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1 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI KANGAR DALAM NEGERI PERLIS, MALAYSIA GUAMAN SIVIL NO.: RA-23NCVC-1-04/2022 ANTARA MOHD HASRAL BIN ABU HASSAN (NO. K/P: 770530-07-5837) ..... PLAINTIF
RA-23NCvC-1-04/2022
High Court of Malaysia28 Nov 2024
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“eceased) & Anor (supra) misalnya, Mahkamah Persekutuan melalui penghakiman yang disampaikan oleh Jeffrey Tan FCJ telah memutuskan bahawa – “[49] The expression ‘onus of proof’ does not appear in the Evidence Act. Only the expression ‘burden of proof’ appears in ss 101-103 of the Evidence Act. But there is a difference”
“1982 Guj 308, P Desai and S Majmudar thus illustrated the ‘burden of proof’ to establish the case which never shifts and the shifting burden to adduce evidence in the context of ss 101 and 102 of the Indian Evidence Act which are identical to ss 101 and 102 of the Evidence Act: It is also well to bear in mind that ther”
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1 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI KANGAR DALAM NEGERI PERLIS, MALAYSIA GUAMAN SIVIL NO.: RA-23NCVC-1-04/2022 ANTARA MOHD HASRAL BIN ABU HASSAN (NO. K/P: 770530-07-5837) ..... PLAINTIF
1
SALMAH BINTI MOHD NOOR
2
AMAR MUSAFIR HOLDINGS SDN BHD [NO. SYARIKAT: 1185925-X] ….. DEFENDAN-DEFENDAN 15/02/2026 22:31:27 RA-23NCvC-1-04/2022 Kand. 103
1
Tuntutan Plaintif terhadap Defendan-Defendan adalah berkaitan dengan tort pencerobohan tanah ke atas sebahagian hartanah yang terletak dalam GM 2074, Lot 2862, Mukim Kayang, Perlis (selepas ini dirujuk sebagai “Hartanah tersebut”) yang mana Plaintif adalah pemilik dan tuan punya berdaftar bersama bagi Hartanah tersebut.
2
Defendan Pertama walau bagaimanapun telah menafikan tuntutan Plaintif tersebut dan telah membuat tuntutan balas terhadap Plaintif. Bagi Defendan Kedua, memandangkan syarikat itu telah digulungkan, peguam Defendan Kedua telah hadir sebagai amicus curiae dalam prosiding ini.
3
Setelah suatu perbicaraan penuh dijalankan dengan tiga (3) orang saksi Plaintif dan dua orang (2) saksi Defendan Pertama dan setelah Mahkamah ini meneliti, menilai dan mempertimbangkan segala pliding, keterangan lisan dan dokumentar serta penghujahan kedua-dua pihak Plaintif dan Defendan Pertama, Mahkamah ini berpuas hati dan mendapati bahawa Plaintif telah berjaya membuktikan tuntutannya terhadap Defendan Pertama atas imbangan kebarangkalian, manakala Defendan Pertama pula telah gagal membuktikan tuntutan balasnya terhadap Plaintif atas imbangan kebarangkalian. Oleh itu, Mahkamah ini telah membenarkan tuntutan Plaintif terhadap Defendan Pertama dan menolak tuntutan balas Defendan Pertama terhadap Plaintif dengan kos bagi kedua-duanya sebanyak RM20,000.00.
4
Alasan Mahkamah ini membuat keputusan tersebut adalah seperti di bawah.
5
Berdasarkan seksyen 101 dan seksyen 102 Akta Keterangan 1950 [Akta 56] dan prinsip undang-undang yang mantap, beban pembuktian adalah terletak pada pihak yang menghendaki Mahkamah untuk memberikan penghakiman kepadanya. Peruntukan tersebut adalah seperti yang berikut: “Burden of proof
101
(1) Whoever desires any court to give judgment as to any legal right or liability, dependent on the existence of facts which he asserts, must prove that those facts exist.
2
When a person is bound to prove the existence of any fact, it is said that the burden of proof lies on that person. On whom burden of proof lies
102
The burden of proof in a suit or proceeding lies on that person who would fail if no evidence at all were given on either side.”. [Penekanan ditambah]
6
Prinsip undang-undang ini telahpun diputuskan dalam banyak kes undang-undang seperti Letchumanan Chettiar Alagappan @ L Allagappan (as executor to SL Alameloo Achi alias Sona Lena Alamelo Acho, deceased) & Anor v Secure Plantation Sdn Bhd [2017] 4 MLJ 697, Keruntum Sdn Bhd v The Director of Forests & Ors [2017] 3 MLJ 281, Hong Yik Trading v Liziz Plantation Sdn Bhd [2017] 5 MLJ 398 dan Tenaga Nasional Bhd v. Perwaja Steel Sdn Bhd [1998] 2 CLJ
740
740.
