Mohd Azzeli Bin Hussin v 1. ) Hiap Seng Heng Construction Sdn Bhd (WA-12BNCvC-146-10/2022)

Rayuan dan rayuan balas di hadapan mahkamah ini melibatkan dua isu yang kerap kali ditimbulkan apabila mangsa kemalangan jalan raya yang kehilangan kaki atau tangan menyaman untuk kos prostesis.

Isu berbangkit adalah seperti berikut - i. Sama ada awad Mahkamah Sesyen sebanyak RM 682,378.00 berdasarkan jangka hayat 74 tahun dengan enam pertukaran sebagai kos prostesis untuk kaki plaintif patut dikekalkan; dan ii. Sama ada Mahkamah Sesyen telah terkhilaf dari segi undang-undang dan fakta apabila gagal untuk membuat potongan 1/3 dari jumlah RM 682,378.00 tersebut sebagai “future contingencies”.

Walaupun dua isu ini agak seringkali biasa ditimbulkan, namun terdapat percanggahan dalam keputusan autoriti di Mahkamah Tinggi dan juga di Mahkamah Rayuan.

Pihak plaintif Mohd Azzeli bin Hussin telah menyaman defendan pertama Tan Chee Chuan Fruits Supply [“D1”]; dan defendan kedua Kumaresan A/L Mutoraman [“D2”] di Mahkamah Sesyen untuk gantirugi am dan khas akibat kecederaan kemalangan jalan raya.

D1 dan D2 telah mengeluarkan Notis Pihak Ketiga terhadap Hiap Seng Heng Construction Sdn Bhd [“P3”] menuntut indemniti untuk liabiliti dan jumlah ganti rugi serta kos berkenaan kemalangan tersebut.

Pada masa kemalangan, plaintif berumur 38 tahun sedang menunggang satu motosikal di lorong kiri. D2 sedang memandu motor lori milik D1 di lorong tengah. Kenderaan milik P3 berada di lorong kanan.

Kenderaan milik P3 telah mengubah haluan ke kiri dan memasuki laluan motor lori D1. Untuk mengelakan perlanggaran motor lori D1 telah mengubah haluan ke kiri. Ini mengakibatkan kemalangan melibatkan motor lori D1 dan motosikal plaintif.

Akibat daripada kemalangan, plaintif mengalami kecederaan parah pada kaki kiri sehingga terpaksa dipotong di atas lutut dan lain-lain kecederaan lagi. Gambar plaintif yang menunjukan kehilangan kaki kiri boleh dilihat di Kandungan 3 Rekod Rayuan (Jilid 1) mukasurat 94.

Puan Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen Yang Bijaksana telah memutuskan bahawa D1 dan P3 adalah masing-masing cuai 50% dalam menyebabkan kemalangan tersebut.

Mahkamah Sesyen telah mengawadkan sebanyak RM 682,378.00 berdasarkan jangka hayat 74 tahun dengan enam pertukaran sebagai 5 kos prostesis untuk kaki berdasarkan cadangan Pakar Prostesis defendan Ashutosh Gawande. [Kandungan 3 Rekod Rayuan (Jilid 2) mukasurat 367-387 di 387].

Rayuan daripada plaintif kepada mahkamah adalah terhadap kuantum RM 682,378.00 ini.

Plaintif merayu supaya mahkamah menerima kos dan penyelenggaraan kaki palsu berjumlah RM 3,160,600.00 berdasarkan jangka hayat 73 tahun dengan enam pertukaran.

Plaintif bergantung kepada satu “Quotation of Above Knee Prostesis” bertarikh 07-10-2019 yang disediakan oleh Santosh Kumar Prasad dari Pusat Anggota Tiruan Central Sdn Bhd (Kandungan 3 mukasurat 209-237 Rekod Rayuan [Jilid 1]).

D1 dan D2 juga memfailkan Rayuan Balas berkenaan dengan potongan 1/3 dari jumlah RM 682,378.00 yang seharusnya diawadkan untuk kos prostesis sebagai “future contingencies”.

D1 dan D2 berhujah Mahkamah Sesyen telah terkhilaf dari segi undang-undang dan fakta apabila gagal untuk membuat potongan 1/3 daripada jumlah RM 682,378.00 tersebut. Pendengaran di hadapan Mahkamah ini

Mahkamah mendengar penghujahan pada 23-03-2023, 16-06-2023 dan 27-06-2023.

Mahkamah telah membenarkan rayuan plaintif dan menolak rayuan balas.

