalah meragukan. Tandaan P juga di mana dikatakan pelanggaran berlaku juga tidak boleh diterima oleh Mahkamah ini.

Percanggahan keterangan OKT ini adalah material dan OKT juga tidak berjaya meyakinkan bahawa pelanggaran pada tandaan P. Justeru, Mahkamah memutuskan bahawa keterangan OKT adalah rekaan semata-mata. Mahkamah ini juga mendapati keterangan OKT ini juga bersifat afterthought kerana keterangan ini langsung tidak diberikan semasa siasatan dijalankan.

Mahkamah juga meneliti persoalan seterusnya sama ada keterangan OKT selanjutnya adalah selamat untuk diterima? Dalam konteks ini, OKT di dalam keterangannya menyatakan bahawa dia telah menunggang di bahagian kanan lorong. OKT juga memaklumkan kepada Mahkamah bahawa dia telah berada di lorong kanan untuk membelok ke kanan memasuki simpang lampu isyarat yang berada di hadapan.

Mahkamah ini berpandangan bahawa alasan yang dinyatakan oleh OKT juga adalah tidak berasas dengan hanya menyatakan bahawa motosikal ditunggangnya di bahagian kanan lorong tersebut kerana OKT ingin membelok ke kanan memasuki simpang lampu isyarat yang berada di hadapan. [Type the document title] 9 | P a g e

Mahkamah ini juga berpandangan bahawa adalah tidak logik untuk OKT membuat keputusan menunggang motosikal di bahagian paling kanan lorong tersebut sekiranya simpang lampu isyarat tersebut masih berada jauh di hadapan dari tempat kejadian berlaku.

Mahkamah ini juga merujuk kepada keterangan OKT semasa pemeriksaan balas di mana OKT tidak nampak warna lampu isyarat di situ dan OKT telah bersetuju bahawa dia tidak nampak. Dan pihak pendakwaan telah mencadangkan kepada OKT, jika OKT tidak nampak, sudah pasti kedudukan OKT masa tersebut berada lebih dari 50 meter, dan OKT telah tidak bersetuju.

Dalam hal ini, Mahkamah berpandangan bahawa adalah tidak logik OKT tidak dapat melihat warna lampu isyarat jika berada pada jarak yang dekat. Oleh yang demikian, Mahkamah ini berpandangan bahawa keterangan OKT ini adalah suatu rekaan semata-mata dan Mahkamah ini berpandangan keterangan OKT adalah tidak selamat untuk diterima oleh Mahkamah ini.

Mahkamah ini juga meneliti keterangan OKT di mana terdapat pergerakan Si Mati dari titik P ke Z dan ketika sampai di titik Z tersebut, OKT mengatakan bahawa dia tidak dapat mengelak Si Mati yang sedang melalui laluan tersebut dan menyebabkan perlanggaran berlaku. Mahkamah setelah menyemak keterangan [Type the document title] 10 | P a g e OKT dan mendapati bahawa keterangan ini tidak dapat disokong dengan mana-mana keterangan lain.

Mahkamah ini juga berpandangan sekiranya kedua-dua kenderaan dalam keadaan bergerak dan OKT berada di dalam kelajuan motosikal pada kadar 40-50km/j (berdasarkan keterangan OKT), kedudukan akhir kenderaan Si Mati, kesan calar pada jalan dan kesan kerosakan kenderaan Si Mati akibat perlanggaran tidak akan seperti mana yang dibentangkan oleh pihak pendakwaan sebelum ini. Keterangan-keterangan ini akan sedikit berbeza memandangkan impak perlanggaran bagi suatu kenderaan yang sedang bergerak dengan satu kenderaan lagi yang turut bergerak akan berbeza dengan keadaan kemalangan yang satu kenderaannya statik dan satunya lagi sedang bergerak.

Terdapat juga beberapa keterangan OKT yang hanya sekadar tidak setuju dengan soalan Timbalan Pendakwa Raya tanpa memberikan sebarang penjelasan yang munasabah dan tiada pemeriksaan semula dari pihak pembelaan bagi menjelaskan versi keterangan tersebut.

