Mohd Mazani Bin Tugimen v Eeps Engineering Sdn Bhd (BA-24NCvC-616-03/2024)

Dalam Saman Pemula/Originating Summons (OS) [BA-24NCvC- 616-03/2024/selepas ini disebut OS No. 616] yang difailkan oleh Mohd Mazani bin Tugimen (Plaintif) terhadap EEPS Engineering Sdn Bhd (Defendan) bertarikh 25-3-2024 (Kand. 1) di Mahkamah Tinggi Shah Alam Sivil NCvC 10 ialah mengenai permohonan Plaintif untuk membatalkan dan memotong suatu kaveat persendirian yang didaftarkan pada 11-1- 2024 ke atas hartanah (Tanah). Defendan memfailkan Saman Pemula No.: BA-24NCvC-696- 04/2024 (“OS No. 696”) untuk menuntut “specific performance” terhadap Plaintif.

Saman Pemula Plaintif ini (OS No. 616), kemudiannya, atas Perintah Mahkamah dipindahkan untuk didengar bersekali dengan OS No. 696 di hadapan Mahkamah ini. Kedua-dua Saman Pemula ini didengar dan diputuskan di Mahkamah ini.

OS No. 616 ialah permohonan Plaintif untuk membatalkan dan memotong kaveat persendirian itu, memohon ganti rugi am untuk ditaksirkan oleh Mahkamah untuk kerosakan dan kerugian yang dialaminya akibat daripada kaveat persendirian serta kos berdasarkan peguam dan anakguam. OS No. 696 ialah permohonan Defendan untuk menuntut “specific performance” terhadap Plaintif.

Selepas meneliti Kandungan 1 (OS No. 616 dan OS No. 696), afidavit, dokumen dan hujahan bertulis, Mahkamah ini memutuskan seperti yang berikut: a) OS 616 adalah dibenarkan dan tiada kos diawardkan kepada Plaintif (Mohd Mazani bin Tugimen). b) OS 696 adalah ditolak dan selanjutnya Mahkamah memerintahkan Defendan (Mohd Mazani bin Tugimen) memulangkan/mengembalikan 2% harga belian being the earnest deposit kepada Plaintif. Tiada kos diawardkan kepada Plaintif (EEPS Engineering Sdn Bhd). c) pihak-pihak menanggung kos mereka masing-masing. Berkenaan dengan pemulangan 2% harga belian being the earnest deposit, Mahkamah diberitahu bahawa bayaran earnest deposit dibayar kepada syarikat ejen hartanah (Knight World).

EEPS Engineering Sdn Bhd tidak berpuas hati dengan keputusan Mahkamah ini dan merayu terhadap keputusan-keputusan OS No. 616 dan OS No. 696 kepada Mahkamah Rayuan.

Pada 31-1-2013, Plaintif telah membeli 1 unit pejabat kedai 2 tingkat berangkai (2 storey link link shop office) di KIP Sentral @ KLIA daripada penjual/pemaju iaitu Cahaya Serijaya Sdn Bhd dengan harga sebanyak RM917,800.00. Plaintif melampirkan Perjanjian Jual Beli/PJB bertarikh 31-1-2013 yang ditanda sebagai Ekshibit MM-1. Plaintif telah menandatangani Borang 14A bagi pindahmilik ke atas nama Plaintif. Plaintif melampirkan salinan Borang 14A yang ditanda sebagai Ekshibit MM-2.

Pada 27-11-2023, Plaintif dan EEPS Engineering Sdn Bhd (Defendan) telah menandatangi Letter of Offer to Purchase untuk Membeli (selepas ini disebut “Letter of Offer to Purchase”) yang disediakan oleh syarikat ejen hartanah i.e. Knight World Realty (M) Sdn Bhd yang mengandungi syarat standard mengenai Execution dan Other Conditions, iaitu −

EXECUTION a) I/We hereby undertake to execute the SPA within 14 working days (“said Period”) from the date of this Letter Offer to Purchase (“Letter of Offer”) by the Vendor(s) (provided that there is no delay on the part of the Vendor(s) or Vendor(s)’lawyer in agreeing to the term and condition of the SPA), failing which the said Earnest Deposit shall be forfeited by the Vendor(s) as agreed liquidated damages PROVIDED ALWAYS that the non-execution by the Purchaser is not caused or attributable to the Vendor’s misrepresentation, misconduct and/or fraudulent acts. Thereinafter this Letter of Offer shall be terminated and be null and void and neither party shall have any further claim against each other. Syarat dan terma tambahan yang telah dipersetujui kedua belah pihak seperti di perenggan 11 Letter of Offer to Purchase tersebut ialah −

OTHER CONDITIONS (if any) 1. SUBJECT TO LOAN APPROVAL 2/3 WEEKS TIME FOR PURCHASER TO GET LOAN APPROVAL FROM 28/11/2023 TILL 19/12/2023 Plaintif melampirkan Letter of Offer to Purchase bertarikh 27-11-2023 yang ditanda sebagai Ekshibit MM-3. [8] Berikutan dengan itu, atas nasihat peguam cara Plaintif yang mengendalikan perjanjian jual beli (selepas ini disebut “T/N Adnan Rahim & Co.”) menyatakan bahawa − • selepas Letter of Offer to Purchase, suatu perjanjian jual beli perlu ditandatangani dalam masa 14 hari bekerja dari tarikh Letter of Offer to Purchase. • walau bagaimanapun, memandangkan terdapat perenggan 11 Letter of Offer to Purchase tersebut, maka perjanjian jual beli perlu ditandatangani pada atau sebelum 19-12-2023. • peguam cara Defendan iaitu T/N Yeoh Mazlina & Partner hanya menyerahkan draf pertama perjanjian jual beli pada 17- 12-2023 iaitu selepas 14 hari yang ditetapkan. Dengan adanya perenggan 11 Letter of Offer to Purchase tersebut, maka draf pertama perjanjian jual beli itu tetap disemak oleh T/N Adnan Rahim & Co. dan dikembalikan kepada T/N Yeoh Mazlina & Partner pada 18-12-2023. • pada 19-12-2023, T/N Yeoh Mazlina & Partner membuat pindaan lagi. T/N Adnan Rahim & Co. telah menyatakan tiada lagi pindaan. • Plaintif meminta agar urusan perjanjian jual beli itu ditandatangani kerana Plaintif akan bercuti panjang selepas tarikh 26-12-2023. Plaintif menyatakan bahawa tiada lanjutan masa diberikan kepada Defendan untuk menandatangani perjanjian jual beli itu. Plaintif melampirkan e-mel T/N Adnan Rahim & Co. bertarikh 20-12-2023 yang ditanda sebagai Ekshibit MM-4. • Plaintif telah meminta syarikat ejen hartanah untuk memaklumkan status pembiayaan pinjaman oleh Defendan dengan pihak Bank. sehingga tarikh 21-12-2023 tiada apa-apa pengesahan diperoleh daripada ejen hartanah tersebut atau daripada T/N Yeoh Mazlina & Partner atau daripada Defendan sendiri mengenai perkara ini. Memandangkan tiada pengesahan mengenai status pembiayaan pinjaman oleh Defendan itu maka Plaintif merasa unsecured dan tidak yakin dengan penjelasan daripada syarikat ejen hartanah. Plaintif melampirkan pesanan WhatsApp antara Plaintif dan syarikat ejen hartanah dan contoh perbualan WhatsApp yang lazim mengenai status pembiayaan dengan pihak bank yang ditanda secara kolektif sebagai Ekshibit MM-5. [9] Plaintif mengarahkan T/N Adnan Rahim & Co. untuk menamatkan Letter of Offer to Purchase tersebut dan mengarahkan T/N Adnan Rahim & Co. memulangkan semua deposit yang dibayar oleh Defendan. Pembayaran dimajukan kepada T/N Yeoh Mazlina & Partner. Plaintif melampirkan Surat T/N Adnan Rahim & Co. bertarikh 22-12-2023 dan 26- 12-2023 yang ditanda sebagai Ekshibit MM-6. Kaveat persendirian: [10] Defendan telah memasukkan Kaveat Persendirian bertarikh 11.1.2024 melalui Nombor Perserahan 00B2107/2024. Plaintif melampirkan Carian Persendirian Hakmilik bertarikh 18-1-2024 yang ditanda sebagai Ekshibit MM-7. [11] Atas nasihat peguam cara Plaintif, Plaintif menyatakan bahawa Defendan tiada apa-apa kepentingan mengkaveat (caveatable interest) ke atas hartanah itu kerana tiada apa-apa perjanjian jual beli ditandatangani antara Plaintif dan Defendan. Maka, sebagai pemilik benefisial ke atas hartanah itu, Plaintif berhak atas apa-apa urusan berkenaan dengan hartanah itu. Perjanjian Jual Beli dengan pihak lain: [12] Plaintif menandatangani perjanjian jual beli dengan pihak lain pada 19-1-2024 tetapi urusan jual beli itu tergantung kerana wujudnya kaveat persendirian oleh Defendan. Plaintif melampirkan Perjanjian Jual Beli bertarikh 19-1-2024 yang ditanda sebagai Ekshibit MM-8. [13] Atas nasihat peguam cara Plaintif, memandangkan pindahmilik ke atas hartanah itu tidak dapat disempurnakan selagi mana kaveat persendirian oleh Defendan itu tidak dibatalkan dan dipotong, maka Plaintif akan/telah mengalami kerosakan dan kerugian. [14] T/N Adnan Rahim & Co. telah menghantar Surat bertarikh 15-2- 2024 kepada Defendan memohon agar Defendan menarik balik kaveat persendirian tersebut. Hingga kini, Defendan gagal/enggan/cuai menarik balik kaveat persendirian tersebut. Plaintif melampirkan Surat T/N Adnan Rahim & Co. bertarikh 15-2-2024 yang ditanda sebagai Ekshibit MM-9. Afidavit jawapan Defendan: [15] Pengarah Defendan mengikrarkan afidavit jawapan dan menyatakan seperti berikut: • hal perkara mengenai proses pindahmilik daripada penjual/pemaju kepada Plaintif adalah terletak kepada Plaintif. Ekshibit MM-2 (Borang 14A) tidak ditandatangani dan tidak didaftarkan. • Plaintif adalah terikat dengan terma dalam perenggan/klausa 5 Letter of Offer to Purchase tersebut. • perenggan 11 Letter of Offer to Purchase tersebut (syarat tambahan) bertujuan untuk memberikan peluang kepada Defendan untuk mendapatkan kemudahan pembiayaan dengan pihak Bank. Obligasi kontraktual pihak-pihak di bawah dokumen ini kekal dan tidak terjejas oleh syarat tambahan tersebut. • sekiranya Defendan gagal mendapatkan kemudahan pembiayaan dengan pihak Bank, transaksi jual beli hartanah itu masih akan dan perlu diteruskan dan disempurnakan melalui bayaran wang oleh Defendan dan perjanjian jual beli perlu ditandatangani dalam tempoh 14 hari dari tarikh 19-12-

