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Jadual 1, Akta Mahkamah Kehakiman, 1964 60 BETWEEN MOHD FIRDAUS BIN JAHAYA (NRIC NO.: 850114-08-6449) … APPLICANT 65 AND 1. JABATAN AGAMA ISLAM NEGERI PERAK 2. PENGERUSI LEMBAGA TATATERTIB PERKHIDMATAN AWAM NEGERI PERAK BAGI 70 KUMPULAN SOKONGAN (NO. 1) 3. PENGERUSI LEMBAGA RAYUAN TATATERTIB PERKHIDMATAN AWAM NEGERI PERAK BAGI KUMPULAN SOKONGAN 4. SURUHANJAYA PERKHIDMATAN AWAM NEGERI PERAK 75 5. KERAJAAN NEGERI PERAK … RESPONDENTS GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT Introduction [1]. The applicant seeks judicial review of decisions by various 80 disciplinary bodies within the Perak State Government. He contends that his dismissal from public service as an Islamic Affairs Assistant (Grade S19, Contract) was unlawful, irrational, procedurally flawed, and grossly disproportionate. The applicant prays for orders of certiorari and mandamus to quash the dismissal, reinstate him, and 85 award back pay and damages. Background facts [2]. The appellant, Mohd Firdaus bin Jahaya, formerly served as a contract Islamic Affairs Assistant (Grade S19) under the “Majlis Agama Islam dan Adat Melayu Perak” (MAIPk) since 2010, with 90 successive renewals. In 2020, he was transitioned to a similar position with the “Jabatan Agama Islam Perak” (JAIPk), under the Perak State Government, where his latest contract was to run from 7 February 2023 to 6 February 2025. [3]. On 17 June 2020, the Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission 95 (MACC) raided the appellant’s residence based on an allegation that he submitted a false claim of RM18,400.00 for a 2018 Hari Raya program involving fictitious recipients. During the raid, RM20,525.00 in cash was seized, allegedly earmarked for other MAIPk outreach programs. Despite this, the appellant was never preferred criminal 100 charges. The MACC, in its affidavit dated 8 August 2022, conceded that the evidentiary basis for the prosecution was doubtful. [4]. However, following the raid, disciplinary proceedings commenced. A show-cause letter was issued, culminating in the appellant being dismissed. The Order was dated 4 October 2023, under Regulation 105 38(g) of the Public Officers (Conduct and Discipline) Regulations 1995 (Peraturan-peraturan Pegawai Awam (Kelakuan dan Tatatertib) 1995). The Third Respondent dismissed the appellant’s appeal in January 2024. Merits of the appeal 110 [5]. Having heard the parties and considered the relevant authorities, this Court is compelled to allow the applicant’s claim on the narrow but pivotal ground that the impugned decision was made without providing contemporaneous reasons. [6]. The central issue before the Court, concerns the reasoning 115 accompanying a decision by a public authority in this case, the tribunal or board that effected the applicant’s dismissal. The applicant correctly contended that the failure to furnish reasons at the material time of the decision compromises procedural fairness and impairs the applicant’s right to meaningful judicial review. 120 [7]. In this respect, the Court finds binding principles in Nazrul Imran Mohd Nor Civil Service Commission Malaysia & Anor [2021] 10 CLJ 737; [2021] 6 MLJ 750; [2022] 1 MLRA 96; [2021] AMEJ 1626, which states that the decision-maker must disclose the reasons forming the basis of its decision contemporaneously, not 125 retrospectively. It is not sufficient for the respondent authority to merely include justifications later through affidavits filed in court proceedings, after the challenge has been initiated. [8]. The Court is fortified in this view by the judgment of Abu Bakar Jais J in Nazrul Imran (supra), where it was held that the need for 130 reasons is an indispensable requirement of natural justice. The failure to provide such reasons at the time of the decision, the learned judge observed, not only obscures the factual and legal basis for the tribunal’s conclusion but also gives rise to an inference that the decision was arbitrary or predetermined. This omission 135 deprives the affected party of the opportunity to properly understand, respond to, and challenge the decision. Here, the decision letter issued to the applicant did not contain any reasons justifying the dismissal. It was only later, in affidavits filed in court proceedings, that the respondents sought to articulate the rationale, 140 claiming that the applicant’s explanation for retaining funds was unconvincing. However, this subsequent reasoning cannot cure the initial procedural defect. [9]. The following passages from the decision Nazrul Imran (supra), narrates the legal propositions: 145 “[65] It is incumbent on both respondents not to merely say the appellant did not exculpate himself in respect of the charge against him by the representation he had sent. These statements made that are without any basis given, no matter how strenuously made, remain devoid of any substance or 150 weight. Both respondents, especially first respondent, are duty-bound to explain and give reasons for rejecting the grounds given by the appellant in his representation in answering the charge. Unfortunately, this was not done by the respondents as is evident from the affidavits filed. 155 [66] Further, the failure of the first respondent to explain why the appellant was found not able to exculpate himself, also gives credence to the contention that the first respondent did not sufficiently consider the appellant’s defences. If indeed the first respondent had taken into account the appellant’s 160 defences and had rationally considered the same, surely reasons could be provided for rejecting the appellant’s defences “[67] A recent case on judicial review explaining the need to provide reasons for a decision is to be found in the decision 165 of this court in Perbadanan Pengurusan Trellises & Ors v. Datuk Bandar Kuala Lumpur & Ors [2021] 2 CLJ 808; [2021] 3 MLJ 1. Our learned sister, Mary Lim JCA (now FCJ) in delivering the judgment of the court, went through a number of cases and clearly explained as follows: 170 [112] Then, there is the matter of duty to give reasons. We would have thought that the law on this issue is fairly clear and settled from the early years of Rohana bte Ariffin & Anor v Universiti Sains 175 Malaysia [1989] 1 MLJ 487 where it was ruled that a ‘reasoned decision can be an additional constituent of the concept of fairness’ and where the reasons have to be given so that the right of appeal may be properly and meaningfully 180 exercised; to Majlis Perbandaran Pulau Pinang v. Syarikat Bekerjasama-sama Serbaguna Sungai Gelugor Dengan Tanggungan [1999] 3 MLJ 1 (‘MPPP’) where the Federal Court extensively reasoned on why there must be this duty to give 185 reasons even if there is no express provision for such duty. According to the Federal Court, this duty to give reasons emanates from the concept of fairness; see also Kesatuan Pekerja-Pekerja Bukan Eksekutif Maybank Bhd v. Kesatuan Kebangsaan Pekerja- 190 Pekerja Bank & Anor [2018] 2 MLJ 590; [2017] 4 CLJ 265 and Mohamad Hassan bin Zakaria v Universiti Teknologi Malaysia [2017] 6 MLJ 586; [2017] 10 CLJ 36 (see discussions of the same in Save Britain’s Heritage v. Secretary of State for the Environment 195 and others [1991] 2 All ER 10).” [10]. The Court further rejects the contention of the respondents that the tribunal’s internal minutes, which were not contemporaneously provided to the applicant would suffice as valid reasoning. It is trite 200 that reasons must also be communicated to the affected party at the material time. In this case, the minutes were not made available to the applicant at the time of the dismissal, and the respondent's reliance on these documents was belatedly misplaced. The tribunal’s failure to furnish such reasons deprived the applicant of 205 procedural safeguards inherent in the judicial review process and violated the tenets of transparency and accountability expected of public decision-makers. [11]. While the Respondents argue that neither the Public Officers (Conduct and Discipline) Regulations 1993 nor Article 135(2) of 210 the Federal Constitution expressly require that reasons be given in a dismissal or appeal rejection letter, this Court is unable to accept that such silence relieves a public authority from the obligation to act transparently and fairly. In Pembinaan Batu Jaya Sdn Bhd v Pengarah Tanah dan Galian, Selangor & Anor [2016] 5 CLJ 250; 215 [2016] 2 MLJ 495; [2016] 5 MLRA 503; [2016] AMEJ 0895, the Court of Appeal made clear that the absence of such a requirement does not excuse the duty to give reasons, which is essential to good governance, accountability, and procedural fairness. It states that silence in the statute should not be used as a cloak to shield the 220 rationale for a decision from scrutiny: “[49] Learned counsel for the respondents had also submitted that there was no duty expressly provided in the NLC for the SA to give or assign any reason(s) for deciding the way it deems fit. The case of Minister of Labour, Malaysia v. Sanjiv Oberoi & 225 Anor [1990] 1 CLJ 44; [1990] 1 CLJ (Rep) 200 was cited in support. But, we could not find any statute which contains express provisions that affirmatively prohibit a public officer, as a decision-maker, in the discharge of his public duty, from assigning any reason for his decision. Indeed, it would be most 230 strange, if there was one such statute. We say so because it would defeat the essence of good governance and that it would not promote accountability and owning up to responsibility in decision-making. As such, the silence in a statute requiring that a reason or reasons be given by the decision-maker 235 ought not to be taken to mean that there was therefore no duty to give reasons. The silence in the statute, on the duty to give reason for a decision, ought not to be made a cloak or a blanket under which the decision-maker could conveniently find refuge so that the rationale for his 240 decision remains shrouded in mystery, privy only to himself, but not to the public at large, on whose behalf, he is entrusted to discharge that duty. That scenario would indeed be a contradiction in terms. The proper view, as stipulated by the apex court in the Sugumar case (supra) is to 245 be preferred in that, whether a reason need to be given by a decision-maker, is to be determined on a case by case basis. In the case of R v. Secretary Of State For Trade And Industry, Ex parte Lonhro Plc [1989] 1 WLR 525 ("Lonhro case"), Lord Keith of Kinkel, had this to say: 250 The absence of reasons for a decision where there is no duty to give them cannot of itself provide any support for the suggested irrationality of the decision. The only significance of the absence of reasons is that if all other known facts and circumstances appear to 255 point overwhelmingly in favour of a different decision, the decision-maker, who has given no reasons, cannot complain if the court draws the inference that he had no rational reason for his decision.” 260 [12]. Accordingly, in this case, the Respondents cannot rely solely on the statutory silence to justify the absence of contemporaneous reasons. The duty to give reasons, especially when a livelihood is at stake, may be constitutionally or administratively required to satisfy principles of fairness and accountability in public decision- 265 making. Jurisdictional overreach [13]. The Court also notes the alleged wrongdoing of the applicant of failing to distribute or return Hari Raya funds, occurred in 2018, when the MAIPk, a separate statutory body, employed the applicant. 270 He only became a contract officer under the State Government in February 2020. At the time of the alleged misconduct, he was not part of the public service and was not covered by the public service disciplinary rules. Therefore, the disciplinary action taken by the State was therefore without legal foundation. The reason MAIPk, as 275 the employer at the material time, did not initiate disciplinary action and the SPRM likewise did not pursue charges, is clearly stated in the SPRM’s affidavit dated 8 August 2022, wherein it expressly acknowledged evidential doubts in proceeding with prosecution against the applicant. 280 Conclusion [14]. The Court finds that the applicant has succeeded on the ground of procedural unfairness. However, the Court will only grant the remedy necessary to rectify that irregularity. The applicant had asked to be reinstated, to continue working until the end of his 285 contract in February 2025, and to be paid general damages. The Court decides that reinstatement with back pay is fair in this case. There is no legal or equitable basis to extend the contractual period or award general damages, particularly when the misconduct of alleged retention of entrusted funds was not denied but justified by 290 the applicant by giving a technical explanation. The reinstatement will be treated as if the dismissal never happened, and the applicant is entitled to his salary from the dismissal date until the end of his contract period. The Court will not give any orders to extend his contract beyond its original end date. 295 [15]. Accordingly, the Court allows prayers (a) and (b) in the draft order prepared by the parties marked as “A” as proposed by the applicant with minor modifications. Prayer (c) is granted in part, limited strictly to reinstatement with salary and benefits for the unexpired term of the contract. General damages are refused. The respondents are 300 ordered to pay the costs of RM5,000 to the applicant. Dated : 7 July 2025 MOSES SUSAYAN 305 Judicial Commissioner High Court in Malaya at Ipoh, Perak 310 Counsel For the Applicant : Noorazmir bin Zakaria (together with Siti Farah Farhana Ahmad Fathi) 315 Advocates and Solicitors [Messrs Akram Hizri Azad & Azmir) Kuala Lumpur For the Defendant : Mohd Fitri Bin Sadarudin 320 Senior Federal Counsel [Advisory Unit] Perak Legal Advisor Offices Ipoh, Perak 325 (Notice: This Grounds of Decision is subject to official editorial revision) Headnotes: Judicial Review – Public employment – Dismissal – Failure to give contemporaneous reasons – Procedural unfairness – Right to meaningful 330 judicial review – Whether silence in statute excuses duty to give reasons – Disciplinary jurisdiction – Whether public service rules applicable to conduct committed before entry into public service – Whether State authority acted ultra vires – Remedies limited to reinstatement and back pay is appropriate relief to cure procedural irregularity 335