Mahkamah ini juga mendapati semasa pemeriksaan balas dijalankan, pihak pendakwaan telah mencadangkan bahawa kesan calar pada jalan tidak akan hanya sekadar dua calit sekiranya kedua-dua kenderaan yang terlibat dalam kemalangan dalam keadaan bergerak. Namun begitu, Mahkamah ini mendapati [Type the document title] 11 | P a g e bahawa OKT tidak bersetuju dengan cadangan tersebut, OKT telah menyatakan bahawa terdapat banyak kesan calar tanpa membentangkan versi keterangan sokongannya bagi menunjukkan terdapatnya banyak kesan calar tersebut.

Seterusnya, Mahkamah juga meneliti keterangan OKT di mana OKT telah melarikan diri sejurus kemalangan berlaku. Mahkamah juga mendapati pihak peguambela mahupun OKT tidak pernah menafikan mahupun memnpertikaikan isu ini. Dengan ini, Mahkamah berpandangan bahawa OKT sememangnya tidak tahu isu kesan calar pada jalan tersebut kerana OKT telah melarikan diri secepat mungkin daripada kawasan kemalangan tersebut.

Dalam situasi ini, Mahkamah telah membuat pertimbangan berkenaan versi mana satu yang lebih berkemungkinan berlaku (inherently probable). Justeru itu, Mahkamah sekali lagi merujuk semula kepada kesemua keterangan sokongan dan keterangan senyap yang telah pun dibentangkan oleh kedua-dua pihak.

Melihat kepada kesemua keterangan yang dikemukakan, inferen munasabah yang boleh diterima oleh Mahkamah ini adalah motosikal telah ditunggang oleh OKT dengan laju sehingga menyebabkan OKT tidak sempat mengelak kenderaan motosikal Si Mati yang berada di hadapannya yang ketika itu sedang dalam keadaan statik untuk membelok ke simpang sebelah kanan. Mahkamah juga merujuk pada kerosakan pada motosikal Si Mati. [Type the document title] 12 | P a g e Dan berdasarkan kesan langgar ini menunjukkan bahawa suatu kemalangan langgar belakang yang mana kesan kerosakan pada kenderaan motosikal telah menjelaskan keadaan tersebut. Berdasarkan keterangan ini juga, fakta tersebut tidak pernah dipertikai atau dinafikan oleh pihak pembelaan.

Mahkamah ini juga berpandangan, akibat kecuaian OKT yang tidak menunggang di laluan paling kiri telah menyebabkan OKT tidak sempat mengelak kenderaan motosikal Si Mati yang sedang bersedia untuk membelok ke kanan.

Merujuk kepada kepada Kaedah 3(1), Kaedah-kaedah Lalulintas 1959 [LN166/59] telah menjelaskan bahawa :

Every vehicle shall ordinarily be driven on the left hand side of the road, that is to say that part of the road which lies between the center thereof and the left hand edge of the road; and shall allow all traffic which is proceeding in the opposite direction to pass on the right hand side.

Pihak pendakwaan kemudiannya merujuk kepada Kaedah 5 Kaedah-kaedah Lalulintas 1959 LN166/59 yang menjelaskan keadaan bagaimana yang dibenarkan untuk kenderaan mengambil bahagian paling kanan di atas jalan raya yang menyatakan seperti berikut: “The driver of a motor vehicle shall pass on the right-hand side when [Type the document title] 13 | P a g e overtaking traffic proceeding in the same direction: Provided that he may pass on the left hand side of a vehicle-

the driver of which having indicated an intention to turn right has drawn to the centre of the road; or

which is stationary in or proceeding in a traffic lane at or near a traffic junction provided for the purpose of segregating traffic.”

Berdasarkan Peruntukan Kaedah 5 LN166/59 ia telah menjelaskan keadaan bagaimana bahagian paling kanan lorong tersebut boleh digunakan yang mana bagi tujuan memotong kenderaan yang berada di arus yang sama, suatu kenderaan perlulah memotong dengan menggunakan bahagian paling kanan jalan raya melainkan sekiranya terdapat kenderaan di hadapan telah memberikan isyarat ke kanan dan telah memacu kenderaannya di bahagian tengah jalan untuk tujuan membelok ke kanan.