7
Dalam kes Letchumanan Chettiar Alagappan @ L Allagappan (as executor to SL Alameloo Achi alias Sona Lena Alamelo Acho, deceased) & Anor (supra) misalnya, Mahkamah Persekutuan melalui penghakiman yang disampaikan oleh Jeffrey Tan FCJ telah memutuskan bahawa – “[49] The expression ‘onus of proof’ does not appear in the Evidence Act. Only the expression ‘burden of proof’ appears in ss 101-103 of the Evidence Act. But there is a difference between the sense of the expression ‘burden of proof’ in s 101 and the sense of that same expression in s 102. [50] In International Times & Ors v Leong Ho Yuen [1980] 2 MLJ 86, Salleh Abas FCJ (as he then was), delivering the judgment of the court, said that the first sense of the expression ‘burden of proof’ in s 101 is the burden to establish the case which rests throughout on the party who asserts the affirmative of the issue, while the second sense of the expression ‘burden of proof’ in s 102 is the burden to adduce evidence: For the purpose of this appeal it is necessary to bear in mind the distinction between the two senses in which the expressions burden of proof and onus of proof are used (Nanji & Co v Jatashankar Dossa & Ors AIR 1961 SC 1474 1748 and Raghavamma v Chenchamma AIR 1964 SC 136-143). The first sense, signified by the expression burden of proof such as referred to in s 101 of the Evidence Act is the burden of establishing a case and this rests throughout the trial on the party who asserts the affirmative of the issue. The appellants in the present appeal relied on justification and fair comment. Therefore, the burden of proving these defences rests entirely upon them (Gatley on Libel and Slander 7th Ed, paras 351 and 354). The second sense referred to as onus of proof, on the other hand, relates to the responsibility of adducing evidence in order to discharge the burden of proof. The onus as opposed to burden is not stable and constantly shifts during the trial from one side to the other according to the scale of evidence and other preponderates. Such shifting is one continuous process in the evaluation of evidence. According to ss 102 and 103 of the Evidence Act, if the party with whom this onus lies whether initially or subsequently as a result of its shifting does not give any or further evidence or gives evidence which is not sufficient, such party must fail. It is this onus that we are concerned with in the present appeal. [51] ‘There is an essential distinction between burden of proof and onus of proof, burden of proof lies upon the person who has to prove a fact and it never shifts, but the onus of proof shifts’ (Addagada Raghavamma And Anr v Addagada Chenchamma And Anr 1964 SCR (2) 933). [52] The ‘burden of proof’ in s 101 is the burden to establish a case which rests throughout on the party who asserts the affirmative of the issue. The ‘burden of proof’ in s 102 is the burden to adduce evidence, to make out or rebut the claim. The ‘burden of proof’ in s 102 shifts from one side to the other according to the weight of the evidence. To differentiate the sense used, the ‘burden of proof’ in s 101 is ‘burden of proof’, while the ‘burden of proof’ in ss 102 and 103 is dubbed ‘onus of proof’. In some jurisdictions, the s 101 ‘burden of proof’ is labelled ‘legal burden’ while the s 102 burden of proof’ is referred to as ‘evidential burden’. [53] In Ranchhodbhai Somabhai And Anr v Babubhai Bhailalbhai And Ors AIR 1982 Guj 308, P Desai and S Majmudar thus illustrated the ‘burden of proof’ to establish the case which never shifts and the shifting burden to adduce evidence in the context of ss 101 and 102 of the Indian Evidence Act which are identical to ss 101 and 102 of the Evidence Act: It is also well to bear in mind that there is an essential distinction between ‘burden of proof’ and ‘onus of proof’; burden of proof lies upon the person who has to prove a fact and it never shifts, but the onus of proof shifts. Such a shifting of onus is a continuous process in the evaluation of evidence (see Raghavamma v Chenchamma AIR 1964 SC 136). Burden of proof has two distinct meanings, namely, (i) the burden of proof as a matter of law and pleadings, and (ii) the burden of proof as a matter of adducing evidence. Section 101 of the Evidence Act deals with the former and Section 102 of the Evidence Act with the latter. The first remains constant but the second shifts. In a claim application, therefore, the burden of proof, in the first sense, certainly lies on the claimant. If he examines himself and his witness, if any, and if the evidence, tested in the light of the principles set out above, is found to be acceptable, the onus shifts on the tortfeasor to prove those circumstances, if any, which dislodge the assertions of the claimants. If the tortfeasor fails to prove before the Court any fact or circumstance which tends to affect the evidence led by the claimant, the claimant would be entitled to ask the Court to hold that he has established the case and, on that basis, to make a just award it would thus appear, that though the legal burden — the burden as a matter of law and pleadings — remains constant on the claimant, the burden as a matter of adducing evidence changes often times as the trial of the claim petition progresses. [54] Section 101(1) provides that ‘Whoever desires any court to give judgment as to any legal right or liability, dependent on the existence of facts which he asserts, must prove that those facts exist’. ‘Section 101 states that the initial burden of proving a prima facie case in his favour is cast on the plaintiff …’ (Woodroffe and Amir Ali, Law of Evidence (19th Ed Vol 3) at p 3194). Illustration (b) to s 101 puts it beyond doubt that the ‘burden of proof’ rests throughout on the plaintiff. Section 102 provides that ‘The burden of proof in a suit or proceeding lies on that person who would fail if no evidence at all were given on either side’. ‘The initial onus of proving the case is always on the plaintiff’ (Sarkar Law of Evidence 16th Ed at p 1593). Illustration (a) to s 102 puts it beyond doubt that a plaintiff has the initial onus of proof. [55] But ‘when (the plaintiff) gives such evidence as will support a prima facie case, the onus shifts on to the defendant, to adduce rebutting evidence to meet the case made out by the plaintiff. As the case continues to develop, the onus may shift back again to the plaintiff. It is not easy to decide at what particular stage, in the course of the evidence, the onus shifts from one side to the other. When after the entire evidence has been adduced, the tribunal feels it cannot make up its mind as to which of the versions is true, it will hold that the party on whom the burden lies has not discharged the burden, but if it has, on the evidence, no difficulty arriving at a definite conclusion, then the burden of proof on the pleading recedes into the background’ (Woodroffe and Amir Ali, at p 3194; see also Abrath v The North Eastern Railway Company at p 452). ‘… the onus of proof may shift … but the question must ultimately arise whether the person who is bound to prove the affirmative of the issue … has discharged … that burden’ (Jane Wakelin v The London and South Western Railway Company (1886) 12 App Cas 41 per Lord Halsbury LC) or proved ‘his case sufficiently to justify a judgment in his favour’ (Stoney v Eastbourne Rural District Council [1927] 1 Ch 367 at p 397 per Lord Hanworth MR). [56] Thus, a plaintiff has both the burden of proof as well as the initial onus of proof. In Britestone Pte Ltd v Smith & Associates Far East, Ltd [2007] 4 SLR 855, the Singapore Court of Appeal per VK Rajah JCA, delivering the judgment of the court, explained that at the start of the plaintiff’s case the burden of proof and the onus of proof coincide: … at the start of the plaintiff’s case, the legal burden of proving the existence of any relevant fact that the plaintiff must prove and the evidential burden of some (not inherently incredible) evidence of the existence of such fact coincide. Upon adduction of that evidence, the evidential burden shifts to the defendant, as the case may be, to adduce some evidence in rebuttal. If no evidence in rebuttal is adduced, the court may conclude from the evidence of the defendant. If, on the other hand, evidence in rebuttal is adduced, the evidential burden shifts back to the plaintiff. If, ultimately, the evidential burden comes to rest on the defendant, the legal burden of proof of the relevant fact would have been discharged by the plaintiff. The legal burden of proof — a permanent and enduring burden — does not shift. A party who has the legal burden of proof on any issue must discharge it throughout. Sometimes, the legal burden is spoken of, inaccurately, as ‘shifting’; but what is truly meant is that another issue has been engaged, on which the opposite party hears the legal burden of proof. [57] The rule is that ‘the onus of proof of any particular fact lies on the party who alleges it, not on him who denies it; et incumbit probation qui decit, non qui negat, Actori incibit probation … The plaintiff is bound in the first instance, to show a prima facie case, and if he leaves it imperfect, the court will not assist him. Hence the maxim Potior est condition defendantis. A plaintiff cannot obviously advantage himself by the weakness of the defence. A plaintiff’s case must stand or fall upon the evidence adduced by him. When, however, the defendant, or either litigant party, instead of denying what is alleged against him, relies on some new matter which, if true, is an answer to it, the burden of proof changes sides; and he, in his turn, is bound to show a prima facie case at least and, if he leaves it imperfect, the court will not assist him. Reus excipendo fit actor’ (Woodroffe and Amir Ali, Vol 3 at pp 3190- 3191).”. [Penekanan ditambah]
8
Berdasarkan peruntukan dan nas-nas undang-undang di atas adalah jelas bahawa beban pembuktian dalam sesuatu kes sivil sentiasa terletak pada bahu pihak yang menuntut dan ia adalah atas imbangan kebarangkalian. Prinsip ini turut terpakai kepada pihak yang membuat tuntutan balas. Kegagalan pihak yang menuntut berbuat demikian akan menyebabkan tuntutannya ditolak oleh Mahkamah.