D1, D2 dan P3 tidak berpuas hati dan telah merayu kepada Mahkamah Rayuan terhadap keseluruhan keputusan mahkamah ini.

Ini adalah Alasan Penghakiman mahkamah ini. Isu yang diketengahkan i. Rayuan - Sama ada awad Mahkamah Sesyen sebanyak RM 682,378.00 berdasarkan jangka hayat 74 tahun dengan enam pertukaran sebagai kos prostesis untuk kaki plaintif patut dikekalkan; ii. Rayuan Balas - Sama ada Mahkamah Sesyen telah terkhilaf daripada segi undang-undang dan fakta apabila gagal untuk membuat potongan 1/3 daripada jumlah RM 682,378.00 tersebut sebagai “future contingencies”. Rayuan oleh plaintif Sama ada awad Mahkamah Sesyen sebanyak RM 682,378.00 berdasarkan jangka hayat 74 tahun dengan enam pertukaran sebagai kos prostesis untuk kaki plaintif patut dikekalkan.

Plaintif berhujah bahawa prostesis untuk kaki berdasarkan cadangan pakar prostesis D1 dan D2 Ashutosh Gawande tidak boleh digunakan kerana prostesis tersebut tidak diluluskan dan didaftarkan dibawah Akta Peranti Perubatan 2012 / Medical Device Act 2012 untuk digunakan di Malaysia.

Plaintif juga berhujah bahawa prostesis untuk kaki berdasarkan cadangan Pakar Prostesis plaintif Santosh Kumar Prasad dari Pusat Anggota Tiruan Central Sdn Bhd adalah lebih sesuai untuk plaintif.

D1, D2 dan P3 tidak bersetuju dengan hujahan plaintif.

Adalah undang-undang mantap bahawa mahkamah yang mendengar suatu rayuan boleh mendengar rayuan tersebut secara semula. [Sivalingam A/L Periasamy v Periasamy & Anor [1995] 2 MLRA 432, [1996] 4 CLJ 545 dan [1995] 3 MLJ 395 CA Gopal Sri Ram and Mahadev Shankar JJCA and the 'Eurymedon' (1942) 73 Lloyd LR 217 House of Lords Lord Atkin di mukasurat 220]

Di Sivalingam A/L Periasamy v Periasamy & Anor [1995] 2 MLRA 432, [1996] 4 CLJ 545 dan [1995] 3 MLJ 395 CA Gopal Sri Ram and Mahadev Shankar JJCA apabila menterbalikkan penemuan fakta oleh hakim perbicaraan berkata di mukasurat 398-399 - It is trite law that this court will not readily interfere with the findings of fact arrived at by the court of first instance to which the law entrusts the primary task of evaluation of the evidence. But we are under a duty to intervene in a case where, as here, the trial court has so fundamentally misdirected itself, that one may safely say that no reasonable court which had properly directed itself and asked the correct questions would have arrived at the same conclusion… … Lord Atkin, while recording a vigorous dissent, said (at p 220): My Lords, this is an appeal from the Court of Appeal, who affirmed a decision of Langton J, holding that in a collision between the Eurymedon, belonging to the appellants, and the British Reliance, belonging to the respondents, the Eurymedon was alone to blame. The learned judge, of course, saw the witnesses, and had that initial advantage which, as I have said elsewhere, an appeal tribunal can never recapture. But judges have before this been mistaken in their acceptance of witnesses' stories; and if the appellate tribunal is satisfied that a mistake has been made, I apprehend that it is their duty to say so. [Penekanan ditambah]

Mahkamah Rayuan di Wasal Construction Sdn Bhd v Boh Huat Chan Timber Products Sdn Bhd [2014] 4 MLRA 482, [2013] 1 LNS 1269 dan [2014] 4 MLJ 294 CA melalui Abdul Aziz Abdul Rahim JCA juga menekankan -

In exercising its judicial discretion to interfere with the finding of fact by a trial court, the appellate court draws the distinction between a case where the finding of a specific fact depends upon the credibility of witnesses and one which depends upon inference drawn from other facts. The appellate court would readily interfere in the latter case and form its own opinion on those facts than in the case of the former — China Airlines Ltd v Maltran Air Corp Sdn Bhd (formerly known as Maltran Air Services Corp Sdn Bhd) and another appeal [1996] 2 MLJ 517. And it was said by House of Lords in Benmax v Austin Motor Co Ltd [1955] 1 All ER 326 at p 329 that ‘where there is no question of the credibility or reliability of any witness, and in cases where the point of dispute is the proper inference to be drawn from proved facts, an appeal court is generally in as good a position to evaluate the evidence as the trial judge, and ought not to shrink from that task, though it ought, of course, give weight to his opinion.’ [Penekanan ditambah]

Di kes Appalasamy Bodoyah v Lee Mon Seng [1996] 3 CLJ 71 dan [1996] 2 MLRH 647 Abdul Malik Ishak J berkata di mukasurat 78 - Thus, one must not forget the general rule that the function of damages in tort actions is purely to put the plaintiff in the position which he would have been in had the tort not been committed in the first 10 place and this can only be done through a reasonable award of damages. Syed Agil Barakbah FJ in Ong Ah Long v. Dr S Underwood [1986] 1 LNS 99[1983] 2 MLJ 324 at page 334 compartmentalised the question of damages in its correct perspective when his Lordship said in erudite terms that: Damages for personal injuries are not punitive and still less a reward. They are simply compensatory that will give the injured party reparation for the wrongful act and for all the natural and direct consequences of the wrongful act, so far as money can compensate. [Penekanan ditambah]

Mahkamah perlu menekankan disini bahawa persoalan bukan sama ada awad gantirugi untuk prostesis adalah tinggi atau rendah. Prinsip yang akan menjadi panduan mahkamah adalah seperti dinyatakan oleh YA Hakim Abdul Malik Ishak J dalam kes Appalasamy Bodoyah v Lee Mon Seng [1996] 3 CLJ 71 dan [1996] 2 MLRH 647.

Adalah juga penting bahawa prostesis yang dicadangkan mesti diluluskan dan didaftarkan dibawah Akta Peranti Perubatan 2012 / Medical Device Act 2012 untuk digunakan di Malaysia. Ini adalah berdasarkan peruntukan Seksyen 5 Akta Peranti Perubatan 2012 / Medical Device Act 2012.

Seksyen 2 Akta Peranti Perubatan 2012 / Medical Device Act 2012 menyatakan :-

“Interpretation In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires: - “Authority” means the Medical Device Authority established under the Medical Device Authority Act 2012. [30] Seksyen 5 Akta Peranti Perubatan 2012 / Medical Device Act 2012 menyatakan :- “Requirement for registration of medical device

(1) No medical device shall be imported, exported or placed in the market unless the medical device is registered under this Act.

Any person who contravenes subsection (1) commits an offence and shall, on conviction, be liable to a fine not exceeding two hundred thousand ringgit or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years or to both.” [Penekanan ditambah] [31] Adalah jelas prostesis yang dicadangkan oleh pakar plaintif telah diluluskan dan didaftarkan dibawah Akta Peranti Perubatan 2012 / Medical Device Act 2012 untuk digunakan di Malaysia. Nota Prosiding di Kandungan 3 Rekod Rayuan (Jilid 3), mukasurat. 670 - dan Kandungan 28 Rekod Rayuan Tambahan 2 mukasurat. 670A – “Examination In Chief of SP3 - Santosh Kumar Prasad Saya ada beberapa soalan tambahan, Mr. Santosh, what is MDA Medical Device Authority of Malaysia? Are you aware of that? SANTOSH Yes. Ok. Can you explain to the Court, what does MDA does? SANTOSH MDA, the Medical Device Authority of Malaysia, since the, whatever the medical device are sold in Malaysia should be registered for the security and safety purpose. And all documents and all the certifications and all everything need to be submitted, to get registered and get approved. A simple example like Covid test kit also nowadays they say it should be MDA approved. Then only you can sell it all it’s more reliable. Ok, can you explain to this Court whether the product which you prescribed, the Genium X3, is it registered with the MDA? SANTOSH Yes. It’s in everything, Sir, Even the liner also is registered. [Penekanan ditambah] [32] Adalah jelas juga prostesis yang dicadangkan oleh pakar D1 dan D2 tidak diluluskan dan tidak didaftarkan dibawah Akta Peranti Perubatan 2012 / Medical Device Act 2012 untuk digunakan di Malaysia. Saksi balas pakar defendan Ashutosh Gawande - SD2 (Lihat Kandungan 3 Rekod Rayuan (Jilid 3) - mukasurat 798-799 (826-827)) Ok. Now the question is, is your product registered with the MDA? ASHUTOSH The MDA? This MDA which I’m talking about just now. ASHUTOSH Yes, I think we can we give you a certificate. Because this also is a, we can get it for you. So, so you are saying you are registered? ASHUTOSH Yes. BSJ This product is registered? ASHUTOSH Ok This prescribed product is registered with the MDA? Yes or No. ASHUTOSH Ok. I’m not sure about it Yes or no? ASHUTOSH I’m not sure about it You are not sure ASHUTOSH This is a….. Ok. I am not sure… ASHUTOSH But our dealer form where we get it, their products are certified. It’s ok. Thank you. You just said but based on this product you are not sure? ASHUTOSH Yes. I’m not sure. Ok, if it is registered, can you undertake to give us a copy? ASHUTOSH Yes. If it was registered we can give it to you.” … Soal Balas: mukasurat 810, Rekod Rayuan (Jilid 3): BSJ: This product that you prescribed, like Mr Santosh, to fix this Genium X3 prescribed, he has certification. That means he is certified to fix or to handle this device. What about this one? ASHUTOSH: These are microprocessor knee. BSJ: So, do you have certification to support you? No? ASHUTOSH: No, I don’t have any certificates. Ok. [Penekanan ditambah] [33] Keterangan defendan dan pakarnya, dengan jelas tidak dapat mengemukakan bukti bahawa prostesis yang dicadangkan oleh pakar D1 dan D2 adalah diluluskan dan didaftarkan dibawah Akta Peranti Perubatan 2012 / Medical Device Act 2012 untuk digunakan di Malaysia. [34] Bagi rayuan di hadapan mahkamah ini, mahkamah juga mengajukan soalan ini pada 23-03-2023 dan hujahan sambungan pada 16-06- 2023 kepada kaunsel bagi D1, D2 dan P3. Mereka secara terang-terangan tidak dapat menjawab prostesis yang dicadangkan oleh pakar D1 dan D2 diluluskan dan didaftarkan dibawah Akta Peranti Perubatan 2012 / Medical Device Act 2012 untuk digunakan di Malaysia. [35] Kegagalan D1 dan D2 mengemukakan bukti prostesis yang dicadangkan oleh pakar D1 dan D2 diluluskan dan didaftarkan dibawah Akta Peranti Perubatan 2012 / Medical Device Act 2012 untuk digunakan di Malaysia walaupun telah diberi peluang membolehkan mahkamah membuat inferens bertentangan / adverse inferens dibawah Seksyen 114(g) Akta Keterangan 1950. [Munusamy Vengadasalam V Public Prosecutor [1987] CLJ (Rep) 221 Mahkamah Agung]. [36] Isu kesahihan / legality prostesis yang dicadangkan oleh pakar D1 dan D2 juga di hujahkan di dalam Hujahan Bertulis plaintif di peringkat Mahkamah Sesyan. [lihat Rekod Rayuan RR Jilid 4 – Kandungan 3 mukasurat 889]. Walaubagaimanapun, Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen Yang Bijaksana tidak memberi perhatian kepada isu ini. [Lihat Kandungan 6 Alasan Penghakiman di Rekod Rayuan Tambahan (1)]. [37] Oleh kerana prostesis yang dicadangkan oleh pakar D1 dan D2 tidak boleh digunakan di Malaysia, rayuan plaintif patut dibenarkan. [38] Selain daripada isu kesahihan prostesis yang dicadangkan oleh pakar D1 dan D2, mahkamah juga berpendapat prostesis yang dicadangkan oleh pakar plaintif lebih sesuai dan lebih canggih berdasarkan perbandingan yang dikemukakan di Kandungan 31 Hujahan Bertulis Perayu di perenggan 4.13. [39] Berdasarkan prinsip yang di