Berdasarkan keterangan OKT dan tanpa sebarang pertikaian dan penafian dari pihak pembelaan, Mahkamah mendapati OKT gagal dalam mematuhi Kaedah-kaedah Lalulintas LN166/59 ini dan OKT telah dengan secara terang menunjukkan OKT telah mewujudkan suatu tunggangan motosikal secara merbahaya di atas jalan raya.

Berdasarkan diperuntukkan dalam peraturan ini, LN166/59 Mahkamah berpandangan OKT telah cuai dan gagal menunggang kenderaannya di bahagian paling kiri jalan sedangkan terdapat [Type the document title] 14 | P a g e kenderaan di hadapannya yang telah “drawn to the centre of the road” bagi tujuan membelok ke kanan.

OKT sepatutnya berada di bahagian paling kiri jalan tersebut untuk memberikan laluan kepada kenderaan motosikal Si Mati yang telah memberikan isyaratnya untuk masuk ke simpang ke sebelah kanan tersebut tetapi OKT gagal untuk berbuat demikian.

Mahkamah juga mendapati OKT telah lewat hadir membuat laporan polis. Dalam situasi ini, Mahkamah berpandangan keterangan sebenar OKT di dalam laporan polis adalah tidak tepat. Berdasarkan laporan polis Eksibit (P15), tempoh jarak masa kemalangan dengan laporan polis dibuat oleh OKT adalah lebih kurang 2 bulan. Mahkamah berpandangan jangka masa tempoh yang lama ini merupakan satu isu yang material, di mana OKT mungkin tidak dapat memberikan maklumat yang tepat.

Selain itu, kenyataan OKT di mana dia tidak ada pengetahuan untuk melaporkan kes kemalangan dengan kadar segera adalah tidak relevan dan tidak boleh diterima. Maka prinsip-prinsip “ignorance of the law is no excuse” adalah terpakai.

Mahkamah ini juga mendapati tindakan OKT adalah mencurigakan di mana motosikal telah segera dibaikpulih oleh OKT setelah kemalangan. Berdasarkan keterangan oleh OKT juga di mana [Type the document title] 15 | P a g e kenderaan motosikal yang terlibat dengan kemalangan tersebut telah diubah sebelum pihak polis dapat menyelesaikan siasatan terhadap kenderaan yang digunakan oleh OKT pada hari kejadian. Mahkamah ini berpandangan bahawa tindakan OKT ini adalah sengaja untuk menghapuskan bukti pada motosikal miliknya agar keterangan tersebut dapat memihak pada dirinya semasa perbicaraan.

Sehubungan dengan ini, Mahkamah merujuk konsep andaian di bawah Subseksyen 114(g) Akta Keterangan 1950 [Akta 50] yang mana ia boleh digunapakai bagi kes ini memandangkan bukti tersebut telah dihapuskan oleh OKT sendiri ketika siasatan dijalankan. Subseksyen 114(g) Akta Keterangan 1950 menyatakan: “The court may presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened, regard being had to the common course of natural events, human conduct, and public and private business, in their relation to the facts of the particular case. The court may presume: -

that evidence which could be and is not produced would if produced be unfavourable to the person who withholds it;

Berdasarkan peruntukkan ini, Mahkamah juga mendapati dengan tindakan OKT yang telah melarikan diri setelah kemalangan berlaku merupakan suatu keterangan perlakuan dan pengetahuan OKT berkenaan dengan kesalahan yang dilakukan yang mana ianya [Type the document title] 16 | P a g e boleh diterima masuk sebagai keterangan di bawah Seksyen 8 Akta Keterangan 1950.

Seksyen 8 Akta Keterangan 1950 menyatakan seperti berikut: “Motive, preparation and previous or subsequent conduct

Any fact is relevant which shows or constitutes a motive or preparation for any fact in issue or relevant fact.

The conduct of any party, or of any agent to any party, to any suit or proceeding in reference to that suit or proceeding, or in reference to any fact in issue therein or relevant thereto, and the conduct of any person an offence against whom is the subject of any proceeding, is relevant if the conduct influences or is influenced by any fact in issue or relevant fact, and whether it was previous or subsequent thereto.”

