Schedule
Jadual Pertama. SP6 telah mengesahkan analisisnya atas barang kes yang diserahkan oleh SP4 kepadanya melalui satu laporan kimia yang disediakan olehnya (P40). [18] SP6 adalah seorang ahli kimia yang berkelayakan untuk menjalankan analisis atas dadah tersebut berdasarkan kelulusan, pengalaman dan kepakarannya. Mahkamah menerima keputusan analisis yang dibuat oleh SP6 berkaitan dengan identiti dan kuantiti dadah yang dinyatakan. Adalah menjadi keputusan Mahkamah dan hasil penelitian, dadah yang dirampas adalah dadah sepertimana yang disenaraikan di bawah Jadual Pertama ADB. Mahkamah juga mendapati tidak ada putusnya rantaian keterangan dari waktu barang kes dijumpai oleh SP1 sehingga diserahkan kepada SP4 dan seterusnya SP4 menghantar kepada SP6 untuk dianalisis di Jabatan Kimia Malaysia dan barang kes diambil semula dari Jabatan Kimia oleh SP4. II. Dadah itu di dalam kawalan dan jagaan OKT [19] Barang kes itu di dalam sebuah plastik berwarna hitam yang diletakkan di ruang tamu rumah tersebut. Ini disahkan oleh SP1. SP4 pula mengesahkan rumah tersebut didiami oleh 6 warga Myanmar dan OKT tidak tinggal disitu. Ini bermakna selain OKT; warga Myanmar yang tinggal di situ turut mempunyai akses ke atas rumah tersebut. [20] Adakah OKT dikatakan mempunyai pemilikan ke atas barang kes tersebut? Mahkamah merujuk kepada Chan Pean Leon v Public Prosecutor [1956] MLJ 237 dan di mukasurat 239: “Possession” itself as regards the criminal law is described as follows in Stephen’s Digest (9th Edn, p 304):- “A moveable thing is said to be in the possession of a person when he is so situated with respect to it that he has the power to deal with it as owner to the exclusion of all other persons, and when the circumstances are such that he may be presumed to intend to do so in case of need”. To put it otherwise, there is a physical element and a mental element which must both be present before possession is made out. The accussed must not only be so situated that he can deal with the thing as if it belongs to him, for example have it in his pocket or have it lying in front of him on a table. It must also be shown that he had the intention of dealing with it as if it belonged to him should he see any occasion to do so, in other words , that he had some animus possimdendi”. [21] Di dalam kes ini akses rumah itu boleh dilakukan oleh OKT dan 6 lagi orang warga Myanmar tersebut. Mahkamah merujuk kepada kes Leow Nghee Lim v Regina [1956] MLJ 28: - “The dictionary definition brings in the idea of exclusiveness. It is often said that “possession must be exclusive”. This is ambiguous. Possession need not be exclusive to the accused. Two or more persons may be in joint possession of chattels, whether innocent or contraband. The exclusive element of possession means that the possessor or possessors have the power to exclude other persons from enjoyment of the property. Custody likewise may be sole or joint and it has the same element of excluding others. The main distinction between custody and possession is that a custodian has not the power of disposal. The statement that “possession must be exclusive” is often due to confusion of the fact to be proved with the evidence by which it is to be proved. It is essential to keep this distinction clearly in mind, especially when applying presumptions”. (penekanan ditambah) [22] Dalam menilai keadaan di mana terdapat akses ada orang lain selain OKT ke atas sesebuah premis; Mahkamah merujuk kepada keputusan Mahkamah Rayuan di dalam Azizan Yahaya v PP [2012] 8 CLJ 405, yang memutuskan seperti berikut: - “[1] The room where the drugs were found was accessible to all other occupants in the house. The room was unlocked. SP4 and the Appellants children has access to the room yet SP4 was not charged although she was remanded. The prosecution failed to discharge its bounded duty of excluding access to the appellants room by others. … [5] The mere fact that the drugs were found in the drawer on the appellants side of the bed was insufficient for the learned judge to make an inference that the appellant had exclusive custody and control over the bag. The failure on the part of the learned judge to properly