9
Setelah mengambil kira keseluruhan pliding, keterangan lisan saksi-saksi Plaintif dan Defendan Pertama, keterangan dokumentar dan fakta dalam kes ini, adalah menjadi dapatan Mahkamah ini bahawa –
a
Noor Hasshila Binti Abu Hassan, iaitu adik kandung kepada Plaintif dan merupakan pemilik dan tuan punya berdaftar ke atas 3/14 bahagian di atas Hartanah tersebut (selepas ini dirujuk sebagai “Kawasan/Bahagian tersebut”);
b
Noor Adilah Binti Abu Hassan, iaitu adik kandung kepada Plaintif dan Noor Hasshila Binti Abu Hassan, mempunyai hak dan kepentingan ke atas 1/2 bahagian Kawasan/Bahagian tersebut berdasarkan niat dan hasrat Puan Hasnah Binti Mohd Noor, iaitu ibu kandung Plaintif, Noor Hasshila Binti Abu Hassan dan Noor Adilah Binti Abu Hassan semasa membeli Kawasan/Bahagian tersebut pada sekitar tahun 2001, iaitu untuk memberikan Kawasan/Bahagian tersebut kepada Noor Hasshila Binti Abu Hassan dan Noor Adilah Binti Abu Hassan mengikut pecahan 1/2 bahagian setiap seorang. Fakta ini berada dalam pengetahuan penuh Noor Hasshila Binti Abu Hassan dan Defendan Pertama (rujuk perbualan facebook antara Noor Hasshila Binti Abu Hassan dengan Defendan Pertama di muka surat 66 hingga 70 Ikatan Dokumen
c
setelah membeli Kawasan/Bahagian tersebut pada sekitar tahun 2001, Puan Hasnah Binti Mohd Noor tidak boleh mendaftarkan sekali nama Noor Adilah Binti Abu Hassan bersama Noor Hasshila Binti Abu Hassan dalam hakmilik Hartanah tersebut kerana pada ketika itu Noor Adilah Binti Abu Hassan berumur di bawah 18 tahun;
d
Defendan Pertama dan Noor Hasshila Binti Abu Hassan telah gagal mencabar dan menyangkal keterangan Plaintif, Puan Hasnah Binti Mohd Noor dan Noor Adilah Binti Abu Hassan bahawa Kawasan/Bahagian tersebut telah dibeli oleh Puan Hasnah Binti Mohd Noor pada sekitar tahun 2001 untuk Noor Hasshila Binti Abu Hassan dan Noor Adilah Binti Abu Hassan mengikut pecahan 1/2 bahagian setiap seorang dan hanya nama Noor Hasshila Binti Abu Hassan sahaja yang dapat didaftarkan dalam hakmilik Hartanah tersebut pada ketika itu kerana Noor Adilah Binti Abu Hassan berumur di bawah 18 tahun pada ketika itu. Tiada keterangan daripada Defendan Pertama dan Noor Hasshila Binti Abu Hassan bahawa Kawasan/Bahagian tersebut telah diperoleh oleh Noor Hasshila Binti Abu Hassan melalui urusniaga atau kaedah yang lain seperti jual beli, hibah, turun milik dan sebagainya;
e
Defendan Pertama dan Noor Hasshila Binti Abu Hassan telah gagal mencabar dan menyangkal keterangan Plaintif, Puan Hasnah Binti Mohd Noor dan Noor Adilah Binti Abu Hassan bahawa Noor Adilah Binti Abu Hassan mempunyai hak dan kepentingan ke atas 1/2 bahagian Kawasan/Bahagian tersebut seperti mana yang diniatkan dan dihasratkan oleh Puan Hasnah Binti Mohd Noor semasa membeli Kawasan/Bahagian tersebut pada sekitar tahun 2001;
f
walaupun Noor Hasshila Binti Abu Hassan sedar dan tahu bahawa Noor Adilah Binti Abu Hassan mempunyai hak dan kepentingan ke atas 1/2 bahagian Kawasan/Bahagian tersebut, Noor Hasshila Binti Abu Hassan telah gagal dan enggan mendaftarkan nama Noor Adilah Binti Abu Hassan sebagai pemilik dan tuan punya berdaftar bagi 1/2 bahagian Kawasan/Bahagian tersebut dalam hakmilik Hartanah tersebut setelah Noor Adilah Binti Abu Hassan mencapai umur 18 tahun;
g
sebaliknya, Noor Hasshila Binti Abu Hassan yang mempunyai tanggungjawab moral dan undang-undang untuk melindungi hak dan kepentingan Noor Adilah Binti Abu Hassan ke atas 1/2 bahagian Kawasan/Bahagian tersebut telah secara unilateral menjual keseluruhan Kawasan/Bahagian tersebut kepada Defendan Pertama tanpa pengetahuan dan persetujuan Noor Adilah Binti Abu Hassan. Tindakan Noor Hasshila Binti Abu Hassan tersebut jelas telah mencabuli dan menafikan hak dan kepentingan Noor Adilah Binti Abu Hassan ke atas 1/2 bahagian Kawasan/Bahagian tersebut;
h
walaupun Defendan Pertama sedar dan tahu bahawa Noor Adilah Binti Abu Hassan mempunyai hak dan kepentingan ke atas 1/2 bahagian Kawasan/Bahagian tersebut, Defendan Pertama telah meneruskan hasratnya untuk membeli Kawasan/Bahagian tersebut daripada Noor Hasshila Binti Abu Hassan. Tindakan Defendan Pertama tersebut jelas menunjukkan yang beliau bukan pembeli yang bona fide;
i
sebagai salah seorang pemilik dan tuan punya berdaftar bersama di atas Hartanah tersebut, Plaintif memfailkan tindakan ini untuk melindungi hak dan kepentingan Noor Adilah Binti Abu Hassan ke atas 1/2 bahagian Kawasan/Bahagian tersebut seperti mana yang telah diniatkan dan dihasratkan oleh Puan Hasnah Binti Mohd Noor semasa beliau membeli Kawasan/Bahagian tersebut; dan
j
berdasarkan Rekod Ketuanpunyaan dalam hakmilik Hartanah tersebut yang bertarikh pada 25.8.2022, nama Defendan Pertama hanya didaftarkan sebagai pemilik dan tuan punya berdaftar bagi Kawasan/Bahagian tersebut pada 25.8.2022.
10
Berdasarkan kesemua keterangan, fakta, dapatan dan alasan di atas, Mahkamah ini berpendapat bahawa –
a
memandangkan Perjanjian Jual Beli antara Noor Hasshila Binti Abu Hassan dengan Defendan Pertama bagi Kawasan/Bahagian tersebut tidak mendapat persetujuan daripada Noor Adilah Binti Abu Hassan yang mempunyai hak dan kepentingan ke atas 1/2 bahagian Kawasan/Bahagian tersebut, maka Perjanjian Jual Beli tersebut dan dokumen-dokumen lain yang berkaitan dengan Perjanjian Jual Beli tersebut seperti Borang 14A Kanun Tanah Negara (Pindahmilik Tanah, Bahagian atau Pajakan) adalah terbatal dan tidak sah dari segi undang-undang; dan
b
sehubungan dengan itu, pindahmilik yang didaftarkan atas nama Defendan Pertama pada 25.8.2022 tersebut adalah terbatal dan tidak sah. Oleh itu, tindakan Defendan Pertama mengarahkan Defendan Kedua untuk memasuki Kawasan/Bahagian tersebut serta meletakkan bahan-bahan binaan dan memulakan kerja-kerja binaan sebuah rumah di atas Kawasan/Bahagian tersebut pada 23.1.2022 dan 23.2.2022 adalah tidak sah dan merupakan perbuatan menceroboh Kawasan/Bahagian tersebut. Dapatan Mahkamah ini adalah selaras dengan penghakiman Abdul Malik Ishak J dalam kes Terra Damansara Sdn Bhd v Nandex Development Sdn Bhd [2006] 6 MLJ 24; [2006] 3 MLRH 443, yang mana Mahkamah dalam kes ini telah menjelaskan elemen-elemen tort pencerobohan tanah seperti yang berikut: “(1) The tort of trespass to land or what is known as trespass quare clausum fregit consists of three significant factors. Firstly, it is the act of entering upon land in the possession of another — here it would be the plaintiff as against the defendant who is the trespasser. Secondly, having entered upon such land the trespasser continues to remain on the land. Thirdly, the trespasser placing or projecting any object upon such land. It must be emphasised that in each case, the entry is without lawful justification (Barker v The Queen (1983) 153 CLR 338,356) (see para 10 (refd)). [Penekanan ditambah]
11
Sebagai kesimpulan, berdasarkan alasan-alasan di atas, Mahkamah ini berpuas hati dan mendapati bahawa Plaintif telah berjaya membuktikan tuntutannya terhadap Defendan Pertama atas imbangan kebarangkalian, manakala Defendan Pertama pula telah gagal membuktikan tuntutan balasnya terhadap Plaintif atas imbangan kebarangkalian. Oleh itu, Mahkamah ini telah memutuskan seperti yang berikut:
a
Perintah Pelaksanaan Spesifik (specific performance) ke atas Defendan Pertama untuk berhenti menjalankan sebarang kerja untuk membina sebarang binaan termasuk, namun tidak terhad kepada, sebuah rumah di atas Kawasan tersebut dan mengosongkan Kawasan tersebut dari bahan-bahan binaan yang telah diletakkan oleh Defendan Kedua di atasnya dalam tempoh 30 hari selepas tarikh penghakiman (“Perintah Pelaksanaan Spesifik tersebut”);
b
seandainya Perintah Pelaksanaan Spesifik tersebut gagal dilaksanakan oleh Defendan-Defendan, Defendan Pertama dan Defendan Kedua dan/atau wakil dan/atau ejennya boleh dikomitkan oleh Mahkamah atas tindakan menghina mahkamah;
c
seandainya Perintah Pelaksanaan Spesifik tersebut gagal dilaksanakan oleh Defendan Pertama, Plaintif dan/atau wakil-wakilnya diberikan kebenaran untuk memasuki Kawasan tersebut bagi tujuan mengusir wakil dan/atau ejen dan/atau pekerja Defendan Kedua seterusnya bagi tujuan mengosongkan Kawasan tersebut dari sebarang barang-barang binaan di mana kos-kos yang ditanggung oleh Plaintif bagi tujuan tersebut harus ditanggung oleh Defendan
d
sekiranya Defendan Pertama enggan memberikan kerjasama bagi perintah (c), Plaintif diberikan kebenaran untuk menggunakan kekerasan yang wajar dan/atau melibatkan pihak Polis DiRaja Malaysia dari balai polis daerah yang berdekatan bagi tujuan memasuki Kawasan tersebut;
e
ganti rugi am bagi tindakan tort pencerobohan hartanah sebanyak RM70,000.00 dibayar oleh Defendan Pertama kepada Plaintif;
f
tuntutan balas Defendan Pertama terhadap Plaintif ditolak; dan
g
kos sebanyak RM20,000.00 dibayar oleh Defendan Pertama kepada Plaintif. Bertarikh : 13 FEBRUARI 2026 (DR. ARIK SANUSI BIN YEOP JOHARI) Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi Malaya, Kangar Negeri Perlis (NEGERI PERLIS) Peguam bagi pihak Plaintif: Encik Ahmad Mukmin Aimi Bin Azmi Tetuan Mukmin Azmi & Co Peguam Bela dan Peguam Cara No.11, 1st Floor Lorong 1 Taman Bukit Mas 34000 Taiping Perak. Peguam bagi pihak Defendan Pertama: Puan Fathin Delila Binti Hamdan Tetuan Rajadevan & Associates Peguam Bela dan Peguam Cara No.105, Tingkat 1, Langkawi Mall Persiaran Bunga Raya, Kuah 07000 Langkawi Kedah. Peguam bagi pihak Defendan Kedua: Encik Ramesh A/L Lachmanan Tetuan Nith Gowri, Lachman & Partners Peguam Bela dan Peguam Cara D-3-31 Block D 8, Avenue Business Centre Jalan 8/1 Section 8 46050 Petaling Jaya Selangor.
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