Perayu juga mengatakan bahawa bila masuk semula ke dalam bilik mandi tersebut, Perayu merasa terkejut kerana terdapat seorang lelaki di dalam bilik mandi tersebut dalam keadaan tidak berpakaian. SP3 juga turut kelihatan terkejut melihat Perayu. Perayu juga tidak menyangka bahawa bilik mandi yang dimasuki oleh Perayu pada S/N tHL/IfcqbEauOeNTf3/qKg mulanya itu telah pula digunakan oleh SP3. Lantas Perayu dikatakan menjadi panik dan terus tersentuh pergelangan tangan dan tertolak perut SP3 yang sedang menghalangnya dari masuk. Keterangan Perayu ini bukan sahaja tidak munasabah malah tidak boleh dipercayai sama sekali. Daripada keterangan SP13, jelas menunjukkan bahawa kejadian ini bukannya berlaku secara spontan ataupun yang tidak direncanakan sepertimana yang dirumuskan oleh Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen. Tuala yang pada asalnya yang disidaikan di atas pintu bilik mandi (sebelum diambil oleh Perayu) adalah suatu tanda atau isyarat bahawa bilik mandi tersebut ada penghuni di dalamnya. Ini dapat dibuktikan apabila Perayu menolak pintu mandi tersebut, SP3 telah berteriak dengan kuat “jangan tolak, ada orang”. Namun, yang menghairankan, Perayu yang dikatakan di dalam keadaan panik masih terus menolak pintu tersebut berulang kali sehingga hampir terlucut tuala yang dipakainya bagi membolehkan badannya yang besar itu masuk ke dalam bilik mandi tersebut. Kenapa Perayu tidak berundur sahaja ke belakang setelah beliau menyedari ada orang di dalam bilik mandi tersebut. Pada hemat kami, Perayu berani melakukan perbuatan ini kerana sebelum insiden ini berlaku Perayu sudah pun meninjau keadan sekeliling dan mendapati bahawa tiada orang lain yang berada di tingkat atas kecuali SP3 sahaja. Jika tidak kerana halangan keras dan jeritan SP3 tersebut sudah pasti bukan sahaja pergelangan tangan dan perut SP3 berjaya disentuhnya malah perbuatan seksual yang lebih buruk lagi boleh berlaku kepada SP3 memandangkan SP3 pada ketika itu berada di dalam keadaan tiada memakai apa-apa pakaian bagi menutupi tubuhnya. S/N tHL/IfcqbEauOeNTf3/qKg [45] Di dalam kes Sakai ak Sanga v. Public Prosecutor [2021] MLJU 507; [2021] 1 LNS Mahkamah memutuskan seperti berikut: “The LSJ was also satisfied that the act of hugging and kissing X on the right cheek was for sexual purposes. She based her findings on the Appellant’s act of following her into the house and subsequently hugging her tightly from behind and kissing her on the right cheek, when there was no one in the house which if taken in totality showed that the Appellants action was for sexual purposes”. [46] Perayu juga membangkitkan pembelaan bahawa di dalam bilik mandi tersebut tidak ada peralatan untuk mencuci. Perayu mengendap di dalam bilik air tersebut kerana beliau sedang mencari sabun untuk mencuci najis yang terkena pada seluarnya. Pembelaan ini jelas merupakan suatu pembohongan. Ini adalah kerana jika benar Perayu ingin mencuci najis yang terkena pada seluarnya, kami tidak nampak keperluan sama sekali untuk Perayu masuk ke bilik air tersebut kerana Perayu masih boleh mencuci najis yang terkena pada seluarnya di mana-mana sinki yang terdapat di luar bilik mandi yang terdapat di dalam asrama tersebut. [47] Pembohongan yang dilakukan oleh Perayu ini telah menguatkan lagi keterangan kes pendakwaan. Mahkamah Tinggi di dalam kes Kurchang Singh v. PP [1989] 2 CLJ 442 memutuskan seperti berikut: “corroboration may come from the other prosecution witnesses or from the accused. Deliberate lies or incriminating conduct in a material particular can constitute corroboration. S/N tHL/IfcqbEauOeNTf3/qKg [48] Kelakuan atau tingkah laku Perayu sebelum dan selepas kejadian adalah merupakan suatu fakta yang relevan selaras dengan kehendak di bawah seksyen 8 Akta Keterangan 1950 yang memperuntukan seperti berikut: “Any fact is relevant which shows or constitutes a motive or preparation for any fact in issue or relevant fact” [49] Ianya juga relevan bagi membuktikan “state of mind” Perayu. Rujukan dibuat kepada seksyen 14 Akta Keterangan 1950 yang memperuntukan seperti berikut: Facts showing existence of state of mind or of body or bodily feeling “4. Facts showing the existence of any state of mind, such as intention, knowledge, good faith, negligence, rashness, ill-will or goodwill towards any particular person, or showing the existence of any state of body or bodily feeling, are relevant when the existence of any such state of mind or body or bodily feeling is in issue or relevant”. [50] Berdasarkan kepada keterangan yang dikemukakan, dapatlah dilihat bahawa sebelum kejadian, Perayu dikatakan asyik bermain game Pokemon Go sahaja. Namun begitu, selepas insiden “pencerobohan” di bilik air No. 4 ini berlaku, Perayu telah bergegas keluar daripada kawasan asrama tersebut dan