Mohd Zaidi Bin Abd Malek v Pendakwa Raya (JB-42JSKS-1-06/2025)

Rayuan ini adalah terhadap keputusan Mahkamah Sesyen Jenayah di Muar yang telah mensabitkan Perayu atas tiga (3) pertuduhan di bawah Seksyen 376(1) Kanun Keseksaan. Perayu kemudiannya telah dijatuhkan dengan hukuman pemenjaraan selama sepuluh (10) tahun bermula dari tarikh sabitan iaitu 18 Jun 2025 dan dua (2) kali sebatan bagi setiap pertuduhan. Hukuman-hukuman pemenjaraan berjalan serentak bagi kesemua pertuduhan.

Perayu telah memfailkan rayuan terhadap sabitan-sabitan dan hukuman-hukuman tersebut. Alasan Perayu terhadap rayuan ini, inter alia, bahawa sabitan yang dibuat adalah tidak selamat, serta terdapat kekhilafan dari segi fakta dan undang-undang dalam penilaian keterangan dan aplikasi prinsip undang-undang oleh Mahkamah Sesyen.

Perayu didakwa telah merogol pengadu, SP3, yang merupakan anak angkatnya, pada bulan Januari 2017, Julai 2017 dan Disember 2017, ketika pengadu berumur 15 tahun.

Laporan polis hanya dibuat oleh pengadu pada 11 Ogos 2021, iaitu kira-kira empat (4) tahun selepas kejadian yang didakwa.

Pihak Pendakwaan memanggil sepuluh (10) orang saksi, termasuk pengadu (SP3), ibu kandung pengadu (SP2), Doktor Pakar Obstetrik dan Ginekologi (SP4), pegawai sains dari Jabatan Kimia (SP8) dan pegawai penyiasat (SP10). Pihak Pembelaan pula memanggil Perayu sendiri serta dua orang saksi pembelaan.

Mahkamah Sesyen kemudiannya mendapati bahawa pihak Pendakwaan telah berjaya membuktikan kes melampaui keraguan munasabah dan mensabitkan Perayu atas ketiga-tiga pertuduhan.

Prinsip undang-undang berkaitan skop rayuan dalam kes jenayah adalah mantap. Mahkamah yang mendengar rayuan bukan bertanyakan sama ada hakim bicara telah melakukan kesilapan, tetapi sama ada sabitan yang dibuat adalah selamat.

Prinsip ini ditegaskan oleh Mahkamah Rayuan dalam Mohd Johi bin Said & Anor v Public Prosecutor [2005] 1 CLJ 389, di mana Mahkamah menyatakan bahawa pendekatan yang betul dalam rayuan jenayah ialah menilai keselamatan sabitan ("safety of conviction") sebagaimana yang berikut :- "Unlike civil appeals, where the appellant carries the burden of showing that the judge at first instance went wrong, in a criminal case the duty of the court is to consider whether the conviction is right. The correct approach is therefore not whether the decision is wrong but whether the conviction is safe. See, Mohammad Husain v. Emperor AIR [1945] Nag 441; Zahari bin Yeop Baai v. PP [1977] CLJU 162; [1977] 1 LNS 162; [1980] 1 MLJ 160.

Pada asasnya, Mahkamah yang mendengar rayuan lazimnya memberikan penghormatan kepada dapatan fakta hakim bicara yang mempunyai kelebihan melihat dan mendengar saksi sewaktu perbicaraan. Namun begitu, Mahkamah yang mendengar rayuan wajib campur tangan sekiranya dapatan tersebut dibuat tanpa penilaian maksimum, melibatkan salah arah undang-undang, atau bercanggah dengan berat keterangan. Prinsip ini dihuraikan dengan jelas dalam Periasamy a/l Sinnappan v Pendakwa Raya [1996] 3 CLJ 187 sebagaimana yang berikut :- In allowing the application and quashing the conviction, the Federal Court whose judgment was delivered by Hashim Yeop Sani FJ (later CJ Malaya) said: We gave leave because firstly we felt that there was no proper appraisal of Sheo Swarup v. King-Emperor AIR 1934 PC 227 and secondly purporting to follow Terrell, Ag. CJ in Rex v. Low Toh Cheng [1941] MLJ 1, the appellate Judge went into conflict with the trend of authorities in similar jurisdictions. With respect, what Lord Russel of Killowen said in Sheo Swarup was that although no limitations should be placed on the power of the appellate Court, in exercising the power conferred 'the High Court should and will always give proper weight and consideration to such matters as:

