Mohd Huszad Bin Mohamed Ali v Abu Bakar Bin Ahmad (MA-24NCvC-375-09/2025)

ISMAIL BIN JOHAN (NO. K/P : 640829-04-5389 ... DEFENDAN-DEFENDAN GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT (Enclosure 6) A. INTRODUCTION [1] The proceedings were commenced by the Plaintiff, Mohd Huszad bin Mohamed Ali, by way of an Originating Summons (Saman Pemula). By that process the Plaintiff seeks, in substance, a declaration that the sale and transfer by the First Defendant to the Second Defendant of an undivided 3/10 share in agricultural land held under title GMM 523, Lot 1881, Mukim Masjid Tanah, Daerah Alor Gajah, Negeri Melaka, is void; a declaration that the said share is held for the Plaintiff; and the cancellation of the registration giving effect to the transfer in favour of the Second Defendant. The reliefs are framed by reference to ss 214, 215 and 217, and ss 417, 420 and 421A, of the National Land Code 1965. [2] The application now before the Court is Enclosure 6, the Defendants' notice of application dated 27 March 2026, brought under O 28 r 8 of the Rules of Court 2012 and the inherent jurisdiction of the Court. The order sought is that the proceedings, although begun by Originating Summons, be continued as if begun by writ, with consequential directions for the filing of pleadings. [3] The application is supported by the affidavit of the Second Defendant, Ismail bin Johan (Encl. 7). It is met by the Plaintiff's affidavit in reply (Encl. 8) and a further affidavit of the Second Defendant in reply (Encl. 9), the last of which exhibits audio recordings and their transcripts. [4] An application under O 28 r 8 does not call upon the Court to decide the substantive controversy between the parties. It does not decide whether the hibah was validly made, whether the Second Defendant holds an indefeasible title, or whether the Plaintiff's claim is answered by res judicata. The single question is one of procedure: by what mode of trial the action ought to be determined. [5] That question is sharpened by the position taken in answer to the application. Conversion is resisted not on the footing that the chosen procedure is adequate to try contested facts, but on the footing that there are no contested facts left to try because the matters the Defendants would raise are said to have been concluded by the Syariah High Court, to lie within the exclusive jurisdiction of that Court, or to be, on the Second Defendant's own exhibited material, no longer in genuine dispute. The real controversy on Enclosure 6 is therefore whether those contentions, taken at their highest, leave the action fit for disposal on affidavit evidence alone. [6] The central issue is whether the action raises substantial disputes of material fact that cannot justly be resolved on affidavit evidence in an Originating Summons, such that the action ought to be continued as if begun by writ. B. MATERIAL FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY [7] The land is held under a single undivided title and has not been partitioned. The First Defendant, Abu Bakar bin Ahmad, held an undivided 3/10 share in it. [8] The Plaintiff's case, as deposed, is that the First Defendant made a hibah to him of a portion of the land, and that he paid the First Defendant a sum of RM43,000. A Suratcara Ikatan Hibah is said to have been executed between the First Defendant and the Plaintiff. By an order dated 9 July 2024, the Syariah High Court of Melaka confirmed the hibah. The Plaintiff further deposed that, by an order dated 9 July 2024, the Syariah High Court of Melaka confirmed the hibah. The Syariah proceedings were between the Plaintiff and the First Defendant. It is common ground that the Second Defendant was not a party to those proceedings. [9] Before the Plaintiff was able to register his interest arising from the hibah, the First Defendant sold his 3/10 share in the land to the Second Defendant. The sale was effected on 4 March 2025 for a stated consideration of RM34,000. Thereafter, the transfer in favour of the Second Defendant under Pindahmilik No. Pers. 0403SC2025000843 was registered on 13 March 2025. [10] On 11 April 2025 the First Defendant lodged a police report. By that report the First Defendant is said to have acknowledged receiving RM43,000 from the Plaintiff and thereafter selling the same share to the Second Defendant for RM34,000. [11] The Second Defendant's Affidavit in Reply (Enclosure 9) exhibits a number of audio recordings together with transcripts of the conversations. The Plaintiff relies, in particular, on one of those recordings to contend that the Second Defendant was aware, prior to the purchase of the First Defendant's interest, that the property had been the subject of an alleged hibah and that proceedings in relation to the hibah had been commenced before the Syariah Court. [12] The reliefs claimed in the Originating Summons are neither interlocutory nor administrative. They seek to undo a registered dealing, to cancel the registration of the Second Defendant as proprietor of the 3/10 share, and to have that share vested in the Plaintiff. The Second Defendant is the registered proprietor of that share. [13] Three positions are advanced in answer to Enclosure 6: first, that there is no bona fide dispute of material fact; secondly, that the matters the Defendants would litigate the capacity, understanding and free will of the First Defendant, undue influence, and the validity of the hibah were determined, or fell to be determined, by the Syariah High Court and are barred by res judicata and by Article 121(1A) of the Federal Constitution; and thirdly, that the Second Defendant cannot in any event claim the protection of a bona fide purchaser because he had knowledge of the hibah before he purchased. C. ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION [14] The dispositive issue is whether the action raises substantial disputes of material fact, incapable of just resolution on affidavit evidence, so as to warrant an order under O 28 r 8 of the Rules of Court 2012 that it continue as if begun by writ. [15] Resolution of that issue requires consideration of three subsidiary questions. First, what is the test governing the exercise of the power of conversion under O 28 r 8, and whether the disputes raised meet it. Secondly, whether the objections founded on res judicata and on Article 121(1A) of the Federal Constitution operate, at this stage, to extinguish every triable issue, so that nothing remains to be tried. Thirdly, whether the question of the Second Defendant's status as a bona fide purchaser, and the indefeasibility of his title under s 340 of the National Land Code 1965, is capable of determination on affidavit evidence. [16] It must be emphasised, at the threshold of the analysis and not as a conclusion, that none of these subsidiary questions is to be decided on its merits. They are examined only so far as is necessary to determine whether they render the action fit, or unfit, for disposal on affidavit. D. GOVERNING LAW AND FRAMEWORK [17] O 28 r 8(1) of the Rules of Court 2012 empowers the Court, where it appears at any stage that proceedings begun by originating summons ought for any reason to be continued as if begun by writ, to order that they be so continued and to give consequential directions including that pleadings be filed, or that the affidavits already filed stand as pleadings, with or without liberty to add to them. The power is wide; it is not, however, exercised mechanically. The principle is that conversion is discretionary and not automatic, and is confined to cases in which there exists a substantial dispute of fact incapable of resolution on affidavit. The point was stated authoritatively by the Supreme Court in Ting Ling Kiew v Tan Eng Iron Works [1992] 2 MLJ 217, where Jemuri Serjan CJ (Borneo) said (at p 227): "Unquestionably, these conflicts in the evidence can only properly and satisfactorily resolved if oral evidence is adduced and witnesses cross-examined on their evidence which, however, is not possible in proceedings begun by originating summons." That passage was quoted in Husly bin Mok v Jundar Realty Development Sdn Bhd & Anor [2014] 3 MLJ 496. [18] It is convenient to record, at this point, an observation upon one of the authorities relied upon by the Plaintiff for the formulation of that principle. In the Plaintiff's written submissions (at para 20) the test is sourced to Shell MDS (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd v Petroliam Nasional Berhad (Petronas) & Ors [2026] 3 MLRH 335, which is in turn said to have drawn the principle from Tahan Steel Corp Sdn Bhd v Bank Islam Malaysia Bhd [2004] 6 MLJ 1. With respect to counsel, Tahan Steel lends no support to the proposition for which it is invoked. That action was not begun by originating summons at all; it was commenced by writ, and the matter before Abdul Malik Ishak J was an interlocutory application, by summons in chambers, for an interim injunction to restrain the defendant bank from enforcing its security pending trial. The judgment is concerned with the three-stage inquiry governing interlocutory injunctions, with the unilateral