nyatakan oleh Hakim Abdul Malik Ishak J dalam kes Appalasamy Bodoyah v Lee Mon Seng [1996] 3 CLJ 71 yang mahkamah ini telah rujuk di atas, adalah tidak relevan kos prostesis pakar plaintif adalah RM 3,160,600.00 berbanding kos prostesis pakar D1 dan D2 yang cuma RM 682,378.00. Tambahan pula, kos ini adalah berdasarkan jangka hayat 73 tahun dengan enam pertukaran. Perlu diingatkan bahawa plaintif adalah seorang mangsa kemalangan. [40] Mengambil kira kedua-dua alasan di atas, mahkamah membenarkan rayuan oleh plaintif. Rayuan balas oleh D1 dan D2 Sama ada Mahkamah Sesyen telah terkhilaf daripada segi undang-undang dan fakta apabila gagal untuk membuat potongan 1/3 daripada jumlah RM 682,378.00 tersebut sebagai “future contingencies”. Hujahan D1, D2 dan P3 [41] Rayuan balas difailkan oleh D1 dan D2 dan disokong oleh P3 memohon mahkamah membuat potongan 1/3 daripada jumlah RM 682,378.00 yang diawadkan sebagai “future contingencies”. [42] D1, D2 dan P3 bergantung kepada kes Mahkamah Rayuan Wong Kuan Kay v Rohaizad Othman & Anor; Majlis Perbandaran Johor Bahru Tengah (Third Party) & Anor. Appeal [2015] 4 CLJ 902 dimana Mahkamah Rayuan telah membenarkan potongan 1/3 daripada multiplier dalam penilaian awad bagi kos penjagaan masa hadapan. [43] D1, D2 dan P3 juga bergantung kepada kes Muhammad Asyraf Zulkipli & Anor v Muhammad Hafiz Ezman Ismail & Ors [2019] 1 LNS 472 di mana Mahkamah Tinggi semasa rayuan telah mengikuti rasional keputusan yang diambil oleh kes Wong Kuan Kay di dalam memutuskan “deduction for contingencies, vicissitudes and accelerated payment ” sebanyak 1/3. [44] D1, D2 dan P3 juga bergantung kepada kes Mohamed Razif bin Hashim & Anor v Muhammad Saiful Suffian bin Zulkafli [2021] MLJU 133 dimana Mahkamah Tinggi telah membenarkan potongan 40% untuk kos prostesis. [Lihat perenggan 65 Alasan Penghakiman Mohamed Razif]. Analisa Mahkamah [45] Mahkamah bersetuju dengan keputusan Mahkamah Sesyen yang memutuskan autoriti menunjukan tidak patut ada “deduction for contingencies, vicissitudes and accelerated payment” sebanyak 1/3. [Lihat Kandungan 6 Alasan Penghakiman di Rekod Rayuan Tambahan (1) perenggan 52-53]. [46] Dalam kes yang baru diputuskan Chua Kay Hock & Anor v Lee Hoon Poi [2022] 5 MLRA 625 CA, Mahkamah Rayuan melalui Gunalan JCA juga tidak membuat potongan kos prostesis untuk “contingencies, vicissitudes and accelerated payment”. [47] Dalam satu lagi kes yang di putuskan tahun lepas pada 24-01-2022 oleh Has Zanah, Nordin bin Hassan dan See Mee Chun JJCA Mahkamah Rayuan telah mengenepikan keputusan Mahkamah Tinggi Mohamed Razif v Muhammad Saiful [2021] MLJU 133 dimana Mahkamah Tinggi telah membenarkan potongan 40% untuk kos prostesis. Pada setakat ini tidak ada Alasan Penghakiman tetapi plaintif telah memberikan Perintah Mahkamah Rayuan sebagai bukti. [48] Mahkamah Rayuan dalam kes Noraini Omar & Anor v Rohaini Said (and Another Appeal) [2006] 1 CLJ 895 dan [2006] 1 MLRA 117 CA juga tidak membuat potongan kos prostesis untuk “contingencies, vicissitudes and accelerated payment”. [49] Dalam kes Noraini Omar Arifin Zakaria JCA [Nik Hashim bin Nik Ab. Rahman FCJ bersetuju] telah membuat analisa mendalam bahawa selepas Parlimen membuat pindaan kepada Seksyen 7[3] dan 28 A Akta Undang-Undang Sivil 1956 / Civil Law Act 1956, amalan terdahulu untuk mahkamah membuat potongan terhadap “contingencies, other vicissitudes of life and accelerated payment” tidak lagi terpakai - [24] One of the issues that came on appeal before us was whether the learned High Court Judge was right in making a deduction of ¼ for loss of future earnings and future cost of prosthesis awarded to first appellant and also in reducing the years of purchase to 5 years for the second appellant and to 10 years for the third appellant. In making the award the learned judge was relying on the judgement of this court in Takong Tabari. In his judgement the learned judge stated: In respect of this Mr. Rajendran's complaint is that there ought to be a 1/3 deduction from the total award made for future loss based on the Court of Appeal's decision in Takong Tabari v. Government of Sarawak & Ors and Another Appeal [1998] 4 CLJ 589; [1998] 4 MLJ 52 which followed the decision of the Federal Court in Chan Chin Ming & Anor v. Lim Yok Eng [1994] 3 CLJ 687; [1994] 3 MLJ 233 which gave the Court the right to deduct a sum for contingencies and based on other vicissitudes of life and also taking into account the accelerated payment. Since it is open to each Court to consider each case on its own special features when taking into account the principles of contingencies and other vicissitudes of life, and bound by the decision of the Federal Court and the Court of Appeal on the application of the said principle, I find that there ought to be a deduction made. However, since there was no basis nor explanation for a standard 1/3 deduction, I am of the view that I am not transgressing the principle of stare decisis if I exercise my discretion