Ketiadaan pinjaman Bank tidak memberikan hak kepada Plaintif untuk menamatkan Letter of Offer to Purchase tersebut. • pada 20-12-2023, T/N Adnan Rahim & Co. bersetuju untuk Defendan menyerahkan perjanjian jual beli yang ditandatangani oleh Defendan. Pada 22-12-2023, Defendan membayar baki deposit sebanyak RM110,320.00 kepada peguam cara Plaintif sebelum 26-12-2023. • pada tarikh yang sama (22-12-2023), Plaintif secara unilateral menamatkan Letter of Offer to Purchase tersebut dan enggan meneruskan transaksi jual beli hartanah tersebut dengan Defendan. • pada 26-12-2023, Plaintif memulangkan perjanjian jual beli yang telah ditandatangani oleh Plaintif bersama cek berjumlah RM110,320.00 kepada Defendan. Terma dalam Letter of Offer to Purchase: [16] Defendan menyatakan bahawa terma penting dalam Letter of Offer to Purchase tersebut adalah −

Harga jualan bagi Hartanah tersebut adalah berjumlah RM1,400,000.00 (“Harga Jualan”).

terma pembayaran bagi Harga Jualan adalah seperri yang berikut: i. 2% daripada Harga Jualan merupakan deposit awal (“Deposit Awal”). ii. 8% daripada Harga Jualan yang merupakan baki deposit hendaklah dibayar selepas Perjanjian Jual Beli ditandatangani (“Baki Deposit”). iii. 90% daripada Harga Jualan (“Baki Harga Jualan”) hendaklah dibayar dalam tempoh 90 hari daripada tarikh Perjanjian Jual Beli atau tarikh penerimaan kebenaran daripada Pemaju/Badan Statutori atau apa-apa penguatkuasa yang berkenaan daripada tarikh Sijil Penyiapan dan Pematuhan dikeluarkan, yang mana terkemudian (“Tarikh Penyiapan”). iv. Selepas tamat Tarikh Penyiapan untuk memberikan tempoh lanjutan selama 30 hari untuk membayar Baki Harga Jualan yang belum dibayar yang tertakluk kepada faedah 9% setahun yang dikira berdasarkan dasar harian.

Defedan hendaklah menandatangani Perjanjian Jual Beli dalam tempoh 14 hari daripada tarikh penerimaan Letter of Offer to Purchase oleh Plaintif (dengan syarat tiada kelewatan daripada pihak Plaintif untuk bersetuju kepada terma dan syarat yang tertakluk dalam Perjanjian Jual Beli), jika gagal Deposit Awal akan dirampas.

Dalam keadaan mana Plaintif gagal untuk melaksanakan Perjanjian Jual Beli dalam tempoh yang ditetapkan, Defendan berhak kepada perlaksanaan spesifik dan/atau ganti rugi atau secara alternatif , Defendan berhak untuk membatalkan dan Plaintif hendaklah memulangkan Deposit Awal bebas daripada faedah dengan jumlah tambahan yang bersamaan dengan Deposit Awal sebagai ganti rugi dan selepas pemulangan tersebut , Letter of Offer to Purchase hendaklah dibatalkan dan mana-mana pihak tidak boleh mempunyai sebarang tuntutan lebih lanjut terhadap satu sama lain.

Terma-terma di atas adalah tertakluk kepada kelulusan pinjaman yang mana Defendan diberikan tempoh 2 atau 3 minggu untuk mendapatkan yang sama iaitu daripada 28.11.2023 sehingga 19.12.2023. Defendan mempunyai caveatable interest: [17] Atas nasihat peguam cara Defendan, Defendan menyatakan bahawa Defendan sememangnya mempunyai kepenting mengkaveat ke atas hartanah itu menurut Letter of Offer to Purchase tersebut. [18] Defendan telah membayar Earnest Deposit dan memberikan cek bagi bayaran baki deposit kepada Plaintif. [19] Kedua-dua pihak melalui peguam cara masing-masing telah menyemak draf perjanjian jual beli dan memuktamadkan terma dalam perjanjian jual beli. [20] Penamatan Letter of Offer to Purchase tersebut oleh Plaintif adalah suatu kemungkiran dan Defendan berhak untuk melaksanakan “specific performance” terhadap Plaintif untuk menyempurnakan transaksi jual beli hartanah tersebut. Defendan memfailkan Saman Pemula No.: BA-24NCvC-696- 04/2024 (“OS No. 696”) untuk menuntut “specific performance” terhadap Plaintif. [21] Saman Pemula Plaintif ini (OS No. 616), kemudiannya, atas Perintah Mahkamah Tinggi Shah Alam Sivil NCvC 10 dipindahkan untuk didengar bersekali dengan OS No. 696. [22] Tindakan Plaintif menjual hartanah tersebut kepada pihak lain adalah menyalahi undang-undang dan tidak sah. Plaintif adalah masih terikat dengan terma dalam Letter of Offer to Purchase tersebut. Perjanjian Jual Beli antara Plaintif dengan pihak lain telah menunjukkan keperluan Defendan untuk memasukkan kaveat persendirian tersebut demi memelihara hak Defendan di bawah Letter of Offer to Purchase tersebut dan untuk menghalang Plaintif melupuskan dan/atau menguruskan pindahmilik hartanah itu kepada pihak lain. Hujahan bertulis pihak-pihak Hujahan Plaintif: [23] Berdasarkan kepada syarat dan terma di perenggan 11 Letter of Offer to Purchase tersebut, terdapat lanjutan masa untuk menandatangani perjanjian jual beli atas alasan bagi membolehkan pihak Defendan mendapatkan kelulusan pinjaman daripada pihak Bank iaitu daripada syarat awal iaitu 14 hari daripada tarikh 27-11-2023 yang sepatutnya berakhir pada 15-12-2023 akan tetapi dilanjutkan kepada 19- 12-2023. Oleh itu, tempoh yang diberikan kepada pihak-pihak untuk menandatangani Perjanjian Jual Beli adalah pada atau sebelum 19-12-

[24] Peguam cara terpelajar Plaintiff berhujah bahawa sesungguhnya kegagalan dan/atau kemungkiran untuk menandatangani Perjanjian Jual Beli di dalam tempoh yang ditetapkan adalah berpunca daripada peguam cara Defendan sendiri. Ini berdasarkan kepada tindakan peguamcara Defendan sendiri yang hanya menyerahkan sesalinan draf pertama Perjanjian Jual Beli untuk disemak pada 17-12-2023. Tiada kegagalan atau kemungkiran di pihak Plaintiff dalam penyediaan draf Perjanjian Jual Beli bagi membolehkan Perjanjian Jual Beli hartanah tersebut ditandatangani dalam tempoh yang ditetapkan. Malahan, peguam cara Plaintiff (T/N Adnan Rahim & Co.) dan juga Plaintiff masih berlembut dan bertimbangrasa dengan memberikan lanjutan masa yang sewajarnya sehingga 22-12-2023 via perbualan WhatsApp. [25] Peguam cara Plaintiff berhujah bahawa Defendan adalah tersilap dan terkhilaf dalam pemahaman menafsirkan perenggan 11 Letter of Offer to Purchase tersebut dengan menyatakan bahawa tempoh 14 hari Perjanjian Jual Beli tersebut hendaklah ditandatangani oleh kedua pihak adalah dikira daripada tarikh akhir lanjutan masa di perenggan 11 iaitu dari tarikh 19-12-2023. Plaintiff seterusnya berhujah bahawa adalah salah dan tidak adil serta memprejudiskan pihak Plaintiff sekiranya Defendan tidak mengambil kira keseluruhan terma di dalam Letter of Offer to Purchase tersebut. Perenggan 5 (a) dan perenggan 11 adalah berkait rapat yang mana ianya adalah berkenaan tempoh yang perlu dipatuhi oleh pihak-pihak. Plaintiff telah memaklumkan dan juga bertimbang rasa dengan memberi kelonggaran masa untuk pihak Defendan memberikan Perjanjian Jual Beli (perenggan 11) dan lanjutan seterusnya atas budi bicara Plaintiff iaitu pada atau sebelum 22-12-2023(perbualan WhatsApp) kerana memberi peluang dan masa kepada Defendan selaku pembeli untuk membuat permohonan pinjaman dengan Bank bagi membiayai pembelian hartanah tersebut. [26] Oleh yang demikian, Plaintif seterusnya berhujah bahawa penamatan Letter of Offer to Purchase tersebut pada 22-12-2023 adalah sah dan tidak memprejudiskan Defendan sama sekali kerana peguam cara Plaintif (T/N Adnan Rahim & Co.) telahpun memulangkan kesemua duit deposit kepada Defendan melalui surat bertarikh 26-12-2023 dan diakui terima oleh peguam cara Defendan. Seterusnya Plaintif berhujah bahawa dengan penamatan Letter of Offer to Purchase tersebut tersebut, Defendan sama sekali tidak mempunyai hak dan kepentingan kaveat ke atas hartanah tersebut. Selanjutnya Plaintiff berhujah bahawa secara alternatifnya, sekiranya penamatan OTP tersebut tidak sah, Defendan tetap tidak mempunyai kepentingan kaveat ke atas hartanah tersebut kerana Letter of Offer to Purchase tersebut bukanlah suatu instrument yang boleh didaftarkan ke atas hartanah tersebut. [27] Plaintiff berhujah bahawa kemasukan kaveat persendirian oleh Defendan ke atas hartanah tersebut adalah salah, silap dan tidak mematuhi Seksyen 323 Kanun Tanah Negara 1965. [28] Nas undang-undang kes yang dirujuk oleh peguam cara terpelajar Plaintif ialah −

Luggage Distributors (M) Sdn Bhd v. TAN HOR TENG & ANOR [1995] 1 MLRA 496 yang mana Y.A Gopal Sri Ram JCA dalam penghakimannya di perenggan 92 sehingga perenggan 99 dimuka surat 521 telah menggariskan bahawa terdapat 3 kategori kepentingan hartanah sepertimana yang ditetapkan dibawah Seksyen 323(1) Kanun Tanah Negara − Caveatable interest [92] To paraphrase s 323(1)(a) of the Code, a private caveat may be entered at the instance of any person or body who claims either:

the title to land; or

any registrable interest in Land. [93] The parameters of caveatability under s 323(1)(a) are therefore circumscribed by these words: “title” and “registrable interest”. It is only one who makes a claim to either of these in land may enter a private caveat. [94] Although the words “title” and “registrable interest” are not defined by the Code, their meaning may be gathered from the scheme of the Code and from the indefeasibility provision, namely, s 340(1). The latter points to a bifurcation between title (the equivalent of the English fee simple) and registrable interests, that is, leases, charges and easements. [95] In my judgment, the position that obtains under the Code, so far as is relevant to the present appeal, may be stated in the following way. The Code creates three categories of interests in land. They are as follows: Category 1: Registrable interests in land. [96] Only certain interests are capable of registration. Within this are two subcategories, namely:

Registered title. This may be in perpetuity or for a term of years. It pertains to ownership of land. The “owner” is termed by the Code as a “registered proprietor”,

Registrable interests falling short of ownership. These are leases charges and easements. [97] Registration carries with it a bundle of rights, which includes, subject to any restriction imposed by the alienating authority, the right to effect a transfer of the particular registered interest. The Code, in s 340(1), confers indefeasibility upon registered title and interests in land. Section 340(2) creates exceptions which, if established, may operate to defeat such registered title or interest; Category 2: Interests that are incapable of registration. [98] These include tenancies exempt from registration, which may be protected by means of an endorsement upon the register document of title; Category 3: Caveatable interests. [99] These are unregistered interests which are capable of protection by the entry of a private caveat. In the context of s 323(1)(a), it is only a claim to the interests falling under category 1(a) and (b) above that may be protected by the entry of a private caveat. Cases falling under category (2) are not caveatable interests. A private caveat cannot, therefore, be entered by one who claims such an interest. Protection for such interests must be secured in the manner prescribed by the Code. Peguam cara terpelajar Plaintiff berhujah bahawa berdasarkan kepada garis panduan yang telah diputuskan di Mahkamah Rayuan seperti diatas, sesungguhnya kemasukan kaveat oleh Defendan adalah tidak termasuk di dalam kepentingan yang boleh dikaveatkan maka kaveat tersebut mestilah dibatalkan dan dipotong.

kes Million Group Credit Sdn Bhd v. Lee Shoo Koon [1984] 1 MLRH 484 yang mana Mahkamah telah memutuskan di muka surat 484 & 485 bahawa pemohonan pemohon pengkaveat untuk melanjutkan kaveat adalah ditolak dan memutuskan − Held (dismissing the applicant’s application):

A mere chose in action arising out of or incidental to a contract for the sale of land could not entitle the applicant to lodge a caveat to freeze the land until his action was heard. The applicant must have “an interest in land”. (paras 13-14)