consider and evaluate the evidence coupled with his Lordship failure to make an affirmative finding of possession was a serious misdirection in law”. [penekanan ditambah] Mahkamah Persekutuan pula di dalam kes Chan Wei Loon v Public Prosecutor & Anor [2021] 4 MLJ 660 memutuskan: - “[93] The evidence laid down above pinpoints the access possibility by the third party to the ground floor. It is trite that the burden is on the prosecution to exclude access of the said ground floor by others to prove that the appellants were exclusively in custody and control of the dangerous drugs and the machines found on the ground floor. The prosecution had failed to establish such evidence when the onus is not on the defence to prove possibility of access by others, but on the prosecution to exclude such possibility. The burden of proving its case at every stage lies on the prosecution. The only task of the accused is to raise a reasonable doubt as to the truth of the prosecution’s case. See: Mohan Singh a/l Lachman Singh v Public Prosecutor [2002] 3 MLJ 291. [penekanan ditambah] [23] Bagi membuktikan elemen milikan Mahkamah akan melihat pada keterangan yang dikemukakan oleh saksi-saksi pendakwaan untuk membuktikan hanya OKT sahaja ada akses rumah tersebut dan dadah itu adalah di dalam kawalan dan milikannya. Mahkamah ini merujuk kepada keputusan Mahkamah Agung di dalam Choo Yoke Choy v Public Prosecutor [1992] 2 MLJ 632: - “In our opinion, the evidence before the court was not sufficient to establish that the appellant alone had the drugs in his custody or under his control. The drugs were found lying on the floor. They were not hidden. It is not probable to suggest that the appellant alone had custody or control of the drugs since there were two people occupying the room at the material time. The mere fact that the drugs were found in the room does not necessarily prove that the appellant had sole custody or control. It is not conclusive evidence; it is neutral in nature. At best, the evidence before the court shows either the appellant or his wife could have custody or control of the drugs.” [penekanan ditambah] Dalam konteks kes ini, rumah di mana dadah itu dijumpai adalah diduduki oleh 6 warga Myanmar yang disahkan oleh SP4. OKT tidak tinggal di rumah tersebut. Ini bermakna selain dari OKT mempunyai akses ke rumah itu berdasarkan kunci yang dirampas oleh SP4 boleh membuka grill rumah tersebut, 6 warga Myanmar juga ada akses atas rumah itu. [24] Pihak pendakwaan mengemukakan rakaman percakapan 6 warga Myanmar itu iaitu ID36(1) - (6) untuk menunjukkan bahawa plastik hitam itu diletakkan oleh OKT di ruang tamu. Untuk menerima begitu sahaja rakaman percakapan warga Myanmar ini akan memprejudiskan OKT kerana pembelaan tidak boleh menyoal balas mereka supaya Mahkamah ini dapat menilai kesahihan keterangan mereka. Lebih-lebih lagi mereka tidak faham Bahasa Malaysia dan disahkan oleh SP4 rakaman percakapan mereka dibuat melalui salah seorang dari warga Myanmar yang dikenali sebagai Min-Min. Keenam-enam mereka ini sepatutnya hadir ke Mahkamah kerana hanya mereka sahaja boleh mengesahkan kandungan rakaman percakapan itu. Sekiranya pun Mahkamah telah melihat rakaman percakapan warga Myanmar (ID36 (1) - (6) dan membuat penilaian atas rakaman tersebut semata-mata, kesemua mereka hanya menyatakan melihat “Ali” meletakkan barang miliknya di rumah sewa tersebut; tidak dipastikan apakah barang milik Ali, adakah plastik hitam yang mengandungi dadah kerana hanya 6 warga Myanmar ini sahaja boleh mengesahkan bahawa “barang Ali” yang diletakkan di rumah tersebut adalah merujuk kepada ekshibit P13 iaitu plastik hitam. [25] Walaupun SP4 mengakui keenam-enam mereka adalah saksi penting kes ini, namun tiada usaha dilakukan oleh SP4 untuk memastikan kehadiran mereka sebagai saksi. Keenam-enam warga Myanmar ini telah diusir keluar pada tahun 2023. SP4 mengakui beliau tidak membuat apa-apa tindakan untuk menahan mereka sehingga kes ini selesai. Mahkamah ini telah membuat rujukan kepada kes Tee Hock Keong v. PP [2021] 1 LNS 497 di mana Vazeer Alam Mydin Meera, Hakim Mahkamah Rayuan (ketika itu) telah menyatakan: [25] …The law requires strict proof to explain the non-availability of the maker of a statement as a witness. See Mohamed Ghouse v. R [1910] 11 SSLR 31; Allied Bank (Malaysia) Berhad v. Yau Jiok Hua [1998] 2 CLJ 33; [1998] 6 MLJ 1. The circumstances that would bring a statement within any one of the exceptions in s. 32(1) of the Evidence Act must be established by the party desiring its admission as evidence. This was reiterated by the Federal Court in Sim Tiew Bee v. Public Prosecutor [1973] CLJU 138; [1973] 1 LNS 138; [1973] 2 MLJ 200. See also Public Prosecutor v. Lam Peng Hoa & Anor [1996] 3 CLJ 747; [1996] 5 MLJ 405 (HC). [26] The police, and by extension the prosecution, ought to have fully utilised the prevailing and available provisions in the Criminal Procedure Code ("CPC") in order to secure the attendance of witnesses. The prosecution could have used the provisions of section 396 of the CPC and have Wulandari committed to civil prison until trial. See Public Prosecutor v. Lee Jun Ho & Ors [2009] 4 CLJ 90; [2009] 3 MLJ 400; Public Prosecutor v. Somasundram a/l Rajasegaran & Anor [2016] CLJU 1067; [2016] 1 LNS 1067; [2016] MLJU 619. In fact, Wulandari's evidence could have been first recorded before she was deported to Indonesia. Additionally, the prosecution could have sought the assistance of the Indonesian authorities to procure her attendance in court. However, the prosecution did not do any of this. [27] In this regard, we agree with the contention of learned counsel for the appellant that Wulandari's statement was inadmissible, for we were not convinced that the prosecution had taken all reasonable steps to trace the witness and procure her attendance in court. In Sim Tiew Bee v. PP [1973] CLJU 138; [1973] 1 LNS 138; [1973] 2 MLJ 200 the Federal Court adopted the following principle enunciated by Lord Goddard in Chainchal Singh v. Emperor AIR [1946] PC 1 in respect of the exception to the hearsay rule in section 32(1) of the Evidence Act and held as follows: In the case of Chainchal Singh v. Emperor AIR [1946] PC 1 at p 2 evidence given by a witness in a judicial proceeding was to be used under section 33 of the Indian Evidence Act in a subsequent judicial proceeding on the ground that the witness was incapable of giving evidence. It was held by Lord Goddard that: "Where it is desired to have recourse to this section on the ground that a witness is incapable of giving evidence that fact must be proved, and proved strictly. It is an elementary right of an accused person or a litigant in a civil suit that a witness who is to testify against him should give his evidence before the court trying the case which then has the opportunity of seeing the witness and observing his demeanour and can thus form a far better opinion as to his reliability than is possible from reading a statement or deposition. It is necessary that provision should be made for exceptional cases where it is impossible for the witness to be before the court, and it is only by a statutory provision that this can be achieved. But the court must be careful to see that the conditions on which the statute permits previous evidence given by the witness to be read are strictly proved. In a civil case a party can if he chooses waive the proof, but in a criminal case strict proof ought to be given that the witness is incapable of giving evidence." In the case of Bal Gangadhar Tilak and others v. Shrinivas Pandit and others AIR [1915] PC 7 at p 11, Lord Shaw said: "Under section 33 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, evidence given by a witness in a judicial proceeding in a criminal trial is relevant for the purpose of proving in a subsequent proceeding the truth of the fact which it states, but it is only, as the section proceeds: – 'when the witness is dead, or cannot be found, or is incapable of giving evidence, or is kept out of the way etc.' Not one of these circumstances was proved in the present case, and the depositions could not have been used with propriety even to support the evidence of the plaintiffs...." These cases dealt with section 33 of the Indian Evidence Act, but they are applicable to section 32(2) which section is similar to section 32(b) of our Evidence Act. In the instant case no such proof having been led, the document is therefore not receivable in evidence. [28] Further, the commentary in Sarkar's Law of Evidence (14th Ed) at page 649, in respect of admissibility of statements under section 32(1) of the Evidence Act without calling the maker states as follows: Where no diligent and reasonable exertion were made to procure the witness, the court could not come to a finding that the witness could not be found and therefore his statement could not be admitted under the section. Mere ignorance of the witness is not sufficient to invoke the section. As the interpretation appears to be somewhat sound, I will, for the present case, adopt their view. It stands to reason that unless stringent conditions are prescribed and fulfilled, the established rule against the reception of hearsay evidence would be eroded; courts would have to accept as evidence statements which may not stand the vigours of cross-examination had the maker been called to give evidence. See also the cases of Public Prosecutor v. Lom Bong Kat & Anor [1992] 4 CLJ 2173; D A Duncan v. Public Prosecutor [1980] CLJU 12; [1980] 1 LNS 12; [1980] 2 MLJ 195; PP v. Mogan Ayavoo [2004] 3 CLJ 623. [29] The combined import of these authorities is that before a statement recorded by the police in the course of investigations could be admitted under s. 32(1)(i) of the Evidence Act, the necessary pre-conditions must be satisfied. In the context of the present case, it must be shown by the prosecution that it has taken all necessary and reasonable steps to locate and procure the attendance of Wulandari in court. However, when the evidence is scrutinised it is abundantly clear that steps taken by the prosecution to locate and procure this witness are woefully inadequate and do not fulfil the stringent pre-requisites for the admissibility of her s. 112 CPC statement as an exception to the hearsay rule under s. 32(1) of the Evidence Act. The mere residence of a witness outside of jurisdiction of the court is inadequate to qualify as an exception under section 32(1) of the Evidence Act. More must be shown as to why procuring such a witness would cause delay or expense which under the circumstance appears to the court unreasonable. [30] The danger of including out of court statements by non-witnesses at trial, without imposing a stringent examination of the factual circumstances that would bring it within the exception in section 32(1)(i) of the Evidence was very well stated by KC Vohrah J (as he then was) in Public Prosecutor v. Mohd. Jamil B. Yahya & Anor [1994] 1 CLJ 200 in the following terms: "... a statement by a declarant under paragraph (i) who is patently not disinterested must be examined with the greatest of caution lest false stories or a false colouring to the stories given by the declarant in the statement makes the court draw a jaundiced view of facts which cannot be verified through the cross-examination of the declarant and facts which may falsely implicate an accused. And more so where an accused faces a charge carrying a mandatory sentence of death on conviction on the charge." [31] Hence, having scrutinised the facts and the measures, or rather the lack thereof, taken by the prosecution in procuring the attendance of Wulandari as a witness at trial, we find that P109, ie, Wulandari's s. 112 CPC statement is inadmissible in evidence. Thus, it ought not to have been admitted in evidence by the learned trial judge. [penekanan ditambah] Inilah yang berlaku dalam kes ini. Plastik hitam yang mengandungi dadah itu dijumpai di ruang tamu rumah tersebut yang pada masa sama didiami oleh 6 warga Myanmar yang mendakwa “Ali” ada meletakkan barangnya di rumah itu. Kesimpulannya berdasarkan fakta yang dibentangkan oleh saksi-saksi pendakwaan untuk elemen “exclusivity” rumah itu kepada OKT sahaja gagal dibuktikan kerana ada orang lain mempunyai akses atas rumah tersebut. III. Adakah OKT mempunyai pengetahuan atas dadah tersebut? [25] Adakah OKT juga boleh dikatakan mempunyai pengetahuan atas sesuatu benda dan bebas untuk mengendalikan benda berkenaan dengan mengecualikan orang lain dari menguruskan benda itu memandangkan ada orang lain tinggal di rumah itu dan OKT tidak tinggal disitu. [26] Bolehkah OKT dikatakan mempunyai pengetahuan atas dadah tersebut hanya kerana kunci untuk membuka premis itu dijumpai dengannya oleh SP1 dan OKT yang memandu arah SP1 dan pasukan ke rumah tersebut. Ketika pemeriksaan balas SP4, beliau memaklumkan kepada Mahkamah bahawa tiada DNA atau cap jari OKT ditemui di rumah itu. Barang kes tidak tersorok dan berada di ruang tamu dan mudah dijumpai. Cap jari OKT atas beg plastik hitam dan 113 paket dadah itu tidak diambil oleh SP4 untuk mengesahkan plastik hitam itu milik OKT. [27] Walaupun otoriti mengatakan cap jari bukanlah keterangan konklusif tetapi merupakan keterangan sokongan; namun dalam keadaan barang kes tidak tersorok dan berada di dalam bilik yang boleh diakses oleh ramai orang, maka adalah satu keperluan cap jari di ambil untuk membuktikan plastikj hitam itu adalah milik OKT. Mahkamah Persekutuan di dalam Chan King Yu v Public Prosecutor [2009] 1 MLJ 457 telah membuat anggapan bertentangan kepada pihak pendakwaan atas kegagalan mereka membuat pengesanan cap jari kerana pihak pendakwaan mendakwa OKT telah memegang beg hitam tersebut dan menyerahkannya kepada SP3. “[105] Learned counsel for the appellant had also raised in this appeal on the issue of exh P24 and the contents found therein which the prosecution contended were thrown into the dustbin outside Hotel Nova by the appellant. The complaint of the appellant on this issue is that P24 was not sent to the fingerprint department for analysis at all. P24 contains a very vital piece of evidence, that the cover or lid that is placed on top of the cylinder in which the drugs were placed. P24 is a material prosecution exhibit imputing the appellant has knowledge of the drugs, and his power to dispose off the same. Despite this, the learned judge of the High Court never once considered the failure of the police to send such a vital piece of evidence in P24 for finger print analysis. If this has been done, it would have pointed to the fact as to whether or not that the appellant had dealt with and handled the drugs exhibits. On this point it would not be far fetched to say that the police had not sent P24 for fingerprint analysis because they knew so well P24 was never handled by the appellant and it would be futile exercise as the appellant’s fingerprints will never be found in P24….” [penekanan ditambah] [28] Jika sekalipun pihak pendakwaan menghujahkan plastik hitam (P13) itu milik OKT (atas alasan OKT yang menunjukkan beg tersebut dan mengambil dan menyerahkannya kepada SP3), Mahkamah mendapati ianya tidak mencukupi dalam keadaan bilik itu boleh diakses oleh sesiapa jua. Terdapat kemungkinan dadah itu diletakkan di dalam beg tersebut oleh orang yang mempunyai akses kepada rumah itu. Mahkamah merujuk kepada satu lagi keputusan Mahkamah Rayuan iaitu Koo Wing Cheung & Anor v PP [2014] 1 CLJ 46: - “[2] The appellants convictions were wholly unsafe. The evidence that other persons had custody and control of the house and hence, had access to the house. The evidence pointed to the possibility of some other persons who could have placed the drugs there….”. Pada hemat saya, dalam keadaan ini, selain daripada menggunakan keterangan sokongan cap jari atau DNA OKT, secara asasnya dalam senario rumah itu didiami oleh orang lain dan bukan OKT, dan tanpa membelakangi prinsip menerima keterangan munasabah pihak berkuasa seperti diterapkan dalam kes PP v. Mohamed Ali [1962] CLJU 129, Mahkamah ini mendapati bagi fakta kes ini untuk semata-mata bergantung kepada keterangan SP1 adalah tidak selamat dan wujudnya satu inferens yang lebih berpihak kepada OKT iaitu samada sebenarnya OKT telah menunjukkan dan menyerahkan dadah tersebut kepada SP1. [29] Isu seterusnya adalah samada OKT diberi amaran bawah Seksyen 37(1) (b) ADB 1952. SP1 di dalam pemeriksaan utama memaklumkan kepada Mahkamah beliau telah memberikan kata-kata amaran di bawah Seksyen 37(1)(b) ADB 1952 kepada OKT sebelum beliau menyoal siasat OKT berkenaan dengan 2 batang anak kunci yang dijumpai dalam poket seluar jeans bahagian hadapan yang dipakai oleh OKT. Hasil soal siasat dengan OKT didapati kunci itu adalah