based on the background of the lives of the plaintiffs herein, and make a deduction of ¼ of the total award made. [25] When that case was decided, the case of Ibrahim bin Ismail was yet to be decided, therefore, the learned judge was thus bound by the decision of this court in Takong Tabari. On appeal before us, we had the benefit of the judgement of this court in Ibrahim bin Ismail. Having considered the issue at hand, we agreed with the decision of this court in Ibrahim bin Ismail in that as regard fatal accident and personal injury claims, this court, as the apex court involving such claims, at the present moment, is at liberty to depart from the decision of the Supreme Court if we think that the decision of the Supreme Court was wrong. As was said by Gopal Sri Ram JCA in Ibrahim bin Ismail: If a decision - and more so as here a majority decision - of the former Supreme Court is obviously wrong, then it is our plain duty to say so. It will, with respect, be an abdication of our solemn duty to simply fold our arms in abject submission and permit an erroneous statement of the law to continue to form part of our jurisprudence especially when it results in an injustice to a litigant. [26] In Cheng Bee Teik we gave our reasons why we ought to depart from Chan Chin Ming. They are as follows: The purpose of the amendment introduced by way of ss. 7(3) and 28A of the CLA, we think, was correctly stated by Gopal Sri Ram JCA in Ibrahim bin Ismail which reads: Now, it is common knowledge that Parliament's purpose was to address the very high award of damages for personal injuries and death. This resulted from three causes. First, the application of a flexible multiplier based on the facts and circumstances of each case. So, one could get a multiplier in excess of 16 years for a plaintiff or deceased who was below the age of majority. Second, the admission of an award for 'lost years'. As a result awards for loss of future earnings were frequently handed down in favour of non-employed injured plaintiffs or the estate of deceased victims. Very young children received huge awards based on their future prospects. In Yang Salbiah & Anor v. Jamil bin Harun [1981] 1 LNS 106; [1981] 1 MLJ 292, for example, a 7 year old girl who had become vegetative was awarded a sum in excess of RM30,000 for loss of future earnings based on a multiplier of 25 years purchase. Again, in Hiang Boon Fatt v. Lembaga Kemajuan Negeri Pahang & Anor, Chin Yee Thow v. Lembaga Kemajuan Negeri Pahang & Anor [1981] 1 LNS 195; [1983] 1 MLJ 89, the dependants of a youth who was killed in an accident just as he was about to enter university were awarded RM15,000 as loss of dependency for the lost years on a multiplier of 5 years purchase based on a predicted income he never earned. Third, a person who had attained or exceeded the age of 55 years could claim for loss of future earnings. Thus, in Tan Kheng Kuan v. Lim Cheng Teik & Ors.[1964] 1 LNS 197; [1965] 1 MLJ 116 a 56 year old plaintiff who was working as a trishaw rider was awarded loss of future earnings. To emphasise, it is to prevent these types of awards that Parliament acted. That is why you find the fixed formula for the multiplier in the amendments. It is a cardinal principle of the interpretation of statutes that the court should look first to the words of the statute itself, and if these words are plain, it is not permissible to consider what was the intention of the statute or the previous history of the law. (See Subramanya Sastry v. Sheikh Ghannu AIR 1935 Mad 928.) In County Council of Hertfordshire v. Rural District Council of Barnet [1902] 2 KB 48, at p. 52 Vaughan Williams LJ stated thus: ... It is not denied that the words of s. 3 of the Highways and Bridges Act, 1891, are such that, if they are construed in their natural sense, the section must be read as giving to the surveyor of highways the power to make the contract which was made in this case. But it is said that, by so construing them, we should be imputing to the Legislature that in this section they had made an enactment which was not entirely consistent with previous legislation as to the surveyor of highways and the previous history of that office. I do not think that this would be a sufficient reason for not giving to the section the meaning which is plainly conveyed by the words of it. The considerations urged by the counsel for the defendants do not appear to me sufficient to justify us in refusing to construe the section according to what seems to be the manifest intention of the Legislature as expressed by the language which they have used. We are of the opinion that words embodied in ss. 7(3) and 28A of the CLA are plain, and therefore, in line with the above stated authorities, it is not open to this court to explore what is the real intention underlying the said provisions or the previous history of the law on this matter. [26] Thus, based on the decisions of this court in Ibrahim Bin Ismail and in