Mohd Najid Bin Hasan (KA-45A-23-05/2023)

Tertuduh dalam kes ini telah dituduh bagi dua pertuduhan iaitu pertamanya di bawah seksyen 39B (1)(a) Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 (Akta 234) iaitu kesalahan mengedar dadah jenis methamphetamine seberat 55.05 gram dan keduanya di bawah seksyen 12(2)/39A(1) Akta 234 bagi kesalahan memiliki dadah jenis methamphetamine seberat 22.83 gram.

Kedua-dua kesalahan dikatakan telah dilakukan pada 22/11/2022 jam lebih kurang 5.30 petang di sebuah rumah tidak bernombor, Jalan Kodiang, Kampung Lembah Palas, Changloon, Kedah (rumah tersebut). Fakta kes pihak Pendakwa Raya

Di peringkat kes pendakwaan, melalui 5 orang saksi yang dikemukakan, naratif kes pihak Pendakwa Raya (PR) adalah mudah dan secara langsung. SP3 yang merupakan pegawai serbuan telah memberikan keterangan bahawa pada hari kejadian, SP3 telah menerima maklumat mengenai pengedaran dadah oleh seorang lelaki berbangsa Melayu di rumah tersebut. SP3 dan anggota serbuan kemudiannya bergerak ke rumah tersebut dan setelah sampai, SP3 telah membuat pemerhatian dari dalam kereta selama lebih kurang 10 minit dalam jarak 10 kaki dari rumah tersebut.

Hasil pemerhatian, SP3 mendapati tiada pergerakan keluar masuk dari mana-mana individu di rumah tersebut dan tiada sesiapa di sekeliling kawasan rumah tersebut. SP3 dan pasukan telah bergerak menghampiri rumah tersebut dan apabila sampai di hadapan rumah tersebut, SP3 dapati pintu rumah tersebut adalah dalam keadaan tertutup namun tidak berkunci. SP3 terus masuk ke dalam rumah tersebut dan nampak tertuduh sedang duduk di atas lantai.

SP3 telah memperkenalkan diri sebagai pegawai polis dan dalam masa yang sama, SP3 juga nampak 2 peket plastik lutsinar (P21(1) dan P21(2)) berada di sebelah tertuduh. Jarak 2 beg plastik tersebut adalah sangat dekat iaitu lebih kurang 1 kaki dari tertuduh. SP3 juga menyatakan P21(1) dan P21(2) berada dalam keadaan terdedah tanpa diselindungi apa-apa objek.

SP3 telah menahan tertuduh dan membuat pemeriksaan fizikal terhadapnya. Hasil pemeriksaan fizikal tersebut, SP3 telah menjumpai satu peket plastik berisi bahan disyaki syabu (P24) dari dalam poket hadapan sebelah kanan seluar jeans (P25) yang sedang dipakai oleh tertuduh. Menurut SP2, tertuduh berada dalam keadaan takut dan berpeluh semasa pemeriksaan dijalankan.

Barang-barang kes telah dirampas dan SP3 telah menyerahkannya kepada pegawai penyiasat iaitu SP4 yang kemudiannya telah menyerahkannya kepada Ahli Kimia iaitu SP2. Hasil analisis yang dijalankan, SP2 telah mengesahkan bahawa ia mengandungi dadah jenis methamphetamine seberat

55.05 gram dan keduanya dadah jenis methamphetamine seberat 22.83 gram. Analisis dan dapatan mahkamah di akhir kes pendakwaan

Kedudukan tertuduh dan barang kes yang begitu hampir dan dapat dilihat dari tandaan yang dibuat oleh SP3 di gambar tempat kejadian iaitu P7(3) yang ditandakan X dan Y menjadi teras penghujahan Puan TPR dengan merujuk kepada keputusan Mahkamah Rayuan dalam kes Tan Yew Choy v. PP [2009] 4 CLJ 245 yang telah memutuskan: “As for physical possession, the learned trial judge accepted the evidence of PW7 that the proscribed drug was only a foot away from the appellant. On this point in the case of Public Prosecutor v. Foo Jua Eng [1965] CLJU 137; [1965] 1 LNS 137 where the accused was found by the police who raided the premises to be seated in close proximity to the offending exhibit, it was held that such close proximity was sufficient to find a case to answer.”