kunci rumah kedai dan ada dadah jenis heroin yang disimpan dalam plastik hitam dekat ruang tamu rumah itu dan OKT boleh menunjukkan lokasi rumah kedai itu. [30] Isu yang lain adalah Mahkamah mendapati bahawa pihak pendakwaan melalui keterangan saksi-saksi cuba membuktikan milikan dan pengetahuan OKT terhadap dadah yang dijumpai melalui kelakuan OKT selaras dengan Seksyen 8 Akta Keterangan 1950. Mahkamah telah meneliti keterangan SP1 dan mendapati bahawa perbuatan menunjukkan dadah tersebut adalah terjumlah kepada “kelakuan” dan samada kata-kata amaran di bawah Seksyen 37B ADB dibacakan terhadap OKT atau tidak adalah tidak material kerana di bawah Seksyen 37B ADB tersebut jelas menyatakan kata-kata beramaran adalah terhadap apa-apa penyataan yang diberikan oleh OKT dan tidak termasuk kelakuan OKT. Prinsip ini digariskan dengan jelas oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan di dalam kes Arif Arhannan Che Udin v. PP [2022] 4 CLJ 1 apabila Abdul Rahman Sebli, Hakim Mahkamah Persekutuan menyatakan: To hold that the conduct of an accused amounts to a statement under s. 37B of the Act would be to overstretch the language beyond its common usage. Conduct could not be considered as a statement under the section that requires caution to be administered before it could be admitted in evidence. The word ‘statement’ in s. 37B of the Act must be confined to ‘something that is stated’ or ‘written or oral communication’ and does not include conduct, such as the act of the appellant in the present case, of picking up the bag containing the drugs and handing it to SP6. If it were otherwise, the conduct of an accused running away from the police would also amount to a statement and would be inadmissible in evidence unless he had been cautioned under s. 37B of the Act before he takes flight. [penekanan ditambah] [31] Melihat kepada keseluruhan fakta kes dan keterangan yang diambil di hadapan Mahkamah ini, saya mendapati adalah tidak selamat untuk menyatakan bahawa dadah tersebut dimiliki oleh OKT dan OKT mempunyai pengetahuan terhadap dadah tersebut. Seperti yang telah dinyatakan terdahulu, Mahkamah ini tidak boleh semata-mata bergantung kepada “kelakuan” menurut Seksyen 8 Akta Keterangan 1950 terhadap OKT apabila sebahagian fakta kes memberikan inferens yang berpihak kepada OKT. Tambahan lagi, Mahkamah mendapati siasatan yang dijalankan terhadap kes ini adalah lemah dan tidak menjurus kepada satu penemuan bahawa OKT yang memiliki dadah tersebut [32] Namun begitu, dalam menentukan pemilikan dan pengetahuan OKT ke atas dadah di dalam kes ini, Mahkamah ini perlu melihat kepada gambaran yang lebih besar. Mahkamah juga mendapati siasatan pegawai penyiasat iaitu SP4 adalah longgar di dalam kes ini. Siasatan yang dilakukan oleh SP4 gagal menutup kelompangan di dalam kes ini. Kelompangan yang dimaksudkan adalah 6 warga Myanmar itu telah dihantar pulang ke negara asal tanpa menunggu kes ini selesai. Untuk bergantung kepada percakapan mereka yang diambil oleh SP4 (ID 36 (1) - (6) adalah tidak selamat dan memprejudiskan OKT. SP4 memaklumkan kepada Mahkamah hanya warga Myanmar yang bernama Min Min sahaja yang boleh faham Bahasa Malaysia dan dia bertindak sebagai jurubahasa bagi 5 warga Myanmar yang lain. Kebenaran kandungan percakapan mereka tidak boleh disahkan dan pihak pembelaan kehilangan hak untuk menyoal balas keenam-enam warga Myanmar yang memang tinggal di rumah kedai tersebut. [33] SP4 gagal mengambil cap cari atau melakukan ujian forensic atas plastik hitam untuk menunjukkan hanya OKT sahaja yang memegang plastic hitam itu dalam keadaan rumah itu mempunyai 6 orang penghuni lain. Mahkamah ini merujuk kepada keputusan Mahkamah Rayuan di dalam Mohd Noor bin Ramli lwn Pendakwa Raya [2020] 3 MLJ 386 di mana diputuskan: - “[34] Walaupun kes pendakwaan telah diletakkan dari awal lagi semasa kes pendakwaan, namun penyiasatan lengkap gagal dilakukan oleh pegawai penyiasat. Kegagalan ini termasuklah gagal untuk sebarang siasatan dan tindakan untuk membawa Iskabelah bin Islahuddin ke Mahkamah walaupun saksi itu, seorang anggota tentera adalah mudah didapatkan. Tiada sebarang usaha dibuat untuk mengesan dan mendapatkan saksi