di dalam usahanya untuk melepaskan dirinya telah berlaku pula pergelutan di antara SP5 dengan Perayu di luar kawasan asrama tersebut. Perayu kemudiannya telah terjun pula ke dalam tasik berdekatan bagi S/N tHL/IfcqbEauOeNTf3/qKg mengelak dirinya daripada tangkapan. Perbezaan tingkahlaku Perayu sebelum dan selepas kejadian nyata sangat berhubungkait dengan jenayah yang telah dilakukannya. [51] Pembelaan Perayu pada keseluruhannya bersifat penafian semata - mata. Undang-undang adalah mantap bahawa penafian bukanlah satu pembelaan yang boleh diterima. Rujukan dibuat kepada kes Mr Losali v. PP [2011] 4 MLJ 694 di mana Mahkamah Rayuan memutuskan seperti berikut: “[54] The learned trial judge rightly held that the defence of the appellant was a bare denial. It is trite law that the defence of bare denial is no defence. What this amounts to is this. That the appellant did not offer any explanation to the two charges and merely denied the evidence advanced by the prosecution. That was indeed a perilous course to undertake. [55] The bare denial cannot in law raise a reasonable doubt and the appellant must be convicted for both the charges. Raja Azlan Shah CJ (Malaya) (as His Majesty then was) in DA Duncan v. Public Prosecutor [1980] 2 MLJ 195, had this to say in regard to the defence of simple denial: The defence was, in effect, a simple denial of the evidence connecting the appellant with the four boxes. We cannot see any plausible ground for saying that the four boxes were not his. In the circumstances of the prosecution evidence, the High Court came, in our view, to the correct conclusion that this denial did not cast a doubt on the prosecution case against the appellant. S/N tHL/IfcqbEauOeNTf3/qKg [ 56] In Public Prosecutor v. Nur Hassan bin Salip Hashim & Anor [1993] 2 CLJ 551, Ian HC Chin JC had this to say at p 556 of the report: The evidence of the second accused was only one of denial; denial of having ever seen the orange plastic bag containing the cannabis, denial of having been together with the first accused, denial of sitting on the same chair together with the first accused and denial of being found immediately next to the orange plastic bag containing the cannabis. All these evidence of the second accused were offered in contradiction to the evidence of the prosecution. The denials have not in any way created any doubt, on a balance of probabilities, in the case of the prosecution. Neither were the presumptions of possession or knowledge rebutted. Nothing was offered by the evidence of the second accused by way of rebutting the presumption of trafficking arising from the fact that the cannabis weighed 311.4g. The second accused had also therefore failed to rebut the presumption of trafficking. [57] This court speaking through Shaik Daud JCA in Andy bin Bagindah v. Public Prosecutor [2000] 3 MLJ 644, (CA), made adverse comments about the efficacy of the defence of mere denial in these erudite terms (see p 647): In the present case, the appellant’s defence was a mere denial and nothing more. In Mohamad Radhi’s case the qualifying factor S/N tHL/IfcqbEauOeNTf3/qKg was that, ‘unless the evidence in a particular case does not obviously so warrant’. The defence was not a mere denial but that he was in possession of the bag in which the offending drug was found but that he was an innocent and a momentary carrier and called several witnesses in support of that defence. The trial judge simply brushed aside all these and held that since the accused had failed to rebut the presumption of possession under s. 37(d) of the Act, the presumption under s. 37(da) of the Act had also not been rebutted. As can be seen in the light of the defence therein, the trial judge failed to carry out a separate exercise to consider whether the defence had also rebutted the presumption of trafficking. In the present case, the appellant had denied possession and the learned judge found that after considering the whole evidence, including that of the appellant, he was satisfied that the prosecution had proved their case beyond a reasonable doubt and the appellant had failed to raise any doubt, we find no reason to disagree with the learned judge. Therefore, the circumstances in the present case did not warrant the learned judge to undertake a separate exercise. [58] Kamalanathan Ratnam J in Public Prosecutor v. Low Soo Song [2004] 3 AMR 320, at p 333 had to reckon with the defence of mere denial and he did not give much mileage to such a defence”. S/N tHL/IfcqbEauOeNTf3/qKg [52] Di dalam kes PP v. Ho Sek Kong [2006] 5 CLJ 49, Abdull Hamid Embong HMT (beliau pada ketika itu) memutuskan seperti berikut: “There was nothing in the defence which merits any consideration as a defence that could raise a reasonable doubt in the prosecution’s