the views of the trial Judge on the credibility of the witnesses;

the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused;

the right of the accused to the benefit of any doubt; and

the slownesss of an appellate Court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a Judge who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses. Lord Reid reiterated this same principle in Benmax v. Austin Motor Co. Ltd. [1955] AC 370, 375 where he quoted from Lord Thankerton's judgment in Thomas v. Thomas [1947] 1 All ER 582, that: Where a question of fact has been tried by a Judge without a jury, and there is no question of misdirection of himself by the Judge, an appellate Court which is disposed to come to a different conclusion on the printed evidence, should not do so unless it is satisfied that any advantage enjoyed by the trial Judge by reason of having seen and heard the witnesses, could not be sufficient to explain or justify the trial Judge's conclusion. The learned appellate Judge held that the learned President had 'misdirected himself on the explanation of the accused.' Given the facts as stated in the appeal record, can it be said that there was a misdirection? Or can it be said that the decision of the learned President was 'plainly unsound'? (Thomas v. Thomas (supra)). On the facts of this case we do not think so. In Wilayat Khan v. The State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 1953 SC 122,123,125, Chandrasekhara Aiyar J, when delivering the judgment of Supreme Court said: Even in appeals against acquittals, the powers of the High Court are as wide as in appeals from conviction. But there are two points to be borne in mind in this connection. One is that in an appeal from an acquittal, the presumption of innocence of the accused continues right up to the end; the second is that great weight should be attached to the view taken by the Sessions Judge before whom the trial was held and who had the opportunity of seeing and hearing the witnesses. Interference with an order of acquittal made by a Judge who had the advantage of hearing the witnesses and observing their demeanour can only for compelling reasons and not on a nice balancing of probabilities and improbabilities, and certainly not because a different view could be taken of the evidence of the facts. ISU-ISU UNTUK DIPUTUSKAN [10] Berdasarkan hujahan kedua-dua pihak dan rekod-rekod rayuan, Mahkamah ini berpendapat isu-isu berikut perlu diputuskan: a) Sama ada Mahkamah Sesyen betul di sisi undang-undang ketika memutuskan bahawa pihak Pendakwaan telah membuktikan kes prima facie terhadap Perayu. b) Sama ada keterangan pengadu (SP3) adalah credible, reliable dan boleh dipercayai. c) Kesan kelewatan hampir empat (4) tahun dalam membuat laporan polis. d) Nilai probatif keterangan perubatan dan forensik, termasuk bukti DNA. e) Sama ada pembelaan Perayu hanyalah penafian kosong (bare denial). f) Sama ada sabitan keseluruhannya adalah selamat. ISU 1: KEPUTUSAN PRIMA FACIE [11] Undang-undang berkenaan penentuan prima facie adalah jelas. Mahkamah mesti menjalankan penilaian maksimum terhadap keseluruhan keterangan Pendakwaan, sebagaimana digariskan oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam Pendakwa Raya v Mohd Radzi Abu Bakar [2006] 1 CLJ 457. [12] Ujian yang perlu diaplikasikan ialah sama ada Mahkamah bersedia mensabitkan tertuduh sekiranya tertuduh memilih untuk berdiam diri. [13] Setelah meneliti alasan penghakiman Mahkamah Sesyen, Mahkamah ini mendapatkan bahawa penilaian maksimum terhadap keterangan, khususnya berkaitan elemen penetration bagi setiap kejadian, serta keterangan material yang menyokong tarikh kejadian 2017, tidak dihuraikan secara terperinci. [14] Kebergantungan utama Mahkamah Sesyen adalah terhadap keterangan lisan pengadu, dengan sokongan bukti perubatan dan forensik yang dikemukakan beberapa tahun selepas kejadian. Ini menimbulkan persoalan sama ada rantaian bukti ("chain of evidence") adalah lengkap dan kukuh. ISU 2: KREDIBILITI PENGADU (SP3) [15] Adalah prinsip undang-undang yang diterima bahawa dalam kes kesalahan seksual, Mahkamah boleh mensabitkan tertuduh semata-mata atas keterangan mangsa, sekiranya Mahkamah mendapati keterangan tersebut luar biasa meyakinkan (unusually convincing). Prinsip ini ditegaskan dalam Public Prosecutor v Mardai [1950] 1 MLJ 33 dan diperhalusi oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam Dato' Seri Anwar Ibrahim v Public Prosecutor [2015] 2 CLJ 145. Perkara ini dapat dilihat sebagaimana yang berikut :- [76] Similarly, our Evidence Act does not require any corroboration in sexual offences and a conviction for such offences may rest entirely on the credibility of the complainant. The need for corroboration remains a rule of good practice and prudence as stated by Thomson LP in Din v. PP [1964] CLJU 33; [1964] 1 LNS 33; [1964] MLJ 300, who opined: But the desirability for corroboration of the evidence of the prosecutrix in a rape case (which in any event has not yet crystallized into something approaching a rule of law and which is still a rule of practice and of prudence) springs not from the nature of the witness but from the nature of the offence. Never has it been suggested that the evidence of a woman as such invariably calls for corroboration. If a woman says her handbag has been snatched and if she is believed there can be no question of a conviction on such evidence being open to attack for want of corroboration. If, however, she complains of having been raped then both prudence and practice demand that her evidence should be corroborated. [77] Similarly, in PP v. Mardai [1949] CLJU 65; [1949] 1 LNS 65; [1950] 16 MLJ 33, Spenser Wilkinson J had occasion to say: Whilst there is no rule of law in this country that in sexual offences the evidence of the complainant must be corroborated; nevertheless it appears to me, as a matter of common sense, to be unsafe to convict in cases of this kind unless either the evidence of the complainant is unusually convincing or there is some corroboration of the complainant's story. It would be sufficient, in my view, if that corroboration consisted only of a subsequent complaint by the complainant herself provided that the statement implicated the accused and was made at the first reasonable opportunity after the commission of the offence. (emphasis added) [78] The "unusually convincing" test was explained in PP v. Mohammed Liton Mohammed Syeed Mallik [2008] 1 SLR 601 in the following words: ... testimony that, when weighed against the overall backdrop of the available facts and circumstances, contains that ring of truth which leaves the court satisfied that no reasonable doubt exists in favour of the accused. [79] The Indian Supreme Court in State of Kerala v. Kurissum Moottil Antony [2007] AIR SCW 1507 took a similar stand that corroboration is not a pre-condition to secure a conviction in sexual offences. What is required is that a judge must be conscious, as a matter of prudence, that in some instances it is necessary to have corroboration. It opined: Corroboration is not the sine qua non for conviction in a rape case... The rule, which according to the cases has hardened into one of law, is not that corroboration is essential before there can be a conviction but that the necessity of corroboration, as a matter of prudence, except where the circumstances make it safe to dispense with it, must be present to the mind of the judge... [80] That case also decided that the same principle applies to a case under s. 377 of the Indian Penal Code the equipollent of our s. 377A of the Penal Code. [81] A judge is entitled in law to convict even without corroboration if convinced of the truth of a complainant's evidence (Chiu Nang Hong v. PP [1964] CLJU 24; [1964] 1 LNS 24; [1965] 1 MLJ 40 PC). If the evidence of a complainant in a sexual offence inspires confidence then it should be relied upon without the need of corroboration. It has been said that a refusal by the courts to convict based on the testimony of a victim of a sexual offence alone in the absence of corroboration, amounts to "adding insult to injury" (Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai v. State of Gujarat [1983] SC 753). [82] Corroboration is independent evidence which implicates the accused by connecting or tending to connect him with the crime (The King v. Baskerville [1916] 2 KB 658). This may be in the form of independent witnesses or medical evidence (Syed Abu Tahir Mohamed Esmail v. PP [1988] CLJU 126; [1988] 1 LNS 126; [1988] 3 MLJ 485) or other scientific evidence such as DNA profiling. [16] Walau bagaimanapun, dalam kes ini, Mahkamah ini mendapati terdapat beberapa perkara yang perlu dinilai dengan penuh berhati hati, antaranya: a) kelewatan laporan polis selama hampir empat (4) tahun; b) percanggahan antara laporan polis asal yang menyebut juga perbuatan liwat dengan dapatan siasatan yang tidak menyokong dakwaan tersebut; c) pengakuan pengadu bahawa beliau telah menjalinkan hubungan seksual dengan dua individu lain sebelum laporan polis dibuat. [17] Percanggahan atau kelemahan sebegini tidak secara automatik menolak keseluruhan keterangan seseorang saksi. Namun, seperti yang diputuskan dalam Khoon Chye Hin v Public Prosecutor [1961] CLJU 41, Mahkamah mestilah menilai keterangan sedemikian dengan lebih berhati-hati dan waspada sebagaimana yang berikut :- "If a witness demonstrably tells lies on one or two points then it is clear that he is not a reliable witness and as a matter of prudence the rest of his evidence must be scrutinised with great care and indeed with suspicion. To say, however, that because a witness has been proved a liar on one or two points then the whole of his evidence "must in law be rejected" is to go too far and is wrong." ISU 3: KELEWATAN DALAM MEMBUAT LAPORAN POLIS [18] Undang-undang memperuntukkan bahawa kelewatan membuat laporan polis tidak semestinya fatal kepada kes Pendakwaan. Namun, kelewatan tersebut mesti disokong dengan penjelasan yang munasabah dan meyakinkan. [19] Dalam kes Pendakwa Raya v Chewang Lama Tamang [2024] MLJU 449, Mahkamah Tinggi menegaskan bahawa kelewatan yang lama, tanpa justifikasi yang kukuh, boleh menjejaskan kredibiliti keterangan pengadu dan menimbulkan inferens pemikiran terkemudian (afterthought). Di dalam Ratanlal & Dhirajla's Law of Crimes 27th Ed. Vol. 2 (muka surat 2353 dan 2354) telah menyatakan bahawa :- "It is stated that mere delay in lodging the F.I.R. cannot be used as a ritualistic formula for doubting and discarding the prosecution's case. Delay however should put the court on its guard to examine whether an explanation has been offered for the delay, and if offered, whether it is satisfactory. The delay could be taken as a factor in determining credibility, if the explanation offered for the delay was unsatisfactory." [20] Dalam kes di hadapan Mahkamah ini, Mahkamah Sesyen menerima penjelasan pengadu bahawa beliau takut dan bergantung kepada Perayu. Walau bagaimanapun, Mahkamah ini mendapati bahawa faktor-faktor lain seperti akses pengadu kepada ibu kandung, guru, rakan, pasangan serta kebebasan bergerak tidak dianalisis secara mencukupi oleh Mahkamah Sesyen bagi menentukan sama ada kelewatan tersebut benar-benar munasabah atau menimbulkan inferens bahawa dakwaan tersebut merupakan suatu pemikiran terkemudian (afterthought). ISU 4: BUKTI PERUBATAN DAN FORENSIK [21] Kehadiran sperma atau kesan DNA bukanlah elemen wajib kepada kesalahan rogol. Elemen terpenting adalah kemasukan (penetration) zakar ke dalam kemaluan mangsa. [22] Dalam kes ini, bukti perubatan dan forensik diperolehi beberapa tahun selepas kejadian. Pegawai Sains mengakui bahawa usia kesan air mani tidak dapat ditentukan. Pengadu pula mengakui hubungan seksual dengan individu lain. [23] Mahkamah ini berpendapat bahawa bukti tersebut, tanpa sokongan yang dapat mengaitkannya secara khusus kepada kejadian tahun 2017, mempunyai nilai probatif yang terhad dan perlu dinilai dengan berhati-hati. ISU 5: PEMBELAN PERAYU [24] Mahkamah Sesyen dalam alasan penghakimannya telah memutuskan bahawa pembelaan Perayu hanyalah suatu penafian semata-mata ("bare denial") dan oleh itu gagal menimbulkan keraguan munasabah terhadap kes Pendakwaan. [25] Dengan hormat, Mahkamah ini berpendapat dapatan tersebut tidak dapat dipertahankan berdasarkan keseluruhan keterangan yang terdapat di hadapan Mahkamah. [26] Prinsip undang-undang yang mantap adalah bahawa sesuatu pembelaan tidak boleh dianggap sebagai "bare denial" semata-mata kerana tertuduh menafikan pertuduhan terhadapnya. Mahkamah wajib menilai sama ada pembelaan tersebut mengandungi penjelasan yang munasabah, tidak mustahil secara inheren ("not inherently incredible"), serta sama ada pembelaan tersebut berjaya menimbulkan keraguan munasabah terhadap kes Pendakwaan. [27] Dalam kes ini, Perayu bukan sekadar menafikan pertuduhan secara kosong. Sebaliknya, pembelaan Perayu telah membangkitkan beberapa isu material yang secara langsung menyentuh kekuatan dan kebolehpercayaan kes Pendakwaan, antaranya: a) kelewatan hampir empat (4) tahun dalam membuat laporan polis; b) percanggahan antara laporan awal pengadu dengan dapatan siasatan berkaitan dakwaan liwat; c) pengakuan pengadu bahawa beliau pernah menjalinkan hubungan seksual dengan individu lain; d) ketidakupayaan bukti DNA dan perubatan untuk mengaitkan dapatan secara khusus kepada kejadian tahun 2017; dan e) kemungkinan alternatif terhadap dapatan koyakan lama yang ditemui oleh SP4. [28] Kesemua isu tersebut bukanlah isu sampingan, sebaliknya merupakan isu material yang memberi kesan secara langsung terhadap keselamatan sabitan. [29] Mahkamah ini juga mendapati bahawa alasan penghakiman Mahkamah Sesyen tidak menunjukkan penilaian yang mendalam terhadap isu-isu pembelaan tersebut. Sebaliknya, pembelaan Perayu telah diketepikan secara umum atas alasan bahawa ia hanyalah suatu penafian semata-mata. [30] Pendekatan sedemikian, pada pandangan Mahkamah ini, adalah bertentangan dengan prinsip yang dihuraikan oleh Mahkamah Rayuan bahawa sesuatu pembelaan tidak boleh ditolak sebagai "bare denial" sekiranya tertuduh telah memberikan penjelasan yang munasabah dan tidak mustahil secara inheren. [31] Mahkamah Rayuan sebagaimana dalam kes Seyedalireza Seyedhedayatollah Ehteshamiardestani v. PP [2014] 4 CLJ 406 telah menegaskan: [16] In our view, the defence of the appellant is not a simple denial. The appellant gave an explanation on how he ended up with P27 and in our judgment his explanation is not inherently incredible. The learned trial judge has therefore erred in describing the defence as a bare denial and has erred in dismissing the defence on the ground that the appellant could pick up any name from the passenger manifest to allege that he was asked to check in the bag for that other passenger. It was never put to the defence that such was the case. [32] Prinsip yang sama terpakai dalam rayuan ini. Persoalan sebenar bukan sama ada Mahkamah menerima keseluruhan pembelaan Perayu sebagai benar, tetapi sama ada pembelaan tersebut telah berjaya menimbulkan keraguan munasabah terhadap kes Pendakwaan. DAPATAN MAHKAMAH [33] Setelah meneliti keseluruhan keterangan, hujahan pihak-pihak dan prinsip undang-undang yang terpakai, Mahkamah ini berpendapat bahawa terdapat keraguan munasabah yang tidak dapat disingkirkan terhadap kes Pendakwaan. [34] Dalam undang-undang jenayah, walau betapa serius pertuduhan sekalipun, tertuduh berhak kepada faedah keraguan. Prinsip ini telah ditegaskan sejak dahulu lagi dalam Mat v Public Prosecutor [1963] 1 MLJ 263. KEPUTUSAN [35] Oleh itu, Mahkamah ini memerintahkan sebagaimana yang berikut :a) sabitan terhadap Perayu adalah tidak selamat. b) Rayuan Perayu terhadap sabitan dibenarkan. c) Sabitan dan hukuman oleh Mahkamah Sesyen diketepikan. d) Perayu dengan ini diperintah dibebaskan dan dilepaskan daripada kesemua pertuduhan. BERTARIKH PADA 13 MEI 2026 YA DATUK ZAMRI BIN BAKAR PESURUHJAYA KEHAKIMAN MAHKAMAH TINGGI (1) MUAR Peguam bagi Pihak Perayu TETUAN MUNIRAH NAJIHAH & CO. Bagi pihak Responden PENDAKWA RAYA