There was never any concluded contract between the parties as the proposed sale was subject to contract. Merely because the respondents’ solicitor agreed to a deletion of one clause in a draft did not entitle the applicant’s solicitor to say that by doing so, he must be taken, on behalf of his clients, to have agreed to all the terms in the contract so that the execution of the document became a mere formality. (paras 15- 21) Mahkamah di dalam Penghakimannya yang menolak permohonan pemohon (pengkaveat) juga telah memutuskan seperti berikut di Perenggan 15-17 − [15] So far as the facts of this case are concerned, it appears to me that there was never any concluded contract between the parties. Negotiations there were, but the only proper inference that I can draw in the circumstances of this case is that by submitting a formal agreement to the respondents’ solicitors which the applicant's solicitor required to be executed this proposed sale was clearly subject to contract. The meaning of these words were spelt out by Lord Greene MR in Spottiswoods, Ballantyne & Co Ltd v. Doreen Applicances Ltd [1942] 2 KB 32: ... the language here is equivalent to the common and more concise phrase “subject to contract”, and, if anything is settled, it is that that phrase is one which makes it clear that the intention of the parties is that neither of them is to be contractually bound until a contract is signed in the usual way. [16] Merely because the respondents' solicitor agreed to a deletion of one clause in a draft does not in my view entitle the applicant’s solicitor to say that by doing so he must be taken, on behalf of his clients, to have agreed to all the terms in the contract so that the execution of the document became a mere formality. [17] There is no evidence whatsoever before me that the respondents had an opportunity of considering all the terms in the final sale agreement before that document was put to each of them for execution. Berdasarkan kepada penghakiman tersebut, peguam cara terpelajar Plaintif menghujahkan bahawa prinsip yang jelas adalah selagi tiada kontrak yang absolute dan telah dimuktamadkan seperti Perjanjian Jual Beli yang ditandatangani oleh kedua pihak, maka pihak Defendan tidak mempunyai kepentingan kaveat untuk membolehkan Defendan memasukkan kaveat ke atas hartanah tersebut dibawah Seksyen 323 Kanun Tanah Negara.

kes Salleh Hassan v. Munusamy Kannan & Ors [2023] MLRHU 1967 yang mana Mahkamah telah memutuskan di perenggan 71 sehingga 75 − [71] The burden is on the Plaintiff to show that his caveat is within the scope of the provision. [72] In the present case, the Plaintiffs private caveat was lodged on 23 February 2022 (Ikatan Dokumen Bersama Bahagian B m/s 63 - 66). The basis for the lodgement of the caveats again on the basis that Hassan is the beneficial proprietor of the Lands on the strength of the Exhibits IDP1 and IDP2. [73] For the reasons stated in Issue One, this Court finds that the Plaintiff does not have a caveatable interest in the Lands and therefore was wrong to lodge the private caveats. [74] Therefore, the answer to Issue Three is affirmative. [75] This Court holds that the Plaintiff's caveat on the Lands is bound to be removed under s 329(1) NLC as the caveats fail outside the scope of s 323. Seterusnya peguam cara terpelajar Plaintif menghujahkan bahawa, dengan ketiadaan kepentingan mengkaveat yang harus dibuktikan oleh pengkaveat, maka Mahkamah haruslah memotong dan membatalkan kaveat persendirian yang dimasukkan oleh pengkaveat.

kes Tan Heng Poh v. Tan Boon Thong & Ors [1992] 1 MLRA 324 yang mana Mahkamah telah memutuskan bahawa kaveat yang telah dimasukkan oleh pengkaveat dibatalkan atas alasan bahawa semasa kaveat sendirian tersebut dimasukkan, pengkaveat tidak mempunyai kepentingan semasa (present interest) kerana semasa kaveat dimasukkan, kepentingan pengkaveat pada masa masih lagi belum disahkan/ditentukan.

kes Score Options Sdn Bhd v. Mexaland Development Sdn Bhd Authority [2012] 6 MLRA 216 yang mana Mahkamah Persekutuan telah memutuskan seperti berikut: [39] It is also our considered view that the caveator under s 323(1)(a) of the NLC must have a present interest as opposed to a potential interest in the land. The registrable interest that the caveator is claiming for, must be an existing interest. The caveator under s 323(1)(a) of the NLC must be limited to those who are claiming to an existing interest in the land or right to such existing interest and cannot include potential interest or interest in future. [29] Berdasarkan kepada keputusan-keputusan dan juga alasan penghakiman yang diberikan didalam kesemua kes-kes diatas, peguam cara terpelajar Plaintif menghujahkan bahawa adalah jelas bahawa beban pembuktian adalah kepada Defendan sebagai pengkaveat untuk membuktikan bahawa Defendan mempunyai kepentingan kaveat (caveatable interest) terhadap hartanah tersebut. Dalam kes ini di hadapan Mahkamah ini, peguam cara terpelajar Plaintif menghujahkan bahawa berdasarkan kepada Afidavit Jawapan Defendan dan berdasarkan kepada Afidavit Sokongan Plaintiff dan juga Afidavit Balasan Plaintiff, adalah jelas bahawa Defendan gagal membuktikan bahawa Defendan mempunyai caveatable interest hanya berdasarkan kepada dokumen Letter of Offer to Purchase yang telahpun tamat tempoh. Dan secara alternatifnya, sekiranya Mahkamah mendapati bahawa Letter of Offer to Purchase tersebut belum tamat tempoh, Letter of Offer to Purchase tersebut tetap tidak membuatkan Defendan mempunyai caveatable interest kerana Letter of Offer to Purchase tersebut bukanlah suatu instrument yang membolehkan Defendan mempunyai kepentingan berdaftar kerana ianya tidak dimuktamadkan atau dimeterai dengan Perjanjian Jual Beli yang ditandatangani oleh kedua belah pihak. Malahan pula, Plaintiff telahpun memulangkan kesemua duit deposit yang diterima oleh peguam caranya terdahulu sebagai stakeholder kepada Defendan melalui peguam cara Defendan. [30] Peguam cara terpelajar Plaintif menghujahkan bahawa Plaintif berhak untuk meneruskan apa-apa transaksi dengan pihak lain memandangkan Letter of Offer to Purchase tersebut telahpun ditamatkan dengan sah dan Plaintif tidak mempunyai sebarang obligasi kontrak terhadap Defendan berkenaan hartanah tersebut. [31] Peguam cara terpelajar Plaintif menghujahkan bahawa permohonan Plaintif di bawah Seksyen 327 Kanun Tanah Negara 1965 adalah satu permohonan yang valid, betul dan mengikut lunas undang-undang yang sebenar. [32] Peguam cara terpelajar Plaintif merujuk kepada Seksyen 327 Kanun Tanah Negara 1965 iaitu − Seksyen 327. Pemotongan kaveat-kaveat sendirian oleh Mahkamah.

Mana-mana orang atau badan yang terkilan dengan kewujudan suatu kaveat sendirian bolehlah pada bila-bila masa memohon kepada Mahkamah untuk suatu perintah untuk pemotongannya, dan Mahkamah (dengan bertindak, jjika keadaan-keadaan menghendaki sedemikian, ex parte), bolehlah membuat apa-apa perintah atas permohonan itu sepertimana yang difikirkannya adil. [33] Peguam cara terpelajar Plaintif menghujahkan bahawa sekiranya permohonan Plaintif ini tidak dibenarkan, ianya akan mengakibatkan Plaintif dinafikan hak sebagai pemilik benefisial kerana tidak dapat mendaftarkan nama Plaintif sebagai pemilik berdaftar (perfection of transfer) ke atas hartanah tersebut dan seterusnya terkilan dan kerugian kerana tidak dapat membuat apa-apa urusan terhadap hartanah tersebut disebabkan kaveat sendirian yang telah dimasukkan oleh Defendan secara salah dan curang. Hujahan Defendan: [34] Peguam cara terpelajar Defendan menghujahkan bahawa menurut seksyen 323(1) Kanun Tanah Negara, Defendan berhak dan mempunyai caveatable interest ke atas hartanah tersebut di mana peruntukan tersebut membenarkan pihak-pihak yang dibolehkan untuk memasukkan kaveat persendirian, seperti yang berikut: “323. (1) The persons and bodies at whose instance a private caveat may be entered are −

any person or body claiming title to, or any registrable interest in, any alienated land or undivided share in any alienated land or any right to such title or interest;

any person or body claiming to be beneficially entitled under any trust affecting any such land or interest; and

the guardian or next friend of any minor claiming to be entitled as mentioned in paragraph (b).”. [35] Peguam cara terpelajar Defendan merujuk kepada keputusan Mahkamah Tinggi dalam kes Cendana Konsep Sdn Bhd v. Island Concept Sdn Bhd [2014] 9 MLJ 331 yang merujuk kepada keputusan Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam kes Macon Engineers Sdn Bhd v. Goh Hooi Yin [1976] 2 MLJ 53 dalam membincangkan prinsip caveatable interest selaras dengan Seksyen 323 KTN − “[86] The next issue is whether by having just paid the deposit and not the full purchase consideration, the defendant has a caveatable interest in the said property. In Macon Engineers Sdn Bhd v Goh Hooi Yin [1976] 2 MLJ 53, it was held as follows: As regards the first question, section 323(1)(a) of the National Land Code provides that a private caveat may be entered at the instance of any person or body claiming title to, or any registrable interest in, any alienated land or any right to such title or interest. It would seem clear that the respondent cannot claim title to or any registrable interest in the property in question merely on the strength of the sale agreement which is a non-statutory and non-registrable instrument, but it cannot be denied that he has a right under that agreement to such title or interest by bringing an action for specific performance of the agreement, which in fact he has al ready done. [87] In Chin Cheng Hong v Hameed & Ors [1954] 1 MLJ 169 Buhagiar J said at p 170: The whole system of caveats is founded on the principle that they exist for the protection of alleged as well as proved interests and of interests that have not yet become actual interests in land, but a caveat, being in the nature of a statutory injunction, does not in itself make a claim or right either better or worse. It would seem abundantly clear from the authorities that, so long as there is in existence a valid agreement for the sale of land, the purchaser is entitled to lodge a caveat to protect his rights under the contract and to sue for specific performance of the agreement … [88] Hence, what is critical is that there should be a valid agreement for the sale and purchaser’s right to enter a caveat to protect his interest over the land is not predicated on him having paid the full purchase consideration. If payment of the full purchase consideration is the sine qua non for entry of a caveat by the purchaser then almost every conveyancing transaction would be in peri land the purchaser would be without statutory protection during the intervening period between execution of the agreement (and payment of deposit) and payment of full purchase considerat ion, which in most cases will be several months later.”. [36] Selanjutnya, peguam cara terpelajar Defendan merujuk keputusan Mahkamah Rayuan dalam kes Wong Kuan Tan v. Gambut Development Sdn. Bhd. [1984] 2 CLJ 26 − “To put it more simply, the caveator in this case must first satisfy the Court that he has a “caveatable interest” in the land. Only if he has such an interest can he qualify to lodge a caveat under s. 323 of the Nat ional Land Code. In the application to have the caveat removed the onus is cast upon the caveator to satisfy the Court that on the evidence presented his claim to an interest in the land raises a serious question to be tried and after having done so he must go on to show that on the balance of convenience, the caveat should be extended until the disposal of the main action.”. Manakala, dalam keputusan Mahkamah Rayuan dalam kes Luggage Distributors (M) Sdn Bhd v Tan Hor Teng & Anor [1995] 1 MLJ 719 yang memutuskan prinsip menentukan suatu permohonan mengeluarkan kaveat − “The first stage is the examination of the grounds expressed in the application for the caveat. If it appears that the grounds stated therein are insufficient in law to support a caveat, then cadit quaestion, and the caveat must be removed without the necessity of going any further.”. [37] Peguam cara terpelajar Defendan berhujah bahawa pihak-pihak di sini telah menandatangani Letter of Offer to Purchase tersebut yang merupakan suatu perjanjian untuk meneruskan dengan transaksi jual beli hartanah tersebut. Dalam hal ini, Defendan telah membayar Earnest Deposit dan selanjutnya memajukan Cek Baki Deposit tersebut kepada Plaintif. Walau bagaimanapun, Plaintif enggan untuk meneruskan transaksi jual beli hartanah tersebut atas alasan kononnya Defendan telah gagal untuk mematuhi terma Letter of Offer to Purchase tersebut. [38] Defendan kemudiannya telah memfailkan Saman Pemula No. BA- 24NCVC-696-04/2024 (“SP 696”) di Mahkamah Tinggi Shah Alam untuk menuntut, antara lainnya, pelaksanaan spesifik terhadap Plaintif. [39] Peguam cara terpelajar Defendan berhujah bahawa Defendan adalah berhak bagi perlaksanaan spesifik Letter of Offer to Purchase tersebut oleh Plaintif, oleh itu, suatu kaveat untuk mengekalkan status quo hartanah tersebut adalah diperlukan dan adalah wajar. Defendan merujuk kepada keputusan Mahkamah Rayuan dalam kes Institut Teknologi Federal Sdn. Bhd. v. HUM Education Sdn. Bhd. [2007] 7 MLJ 23 − “[27] … It is settled that caveatable interest must be a definite right relating to land and capable of enforcement and a caveator must be in a position to institute a suit for specific performance of claim. The position of IIUM was made worse as i t did not even commence action as at 31 December 2004 when the application by FIT for the removal of the caveat was heard. Indeed, it was not rebutted that no action was filed to date in connection with the caveat. [28] The fact that there was payment of earnest deposit and that it should be refundable did not ipso facto provide to IIUM caveatable interest in the said land. Mere pecuniary interest in land does not entitle a person to lodge a caveat under s 323 of the Code (see Registrar of Tit les, Johore v. Temenggong Securities Ltd).”. [40] Peguam cara terpelajar Defendan berhujah bahawa pada setiap masa yang material, Defendan tidak pernah memungkiri mana-mana terma-terma Letter of Offer to Purchase tersebut yang membolehkan Plaintif menjadi berhak untuk menamatkan yang sama. Sehubungan dengan di atas, peguam cara terpelajar Defendan berhujah bahawa kewujudan Letter of Offer to Purchase tersebut yang merupakan kontrak sah di antara pihak-pihak di sini menjadi asas kepada wujudnya kepentingan mengkaveat Defendan sekaligus membawa kepada kesahan pendaftaran Kaveat Persendirian tersebut. Dalam apa jua keadaan, isu kesahan penamatan Letter of Offer to Purchase oleh Plaintif merupakan isu yang harus dipertimbangkan dan diputuskan terlebih dahulu sebelum status pendaftaran Kaveat Persendirian tersebut dapat diputuskan. [41] Oleh demikian, peguam cara terpelajar Defendan berhujah bahawa berdasarkan kepada penamatan tidak sah Letter of Offer to Purchase oleh Plaintif, Defendan adalah berhak dan mempunyai kepentingan mengkaveat untuk mendaftarkan yang sama. Dalam apa jua keadaan, Kaveat Persendirian tersebut seharusnya dilanjutkan sementara menunggu pelupusan SP 696. Sekiranya Kaveat Persendirian tersebut dibatalkan sebelum isu-isu yang berbangkit dalam SP 696 dapat diputuskan dan dilupuskan secara muktamad, perkara ini akan menyebabkan SP 696 menjadi sia-sia dan tidak boleh diteruskan. Penamatan Letter of Offer to Purchase: [42] Peguam cara terpelajar Defendan menghujahkan bahawa − • tindakan Plaintif menamatkan Letter of Offer to Purchase adalah suatu yang tidak sah menurut seksyen-seksyen 5 dan 6 Akta Kontrak 1950 yang memperuntukkan prinsip undang-undang berkenaan waktu dan keadaan pembatalan dan/atau penamatan suatu tawaran boleh dibuat. Berdasarkan kepada prinsip di atas, suatu tawaran hanya boleh dibatalkan sebelum penerimaan yang sama dibuat melainkan dalam keadaan-keadaan yang dinyatakan di seksyen 6 Akta Kontrak 1950. • penamatan Letter of Offer to Purchase tersebut secara unilateral oleh Plaintif sebelum tamat tempoh yang dipersetujui oleh pihak-pihak iaitu sebelum 26-12-2023 dan jelas merupakan penamatan adalah tidak sah. • Plaintif juga telah bergantung kepada klausa 11 untuk menamatkan Letter of Offer to Purchase dan mendakwa Defendan kononnya telah gagal untuk mendapatkan pembiayaan kewangan daripada pihak bank bagi tujuan transaksi jual beli hartanah tersebut (klausa 11 Letter of Offer to Purchase tersebut telah memperuntukkan syarat tambahan bagi pembiayaan kewangan Defendan sebagai pembeli daripada pihak bank). Syarat Tambahan tersebut bukan suatu keperluan bagi pihak-pihak untuk meneruskan transaksi jual beli hartanah tersebut. Dalam hal ini, Syarat Tambahan tersebut hanya sekadar memberi peluang kepada Defendan untuk mendapatkan pembiayaan kewangan daripada pihak bank bagi tujuan jual beli hartanah tersebut. Dalam Letter of Offer to Purchase tersebut tidak menyatakan apa-apa syarat berkenaan cara pembayaran Harga Jualan yang akan dibuat oleh Defendan kepada Plaintif, maka, Syarat Tambahan tersebut hanya terpakai sekiranya terdapat permohonan untuk pembiayaan kewangan daripada pihak bank yang dibuat oleh Defendan. Dalam apa jua keadaan, sekiranya Defendan tidak dapat mendapatkan pembiayaan kewangan daripada bank, transaksi jual beli hartanah tersebut masih boleh diteruskan dan disempurnakan melalui cara pembayaran yang lain iaitu bayaran wang daripada Defendan sendiri tanpa sebarang pinjaman wang yang disediakan oleh mana-mana bank. Oeh demikian, peguam cara Defendan berhujah bahawa kegagalan Defendan untuk mendapatkan pembiayaan kewangan daripada bank tidak memberi apa-apa efek kepada transaksi jual beli hartanah tersebut. Maka, tidak adil untuk Plaintif menamatkan Letter of Offer to Purchase tersebut secara unilateral dan enggan untuk meneruskan transaksi jual beli hartanah tersebut berdasarkan kepada suatu terma yang tidak memberi efek secara dasarnya kepada transaksi jual beli hartanah tersebut. • Plaintif telah menamatkan Letter of Offer to Purchase tersebut secara mala fide untuk memasuki suatu perjanjian yang baharu dengan pihak ketiga. Dalam hal ini, Plaintif telah dalam masa yang singkat menandatangani sepucuk perjanjian jual beli yang baharu dengan pihak ketiga pada 19-1-2024. • Berdasarkan kepada alasan-alasan di atas, ia merupakan kes Defendan bahawa memandangkan Defendan tidak pernah memungkiri apa-apa terma Letter of Offer to Purchase tersebut maka penamatan Letter of Offer to Purchase oleh Plaintif adalah tidak sah sekaligus masih kekal sah dan terpakai. Undang-Undang [43] Kedua-dua peguam terpelajar telah merujuk, menggunapakai peruntukan undang-undang di bawah Kanun Tanah Negara dan Akta Kontrak 1950 serta nas undang-undang kes untuk menegakkan pendirian mereka menurut perspektif undang-undang. [44] Kanun Tanah Negara 2020 (Act 828) memperuntukkan mengenai “removal of private caveats by Registrar” di bawah seksyen 326 dan seksyen 327 dan seksyen 329 Kanun Tanah Negara 1965 (Akta 56/1965) dan Kanun Tanah Negara 2020 (Akta 828) “removal of private caveats by Court” iaitu – Section 326. Removal of private caveats by Registrar