variation of a contractual condition precedent, and with the inability of an Islamic bank to recover penalty interest. It contains no consideration of O28r8, of the mode of commencement, or of the continuation of proceedings as if begun by writ, and it yields no principle upon the power of conversion. The single passage of superficial resemblance the observation that certain asserted issues were in truth resolvable upon the documents without a full trial is directed to the serious-question threshold for interlocutory relief and tends, if anything, the opposite way, the learned judge having there resolved the apparent disputes on the documents rather than directed their trial. I have therefore not rested the test upon that authority. The principle itself is, however, well settled and is amply supported by the authorities considered above and below; nothing turns, for present purposes, upon the misattribution. [19] The mere assertion of a factual dispute does not suffice; the Court must look to the real nature of the dispute and to the materiality of the fact said to be in issue. Where the determination of the cause will turn on a genuine conflict of testimony requiring oral evidence, the established course is trial by writ, because such facts must be established by the examination and crossexamination of witnesses rather than on the affidavits. In Ng Wan Siew v Teoh Sin [1962] CLJU 110; [1963] 1 MLJ 103, Thomson CJ observed that although proceedings of that character may in theory be commenced either way, once it is apparent that there will be a conflict of testimony and a necessity for taking parol evidence the proceedings should be commenced by writ, and a plaintiff who nonetheless proceeds by originating summons may be deprived of the additional costs so occasioned. That discipline was applied more firmly in Abdul Majid v Haji Abdul Razak [1971] CLJU 1; [1971] 2 MLJ 228, where Chang Min Tat J held that where serious disputes of fact arise, such that evidence must be led, the originating summons is not a suitable medium or process for the determination of the issues, and the originating summons was accordingly dismissed in limine. To the same effect is Re National Union of Commercial Workers; Wong Yoon Leong & Ors v S Balasingam & Ors [1974] CLJU 138, where Mohamed Azmi J, finding that the matter raised serious questions of fact resolvable only by the examination of witnesses, held that it did not come within the summary procedure intended for simple matters and that the action ought to have been brought by writ. [20] That principle is, however, subject to an important qualification: the existence of a factual dispute is not in itself decisive. What matters is whether the disputed fact is material to the dispositive issue, for a fact that does not bear upon the determination cannot justify the cost and apparatus of a trial. That qualification is illustrated by Pesurohjaya Ibu Kota Kuala Lumpur v Public Trustee & Ors [1971] CLJU 104, where Raja Azlan Shah J recognised that a question of fact ordinarily calls for trial by writ, yet held the originating summons procedure to be in order on the facts before him. There, a retrospective amendment to the governing regulations had substituted an area-based basis of compensation for the earlier basis computed by reference to the number of squatter families removed; the disputed fact how many families had been removed was thereby rendered immaterial to the dispositive question and did not require resolution by the examination of witnesses. The ratio is not that factual disputes may be disregarded, but that they compel a trial only where they are material to the determination. [21] The authority most directly in point on the exercise of the power is Badan Pengurusan Bersama Avenue K dan K Residence v City Properties Sdn Bhd & Ors [2025] 5 CLJ 825 (CA). There the Court of Appeal held that a court errs in disposing of an originating summons on affidavit evidence alone, and in granting the final reliefs sought, where serious disputes of fact exist; and that the proper course in such circumstances is to exercise the discretion under O 28 r 8 of the Rules of Court 2012 to convert the matter into a writ action, with the affidavits filed standing as pleadings. The distinction drawn there between an interlocutory application, which may be decided upon the existence of a bona fide dispute, and an originating summons seeking final reliefs, which may not forms part of its ratio and is directly engaged in the present case. [22] The doctrine of res judicata, in its wider sense, was expounded by the Supreme Court in Asia Commercial Finance (M) Bhd v Kawal Teliti Sdn Bhd [1995] 3 CLJ 783; where Peh Swee Chin FCJ, adopting the rule in Henderson v Henderson [1843] 3 Hare 100 as explained in Greenhalgh v Mallard [1947] 2 All ER 255, held that the doctrine bars not only issues actually decided but every point which properly belonged to the subject of the earlier litigation and which the parties, exercising reasonable diligence, might have brought forward. That wider principle was reaffirmed by the Federal Court in Lin Wen-Chih & Anor v Pacific Forest Industries Sdn Bhd & Anor [2023] 8 CLJ 671 (FC). It is, however, inherent in the doctrine that it operates only between the same parties or their privies, and only where the issue was, or with reasonable diligence could have been, raised in the earlier proceeding. [23] The jurisdictional objection rests on Article 121(1A) of the Federal Constitution, which removes from the civil courts jurisdiction in respect of any matter within the jurisdiction of the Syariah Courts, and on Latifah Mat Zin v Rosmawati Sharibun & Anor [2007] 1 MLRA 1 (FC), to the effect that the validity of a hibah is a matter within the jurisdiction of the Syariah Court, and that where an Islamic-law issue arises in a civil proceeding, that issue should be determined by the Syariah Court and its decision then applied by the civil court. Section 49 of the Administration of the Religion of Islam (State of Malacca) Enactment 2002 confers on the Syariah High Court jurisdiction over, among other matters, gifts inter vivos (alang semasa hidup). [24] The reliefs touching registered title engage s 340 of the National Land Code 1965. Sub-section (1) confers indefeasibility upon the registered proprietor; sub-section (2) renders that title defeasible in cases of, among others, fraud or misrepresentation and forged, insufficient or void instruments; and the proviso to sub-section (3) preserves the title of a purchaser in good faith and for valuable consideration. The boundaries of that protection were considered by the Federal Court in Tan Ying Hong v Tan Sian San & Ors [2010] 2 CLJ 269 (FC) and, as regards a subsequent purchaser, in Setiakon Engineering Sdn Bhd v Mak Yan Tai & Anor [2024] 5 MLRA 791 (FC), where the majority held where it was held that the vesting of title by registration is conclusive evidence of ownership but not of indefeasibility, that the indefeasibility of a subsequent purchaser's title falls to be decided on the facts and circumstances of each case under s 340(3) and not by registration alone, and that good faith demands more than the conduct of a land search. The principle that knowledge of an unregistered interest is not, of itself and without more, fraud is reflected in Doshi v Yeoh Tiong Lay [1974] CLJU 30. These provisions and authorities are set out not to decide the substantive title dispute, which is not before the Court, but because whether that dispute can be resolved on affidavit cannot be addressed without understanding what its resolution would require the Court to decide. A further observation is required upon the authorities relied upon in this connection by the Defendants. In their Hujahan Balas (Enclosure 14, at para 9.3), and in their Ikatan Autoriti Tambahan (Enclosure 15, item 4, at pp 79-83), the Defendants invoke Teh Bee v K Maruthamuthu [1977] CLJU 135; [1978] 1 MLJ 149 for the proposition that the system of registration of title protects the registered proprietor, subject to exceptions such as fraud. With respect, the case does not bear upon that subject. Teh Bee was a decision of the Privy Council, on appeal from the Federal Court, concerning the recovery by a principal (a housing society) of a bribe of $122,000 received by its director and agent in connection with a purchase of land, and the principal's entitlement to recover both the amount of the bribe as money had and received and damages for fraud. Their Lordships' judgment is directed to the election between those cumulative remedies under United Australia Ltd v Barclays Bank Ltd [1941] AC 1, and to the law of bribery and secret profits. It contains no consideration of s 340 of the National Land Code, of indefeasibility, or of the protection of a registered proprietor; the principle attributed to it by the Defendants is not to be found in it. As with the misattribution noticed at [18] above, nothing turns upon the matter for present purposes, the relevant principles of registration being established by Tan Ying Hong and the other authorities considered above; but the discrepancy is recorded for accuracy.

The Controlling Question And Approach [25] The power under O 28 r 8 is discretionary, and the principle governing its exercise is not seriously in contest. Both sides accept that conversion is neither automatic upon the assertion of a factual dispute nor available merely because a party would prefer a trial. The governing inquiry is whether the dispute is a substantial dispute of material fact that cannot justly be resolved on affidavit. The contest is not as to the test, but as to its application to this action. In determining whether an asserted dispute is a real one, the Court is assisted by the approach of Lord Diplock in Eng Mee Yong & Ors v V Letchumanan [1980] AC 331; [1979] 2 MLJ 212. Although it is not, in the ordinary course, appropriate for a court to resolve conflicts of evidence on affidavit, the court is not bound to treat as raising a triable dispute every averment on affidavit that is equivocal, imprecise, inconsistent with undisputed contemporary documents, or inherently improbable. The question is whether the statements relied upon as raising a conflict of evidence have, in the words of Lord Diplock, "sufficient prima facie plausibility to merit further investigation as to their truth". It is by reference to that standard that the disputes raised in the present action fall to be assessed. [26] Two features of the action frame that application. The first is the nature of the reliefs. The Originating Summons does not seek the construction of a document, or the determination of a short point of law upon undisputed facts. It seeks to set aside a registered transfer, to cancel the registration of the Second Defendant as proprietor, and to vest the disputed share in the Plaintiff. These are final reliefs which, if granted, would divest a registered proprietor of his title. The distinction drawn in Badan Pengurusan Bersama Avenue K dan K Residence v City Properties Sdn Bhd & Ors, between interlocutory relief and final relief sought by Originating Summons, is therefore directly in point. [27] The second feature is that the Second Defendant, whose registered title the Plaintiff seeks to undo, was not a party to the Syariah proceedings in which the hibah was confirmed. The order of 9 July 2024 bound the Plaintiff and the First Defendant. The registered dealing in favour of the Second Defendant came into existence afterwards. Whatever the effect of that order as between the parties to it, the civil reliefs now sought operate upon a registered title held by a stranger to it. [28] On the affidavits, the matters in dispute are neither peripheral nor confined to questions of law. The capacity and understanding of the First Defendant when the hibah was made; the existence of free consent and the absence of undue influence; the true character of the sum of RM43,000 said to have been paid by the Plaintiff and its relationship (if any) to the consideration of RM34,000 stated for the sale to the Second Defendant; and the date and circumstances of registration of the transfer are all in issue, and all material to whether the relief claimed can be granted. [29] The audio recordings illustrate the difficulty rather than resolve it. The Plaintiff relies upon a recording, exhibited by the Second Defendant, as an admission of prior knowledge of the hibah. The Second Defendant disputes the effect of that material. Whatever weight it may ultimately bear, the authenticity of the recording, the identity of the speakers, the completeness and accuracy of the transcript, and the context and meaning of the words used are not matters which can be determined upon competing affidavits; they require the testing of evidence by cross-examination. The same is true of the contents of the police report of 11 April 2025. A finding upon any of these matters would be a finding on credibility, which an Originating Summons on affidavit is not a suitable vehicle to make. [30] The contention that the disputes are artificial or immaterial cannot be accepted at this stage. It is the converse of the position in Pesuruhjaya Ibu Kota Kuala Lumpur v Public Trustee & Ors, where the disputed fact had been rendered immaterial to the dominant issue by a change in the governing law. Here the disputed facts go to the heart of the dominant issue whether the registered transfer should be set aside and the title revested. Far from being immaterial, they are the very matters upon which the relief depends.

(iii) Whether Res Judicata and Article 121(1A) Extinguish All Triable Issues [31] The objections founded on res judicata and on Article 121(1A) are substantial and were advanced with care. They cannot, however, be determined finally on this application; and they do not, taken at their highest, leave the action without a triable issue. [32] As to res judicata, the principle in Asia Commercial Finance (M) Bhd v Kawal Teliti Sdn Bhd and Lin Wen-Chih & Anor v Pacific Forest Industries Sdn Bhd & Anor bars the re-litigation of issues decided, or which ought to have been raised, in earlier proceedings between the same parties or their privies. Whether it applies here turns on questions which are themselves contested: what was decided by the Syariah High Court; whether the Second Defendant, a stranger to those proceedings, is bound as a privy; whether the indefeasibility of his registered title an issue which arose only upon registration of a dealing effected after the Syariah order could have been raised before that Court at all; and whether the civil reliefs now sought exceed the mere implementation of the Syariah order. These are not matters capable of summary resolution on a conversion application; they require pleadings to define the issues and, where necessary, evidence. To decide them now, against either party, would be to decide the merits under the guise of a procedural ruling. [33] As to Article 121(1A), the principle in Latifah Mat Zin v Rosmawati Sharibun & Anor is that the validity of a hibah is a matter for the Syariah Court, whose determination on that issue is then to be applied by the civil court. So understood, the principle does not deprive the civil court of jurisdiction over the reliefs sought here. The validity of the hibah, as between the Plaintiff and the First Defendant, has been determined by the Syariah High Court. What remains for the civil court is the effect of that matter upon a registered title under the National Land Code the cancellation of a registered transfer, the indefeasibility of the Second Defendant's title, and the consequences of registration which are matters of civil jurisdiction, and which were not, and could not have been, adjudicated by the Syariah Court against the Second Defendant. Article 121(1A) does not render conversion futile; it marks the boundary of what the civil court may decide, and the reliefs sought fall on the civil side of that boundary.

(iv) Whether The Bona Fide Purchaser Issue Can Be Decided on Affidavit [34] The contention that the Second Defendant's knowledge of the hibah is, on his own exhibited transcript, established so that the only remaining question is the legal effect of admitted knowledge has a measure of force, and was the most substantial of the points urged against conversion. It cannot, however, carry the application. [35] Setiakon Engineering Sdn Bhd v Mak Yan Tai & Anor, on which reliance is placed, holds that the indefeasibility of a subsequent purchaser's title is to be determined on the facts and circumstances of each case under s 340(3), that good faith demands more than the conduct of a land search, and that the registered proprietor bears the burden of proving affirmatively that he purchased in good faith and for valuable consideration. That is a fact-laden inquiry. Whether the Second Defendant acted in good faith, what he knew and when, the significance of what was said to him, and whether the surrounding circumstances were such as to put him on inquiry, are not resolved by the bare fact of an exhibited recording. They are precisely the matters which Setiakon Engineering Sdn Bhd requires to be assessed on the totality of the evidence. The principle in Doshi v Yeoh Tiong Lay, that knowledge of an unregistered interest is not of itself fraud, only confirms that the legal consequence of the Second Defendant's knowledge cannot be pronounced without first establishing, by evidence, what that knowledge was and how he acted upon it. [36] It follows that the bona fide purchaser issue is not the pure question of law it is said to be. It is a mixed question of fact and law resting upon disputed facts, which under Setiakon Engineering Sdn Bhd and Tan Ying Hong v Tan Sian San & Ors must be decided on the whole of the evidence. An Originating Summons on affidavit is not adapted to that task.