Di dalam kes PP v That Wei v Public Prosecutor [2021] MLJU 1651 yang menyatakan seperti berikut: “ The conduct of the accused soon after incident plays an important part in the determination of the guilt and is a corroborative piece of evidence. Disappearance of the accused after the occurrence is a relevant circumstance which in the absence of any plausible explanation, could be taken into consideration against him as conduct under Section 8 of the Indian Evidence act. In the present case, firstly, there is no material on the record to show why the deceased would have committed suicide. The accused was [Type the document title] 17 | P a g e present at the time of the concurrence and if it was a case of suicide, there is no material brought on the record to show that the accused had taken any steps either to prevent her from so doing or get her medical aid immediately. As a normal human conduct on the death of a near kith and kin, one laments and would raise hue and cry and even take assistance and counsel from the neighbours and the accused had cordial relations with his immediate neighbours. Instead of doing so, he had slipped away and remained absconding for several days. This conduct certainly destroys presumption of innocence on his part. [32] Evidence of conduct admissible under section 8 may be explained as provided in section 9 of the Evidence Act 1950 which reads as follows: Facts necessary to explain or introduce a fact in issue or relevant fact, or which support or rebut an inference suggested by a fact in issue or relevant fact, or which establish the identity of anything or person whose identity is relevant, or fix the time or place at which any fact in issue or relevant fact happened or which show the relation of parties by whom any such fact was transacted, are relevant so far as they are necessary for that purpose. [33] Illustration (c) to section 9 reads as follows: A is accused of a crime. The fact that soon after the commission of the crime A absconded from his house is relevant under section 8 as conduct subsequent to and affected by facts in issue. The fact that at the time when he left home he had sudden and urgent business at the place to which he went is relevant as tending to explain the fact that he left home suddenly. [Type the document title] 18 | P a g e The details of the business on which he left are not relevant, except in so far as they are necessary to show that the business was sudden and urgent. [34] In commenting on section 9 Sarkar on Evidence 15th edn says at p 204: Section 9 deals with facts necessary to explain or introduce relevant facts. Such facts are not of a causative nature, nor can they be strictly said form part of the same transaction. Facts which explain or introduce a fact in issue though relevant for the purpose stated in the section, such facts do not form part of the res gestae (ante, s. 6) as they do not accompany the facts or transaction in issue. Facts which are explanatory or introductory of a relevant fact are often of considerable help in understanding the real nature of a transaction, in supplying missing links, in leading up to the main fact, or in establishing some connexion throwing light on the fact in issue. [35] The applicability of the two sections was considered in PP v. Chia Leong Foo [2000] 4 CLJ 649; [2000] 6 MLJ 705 where the High Court said at pp 721-722: I must add that evidence of conduct which allows inferences to be drawn, as in the two cases referred to, is admissible under s.8 of the Evidence act 1950. A typical example of such conduct is the absconding or flight of a person after the commission of an offence. But evidence of mere absconding or flight is not such a vital circumstance which can be considered to show that the absconder was having any guilty mind (see Bhagat Bahadur v. State [1996] Cri LJ 2201). Such conduct must be considered in the totality of the evidence adduced (see Mansor bin Mohd Rashid ‘s case). [Type the document title] 19 | P a g e For it to be capable of amounting to an admission of guilt there must be a nexus between his conduct, his flight and the offence in question. As Lord Ackner said in Chan Kwok Keung & Anor v. The Queen [1990] 3 CLJ 386 (Rep); [1990] 1 CLJ 411 at p 413: It is common ground that conduct, and in particular the flight of an accused after an offence has been committed, may be tantamount to an admission by him of his guilt of that offence and as such admissible evidence. Their Lordships’ attention was invited by Mr Duckett QC on behalf of the crown to a number of Australian authorities which illustrate this proposition. But each case must depend on its own particular facts. In those cases to which their Lordships were referred, the flight of the accused had occurred within a short space of time of the offence being committed and in circumstances which clearly connected the accused with the offence. In this case the appellants were found stowed away nearly ten months after the commission of the crime. The prosecution led no evidence to suggest that they had been in hiding for all or any part of this period. Indeed there was no evidence as to whether any and if so what efforts had been made by the police to find them and with what result. Leung, in his statement to the police after his arrest, gave them some information as to where the appellants were living or working, but no evidence was given as to whether these leads were followed up and if so with what result. It would in their Lordships’ opinion be quite wrong for the jury to have [Type the document title] 20 | P a g e taken it for granted that the appellants, during all or any part of this relatively lengthy period, had been evading capture for this offence. That was not the case as presented by the prosecution, and very appropriately the judge in his summing-up never suggested to the jury that they were entitled to make such an assumption. In order for flight to be capable of amounting to an admission of guilt there must be some evidence which establishes a nexus between the conduct of the accused, his flight or concealment and the offence in question. In this case the prosecution produced no evidence to establish that either of the appellants had been hiding away or otherwise behaving in an unusual manner in this period of nearly ten months. There was therefore no material which could have justified the jury inferring that the only reasonable explanation for the appellants stowing away on the ship from Hong Kong to Macau was that they were on