Any person or body whose land or interest is bound by a private caveat may at any time apply in Form 19h to the Registrar for its removal, and such application shall be accompanied by the prescribed fee.

On receiving any application for removal under this section, the Registrar shall —

serve upon the person or body at whose instance the caveat was entered a notice of intended removal in Form 19c; and

make an endorsement on the register document of title that the notice in Form 19c has been served on the person or body at whose instance the caveat was entered and of the date of such service, and shall sign and seal the endorsement. (1AA) Notwithstanding section 431, the service of notice in Form 19C may be effected by facsimile transmission to the person or body at whose instance the caveat was entered and it shall be deemed to have been duly served where there is a return acknowledgment by electronic or other means to the effect that the notice has been received by such person or body.

In the case in which a notice of intended removal in Form 19c has been served under subsection (1a), the caveat shall lapse and be of no effect at the expiry of two months specified in the notice unless before the expiry of that period the Registrar shall have been served with an order of the Court extending the time provided in the said notice.

The Court may, on the application of any person or body on whom such a notice has been served under subsection (1a) (and acting, if the circumstances so require, ex parte), from time to time extend the said period of two months; and the Registrar, on being duly served with an order of the Court under this subsection, shall make an endorsement on the register document of title of the date of service on him of the order and of the period of the extension, and shall sign and seal the endorsement.

The Registrar shall remove any caveat pursuant to this section by cancelling the entry thereof on the register document of title, and noting thereon the reason for the cancellation and the date thereof.

Every cancellation under subsection (3) shall be signed and sealed. [45] Manakala peruntukan seksyen 327 dan seksyen 329 Kanun Tanah Negara 1965 (Akta 56/1965) dan Kanun Tanah Negara 2020 (Akta 828) adalah – NATIONAL LAND CODE Act 56 Of 1965 PART NINETEEN - RESTRAINTS ON DEALING

A private caveat is lodged with the following purposes:

to preserve status quo pending the outcome of court’s proceeding in cases where title or interest in land is disputed.

to safeguard a claim to registrable title or interest is pending registration – e.g., a purchaser under a sale and purchase agreement pending registration.

to give actual notice of the caveator’s claim.

A private caveat has the effect of prohibiting the said land from any transfer, charge or lease by the proprietor until such notice shall have been served on the caveator. (Macon Engineers Sdn Bhd v Goh Hooi Yin [1976] 2 MLJ 53)

In the case of Registrar of Titles, Johore v Temenggong Securities Ltd [1976] 2 MLJ 44, Lord Diplock explained that the purpose of a private caveat is “to preserve the status quo pending the taking of timeous steps by the applicant to enforce his claim to an interest in the land by proceedings in the courts.”

In explaining the nature and the purpose of caveat, the Federal Court in Samuel Naik Siang Ting v Public Bank Bhd [2015] 6 MLJ had taken a reference in CPR v District Registrar of Dauphin Land Titles Office (1956) 4 DLR (2d) where Tritscher J had thrown light on the standing of caveat lodged onto a land/property as follows: It is trite law that caveats are to be used for the protection of alleged as well as proved interests and that a caveat is merely a warning which creates no new rights but protects existing rights, if any. xxx 6. Who is an “aggrieved person”?

RAP Nathan v Haji Abdul Rahman bin Haji Yusoff & Ors [1980] 1 MLJ 248, – a person is aggrieved when he can show that he would suffer loss or damage if the caveat is not removed.

Tengku Mohamed Zairuddeen Tengku Md. Zaid v Waizurayah Mohamad & Another Case [1988] 1 CLJ (Rep) 287 – to be an aggrieved person within the meaning of section 327 (1) of the NLC, the applicant must first show that there are sufficient grounds in fact and law in order to make him aggrieved by the existence of the caveat.

Soon Seng Company Sdn. Bhd. v Toko Palayakat Jamal (M) Sdn. Bhd. [1999] 6 CLJ 397 – an aggrieved person is one whose legal right or interest in property is adversely affected by the wrongful act or conduct of another person or body.

In an application of removal of caveat, the onus is on the caveator to satisfy the Court that he has a caveatable interest on the land. In Eng Mee Yong & Ors v V Letchumanan [1979] 2 MLJ 212 (PC), it was held that: This is the nature of the onus that lies upon the caveator in an application by the caveatee undersection 327 for removal of a caveat; he must first satisfy the court that on the evidence presented to it his claim to an interest in the property does raise a serious question to be tried; and having done so he must go on to show that on the balance of convenience it would be better to maintain the status quo until the trial of the action, by preventing the caveatee from disposing of his land to some third party.

As elucidated in the celebrated Court of Appeal case on the removal of caveat in Luggage Distributors (M) Sdn Bhd v Tan Hor Teng [1995] 1 MLJ 719, the court, in confronting with an application for the removal of caveat will have to satisfy itself to three primary stages of questions: The first stage is the examination of the grounds expressed in the application for the caveat. If it appears that the grounds stated therein are insufficient in law to support a caveat, then cadit question, and the caveat must be removed without the necessity of going any further. The second stage is once the caveator satisfies the court that his claim as expressed in the application in Form 19B amounts in law to a caveatable interest. He must go on to show, in appropriate cases, that, based on the affidavits filed, his claim discloses a serious question meriting a trial. The third stage is arrived at only after the first two hurdles have been crossed by the caveator. Here the question to be asked relates to the balance of justice, or what Lord Diplock termed in Eng Mee Yong as ‘the balance of convenience’. As to the matters that go to determine in which direction the balance should tilt, these have already been set out in such clear terms by Lord Diplock in Eng Mee Yong that mere repetition becomes unnecessary.

In summary, the court must satisfy itself the following questions which form the guiding principles in considering whether or not to maintain the status quo of a caveat lodged on a land/property:

Whether the caveator has a caveatable interest over the disputed land/property;

Whether the contended caveatable interest so referred discloses any serious question to be tried;

Whether the balance of convenience is in favour of maintaining the caveat; and

Whether there are any special circumstances on the part of the caveatee that would warrant the status quo to be disturbed.

If the Court finds that the caveator does not profess caveatable interest to justify its lodging of the caveat, the caveat must be removed without the necessity to delve further onto the following stages/questions. Under the National Land Code, whether or not a person or body has any caveatable interest must be determined with reference to section 323(1)(a), (b) or

(c). (Score Options Sdn Bhd v Mexaland Development Sdn Bhd [2012] 6 MLJ 475; [2012] 7 CLJ 802).

In Mosbert Berhad (In liquidation) v Stella D’Cruz [1985] 2 MLJ 446, a caveat cannot be lodged or registered for the entire land when the claim is only related to part of the land.

Caveatable interest must only be confined to interests capable of being registered or those of equitable interests. The issue on what amounts to a caveatable interest has been discussed in length in plethora of cases, among others are:

“It would seem abundantly clear from the authorities that so long as there is in existence a valid agreement for the sale of land, the purchaser is entitled to lodge a caveat to protect his rights under the contract and to sue for specific performance of the agreement” [Macon Engineers Sdn Bhd v Goh Hooi Yin [1976] 2 MLJ 53 (FC)]. xxx

“[39] It is also our considered view that the caveator under section 323(1)(a) of the NLC must have a present interest as opposed to a potential interest in the land. The registrable interest that the caveator is claiming for, must be an existing interest. The caveator under section 323(1)(a) of the NLC must be limited to those who are claiming to an existing interest in the land or right to such existing interest and cannot include potential interest or interest in futuro.” ‘…In my opinion, for all purposes material to the present case the words 'beneficial interest' refer to equitable interests and the section cannot be stretched to include mere potentialities which have not ripened into interests in any particular properties.’ [Score Options Sdn Bhd v Mexaland Development Sdn Bhd [2012] 6 MLJ 475 (FC)].

“It is trite law that a claim for a mere debt cannot give rise to a caveatable interest.” [Kundang Lakes Country Club Bhd v Garden Masters (M) Sdn Bhd [1999] 2 MLJ 537 (CA)].

“The law is clear that a claim based on a monetary loss can never give rise to a caveat able interest and hence the plaintiffs caveat was patently wrong and no extension could be availed of in respect of a wrongful caveat.” [Urethane Systems Sdn. Bhd. v Quek Yak Kang [2006] 6 CLJ 81].

“In our view the nature of Chatib’s and Farland’s interest is of paramount importance in deciding these appeals. Are they merely contractual as submitted by Mr. Suppiah, or are they equitable, as having arisen from the respective sale and purchase agreements which they signed with Dawe and Lim? In our judgment there can be no doubt that their interests in the land despite the smallness in terms of area were not merely contractual but also equitable in nature and therefore caveatable under section 323(1) of the National Land Code. The law which had been consistently followed by the court in this country is that a purchaser of land who has paid the purchase price, until registered as the legal owner, acquires an equitable interest in it. It may well be that the proposed subdivided lots which they purchased did not have the legal status of being separate pieces of land until legally subdivided; nevertheless, that fact does not prevent these purchasers from acquiring equitable interests to the extent of the area they had purchased.” [Mosbert Berhad (In Liquidation) v Chatib Bin Kari [1985] 1 MLJ 162].

In Devi Meyyammai a/p M Ramanathan & Anor v Hartini bt Mohamad & Anor [2013] 3 MLJ 813, the SPA executed by the appellant and respondent was eventually rescinded by the respondent. Following the rescinding of the SPA, the appellant lodged a private caveat onto the property. The High Court judge found that based on the existence of the restriction in interest and the absence of evidence that the consent from the state authority had been applied for, the appellants had no caveatable interest in the property. In allowing the appeal, the Court of Appeal held among others: [10] In the present appeal we find that nowhere in the learned judge's grounds of judgment did Her Ladyship refer to Form 19B. In the appellants' application in Form 19B it is stated that they have the right to lodge the caveat by virtue of the SPA (p 145 of the appeal record). The fact that there was a concluded contract between the appellants and the first respondent is not in issue. It is also not disputed that the appellants have performed their contractual obligations by tendering monies to Affin which amounted to part performance of the SPA… [11] Thus notwithstanding the existence of the restriction in interest, after considering the evidence before us and on the authorities cited above, we find that as at the date of entry of the caveat the appellants had obtained an interest of a contractual nature in the property. In other words, they acquired a caveatable interest in the property. We are of the considered view that the appellants have shown that they have a prima facie contractual right of action against the first respondent which is sufficient to support the caveat.

In Institut Teknologi Federal Sdn Bhd v IIUM Education Sdn Bhd & Another Appeal [2008] 1 CLJ 745 (CA) –

“It is settled that caveatable interest must be a definite right relating to land and capable of enforcement and a caveator must be in a position to institute a suit for specific performance of claim.”. Analisa dan Dapatan Mahkamah [48] Dalam afidavit sokongan Plaintif, suatu perjanjian jual beli bertarikh 19-1-2024 di antara Plaintif dan Teo Siao Wei diekshibitkan dan ditanda sebagai MM-8. Ini bererti hartanah telah tersebut telah dijual oleh penjual (Plaintif) kepada pembeli (Teo Siao Wei) dan kini hartanah tersebut menjadi milik sah pembeli (Teo Siao Wei). [49] Letter of Offer to Purchase yang diekshibitkan oleh Plaintif dan ditanda sebagai MM-3 ialah suatu surat tawaran untuk membeli bertarikh 24-11-2023 yang dikeluarkan oleh ejen hartanah (Knight World). Tempoh dari 24-11-2023 hingga Perjanjian Jual Beli bertarikh 19-1-2024 yang dimeterai dengan pembeli (Teo Siao Wei) ialah lebih kurang 2 bulan. Tempoh 2 bulan tersebut menjadi tempoh sama ada Plaintif ingin menjual hartanah tersebut kepada Defendan atau kepada pembeli (Teo Siao Wei)? Dalam hal ini, pada saat Perjanjian Jual Beli bertarikh 19-1- 2024 yang dimeterai dengan pembeli (Teo Siao Wei) maka pembeli baharu itulah yang menjadi pemilik hartanah. Adakah peribahasa “siapa cepat dia dapat” boleh dikiaskan di sini? [50] Transaksi jual beli dalam tempoh 2 bulan di antara Plaintif dan Defendan, Mahkamah ini mendapati − • draf perjanjian jual beli dalam penyemakan kedua-dua peguam yang mengendalikan perjanjian jual beli. • kedua-dua pihak dan/atau peguam-peguam dan/atau ejen hartanah bertukar-tukar pesanan WhatsApp. • pembelian hartanah oleh Defendan melalui pembiayaan pinjaman daripada bank. • earnest deposit dibayar oleh Defendan. • baki deposit dibayar oleh Defendan. • baki keseluruhan harga jualan belum dilunaskan oleh Defendan sama ada melalui pembiayaan pinjaman daripada bank atau bayar tunai. • tiada perjanjian jual beli ditandatangani di antara penjual (Plaintif) dan “bakal pembeli” (Defendan). • Defendan memasukkan dan mendaftarkan kaveat persendirian demi melindungi haknya. • pada 22-12-2023, Plaintif melalui peguam caranya (T/N Adnan Rahim & Co.) menamatkan Letter of Offer to Purchase dan mengembalikan baki deposit. • pada 19-1-2024, Plaintif menjual hartanah kepada pembeli baharu (Teo Siao Wei). [51] Kaveat persendirian yang dimasukkan oleh Defendan sememangnya bertujuan (a) to preserve status quo pending the outcome of court’s proceeding in cases where title or interest in land is disputed;