Discretion And Disposal [37] Drawing these threads together, the action presents substantial disputes of material fact going to the dominant issue; it requires findings on credibility, including upon disputed audio recordings and a police report; it seeks final reliefs which would divest a registered proprietor of his title; and it would have the civil court adjudicate the position of a registered proprietor who was a stranger to the Syariah proceedings. Each of these features points away from disposal on affidavit. Together they bring the case within the principle applied in Badan Pengurusan Bersama Avenue K dan K Residence v City Properties Sdn Bhd & Ors, that where final reliefs are sought by Originating Summons and serious disputes of fact exist, the discretion under O 28 r 8 should be exercised to convert the action to a writ. [38] No prejudice to the Plaintiff arises from conversion that could outweigh those considerations. The Plaintiff's action is not struck out or dismissed; it proceeds, by a mode of trial adapted to the determination of contested facts, under the control of the Court and within timelines it may fix. The objections of res judicata, collateral attack and want of jurisdiction are not lost by conversion; they remain open to be pleaded and determined, with the benefit of defined issues and, where necessary, evidence. Conversion decides none of them. It decides only that they, and the Plaintiff's claim, are to be tried by a process fit for the purpose. [39] For completeness, the characterisation of the application as a collateral attack upon the Syariah order does not bear upon the present question and is not decided. Whether the Plaintiff's reliefs, or the Defendants' anticipated defence, trespass upon the Syariah order is itself among the matters to be determined after pleadings; it is not a reason to deny the proper mode of trial. F. CONCLUSION [40] The dispositive issue is answered in the affirmative. The action raises substantial disputes of material fact which cannot justly be resolved on affidavit evidence in an Originating Summons. The reliefs sought are final and operate upon registered title; the determinative facts are genuinely in contest and require the testing of evidence; and the objections raised in answer, though substantial, neither fall to be decided on this application nor extinguish the triable issues. The threshold for the exercise of the power under O 28 r 8 of the Rules of Court 2012 is met, and the discretion is properly exercised in favour of conversion. [41] In reaching that conclusion the Court has decided nothing as to the validity of the hibah, the application of res judicata or Article 121(1A), or the indefeasibility of the Second Defendant's title. Those questions remain at large, to be determined in the converted action. G. ORDERS OF THE COURT [42] Accordingly, the Court orders that:

Enclosure 6 is allowed;

the proceedings shall continue as if begun by writ;

the Plaintiff shall file and serve a Statement of Claim within 14 days from the date of this order;

the Defendants shall file and serve their Defence, and any Counterclaim, within 14 days from service of the Statement of Claim;

any Reply, and Defence to Counterclaim if any, shall be filed and served within 14 days thereafter;

the affidavits already filed shall stand as part of the record, with liberty to the parties to apply; and

costs in the cause. Dated : 1 July 2026 (MELAKA) Lawyer For Applicant : Encik Mohd Faizal bin Mohamad Tetuan Ridhuwan & Partners Peguambela dan Peguamcara No. 10-1, Jalan Impian 2, Taman Pangkalan Impian, 75450 Ayer Molek, Melaka. Lawyer For Defendant Puan Suzana binti Ali Tetuan Ariffin Haron Peguambela dan Peguamcara 5-4-19, The Promenade, Persiaran Mahsuri, Bayan Baru, 11950 Bayan Lepas, Pulau Pinang.