the run, because they knew they might be arrested and charged with this murder. There could have been a variety of other reasons for their having stowed away nearly ten months after the murder. Evidence of such conduct can be explained away as provided by s.9 of the Evidence Act 1950 (see Ling Ngan Liong v. PP [1964] MLJ 20; Choo Chang Teik & Anor v. PP [1991] 1 CLJ 54 (Rep); [1991] 3 CLJ 2387. However, the onus is on the accused to explain his conduct. Thus in Mansor bin Mohd Rashid ‘s case, the Federal Court held that the intention of the accused persons to flee, when considered in the light of the evidence adduced, justifiably necessitated some explanation from them. A failure to put forward any explanation of absconding after the occurrence of a crime is a point in favour of the prosecution (see Parmeshwar v. R AIR [1941] Orissa 517). [Type the document title] 21 | P a g e [36] The law relating to evidence of conduct is thus patent. If there is no evidence to show that the conduct is influenced by any fact in issue or relevant fact as required by s. 8 then it is not admissible as it would then be an equivocal act justifying inferences favourable to the accused being drawn. If it satisfies the requirement of s. 8 it is admissible. It must be observed that the degree of proof required to establish evidence of conduct would depend on the nature of the conduct. Conduct like the flight of an accused is a more positive act and is easily established. On the other hand, conduct like the accused looking stunned, nervous, scared or frightened is very often a matter of perception and more detailed evidence may be required. Once admitted the court cannot resort to any other explanation for the conduct or draw inferences on its own accord to render it inadmissible. The onus is on the accused to explain his conduct pursuant to s. 9. Such explanation must not be in their barest possible form, but with areasonable fullness of detail and circumstance (see R v. Stephenson [1904] 68 JP 524). The onus may be discharged even in the course of the case for the prosecution, for example, by way of cross-examination of relevant witnesses. If not so done it can be discharged only at the defence stage. However, the evidence admissible under the section must be confined to what is necessary for the purposes enumerated. Illustration (c) to s. 9 explains the operation of this principle. It provides that when A is accused of a crime the fact that soon after the commission of the crime he absconded from his house is relevant. But the fact that at the time when he left home he had sudden and urgent business at the place to which he went, is [Type the document title] 22 | P a g e relevant, as tending to explain the fact that he left home suddenly. The details of the business on which he left, however, are not relevant, except in so far as they are necessary to show that the business was sudden and urgent. If the explanation is accepted by the court then the inference arising from the conduct is rebutted. If it is not accepted or if the accused does not explain his conduct the inference remains unrebutted. [37] It is now appropriate to consider the rationale of the court in explaining the conduct of the accused in running away in Abdullah Zawawi Yusoff v. PP [1993] 4 CLJ 1 which formed the basis of the submission of the appellant. In that case the drugs were found in a house occupied by the accused, his wife and a third person. The court considered the evidence of possible access to the house by others, and in distinguishing the case from DPP v. Brooks [1974] 2 All ER 840, held that the conduct of the accused in running away was equally consistent with him having been in a state of pure panic even though he did not offer any explanation himself. On the other hand in DPP v. Brooks [1974] 2 All ER 840 the accused was in the driver’s seat of a stationary van with several others. There were drugs in the van. When the police approached the van all of them ran. The conduct of the accused in running away was held against him. The difference in both the cases is that in Abdullah Zawawi Yusoff v. PP [1993] 4 CLJ 1 there was no evidence to show that the act of the accused in running away was influenced by any fact in issue or relevant fact within the meaning of s. 8 in view of the possibility of access to the house by others. It is therefore not admissible on this ground as it is equivocal thereby justifying an [Type the document title] 23 | P a g e inference in favour of the accused being drawn and ought to have been so ruled at an earlier stage of the trial. The case of Abdullah Zawawi Yusoff v. PP [1993] 4 CLJ 1 is therefore authority only to this extent. On the other hand in DPP v. Brooks 2 All ER 840 there was evidence to show that the drugs were in the physical custody and control of the accused and his conduct of running away thus comes, in the Malaysian context, within the meaning of s.8. It is therefore admissible and cannot be explained away by the court itself by offering an explanation which is consistent with the innocence of the accused. The explanation must be offered by the accused himself as required by s.9. [Emphasis added] [83] The Appellant also did not report the incident to his employer, SP3, his co-workers, or even to Hla Shawee who is said to have arranged for his trip to Myanmar through the border in the State of Kelantan. There are many judicial pronouncements in relation to the type of conduct which may attract the inference under s. 8 of the Evidence Act 1950 (see Parlan’s case – supra). But, we find the following passage from the case of Kuldip Sharma v The State [1996] Cri LJ 244 to be particularly relevant. In that case, Justice JB Gole said: The conduct of the accused soon after the incident plays an important part in the determination of the guilt and is a corroborative piece of evidence. Disappearance of the accused after the [Type the document title] 24 | P a g e occurrence is a relevant circumstance which in theabsence of any plausible explanation, could be taken into consideration against him as conduct under Section 8 of the Indian Evidence Act. [84] And it is trite that the conduct of the type contemplated by s.8 of the Evidence Act 1950 which incriminates an accused person, must be explained as per s.9 of the Evidence Act 1950. The question is whether the Appellant’s conduct can be said to be an indication of his guilt or whether he has sufficiently explained his conduct, such that his conduct is to be regarded as benign.