Cheng Bee Teik, discussed above, I am firmly of the view that no deduction ought to be made on account of contingencies, other vicissitudes of life and accelerated payment as was the practice under the common law. [27] In the result I would allow both the appeals herein. Consequently, in the first appeal, I order that, the order of the learned Judicial Commissioner deducting 1/3 from the sum of RM52,000 for loss of support, be set aside and the award of the learned Sessions Court Judge be reinstated. Similarly, in the second appeal, the order of the learned High Court Judge in reducing the multiplier from 16 years to 7 years, is set aside and the order of the learned Sessions Court Judge is accordingly reinstated. … [Penekanan ditambah] [50] Lain-lain kes Mahkamah Tinggi yang juga tidak membuat potongan kos prostesis untuk “contingencies, vicissitudes and accelerated payment” ialah Appalasamy Bodoyah v Lee Mon Seng [1996] 3 CLJ 71 High Court Abdul Malik Ishak J, Yap Weng Ken & Anor v Mohd Hero (Besraya (M) Sdn Bhd & 2 Ors – Third Parties) (and Another Appeal) [2018] 1 PIR [21] para 46-47 Faizah Jamaludin JC dan Hasniyati Hassan & Anor v Kerajaan Malaysia [2022] 7 CLJ dan 2022 MLJ 469 Quay Chew Soon JC. [51] D1 dan D2 dan P3 bergantung kepada kes Mahkamah Rayuan Wong Kuan Kay v Rohaizad Othman & Anor; Majlis Perbandaran Johor Bahru Tengah (Third Party) & Anor. Appeal [2015] 4 CLJ 902 dimana Mahkamah Rayuan telah membenarkan potongan 1/3 daripada multiplier dalam penilaian awad bagi kos penjagaan masa hadapan. [52] Pada pendapat mahkamah ini keputusan Wong Kuan Kay adalah bercanggah dengan Noraini Omar & Anor v Rohaini Said (and Another Appeal) [2006] 3 AMR 185; [2006] 1 CLJ 895 CA. Kes Noraini Omar juga tidak dirujuk dalam kes Wong Kuan Kay. Lagi pun, kes Wong Kuan Kay tidak melibatkan kes prostesis tetapi melibatkan kes kos penjagaan masa hadapan. [53] Mahkamah bersetuju tiada potongan patut dibuat untuk kontinjen hidup. Plaintif mungkin hidup melebihi jangka hayat yang dijangkakan sekarang kerana penjagaan dan diet yang lebih baik. Kos prostesis juga akan meningkat pada masa akan datang dengan inflasi dan Ringgit Malaysia akan lebih rendah berbanding mata wang asing. Lihat pemerhatian dalam Appalasamy Bodoyah v Lee Mon Seng [1996] 3 CLJ 71 dan [1996] 2 MLRH 647 Mahkamah Tinggi Abdul Malik Ishak J pada Held 2. Kesimpulan [54] Sebagai kesimpulan, saya ingin menyatakan di sini prostesis yang dicadangkan oleh pakar dalam kes gantirugi mesti diluluskan dan didaftarkan dibawah Akta Peranti Perubatan 2012 / Medical Device Act 2012 untuk digunakan di Malaysia. Ini adalah berdasarkan Seksyen 5 Akta Peranti Perubatan 2012 / Medical Device Act 2012. [55] Selepas Parlimen membuat pindaan kepada Seksyen 7[3] dan Seksyen 28A Akta Undang-Undang Sivil 1956 / Civil Law Act 1956, amalan terdahulu di bawah undang-undang am untuk mahkamah membuat potongan terhadap “contingencies, other vicissitudes of life and accelerated payment” / kontinjen hidup untuk kehilangan pendapatan masa depan dan kos prostesis masa depan yang diawad tidak lagi terpakai. Keputusan [56] Rayuan plaintif dibenarkan dengan kos. Ganti rugi prostesis berjumlah RM 3,160,000 adalah dibenarkan. D1 dan D2 membayar kos sebanyak RM 5,000 kepada plaintif tertakluk kepada fi. P3 membayar kos sebanyak RM 5,000 kepada plaintif tertakluk kepada fi. [57] Rayuan balas ditolak dengan kos. D1 dan D2 membayar kos sebanyak RM 5,000 kepada plaintif tertakluk kepada fi. P3 membayar kos sebanyak RM 5,000 kepada plaintif tertakluk kepada fi. ……….(signed)….…….. Leong Wai Hong Pesuruhjaya Kehakiman Mahkamah Tinggi Malaya Kuala Lumpur (NCVC 10) Bertarikh: 03 Ogos 2023 PEGUAM: 1) Balwinder Singh dan Harjeet Singh bagi pihak perayu. (Saleem Gill & Partners (Bentong)) 2) Razlan Hadri Zulkifli dan Sukhdeep Singh bagi pihak responden pertama dan responden kedua. (Gan Ho & Razlan Hadri (Kuala Lumpur)) 3) Dato’ Saranpal Singh Gill bagi pihak responden ketiga. (Kenneth William & Associates (Petaling Jaya)) RUJUKAN KES: 1) Appalasamy Bodoyah v Lee Mon Seng [1996] 3 CLJ 71 dan [1996] 2 MLRH 647. 2) Benmax v Austin Motor Co Ltd [1955] 1 All ER 326. 3) Chan Chin Ming & Anor v. Lim Yok Eng [1994] 3 CLJ 687; [1994] 3 MLJ 233. 4) China Airlines Ltd v Maltran Air Corp Sdn Bhd (formerly known as Maltran Air Services Corp Sdn Bhd) and another appeal [1996] 2 MLJ 517. 5) Chua Kay Hock & Anor v Lee Hoon Poi [2022] 5 MLRA 625 CA. 6) County Council of Hertfordshire v. Rural District Council of Barnet [1902] 2 KB 48 7) Hasniyati Hassan & Anor v Kerajaan Malaysia [2022] 7 CLJ dan 2022 MLJ 469. 8) Hiang Boon Fatt v. Lembaga Kemajuan Negeri Pahang & Anor, Chin Yee Thow v. Lembaga Kemajuan Negeri Pahang & Anor [1981] 1 LNS 195; [1983] 1 MLJ 89. 9) Mohamed Razif bin Hashim & Anor v Muhammad Saiful Suffian bin Zulkafli [2021] MLJU 133. 10) Muhammad Asyraf Zulkipli & Anor v Muhammad Hafiz Ezman Ismail & Ors [2019] 1 LNS 472. 11) Munusamy Vengadasalam V Public Prosecutor [1987] CLJ (Rep)

12) Noraini Omar & Anor v Rohaini Said (and Another Appeal) [2006] 1 CLJ 895 dan [2006] 1 MLRA 117 CA. 13) Ong Ah Long v. Dr S Underwood [1986] 1 LNS 99[1983] 2 MLJ

14) Sivalingam A/L Periasamy v Periasamy & Anor [1995] 2 MLRA 432, [1996] 4 CLJ 545 dan [1995] 3 MLJ 395. 15) Subramanya Sastry v. Sheikh Ghannu AIR 1935 16) Takong Tabari v. Government of Sarawak & Ors and Another Appeal [1998] 4 CLJ 589; [1998] 4 MLJ 52. 17) Tan Kheng Kuan v. Lim Cheng Teik & Ors. [1964] 1 LNS 197; [1965] 1 MLJ 116. 18) The 'Eurymedon' (1942) 73 Lloyd LR 217. 19) Wasal Construction Sdn Bhd v Boh Huat Chan Timber Products Sdn Bhd [2014] 4 MLRA 482, [2013] 1 LNS 1269 dan [2014] 4 MLJ 294 CA. 20) Wong Kuan Kay v Rohaizad Othman & Anor; Majlis Perbandaran

21) Yang Salbiah & Anor v. Jamil bin Harun [1981] 1 LNS 106; [1981] 1 MLJ 292. 22) Yap Weng Ken & Anor v Mohd Hero (Besraya (M) Sdn Bhd & 2 Ors – Third Parties) (and Another Appeal) [2018] 1 PIR [21]. RUJUKAN PERUNDANGAN: 1) Seksyen 2 Akta Peranti Perubatan 2012 / Medical Device Act 2012. 2) Seksyen 3 of the Highways and Bridges Act, 1891. 3) Seksyen 5 Akta Peranti Perubatan 2012 / Medical Device Act 2012. 4) Seksyen 7[3] Akta Undang-Undang Sivil 1956 / Civil Law Act 1956. 5) Seksyen 28A Akta Undang-Undang Sivil 1956 / Civil Law Act 1956. 6) Seksyen 114(g) Akta Keterangan 1950.