itu”. [35] …. Siasatan pegawai penyiasat sangat tidak bermakna dan tidak dapat membantu menutup beberapa kelompangan yang timbul dalam kes pendakwaan… ……………… [47] Adalah menjadi tugas SP8 untuk membuat penyiasatan yang menyeluruh, bukan sahaja terhadap keterangan yang menunjukkan kebersalahan tertuduh, tetapi juga keadaan yang boleh menyelamatkan tertuduh daripada pertuduhan. Kedudukan ini dinyatakan oleh Abdul Wahab Patail HMR di dalam kes Bunya ak Jalong v Public Prosecutor [2015] 5 MLJ 72 di ms 81 -82 seperti berikut: - [9] The duty of the investigators is to investigate the facts and to collect all the evidence. The police as investigators are public officers. Their concern must be to investigate the facts without fear or favour, so that all wrong doers may be brought to justice. The completed investigation, complied in the investigation paper is referred to the public prosecutor if an offence is disclosed. A completed investigation is one that includes investigation of the defence that emerged from the investigation. This includes such gaps or weaknesses emerging from the statement of witnesses and of defences from the statement of accused person. Such investigations may eliminate the gaps or weaknesses, and provide substance to be tested against defences when raised. This is important as it ensures that if charges are to be preferred, there are no gaps or weak links in the prosecution case in the way of a successful prosecution. …. [54] Apa yang jelas, penyiasatan SP8 tidk menyeluruh, khususnya selepas pendedahan SP2 di Mahkamah. Tiada siasatan lanjutan dibuat. Tidak keterlaluan jika dikatakan siasatan SP8 adalah secara sambil lewa. [penekanan ditambah] [34] Siasatan di dalam kes yang melibatkan hukuman mati atau hukuman seumur hidup seperti kes ini hendaklah dilakukan dengan teliti dan tanggungjawab seorang pegawai penyiasat adalah besar untuk kes-kes sebegini. Mahkamah Persekutuan di dalam kes Magendran a/l Mohan v Public Prosecutor [2011] 6 MLJ 1 menyatakan: - “Before parting with the case, it is necessary to state that from the facts and circumstances of this appeal it would appear to us that the investigation had been somewhat shoddy. Undoubtedly, heinous crimes are committed under great secrecy and that the investigation of a crime is a difficult and tedious task. At the same time the life and personal liberlty of a citizen is a precious one guaranteed by art 5 of the Federal Constitution and its deprivation shall be only in accordance with law. Thus, before accusing an innocent person of the commission of a grave crime like the one punishable under s.302 of the PC, an honest, sincere and dispassionate investigation has to be made and to feel sure that the person suspected of the crime alone was reasonable to commit the offence. Therefore, greater care and circumspection are needed by the investigating agency in this regard. [penekanan ditambah] Selain itu seperti yang diputuskan di dalam keputusan Mahkamah Agong di dalam Pang Chee Meng v public Prosecutor [1992] 1 MLJ 137 “…………the accused cannot be penalized for lack of ingenuity in police investigation depriving him of the time-honoured benefit of doubt….” (c) Pada masa, tarikh dan tempat tersebut OKT telah melakukan kesalahan mengedar dadah seperti yang dinyatakan di dalam pertuduhan. [35] Oleh kerana elemen milikan, kawalan dan pengetahuan gagal dibuktikan maka elemen ini juga gugur dengan sendirinya. [36] Oleh itu, berdasarkan alasan-alasan di atas, Mahkamah memutuskan atas penilaian maksimum atas keterangan-keterangan yang dikemukakan oleh pihak pendakwaan, Mahkamah mendapati pihak pendakwaan gagal membuktikan satu kes prima facie atas OKT untuk pertuduhan ini. Oleh itu, Mahkamah melepas dan membebaskan OKT dari pertuduhan-pertuduhan dibawah Seksyen 39B(1) (a) ADB 1952. Bertarikh 18 Mac 2026 BAGI PIHAK PENDAKWAAN : Puan Farah Aqilah Binti Ahmad Fuad Timbalan Pendakwa Raya Pejabat Pendakwaan Negeri Selangor, Aras 11,12 dan 13 Corporate Tower IDCC, Seksyen 15, 40200 Shah Alam, Selangor Darul Ehsan. PEGUAM BELA BAGI PIHAK TERTUDUH : Tetuan Najib, Hisham, Isa Peguambela & Peguamcara, SB-06-01, Paragon @ Pan’gaea, Persiaran Bestari, Cyber 11, 63000 Cyberjaya, Selangor