Puan TPR turut menghujahkan bahawa semasa pemeriksaan dijalankan, hanya tertuduh sahaja yang berada dalam rumah tersebut dan tiada orang lain. Ruang rumah tersebut juga kecil dan oleh itu adalah mustahil untuk tertuduh tidak nampak barang kes yang berada di atas lantai. Tambahan pula, SP1 telah mengesahkan rumah tersebut sememangnya disewa oleh tertuduh.

Adalah menjadi teras hujahan pihak PR hanya tertuduh mempunyai kawalan ke atas rumah tersebut. Oleh yang demikian, tertuduh dihujahkan sebagai mempunyai kawalan dan jagaan terhadap kesemua barang kes yang dirampas oleh SP3 semasa kejadian.

Di samping itu, tertuduh turut dihujahkan mempunyai milikan fizikal terhadap P24 yang dijumpai dari dalam poket seluar yang sedang dipakai olehnya. Pada hujahan Puan TPR, adalah mustahil seseorang tidak mengetahui barang yang terkandung di dalam poket seluar yang sedang dipakai olehnya.

Perhatian mahkamah dirujuk kepada kes Adib Nafis bin Hassane Nafis v. Public Prosecutor [2020] CLJU 1240 di mana Mahkamah Rayuan merumuskan seperti berikut: “[76] First, the evidence is that the Appellant had the sling bag on him when he was confronted by several police officers. There was no one else with the Appellant when he was arrested. He had close proximity with the drug as he was slinging the bag by himself. Based on these facts, the learned HCJ found that the Appellant had possession, custody and control of the bag. [77] …Since the Appellant was slinging the bag alone and there was no one else with him at that point of time, he too had the power to exclude other persons from the enjoyment of the contents of the bag. That would constitute possession of the drug by the Appellant. It is also in evidence that the Appellant admitted he had carried the bag. ………….. [79] Similarly in the present appeal, by having the bag slung on him, the Appellant too had knowledge of the contents of the bag i.e the drug.”

Selain itu, barang kes tersebut juga dijumpai dalam keadaan terdedah, tidak disembunyikan atau dibungkus dalam bekas atau plastik yang mengelirukan. Kesemua dadah berada di dalam peket plastik lutsinar. Ini dihujahkan sebagai tertuduh mempunyai pengetahuan terhadap barang kes. Puan TPR merujuk kepada kes PP v. Lim Chsung Meng & Anor [2015] CLJU 1226 yang menyatakan seperti berikut: “[30] In our view, based on the above evidence, it is clear that there was "affirmative link" between both respondents and the impugned drugs other than the evidence of their presence and proximity to the said drugs. The single most important link or connection between both respondents and the impugned drugs was the simple fact they were sitting on the sofa in the living room at a distance of 6 feet away from the place where the "Julie" biscuit tin which contained the impugned drugs was found. This evidence constituted strong "presence" and "proximity". Both respondents were not merely present in a house with the impugned drugs cached away somewhere but the impugned drugs were right under their noses. The "Julie" biscuit tin was in their plain view.”

Akhir sekali, Puan TPR menghujahkan bahawa keadaan tertuduh yang kelihatan takut dan berpeluh ketika pemeriksaan membolehkan inferens pengetahuan tertuduh dan perhatian mahkamah dirujuk kepada keputusan Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam kes Parlan Dadeh v. PP [2009] 1 CLJ 717 yang memutuskan: “Proof of knowledge is very often a matter of inference. The material from which the inference of knowledge can be drawn varies from case to case. It would be sufficient for the prosecution to prove facts from which it could properly be inferred that the accused had the necessary knowledge.”

Keseluruhan keterangan-keterangan setakat ini nampak jelas seolah satu kes prima facie dapat dibuktikan. Namun mahkamah turut menimbang hujahan yang dibawa oleh peguam berkaitan peri pentingnya mahkamah ini berhati-hati menilai keterangan yang dikemukakan oleh pihak PR memandangkan serbuan yang dijalankan oleh SP3 adalah berdasarkan maklumat yang diterima. Ini kerana kemungkinan tertuduh dianiaya adalah tidak boleh ditolak sementah-mentahnya.

Peguam telah merujuk kepada kes Abdullah Zawawi bin Yusoff v. PP [1993] 4 CLJ 1; [1993] 3 MLJ 1, di mana Mahkamah Agung telah memutuskan seperti berikut: “Another distinct possibility-not considered by the judge-was that the informer, upon whose tip-off the raid on the appellant's house had been conducted, might have planted the drugs in the box. This does not seem to us a fanciful possibility, bearing in mind that the house was still under construction and un fenced at the material time, and both the appellant and his wife were. engaged in trade which took them out of doors; he as a carpenter engaged in building a house at Kampong Lembaga for one to' Haji Omar and she as a coffee stall holder at Gua Musang from 6 in the morning until 12.00 noon and again from 2.30 in the afternoon until 10 at night.”

Naratif yang diletakkan oleh tertuduh kepada saksi-saksi PR adalah tertuduh telah menerima panggilan telefon daripada seorang kawannya yang bernama “Mat Indon” yang hendak berjumpa dengannya di rumah tersebut. Selepas menerima panggilan telefon tersebut, tertuduh telah berada di luar rumah untuk menyapu sampah. Semasa itulah pihak polis datang ke rumah tersebut dan menyerbu ke arahnya.

Tertuduh dikatakan cuba melarikan diri melintasi rumah-rumah yang lain dan masuk ke dalam bendang sebelum ditangkap oleh pihak polis. Tertuduh telah dibawa ke dalam rumah tersebut dan kononnya dipukul. Pihak polis kemudiannya telah dikatakan membuat pemeriksaan di dalam rumah tersebut dan selanjutnya menemui dadah-dadah yang menjadi sabjek kepada pertuduhan ke atasnya.

Terdapat beberapa isu yang dibangkitkan oleh peguam tertuduh berkaitan maklumat yang kononnya diterima oleh SP3 yang membawanya kepada serbuan ke atas rumah tersebut. Perhatian mahkamah dibawa kepada beberapa perkara isi dalam keterangan SP3 seperti berikut: a) SP3 mengakui tidak mengenali tertuduh sebelum serbuan; b) rumah tersebut adalah sebuah rumah yang tidak bernombor; c) SP3 telah menyerbu masuk ke dalam rumah tersebut dan terus menangkap tertuduh sedangkan tidak pernah mengenali tertuduh sebelum ini; d) bagaimana SP3 pasti itulah rumah yang dinyatakan oleh sumbernya; dan e) bagaimana SP3 boleh mengetahui tertuduh berada dalam rumah tersebut pada ketika itu.

Keterangan SP3 semasa di peringkat pemeriksaan utama pada awalnya kelihatan konsisten dan utuh. Namun setelah diasak dengan soalan semasa pemeriksaan balas oleh peguam bagaimana SP3 boleh mengetahui kedudukan rumah tersebut serta identiti tertuduh, keterangan SP3 telah mula berubah terutamanya semasa pemeriksaan semula. SP3 telah cuba memberi justifikasi dengan menyatakan bahawa SP3 telah dipandu arah atau ditunjuk jalan oleh sumber kedudukan rumah tersebut.

Perubahan keterangan ini adalah sangat material dan memberi kesan ketara ke atas kes pendakwaan kerana ia melibatkan peranan serta fungsi sumber tersebut.

Di sisi undang-undang, seksyen 40 Akta 234 memberi perlindungan ke atas pihak PR untuk tidak mendedahkan identiti sumber sekiranya sumber hanya bertindak sebagai pemberi maklumat. Namun jika sumber telah melampaui peranannya, maka perlindungan di bawah seksyen 40 Akta 234 tersebut tidak lagi relevan dan sumber perlu dipanggil memberi keterangan. Kegagalan memanggil sumber boleh menyebabkan pihak PR terperangkap bawah seksyen 114 Akta Keterangan 1950 (Akta 56) di misalan (g) yang membolehkan mahkamah membuat satu inferens yang tidak memihak kepada pihak PR.

Dalam kes Ti Chuee Hiang v PP [1995] 3 CLJ 1, perayu mengatakan bahawa sumber bukan hanya merupakan sumber semata-mata tetapi adalah seorang ejen provocateur. Dalam keadaan sedemikian, kegagalan pihak pendakwaan untuk memanggilnya, telah menyebabkan salah laksana keadilan yang serius. Di hadapan Mahkamah Persekutuan, isu utama yang timbul ialah sama ada dalam hal keadaan tersebut, sumber telah menjadi saksi penting dan oleh itu menjadi kewajipan pihak pendakwaan untuk memanggil dan memeriksanya atau menawarkannya kepada pembelaan.

Mahkamah Persekutuan memutuskan; “In the present case, the informer, having regard to his role, was not a mere informer, but had assumed the mantle of an agent provocateur, for it was he, who had put the appellant in touch with the undercover agent Lian. Indeed, he was the active instrument without whose intervention, the appellant might never have been even arrested. His identity was no longer a secret and thus he had lost the protection from disclosure of identity normally accorded to informers under s. 40 of the Act. In these circumstances, he came within the category of witnesses, described by Lord Roche in Seneviratne, as "witnesses essential to the unfolding of the narratives on which the prosecution case is based." The same might be said of the informer's friend.”

Manakala dalam kes Wan Yurillhami Wan Yaacob & anor v PP [2010] 1 CLJ 17, SP5 telah menerima maklumat daripada seorang sumber bahawa seorang lelaki telah meminta sumber mencari seorang pembeli bagi dadah dan satu perjumpaan diaturkan di antara pembeli dan lelaki tersebut. SP7 telah ditetapkan sebagai pembeli dan perangkap telah dipasang di mana tarikh dan tempat bagi penjualan dadah telah disetujui oleh perayu pertama. Pada tarikh tersebut, SP5 dan pasukannya terus ke lokasi tersebut. SP7 dan sumber turut berada di sana. Kedua-dua perayu tiba dan memasuki kereta SP7 sementara sumber keluar dari kereta SP7. Kedua-dua perayu kemudian diserang hendap dan ditangkap. Pembelaan perayu pertama ialah bahawa ia merupakan suatu perangkap yang dilakukan oleh sumber yang beliau kenali sebagai Seman.

Salah satu isu di hadapan Mahkamah Persekutuan adalah sama ada kegagalan memanggil sumber adalah fatal kepada kes pendakwaan. Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam penghakimannya menyatakan; “[14] The law that governs the issue of agent provocateur and informer is provided for under ss. 40 and 40A of the Act. Section 40 provides as follows:

(1) Except as hereinafter provided, no complaint as to an offence under this Act shall be admitted in evidence in any civil, or criminal proceeding whatsoever, and no witness shall be obliged or permitted to disclose the name or address of any informer, or state any matter which might lead to his discovery.

If any books, documents or papers which are in evidence or liable to inspection in any civil or criminal proceeding whatsoever contain any entry in which any informer is named or described or which might lead to his discovery, the Court before which the proceeding is had shall cause all such passages to be concealed from view or to be obliterated so far as is necessary to protect the informer from discovery, but no further.

If on trial for any offence under this Act the Court, after full inquiry into the case, is of opinion that the informer willfully made in his complaint a material statement which he knew or believed to be false or did not believe to be true, or if in any other proceeding the Court is of opinion that justice cannot be fully done between the parties thereto without the discovery of the informer, the Court may require the production of the original complaint, if in writing, and permit inquiry and require full disclosure concerning the informer. Section 40A provides as follows:

(1) Notwithstanding any rule of law or the provisions of this Act or any other written law to the contrary, no agent provocateur shall be presumed to be unworthy of credit by reason only of his having attempted to abet or abetted the commission of an offence by any person under this Act if the attempt to abet or abetment was for the sole purpose of securing evidence against such person.

Notwithstanding any rule of law of the provisions of this Act or any other written law to the contrary, and that the agent provocateur is a police officer whatever his rank or any officer of customs, any statement, whether oral or in writing made to an agent provocateur by any person who subsequently is charged with an offence under this Act shall be admissible as evidence at his trial. [15] The interpretation and the application of the above provisions of the Act have been discussed in a number of earlier decided cases. (See the cases of Munusamy Vengadasalam v. PP [1987] 1 CLJ 250; [1987] CLJ (Rep) 221; Namasiyiam Doraisamy v. PP & Other Cases [1987] 1 CLJ 540; [1987] CLJ (Rep) 241, PP v. Mansor Md Rashid & Anor. [1997] 1 CLJ 233; Ti Chuee Hiang v. PP [1995] 3 CLJ 1; Ghazalee Kassim & Ors. v. PP [2009] 4 CLJ 737). [16] From the decision of the above cited cases, the position in law in relation to ss. 40 and 40A of the Act is well settled and clear. The informer is protected from giving evidence whilst an agent provocateur is not protected. In other words, if a person is only an informer, the prosecution is not required to call him as a witness or offering him to the defence. An informer is protected under s. 40 of the Act. On the other hand, if a person is an agent provocateur, he is required to give evidence in court as a prosecution witness and if he is not called he has to be offered and made available to the defence. Failure to comply with this requirement will attract the application of adverse inference under s. 114(g) of the Evidence Act against the prosecution's case.”

Prinsip berkaitan peranan sumber pernah dibincangkan oleh Mahkamah Rayuan dalam kes Heng Poh Kean v. PP & other appeals [2019] 9 CLJ 69 yang telah merujuk kepada kedua-dua kes di atas dan Mahkamah Rayuan menyatakan seperti berikut: "Role of The Informer [10] The law relating to an informer is settled. Under s. 40 of the DDA, the identity of an informer is protected from disclosure in any legal proceedings, which necessarily includes protection from being identified and called to testify in a criminal trial. [11] However, it was submitted before us by learned counsel for the second appellant and adopted by counsels for the first and third appellants, that the informer in this case had assumed the role or mantle of an agent provocateur. Therefore, it was argued that the identity of the informer lost its protection under the law. The informer in fact has metamorphosed into an essential witness for the prosecution and the failure on the part of the prosecution to call the informer to testify had seriously compromised its case, warranting the adverse inference under s. 114 illustration (g) of the Evidence Act 1950, against the prosecution to be invoked. [12] In support of his submission, learned counsel relied on the judgment of the Federal Court in Wan Yurillhami Wan Yaacob & Anor v. PP [2010] 1 CLJ 17; where it was held that: [16] From the decision of the above cited cases, the position in law in relation to ss. 40 and 40A of the Act is well settled and clear. The informer is protected from giving evidence whilst an agent provocateur is not protected. In other words, if a person is only an informer, the prosecution is not required to call him as a witness or offering him to the defence. An informer is protected under s. 40 of the Act. On the other hand, if a person is an agent provocateur, he is required to give evidence in court as a prosecution witness and if he is not called he has to be offered and made available to the defence. Failure to comply with this requirement will attract the application of adverse inference under s. 114(g) of the Evidence Act against the prosecution's case. [13] The guiding principle regarding the issue can further be found in the Federal Court case of Ti Chuee Hiang v. Public Prosecutor [1995] 3 CLJ 1; in which it was laid down as follows: Having said that, it is in our view clear law, that while the prosecution has a complete discretion as to the choice of witnesses to be called at the trial (see eg, Adel Muhammed el Dabbah v. AG (Palestine) [1994] AC 156 at 167-9) the most basic limitation upon prosecutorial discretion in the presentation of a case, is that it also has a duty to call all of the necessary witnesses to establish proof against the accused beyond all reasonable doubt, and if, in the exercise of its discretion, it fails to fulfil this obligation which is nothing less than a statutory duty - the accused must be acquitted. In the present case, the informer, having regard to his role, was not a mere informer, but had assumed the mantle of an agent provocateur, for it was he, who had put the appellant in touch with the undercover agent Lian. Indeed, he was the active instrument without whose intervention, the appellant might never have been even arrested. His identity was no longer a secret and thus he had lost the protection from disclosure of identity normally accorded to informers under s. 40 of the Act. In these circumstances, he came within the category of witnesses, described by Lord Roche in Seneviratne, as "witnesses essential to the unfolding of the narratives on which the prosecution case is based." The same might be said of the informer's friend. Yet, neither the so called informer nor his friend, whose testimony would have been essential to the unfolding of the narrative on which the prosecution case was based, was called by the prosecution or even made available to the defence to be called as defence witnesses nor any explanation vouchsafed to the trial Judge for these glaring omissions. We hasten to add, that in a case such as the present, where it was never suggested by the prosecution that either of these individuals was not capable of belief, it would not have sufficed for the prosecution to have merely made them available to the defence to be called as defence witnesses as such a course would have put the defence to the disadvantage of not having been able to cross-examine them on any point on which they might support the prosecution case. In our view, having regard to the circumstances of the present case, it was the obligation of the prosecution to call and examine these individuals as their witnesses or, at least, to have offered them for cross-examination by the defence or in default to have explained why they were unable or unwilling to call them as the case may be. We say so because without their testimony there was a gap in the narrative of the prosecution case. Moreover, there was no suggestion that their testimony would have been obviously hostile to the prosecution or otherwise unreliable, in which case, "the prosecutor will ensure that the accused is given the opportunity to call the witness". (Per the High Court of Australia in Richardson, ibid). [14] The pertinent question thus is whether the informer in this case had in fact assumed the mantle of an agent provocateur and hence became "witnesses essential to the unfolding of the narratives on which the prosecution case is based"?"

Berdasarkan kepada perbincangan dalam kes-kes yang dinyatakan di atas, mahkamah perlu menilai dengan tuntas keterangan oleh SP3 bagi menentukan takat peranan sumber. Ia bagi menentukan sama ada sumber tidak langsung terlibat semasa serbuan dilaksanakan atau sebaliknya. Jika sebaliknya, maka perlindungan di bawah seksyen 40 Akta 234, tidak lagi menjadi relevan ke atas sumber.

Bagi maksud tersebut, mahkamah telah menjalankan penilaian maksimum ke atas keterangan SP3 secara khususnya ketika SP3 memberi keterangan secara lisan. Mahkamah mendapati dan berpandangan bahawa wibawa keterangan SP3 adalah sangat mencurigakan. Selain dari SP3 bertukar keterangan semasa pemeriksaan utama dan pemeriksaan balas serta pemeriksaan semula, mahkamah turut berpandangan bahawa adalah tidak mungkin SP3 dapat mengenalpasti rumah tersebut dan identiti tertuduh tanpa ianya diaturkan oleh seseorang.

Tiada penjelasan yang wajar telah diberikan oleh SP3 di mana-mana peringkat keterangannya yang dapat memberi justifikasi bagaimana SP3 dapat mengenalpasti tertuduh apatah lagi untuk mengenalpasti rumah di mana tertuduh berada pada ketika serbuan. Dalam masa yang sama, kecurigaan juga timbul bagaimana SP3 dapat memastikan tertuduh berada di dalam rumah tersebut sebelum dan semasa serbuan dijalankan.

Keseluruhan keterangan SP3 ini, menimbulkan kecurigaan yang jelas mahkamah ini ke atas wibawa keterangan SP3. Ia menjejaskan kebolehpercayaan mahkamah ini ke atas kesahihan keterangan yang diberikan oleh SP3.

Sebaliknya, mahkamah berpandangan naratif yang dikemukakan oleh tertuduh bahawa telah menerima panggilan telefon daripada seorang kawannya yang bernama “Mat Indon” yang hendak berjumpa dengannya di rumah tersebut adalah suatu yang tidak boleh diketepikan, Apatah lagi SP3 telah mengakui bahawa semasa serbuan, terdapat sebuah telefon bimbit yang turut ditemui. Namun malangnya SP3 dan pasukan polis tidak merampas telefon bimbit ini.

Apabila SP3 gagal merampas telefon bimbit tersebut, ia bukan sahaja satu tindakan yang menimbulkan persoalan besar ke atas wibawa serbuan yang dijalankan oleh SP3 serta pasukan, namun telah menidakkan peluang kepada Pegawai Penyiasat iaitu SP4 untuk menyiasat naratif tertuduh. Secara amnya siasatan ke atas telefon bimbit bukanlah suatu yang material dalam kes-kes biasa, namun dalam kes ini, mahkamah berpandangan bahawa kegagalan merampas telefon bimbit serta penyiasatan ke atasnya menimbulkan inferens yang bertentangan ke atas pihak PR sepertimana yang diperuntukkan dalam misalan (g) seksyen 114 Akta 56.