Berdasarkan kes ini, Mahkamah membuat kesimpulan di mana tindakan OKT melarikan diri sejurus kemalangan dan tanpa wujudnya alasan yang munasabah OKT melakukan tindakan itu, maka inferen di bawah Seksyen 8 Akta Keterangan 1950 ini adalah terpakai.

Dengan perlakuan OKT yang melarikan diri daripada tempat kejadian kemudian mengubah terus kenderaan yang terlibat dengan kemalangan tersebut sehingga tidak ternampak kesan kemalangan di mana Mahkamah mendapati perlakuan tersebut sebagai suatu perlakuan relevan yang terangkum dibawah Seksyen 8 Akta Keterangan 1950. [Type the document title] 25 | P a g e

Kesimpulan Merujuk kepada kes Tan Kim Ho & Anor v. PP [2009] 3 CLJ 236; [2009] 3 MLJ 151, Mahkamah Persekutuan telah menyatakan seperti berikut: “In our adversarial system of justice, the duty of each party is to show that his case is the truth. This is done by adducing his own witness to support his contention.”

Selain itu, Mahkamah mendapati tindakan OKT yang gagal mengemukakan sebarang bukti atau saksi-saksi lain untuk menyokong dakwaanya adalah suatu yang dipanggil sebagai bare denial.

Merujuk kes Losali v. PP [2011] 4 MLJ 694, YA Abdul Malik Ishak (HMR) menyatakan bahawa: “it is trite law that the defence of bare denial is no defence.”

Oleh yang demikian, Mahkamah mendapati OKT bersalah dan OKT disabitkan dengan jenayah seperti di dalam kertas pertuduhan [Type the document title] 26 | P a g e Hukuman 50. Dengan ini, setelah Mahkamah mempertimbangkan mitigasi daripada pihak pembelaan dan hujahan pemberat daripada pihak pendakwaan, Mahkamah dengan ini menjatuhkan hukuman kepada OKT penjara selama tempoh 2 tahun dan denda RM 5000 gagal bayar 6 bulan penjara. ................................................................................... [SAIFUL BIN SAYOTI] MAJISTRET MAHKAMAH MAJISTRET KUALA PILAH N.SEMBILAN 3 DISEMBER 2024 Pendakwaan: Timbalan Pendakwa Raya, Nurul Farahana Athirah binti Yaccob [Type the document title] 27 | P a g e Peguambela: Peguambela, Encik Muhammad Aizat Akmal bin Zamri