to safeguard a claim to registrable title or interest is pending registration – e.g., a purchaser under a sale and purchase agreement pending registration; dan (c) to give actual notice of the caveator’s claim. Defendan hendak memberi kesan kepada Plaintif dengan melarang Plaintif daripada menjual hartanah tersebut kepada pembeli baharu. [52] Apabila Plaintif memohon kepada Mahkamah untuk memotong dan membatalkan kaveat persendirian itu, Plaintif mesti menunjukkan bahawa terdapat alasan yang mencukupi dari segi fakta dan undang-undang yang menyebabkan Plaintif terkilan dengan kewujudan kaveat persendirian tersebut. Dalam kes Soon Seng Company Sdn. Bhd. v Toko Palayakat Jamal (M) Sdn. Bhd. (supra), seseorang yang terkilan ialah “an aggrieved person is one whose legal right or interest in property is adversely affected by the wrongful act or conduct of another person or body”. Mahkamah mendapati bahawa tuan punya berdaftar hartanah itu ialah Plaintif dan hartanah itu belum bertukar milik kepada Defendan. Fakta bahawa niat Plaintif untuk menjual hartanah tersebut kepada Defendan hanya berkesan setakat penyediaan dokumen perjanjian susulan daripada Letter of Offer to Purchase dan pembayaran deposit sahaja. Tiada apa-apa perjanjian muktamad dan harga jualan yang dilunaskan sepenuhnya oleh Defendan. Mahkamah mendapati Defendan ialah sekadar pembeli potensial semata-mata. [53] Dalam menggunapakai kes Luggage Distributors (M) Sdn Bhd v Tan Hor Teng (supra), Mahkamah ini perlu memuaskan hatinya dengan bertanyakan soalan yang berikut: The first stage is the examination of the grounds expressed in the application for the caveat. If it appears that the grounds stated therein are insufficient in law to support a caveat, then cadit question, and the caveat must be removed without the necessity of going any further. The second stage is once the caveator satisfies the court that his claim as expressed in the application in Form 19B amounts in law to a caveatable interest. He must go on to show, in appropriate cases, that, based on the affidavits filed, his claim discloses a serious question meriting a trial. The third stage is arrived at only after the first two hurdles have been crossed by the caveator. Here the question to be asked relates to the balance of justice, or what Lord Diplock termed in Eng Mee Yong as ‘the balance of convenience’. [54] Selepas meneliti afidavit dan dokumen yang dilampirkan, fakta bahawa Plaintif telah menjual hartanahnya kepada pembeli baharu adalah jelas menunjukkan bahawa pembeli baharu itu ialah “a bona fide purchaser for value”. Berbanding dengan Defendan yang berstatus “potential purchaser”, atas dasar “balance of justice” dan “balance of convenience”, kaveat persendirian itu perlu “disingkirkan” dan untuk melayani permohonan Defendan bagi “specific performance” adalah sesuatu yang tidak adil. Tiada apa-apa bukti kukuh dapat dipegang oleh Mahkamah ini untuk memihak kepada Defendan. [55] Dalam kes di hadapan Mahkamah ini adalah jelas di sisi fakta bahawa tiada perjanjian jual beli muktamad bagi hartanah itu telah dimasuki oleh Plaintif dan Defendan. Letter of Offer to Purchase setakat suatu Surat dan rujukan kepada Surat itu seharusnya disebut perenggan dan bukannya klausa. Dalam masa yang sama, kandungan Letter of Offer to Purchase tersebut mengenai masa adalah penting dan menjadi sebahagian daripada syarat yang perlu dipatuhi oleh Defendan (time be the essence of a contract). Kegagalan mematuhinya membolehkan penamatan dibuat oleh Plaintif. Dalam kes Kuala Lumpur Landmark Sdn Bhd v. Standard Chartered Bank [1994] 2 MLJ 559, Anuar J memutuskan seperti berikut sama ada “time be of the essence of a contract”: “The general principles as to time being of the essence of a contract have been summarised in the judgment of Mohamed Azmi J (as he then was) in Sharikat Eastern Plastics Industry v. Sharikat Lam Seng Trading [at p 21]: On the first issue, the general principles as to time being [of] the essence of the contract have been dealt with by Gill J (as he then was) in the case of Tan Ah Kian v Haji Hassan [1962] MLJ 400, a decision approved and affirmed by the Federal Court ([1963] MLJ 175). The three situations in which His Lordship had considered time to be [of] the essence of the contract are:

where the parties have expressly stipulated in the contract that it shall be so;

(ii) where it was not originally stated to be but has been made so by one party by giving reasonable notice to the other, who has failed to perform the contract with sufficient promptitude, and

(iii) where from the nature of the contract or of its subject matter time must be taken to be of the essence of the agreement.”. [56] Keputusan Mahkamah ini untuk tidak mengekalkan status quo hartanah itu sebagai mempunyai kaveat persendirian demi kepentingan Defendan adalah keputusan yang wajar dan adil kerana penamatan kontrak tersebut adalah sah dan Defendan tidak lagi mempunyai sebarang kepentingan untuk dilindungi bagi kaveat persendirian tersebut dikekalkan atau menuntut “specific performance” (OS No. 696) terhadap Plaintif bagi penyempurnaan jual beli premis tersebut. [57] Bagi permohonan Plaintif (OS 616) untuk memohon ganti rugi am untuk ditaksirkan oleh Mahkamah untuk kerosakan dan kerugian yang dialaminya akibat daripada kewujudan kaveat persendirian adalah ditolak kerana tiada bukti bahawa Plaintif telah mengalami kerugian malahan Plaintif telah memasuki perjanjian yang baharu bagi hartanah tersebut. Kesimpulan [58] Berdasarkan alasan yang dinyatakan Mahkamah ini memutuskan untuk membenarkan OS No. 616 dan menolak OS No. 696. Bertarikh: 27 Disember 2024. RoziBainon ( ROZI BINTI BAINON ) Pesuruhjaya Kehakiman Mahkamah Tinggi Shah Alam Sivil NCvC12 Peguam cara: Bagi pihak Plaintif: Rafidah binti Abdul Rahman Tetuan Khairul Hanafi & Associates, Senawang, Negeri Sembilan [Nota: (i) Notis Pertukaran Peguam (Kand. 32) Tetuan Adnan Rahim & Co., Shah Alam dilantik sebagai peguam Plaintif menggantikan Tetuan Khairul Hanafi & Associates. (ii) Notis Pertukaran Peguam (Kand. 33) Tetuan Hazura Yusoff & Partners, Shah Alam dilantik sebagai peguam Plaintif menggantikan Tetuan Adnan Rahim & Co.] Bagi pihak Defendan: Muna Farhana binti Zainuddin Tetuan Yeoh Mazlina & Partners, Kuala Lumpur

Any person or body aggrieved by the existence of a private caveat may at any time apply to the Court for an order for its removal, and the Court (acting, if the circumstances so require, ex parte) may make Act 828 Section 327. Removal of private caveats by the Court

Any person or body aggrieved by the existence of a private caveat may at any time apply to the Court for an order for its removal, and the Court (acting, if the circumstances so require, ex parte) may make NATIONAL LAND CODE such order on the application as it may think just.

The Registrar shall, on being duly served with any order under this section for the removal of a caveat, cancel the entry thereof on the register document of title, and note thereon the reason for the cancellation and the date thereof.

Every cancellation under sub-section (2) shall be signed and sealed. such order on the application as it may think just.

The Registrar shall, on being duly served with any order under this section for the removal of a caveat, cancel the entry thereof on the register document of title, and note thereon the reason for the cancellation and the date thereof.

Every cancellation under subsection (2) shall be signed and sealed. Section 329. Compensation for wrongful caveats, and limitation on repeated applications.

Any person or body who, wrongfully or without reasonable cause, secures the entry of, or fails to withdraw, any private caveat shall be liable to Section 329. Compensation for wrongful caveats, and limitation on repeated applications

Any person or body who, wrongfully or without reasonable cause, secures the entry of, or fails to withdraw, any private caveat shall be liable to pay NATIONAL LAND CODE pay compensation to any person or body who thereby suffers any damage or loss.

Where the Court has ordered the removal of any private caveat under section 327, or has refused an application under sub-section

of section 326 for an extension of time with respect to any such caveat, or where the Registrar has removed any caveat pursuant to sub-section

of section 326, the Registrar shall not entertain any application for the entry of a further caveat in respect of the land or interest in question it is based on the like claim as that on which the former one was based. compensation to any person or body who thereby suffers any damage or loss.

Where the Court has ordered the removal of any private caveat under section 327, or has refused an application under subsection 326(2) for an extension of time with respect to any such caveat, or where the Registrar has removed any caveat pursuant to subsection 326(3), the Registrar shall not entertain any application for the entry of a further caveat in respect of the land or interest in question it is based on the like claim as that on which the former one was based. [46] Borang/Form 19C ialah − [47] Mahkamah ini merujuk kepada the Bench Book (Civil Procedure) Third Edition dan memetik panduan yang boleh digunapakai untuk memastikan keputusan Mahkamah ini yang memihak kepada Plaintif adalah tidak tersalah arah. Antara petikan yang dirujuk adalah − REMOVAL OF CAVEAT