Mahkamah berpandukan kepada kes PP v. Mansor Md. Rashid & Anor. [1997] 1 CLJ 233, di mana Mahkamah Persekutuan merumuskan: “The drawing of adverse inferences pursuant to s. 114(g) of the EA is not a matter of an inflexible rule but depends on the circumstances of each particular case. The question to consider is whether the existence of a fact or state of things makes the existence of another fact or state of things so likely that it may be presumed to exist. The answer must naturally vary according to the circumstances, the nature of the fact required to be proved and its importance in the controversy, the usual and commonly recognized mode of proving it, and the nature, quality and cogency of the evidence which has not been produced and its accessibility to the party concerned. In the instant case, no adverse inferences should be drawn against the prosecution for the non-production of both Cholar and Amran, at least at that stage of the trial. They were not material to the point in issue as the basis of the prosecution's case to substantiate the charge was on the "sale of cannabis resulting from negotiations.”

Apatah lagi tiada keterangan-keterangan forensik yang dikemukakan oleh pihak PR yang dapat mengaitkan dadah yang ditemui terutamanya di dalam bilik tersebut mempunyai kaitan dengan tertuduh. Tiada sebarang kesan cap jari mahupun DNA tertuduh yang ditemui ke atas barang-barang kes yang ditemui dalam rumah tersebut.

Kesan ke atas wibawa keterangan SP3 secara keseluruhannya membolehkan mahkamah ini merumuskan bahawa kebolehpercayaan mahkamah ke atas keterangan SP3 adalah terjejas. Ia sekaligus menjadikan keterangan SP3 adalah secara langsungnya tidak boleh disandarkan sama sekali.

Kesannya ke atas dapatan terhadap wibawa SP3 ini menjadikan naratif yang dikemukakan oleh pihak PR ke atas tertuduh adalah runtuh sama sekali. Mahkamah tiada pilihan selain menyatakan bahawa keterangan SP3 secara keseluruhannya berkaitan serbuan serta penemuan P21 (1) dan (2) serta P24 adalah tidak boleh dipercayai. Tiada apa-apa keterangan lain yang dapat disandarkan bagi mengaitkan P21 (1) dan (2) serta P24 tersebut dengan tertuduh.

Sehubungan dengan itu, mahkamah memutuskan bahawa adalah tidak selamat bagi mahkamah ini untuk memerintahkan tertuduh membela diri. Tertuduh dengan ini dilepas dan dibebaskan. Bertarikh: 9hb. Disember, 2025 (DATUK MOHAMAD ABAZAFREE BIN MOHD ABBAS) Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi Malaya Alor Setar, Kedah. Pihak-Pihak: Bagi Pihak Pendakwa Raya : Aisyah Al Humayrah binti Kamaruzzaman Timbalan Pendakwa Raya Pejabat Penasihat Undang-Undang Negeri Kedah Darul Aman Aras 4, Blok C, Wisma Darul Aman 05250 Alor Setar Kedah Darul Aman Bagi Pihak Tertuduh : Ahmad Taufiq bin Baharum Tetuan Abdul Halim Said & Co Peguambela & Peguamcara No. 14, Tingkat Satu Kompleks Kulim Jalan Bayu Satu 09000 Kulim Kedah Darul Aman Tarikh Keputusan : 29hb. September, 2025 Undang-Undang Yang Dirujuk:  Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952  Akta Keterangan 1950 Kes-Kes Yang Dirujuk:  Tan Yew Choy v. PP [2009] 4 CLJ 245  Adib Nafis bin Hassane Nafis v. Public Prosecutor [2020] CLJU 1240  PP v. Lim Chsung Meng & Anor [2015] CLJU 1226  Parlan Dadeh v. PP [2009] 1 CLJ 717  Abdullah Zawawi bin Yusoff v. PP [1993] 4 CLJ 1; [1993] 3 MLJ 1  Ti Chuee Hiang v PP [1995] 3 CLJ 1  Wan Yurillhami Wan Yaacob & anor v PP [2010] 1 CLJ 17  Heng Poh Kean v. PP & other appeals [2019] 9 CLJ 69  PP v. Mansor Md. Rashid & Anor. [1997] 1 CLJ 233