case. In his testimony, the accused had not adverted to his confession, save for a total denial. He also did not refer to the telephone conversations he had with his sister, SP3 and to the fact that he had told SP3 that the deceased had vomited a lot of blood. A total appraisal of the accused’s evidence shows nothing more than a bare denial which in law is not a true defence. The duty now on the accused is only to cast a reasonable doubt on the prosecution case; he is not required to prove his innocence (see Mohd Radhi bin Yaakob v. PP [1991] 3 CLJ 2073; [1991] 1 CLJ (Rep) 311). This is now the question that this court needs to address, even when disbelieving the story of the accused (Mat v. PP [1963] 1 LNS 82; [1963] 29 MLJ 263). In the instant case, however, there was no explanation forthcoming to even consider whether it had raised a reasonable doubt on the prosecution’s case.” [53] Berdasarkan kepada dapatan-dapatan di atas, kami sebulat suara berpandangan bahawa tiada asas bagi kami di peringkat rayuan ini untuk menganggu dapatan yang dibuat oleh Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi. Pihak Pendakwaan telah berjaya membuktikan kesnya melampaui keraguan yang munasabah. Sabitan terhadap Perayu adalah selamat dan dikekalkan. S/N tHL/IfcqbEauOeNTf3/qKg Hukuman [54] Di dalam kes Dato’ Seri Anwar bin Ibrahim v. PP [2002] 3 MLJ 193, Mahkamah Persekutuan memutuskan seperti berikut: “It is of the upmost importance to stress here that the appellate court will not normally alter the sentence unless it is satisfied that the sentence passed by the lower court is manifestly inadequate or excessive or illegal or otherwise not a proper sentence having regard to all the facts disclosed or that the court has clearly erred in applying correct principles in the assessment of sentence, see PP v. Loo Choon Fatt [1976] 2 MLJ 256. [55] Di dalam kes PP v. Loo Choon Fatt [1976] 1 LNS 102; [1976] 2 MLJ 256, Mahkamah memutuskan seperti berikut: “The principles to be applied in imposing sentence however are the same in every case. The High Court sitting in exercise of its revisionary powers will not normally alter the sentence unless it is satisfied that the sentence of the lower court is either manifestly inadequate or grossly excessive or to all the facts which the court ought to take judicial notice of, that it is to say, that the lower court clearly has erred in applying the correct principles in the assessment of the sentence. It is a firmly established practice that the court will not alter a sentence merely because it might have passed a different sentence”. S/N tHL/IfcqbEauOeNTf3/qKg [56] Di dalam kes Raja Izzuddin Shah v. PP [1979] 1 MLJ 270; [1978] 1 LNS 165, Hashim Yeop A Sani HMT (beliau pada ketika itu) menyatakan seperti berikut: “No plea in mitigation should be thrown aside lightly but must be examined and considered equally with the facts presented by the prosecution. Both aspects of the case must be considered in their true perspective so as to strike if possible, a true balance in the scale of justice”. [57] Di dalam kes Azwel Mohd Ali v. Pendakwa Raya [2013] 1 MLJ 253; [2012] 6 CLJ 809, Ramly Ali HMR (beliau pada ketika itu) memutuskan: “[17] Mahkamah Tinggi dan juga mahkamah ini telah mengambil kira bahawa di dalam kes ini terdapat isu kepentingan awam (public interest) dan juga isu kepentingan peribadi perayu yang perlu dipertimbangkan sebelum hukuman dikenakan. Walau bagaimanapun Mahkamah Tinggi dan juga mahkamah ini telah memakai prinsip bahawa kepentingan awam mengatasi kepentingan peribadi. [18] Di dalam kes PP v. Loo Choon Fatt [1976] 1 LNS 102, Hashim Yeop Sani J, pernah memutuskan: One of the main considerations in the assessment of sentence is of course the question of public interest. On this point I need only quote a passage from the judgment of Hilbery J in Rex v. Kenneth John Ball as follows: S/N tHL/IfcqbEauOeNTf3/qKg In deciding the appropriate sentence a court should always be guided by certain considerations. The first and foremost is the public interest...” [58] Berpaksikan kepada prinsip-prinsip hukuman yang telah digariskan di atas, adalah wajar bagi kami mengambilkira kepentingan awam dan rayuan mitigasi Perayu sebelum mengenakan hukuman yang sesuai kepada Perayu. [59] Tidak dapat dinafikan bahawa kesalahan yang dilakukan oleh Perayu ini adalah serius. Di dalam kes-kes yang melibatkan kesalahan seksual terhadap kanak-kanak, kepentingan awam seharusnya mengatasi kepentingan individu /Perayu. [60] Namun di dalam konteks rayuan di atas hukuman ini, kami berpandangan bahawa hukuman yang dikenakan oleh Mahkamah Tinggi iaitu pemenjaraan selama enam (6) tahun dan dua (2) sebatan rotan adalah terlalu tinggi. Dapatan kami ini adalah bersandarkan kepada fakta-fakta berikut: