Mohd Zulfadli Bin Nayan (JA-61R-11-05/2021)

Mohd Zulfadli bin Nayan, the accused, was charged at the Sessions Court with an amended charge as follows: Pertuduhan Pindaan Kepada Pertuduhan Pindaan Kepada Pertuduhan Pindaan Pertama “Bahawa kamu, pada 02 Oktober 2020 lebih kurang jam 9.45 malam, bertempat di dalam Restoran Medina Baru, No.17, Jalan Yahya Awal, Bandar Johor Baru, dalam Daerah Johor Baru, dalam Negeri Johor, sebagai seorang penjawat awam kepada Kerajaan Malaysia iaitu Pengarah Zon Maritim yang berpangkat Kepten Maritim Gred T22, Agensi Penguatkuasaan Maritim Malaysia, Zon Maritim Tanjung Sedili, Johor telah menyetuju terima untuk diri kamu sendiri suatu benda berharga iaitu wang tunai berjumlah RM 10,000.00 tanpa balasan daripada Wan Mohd Fauzi bin Wan Kamaruddin melalui Azmi bin Mohd Nor yang mana kamu mengetahui ada hubungan dengan tugas rasmi kamu sebagai Pengarah Zon Maritim, Tanjung Sedili yang bertanggungjawab ke atas siasatan kapal MT Singa Gangsa milik Ocean Armada Resources Sdn Bhd (No Pendaftaran: 201801021441) yang telah ditahan oleh KM Mulia, Agensi Penguatkuasaan Maritim Malaysia, Zon Maritim Tanjung Sedili pada 17 September 2020 dan dengan itu, kamu telah melakukan satu kesalahan yang boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 165 Kanun Keseksaan”.

The accused claimed trial to the charge and was represented by a Counsel. A Deputy Public Prosecutor from the Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission (MACC) conducted the prosecution. At the close of the case for the prosecution, this court found that the prosecution had made out a prima facie case against the accused. Thus, the accused was called upon to enter on his defence.

At the close of the case for the defence, this court found that the prosecution had proved its case against the accused beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, he was found guilty and convicted.

After hearing and considering submissions from both sides, the accused was sentenced to 20 months of imprisonment from the date it was passed. In the absence of any special or exceptional circumstances, the application for a stay of execution on the sentence of imprisonment by the accused was disallowed.

Aggrieved by the conviction and sentence, the accused is now appealing to the High Court.

To prove its case, the prosecution called a total of sixteen witnesses.

The accused was the Director of the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency (MMEA) for the maritime zone of Tanjung Sedili, Kota Tinggi, Johor. He worked in that capacity for the MMEA from 13.3.2018 until 1.11.2020.

MT Singa Gangsa (the ship) was an oil products tanker ship which belonged to Ocean Armada Resources Sdn Bhd. On 15.9.2020, the tanker ship was filled with marine gas oil at the duty-free area of Tanjung Bin, Pontian, Johor. The ship was tasked to bring the oil to Singapore since the buyer was a company based in Singapore. When the ship was about to depart from Tanjung Bin, the captain realised that one of the crew members had an expired passport. Therefore, the ship could not enter Singapore. A decision was made to anchor the ship at Tanjung Pengelih, Kota Tinggi, Johor.

On 17.9.2020, the ship was boarded by officers from the MMEA Tanjung Sedili for inspection. The order to locate and inspect the 5 ship came from the accused. Based on the inspection that was conducted, certain alleged offences were found. The ship was detained on further instruction by the accused. The captain of the ship and the Chief Engineer were brought to shore to be temporarily detained. They were put overnight in a hotel and released the next day on 18.9.2020.

PW11, the ship owner, instructed PW13 to see the accused. As instructed, PW13 together with PW15 met the accused. On 23.9.2020, the accused informed PW15 that he wanted to meet him at 8.30 pm on the same night. PW15 was a forwarding and operations clerk who worked for the ship’s owner. He informed his superior, who was PW13, and asked him to come along to meet the accused. Subsequently, the three of them met at a restaurant called Restoran Yasin in Johor Bahru.

In the meeting, the accused said the ship had committed an offence. He asked for RM20,000.00 from them. PW13 then went out of the restaurant for a short while to call PW11. In the telephone conversation, PW11 said the RM20,000.00 was too much and asked for a lesser amount. PW13 said he would try to negotiate for RM 10,000.00, and PW11 agreed. The accused was then informed of the requested lesser amount, and he agreed with the amount of RM10,000.00.

On 30.9.2020, PW11 came to Johor. After he came to the office, he gave a white envelope containing RM10,000.00 to PW13. He further instructed PW13 to give the money to the accused. PW13 then asked PW15 to contact the accused for a meeting. On 2.10.2020, the accused informed PW13 and PW15 that he agreed to meet them the same night. The meeting place was at the Restoran Medina Baru as stipulated in the charge. The restaurant happened to be not too far away from the Johor Baru Court Complex.

At about 8.20 pm, PW15 arrived at the restaurant and saw that the accused was already there. At about 9.15 pm, PW13 came and joined them. Whilst having their meal there, PW13 proceeded to give the accused the RM10,000.00 in the white envelope. The accused refused to accept it and said “ Jangan bagi macam ini, masuk dalam beg”. PW13 then went out to his car and found a blue-black coloured Adidas shoe bag. He put the white envelope containing the money inside the shoe bag and went back to where the accused and PW15 were sitting. He placed the bag on their table close to the accused. The accused inquired whether the money was inside the bag, and PW13 answered in the affirmative.

After about 10 minutes, PW13 had to leave the restaurant because his family was waiting for him. After paying for their meal, he left 7 the place. The accused and PW15 were still together at their table. After PW13 left, PW15 saw the accused take the shoe bag from the table and open it. The accused instructed PW15 to wait in PW15’s car, which was parked across the road from the eating place. PW15 then went to wait in his car, and he did not see where the accused had gone. After about 5 minutes, the accused came and knocked on the front left window of the car. The accused placed the shoe bag on the front passenger seat and then went away without saying anything. PW15 took the bag and saw that it was empty. The envelope containing the money was no longer inside the bag.

After the investigation was conducted, the accused was indicted under one of the prescribed offences under the MACC Act 2009 (the Act), which was section 165 of the Penal Code (the Code). The section provides: Whoever, being a public servant, accepts or obtains, or agrees to accept or attempts to obtain, for himself or for any other person, any valuable thing, without consideration, or for a consideration which he knows to be inadequate, from any person whom he knows to have been, or to be, or to be likely to be concerned in any proceeding or business transacted, or about to be transacted, by such public servant, or having any connection with the official functions 8 of himself or of any public servant to whom he is subordinate, or from any person whom he knows to be interested in or related to the person so concerned, shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years or with fine or with both. [Emphasis added]

Based on the charge preferred, the prosecution was required to prove all four ingredients of the offence for a prima facie case against the accused. They were:

that the accused was a public servant;

that the accused accepted a valuable thing for himself;

that there was no consideration for the valuable thing the accused accepted; and

that the accused knew Azmi bin Mohd Noor had a connection with his official functions.

that the accused was a public servant. [17] With regard to the first ingredient of the offence, it was not disputed that the accused was at the material time the MMEA Director of the maritime zone for Tanjung Sedili, Kota Tinggi, Johor. Further, it could not be denied that the accused was a public servant pursuant to section 21(i) of the Code, which states as follows: The words “public servant” denote a person falling under any of the descriptions hereinafter following: ......................

every officer whose duty it is, as such officer, to take, receive, keep or expend any property, on behalf of Government, or to make any survey, assessment, or contract on behalf of Government, or to execute any revenue process, or to investigate, or to report on any matter affecting the pecuniary interests of Government, or to make, authenticate, or keep any document relating to the pecuniary interests of Government, or to prevent the infraction of any law for the protection of the pecuniary interests of Government, and every officer in the service or pay of Government, or remunerated by fees or commission for the performance of any public duty. [Emphasis added] [18] Through PW5, the prosecution tendered P14 (1-3), which was the certificate of the office held by the accused pursuant to section 55(1) of the Act. The certificate was a prima facie proof that the accused received the emoluments as specified in P14. This supported the description in section 21(i) of the Code that the accused was an officer in the service or pay of the Government. Evidence was adduced that he was paid by the Government to perform public duties in his capacity as the MMEA Director and was therefore a public servant. Further, a person who was in the service or pay of the Government, or remunerated by fees or commission for the performance of public duty, was deemed a public servant: Mohd Khir Toyo v. PP [2015] 8 CLJ 769 FC. [19] In any event, the accused did not dispute that he was a public servant. In the circumstances, I found the prosecution had proved the first ingredient of the offence against him.

(ii) that the accused accepted a valuable thing for himself. [20] For the second ingredient of the offence, the valuable thing was the RM10,000.00 that the accused accepted. I did not think that the money could reasonably or logically be argued as having no value. In respect of a valuable thing, I found the prosecution had proved that the money was a valuable thing as stipulated in section 165 of the Code. [21] Now, the accused was charged with the offence of accepting the money for himself. He was not charged with obtaining a valuable thing, which was also an offence under the said section 165. Neither was he indicted for corruptly receiving a gratification which was an offence under the Act. In the correct Malay language translation, accepting is “menyetuju terima”, obtaining is “memperoleh” and receiving is “menerima”. In my view, to accept something is not the same as to obtain or receive something. In the context of the said three offences, the three words should not be used and applied interchangeably because the offences are distinct. Each word has a definite meaning in what the prosecution is required to prove against an accused. After all, Parliament did not legislate in vain to come out with the three distinct offences as provided for in the two statutes. [22] Accepting implies a voluntary and conscious decision to take possession of something that is offered. It often relates to offers, proposals, ideas, things or situations. For example, “He accepted the amount of bribe that was offered”, or “ He did not accept the invitation to attend”, or “ He accepted his fate since long ago”, or “He did not accept the ideas proposed to him”. In short, it is a matter of choice for someone whether to accept or not to accept something that is offered, submitted or befallen upon him. [23] What was the evidence adduced that the accused accepted RM10,000.00 for himself? To prove it, PW11, PW13 and PW15 were the material and crucial witnesses for the prosecution. I had carefully considered and evaluated their evidence in its entirety together with the totality of the evidence adduced by the prosecution. I found their evidence was credible and cogent and that they were witnesses of truth. I accepted the veracity and reliability of their evidence. The accused’s cross-examinations failed to cast any reasonable doubt on the credibility of their evidence. [24] Let us start with the evidence of PW11, Dato’ Sri Wan Mohd Fauzi bin Wan Kamaruddin. He was the owner of the ship and one of the Directors for Ocean Armada Resources Sdn Bhd. He has been involved in the shipping business since 2007. He owned 8 other companies, including Alamgala Resources Sdn Bhd and South Sea Marine Services Sdn Bhd. [25] After PW11 was informed that the ship was detained by the MMEA, he instructed PW13 to see the accused since he was the MMEA Director for Tanjung Sedili. He wanted PW13 to settle the matter as soon as possible. Otherwise he would be penalised for failure dispatch the marine gas oil on time to Singapore. He explained in paragraph 55 of his written statement (PSSP11) that:

Untuk makluman Mahkamah, saya perlu memberikan wang RM 10,000.00 seperti diminta oleh Kepten Zulfadli supaya kes siasatan terhadap Kapal Singa Gangsa tidak diteruskan kerana sekiranya terdapat siasatan dan tahanan terhadap Singa Gangsa, syarikat kami akan dikenakan denda oleh pihak GEOCEAN Pte kerana terdapat perjanjian antara syarikat saya dengan GEOCEAN untuk penghantaran dan pembekalan minyak kepada GEOCEAN Pte. Untuk makluman, denda yang akan dikenakan mencecah USD5,000 sehari jika kapal Singa Gangsa gagal menunaikan penghantaran berdasarkan kontrak pembekalan. [Emphasis added] [26] After a few days, PW11 received a call from PW13 informing him that the accused had asked for RM20,000.00 so that the investigation against the ship would be discontinued. PW11 disagreed with the amount. He instructed PW13 to ask for a lesser amount of RM10,000.00. Later, PW13 informed him that the accused would accept RM10,000.00. [27] On 30.9.2020, PW11 went to his office in Pasir Gudang, Johor. He gave the RM10,000.00 in cash to PW13 in a white envelope for the accused. The money was PW11’s own money that he withdrew from Maybank, Taman Nusa Bestari, from a cash cheque no. 840477 amounting to RM20,000.00. PW11 explained that the extra RM10,000.00 was for his own personal expenditure. He later claimed back the RM10,000.00 given to PW13 from Alamgala Resources Sdn Bhd. [28] The documentary evidence adduced supported what PW11 said. The Maybank Taman Nusa Bestari bank statement, P10(1-6), which belonged to PW11, showed that on 30.9.2020, RM20,000.00 was in the account based on an “inward clearing cheque debit 840477”. Another Maybank Taman Nusa Bestari bank statement, P11(1-6), also belonged to PW11, and P44, which was an email printout, proved that on 30.10.2020, RM10,000.00 was given back to PW11 from Alamgala Resources Sdn Bhd. The evidence was further supported by PW14, who formerly worked with Alamgala Resources Sdn Bhd as an account executive. PW14 testified that he received the email P44 from Maybank to confirm that he was the person who transferred RM10,000.00 from Alamgala Resources Sdn Bhd as a refund to PW11. The words “REFUND TO DATO” stated in P44 were about the money that PW11 got back from the company. PW14 did not know the real purpose of the refund. [29] In the circumstances, I accepted and believed PW11’s testimony that he gave his own money to PW13 in the amount agreed by the accused. And he later got back the same amount as a refund from Alamgala Resources Sdn Bhd. Throughout his testimony, I found that the accused failed to raise any reasonable doubt in the evidence adduced. [30] Moving on to the evidence of PW13, Azmi bin Mohd Noor, who was the Operations Manager for South Sea Marine Services Sdn Bhd. PW11 was his boss. On 17.9.2020, PW13 was informed that the ship was boarded by MMEA officers for inspection. He informed PW11 that the ship was detained and was instructed by PW11 to meet the accused. Together with PW15, PW13 managed to meet with the accused. Initially, the accused said the ship committed an offence because it did not have permission to anchor. However, he later said the offence was because of the failure to submit the K1 form. I took judicial notice that the K1 form is a mandatory customs declaration document required by the Malaysian customs authority for all imports of goods. Despite the protest and explanation by PW15 that the form was not required to be declared, the accused insisted that the offence was committed. [31] On 23.9.2020, the accused wanted to meet PW15 the same night at 8.30 pm. Since PW15 was PW13’s subordinate, he asked PW13 to accompany him to the meeting. The meeting place was at Restoran Yasin in Johor Baru, Johor. PW13 arrived late at the restaurant, and he saw that the accused and PW15 were already there. He joined them for a meal. The accused was still insisting that the offence was committed despite the explanation given by PW15. After some time, the accused asked PW15 to join him outside for a smoke. PW13 did not join them because he was not a smoker. [32] After about 5 minutes, PW15 came back alone whereas the accused was still outside smoking. He whispered to PW13 that the accused wanted RM20,000.00 as a consideration so that an investigation concerning the ship would not be pursued by the MMEA. After the accused came back inside the restaurant, PW13 went out to call PW11 for instructions. After the call, PW13 went back to PW15 and whispered to him, “Mat, 10 ok tak”. Then PW13 saw PW15 leaning close to the accused and whispered something to him. After 2 – 3 minutes, PW15 informed him that the accused agreed to accept RM10,000.00. After that, PW13 took his leave and left the restaurant. [33] On 30.9.2020, PW13 received from PW11 a white envelope containing the money with the instruction to give the money to the accused. The envelope was glued, and he did not open it. However, PW13 understood that it contained RM10,000.00 after what was agreed by the accused previously. PW13 asked PW15 to inquire about the next meeting with the accused so that the money could be given to him. [34] On the night of 2.10.2020, the three of them met at the Restoran Medina Baru. PW13 gave the white envelope containing the money to the accused. However, the accused refused to accept and asked to put it in a bag. PW13 then went out to his car and found an Adidas shoe bag. He put the envelope inside the shoe bag and placed the bag on the table where the accused was sitting. PW13 responded with a yes when the accused inquired whether the money was inside the bag. PW13 then left them because his family was waiting for him. [35] The accused tried to cast doubt on PW13’s testimony and put in a challenge that he did not accept the RM10,000.00 inside the envelope. PW13 disagreed with the challenge. There were other challenges as well that PW13 also disagreed with. The notes of evidence read: S : Saya katakan kepada kamu, pada 2.10.2020 jam 9.45 malam hingga 10.30 malam OKT berada di kawasan letak kereta Klinik Kesihatan Mahmoodiah dengan isterinya, setuju, tidak setuju, tidak pasti? J : Saya tidak setuju. S : Saya katakan kepada kamu, pada jam lebih kurang 10.30 malam OKT, isterinya dan seorang lelaki Cina bernama Chau Zee Yong sampai di kedai makan Medina Baru, setuju, tidak setuju, tidak pasti? J : Tidak pasti sebab saya tidak ada di waktu ini. ............................... S : Saya katakan kepada kamu, selepas lelaki Cina itu beredar daripada kedai baru lah kamu dan Samad datang ke meja OKT, setuju, tidak setuju, tidak pasti? J : Tidak setuju. ................................ S : Saya katakan kepada kamu, OKT tidak pernah berjanji untuk adakan pertemuan di Restoran Medina Baru untuk serahkan duit RM10,000.00 sebagaimana pertuduhan, setuju, tidak setuju, tidak pasti? J : Tidak setuju. ................................. S : Saya katakan kepada kamu tiada serahan duit berlaku pada 2.10.2020? J : Tidak setuju. [Emphasis added] [36] As I understood it, suggestions or questions in cross-examination are not evidence. They only showed the stand taken by the accused or indicative of the case put forward. The accused would have to put in the challenges through the suggestions, otherwise the evidence adduced would be deemed admitted by him. However, they cannot be substituted for evidence if the suggestions are repudiated or disagreed with by a witness such as PW13 in the instant case: Emperor v. Karimuddi AIR 1932 Cal 373; Public Prosecutor v. Dato’ Seri Anwar bin Ibrahim (No.3) [1999] 2 MLJ 1. The suggestions do not prove anything and will remain nothing unless agreed to or admitted by a witness. Since PW13 disagreed with the suggestions, no reasonable doubt could simply be raised since the suggestions were not evidence. [37] With regard to the suggestion that the accused was somewhere else on the same night between 9.45 pm and 10.30 pm, PW13 said in his testimony that he left the restaurant at about 9.45 pm. The notes of evidence during the examination-in-chief showed: S : Soalan saya, kamu telah memberi keterangan selepas 10 minit kamu telah beredar dari restoran tersebut? J : Ya, betul. S : So pada masa itu jam lebih kurang pukul berapa? J : Lebih kurang dalam 9.45 malam. [Emphasis added] [38] Based on the evidence adduced, that was why PW13 disagreed that between 9.45 pm and 10.30 pm, the accused was somewhere else with his wife. As far as he knew, when he left the restaurant at about 9.45 pm, the accused was still there with PW15. And he was also unsure of the suggestion that at about 10.30 pm, the accused and his wife, together with a Chinese man, arrived at the restaurant. This was because he had already left at about 9.45 pm. I accepted and believed the answers because they were manifestly logical in the circumstances. Further, it must also be pointed out that in the cross-examination of PW13, the accused did not dispute that PW13 left the restaurant earlier at about 9.45 pm. And the law is settled that if you did not expressly challenge the evidence, then it was deemed admitted: Wong Swee Chin v. Public Prosecutor [1980] 1 LNS 138; Chua Beow Huat v. PP [1970] 2 MLJ 29. [39] The evidence that the accused accepted the RM10,00.00 was further fortified through the evidence of PW15. PW15 bore witness to what PW13 testified previously and was with him when they met the accused at the Restoran Medina Baru. The money that was inside the shoe bag was placed on the table by PW13, and he left the scene. PW15 saw the accused take the bag and open it. PW15 was then instructed by the accused to wait in PW15’s car, parked across the road from the restaurant. He did what he was told. After a short while, the accused came and knocked on the front left window of the car. He placed the shoe bag on the front passenger seat of the car. Then he went away without saying a word. PW15 found the bag empty, and the envelope with the money was no longer inside it. [40] I had evaluated the evidence of PW11, PW13, and PW15 in its entirety, and had the advantage of hearing and seeing them testify. There was nothing to suggest they had any motive to falsely implicate or frame the accused. I found they were credible witnesses. I accepted and believed the evidence adduced. Further, the accused failed to raise any reasonable doubt in their evidence. I was guided by the often-quoted principle that a reasonable doubt must be a doubt arising from the evidence or want of evidence and cannot be an imaginary doubt unrelated to evidence: Public Prosecutor v. Saimin & Anor [1971] 1 LNS 115. In addition, the probabilities of the case are important to consider when dealing with the credibility of witnesses. To my mind, it was inherently improbable that the said prosecution witnesses were lying to fix the accused. As a businessman, it was unlikely that PW11 would go to all the trouble just to create a false narration against the accused. There was nothing to show that he had an axe to grind as well. In fact, PW11’s testimony had portrayed him negatively because he agreed to give the money so that he would not incur additional expenses. In Public Prosecutor v. Mohd Bandar Shah bin Nordin & Anor [2008] 4 MLJ 556, the Court of Appeal opined: If a witness’s evidence is improbable, this would be a good reason for rejecting his evidence or according it very little weight. By the same token, where the evidence of a witness accords with the probabilities of a case, it would be a serious misdirection on the part of the trial court to give it little or no weight on grounds of credibility. [Emphasis added] The Federal Court in Md Zainudin Raujan v. PP [2013] 4 CLJ 21 opined: It is trite that the inherent probability or improbability of a fact in issue must be the prime consideration in deciding whether a witness is credible or not. It is the duty of the court to sieve the evidence and to ascertain what are the parts of the evidence tending to incriminate the accused which he accepted. [Emphasis added] [41] In the premises, I found the prosecution had proved the second ingredient of the offence that the accused accepted a valuable thing for himself.

(iii) that there was no consideration for the valuable thing the accused accepted. [42] In the charge, the accused was indicted for accepting the RM10,000.00 without consideration. Consideration is something that is given or promised by someone in exchange for something given or promised by another person. A promise to do something illegal or impossible could not be regarded as a valid consideration. So, did the accused give anything in return to PW13 after accepting the money? From the totality of the evidence adduced, there was none. After he accepted the money, nothing was given in return to PW13 or to the ship owner, PW11. In other words, there was no consideration given by the accused for the valuable thing he accepted. And the evidence was further strengthened since the accused did not dispute or put in any challenge that he gave consideration to PW13 after accepting the money. He pocketed the money but did not give anything back in return. [43] Thus, I was satisfied the prosecution had proved the third ingredient of the offence against the accused.

(iv) that the accused knew Azmi bin Mohd Noor (PW13) had a connection with his official functions. [44] On this final ingredient of the offence, all that was required for the prosecution to prove was that the accused knew PW13 had a connection with his official functions. It was specified as such concerning the particulars in section 165 of the Code that the prosecution chose to frame in the charge. Consequently, it was not necessary to also prove that the accused was actually responsible for an investigation of the ship detained, and whether or not an actual investigation was conducted. Much ado had been made and argued by the accused on the said two issues. However, they were plainly not the ingredients required to prove the offence as stipulated in section 165 of the Code. [45] It was proved and not disputed that PW13 met the accused on the instruction of the ship’s owner, PW11. As clearly testified by PW6, the ship was detained for inspection by the order of the accused. It was made based on his official functions as the MMEA Director. PW6 was the officer who commanded an MMEA ship (KM Mulia) that went out to locate and detain the ship. Further, all the evidence adduced by PW13 and PW15 proved that the accused knew PW13 had a connection with his official functions. Otherwise, why would the accused meet PW13 twice at night? The two occasions were not some social gatherings between long-lost friends. Therefore, I found there was sufficient evidence that the prosecution had proved the ingredient of the offence. [46] Be that as it may, the accused submitted in his written submission that instead of PW13, the prosecution must prove that it was PW11 that the accused must have known who had a connection with his official functions. I had carefully considered this line of argument. [47] In my considered view, there was no requirement to prove as such based on section 165 of the Code and also the charge preferred against the accused. The particulars of the charge clearly mentioned that the accused accepted the money from PW11 through PW13, which he knew had a connection with his official functions. Therefore, the prosecution was only required to prove that at the time he accepted the money, the accused knew it was PW13, who had a connection with his official functions. And there was no doubt in my mind that when he accepted the money, the accused knew PW13 had a connection with his official functions. [48] Thus, it was not incumbent for the prosecution to further prove that the accused knew the ship owner, PW11, who came out with the money, had a connection with his official functions. With respect, to hold otherwise would be unreasonable and did not make sense under the circumstances. [49] To conclude, I was constrained to find that the prosecution had proved the fourth and last ingredient of the offence. The presumption under section 50(3) of the Act [50] Section 50(3) of the Act reads: Where in any proceedings against any person for an offence under section 165 of the Penal Code it is proved that such person has accepted or attempted to obtain any valuable thing without consideration or for a consideration which such person knows to be inadequate, such person shall be presumed to have done so with such knowledge as to the circumstances as set out in the particulars of the offence, unless the contrary is proved. [Emphasis added] [51] As I had discussed and found earlier, the primary facts and ingredients required to apply the presumption were proved for the charge. In other words, the prosecution had proved the pre-requisites or the condition precedents to apply section 50(3) of the Act. In the absence of those, the presumption should not be invoked. In Ng Kim Huat v. Public Prosecutor [1961] 1 LNS 73, Thomson CJ opined that: It is surely elementary to observe that while a statutory presumption when it arises may operate in place of evidence and so reverse the onus of proof on any point the bare potential existence of such a presumption cannot of itself dispense with proof of any fact the existence of which is a condition precedent of the presumption arising. To say otherwise would fly in the face of all the rules of logic. [Emphasis added] [52] As such, I was satisfied to apply the presumption that the accused had accepted a valuable thing without consideration with such knowledge as to the circumstances as set out in the particulars of the offence unless the contrary is proved. This meant that when he accepted the money without consideration from PW11 through PW13, he knew that PW13 had a connection with his official functions concerning the detained ship. The accused was called upon to rebut the presumption on the balance of probabilities: Public Prosecutor v. Yuvaraj [1969] 2 MLJ 89. I also informed the parties that the presumption was applied during the decision delivered at the close of the prosecution’s case. Conclusion at the close of the prosecution’s case [53] I carefully scrutinised and evaluated the credibility of the witnesses together with the reliability of the evidence. This court found the prosecution had adduced credible evidence to prove all the ingredients of the offence against the accused. Credible evidence is evidence that has been filtered and has gone through the process of evaluation, and any evidence that is unsafe should be rejected: PP v. Ong Cheng Heong [1998] 4 CLJ 209. [54] Thus, a prima facie case had been made out against the accused on the offence charged and the accused must be called upon to enter on his defence: section 173(h)(i) of the Code. A prima facie case is where the prosecution had adduced credible evidence proving each ingredient of the offence which if unrebutted or unexplained would warrant a conviction: section 173(h)(iii) of the Code. This court also explained the three options for the accused to defend himself. [55] I had subjected the whole evidence to a maximum evaluation which was clearly explained by the decision in PP v. Lee Hock Lai [2004] 1 CLJ 57: In my view, the ‘maximum evaluation’ refers to a proper and complete evaluation of all the evidence adduced to determine whether a prima facie case has or has not been made out. Thus, all the evidence adduced has to be scrutinised properly and this should not be just a perfunctory, cursory evaluation or an exercise of skimming over the surface of the evidence only. The prosecution must make out the ingredients of the charge with the evidence adduced. If the evaluation of the evidence results in doubts in the prosecution’s case at this stage of the proceedings itself then it cannot be said that a ‘prima facie’ has been made out. The defence ought not to be called merely to clear or clarify the doubts. The benefit of the doubt, if any, at the end of the prosecution’s case must go to the accused. [Emphasis added] [56] The totality of the evidence against the accused was sufficient for the defence to be called, and this court was prepared to convict the accused on the charge if he had elected to remain silent: Balachandran v. PP [2005] 1 CLJ 85; PP v. Mohd Radzi bin Abu Bakar [2006] 1 CLJ 457. The defence’s case [57] The accused elected to give sworn evidence from the witness’s box. He further called three witnesses to testify on oath. [58] I considered and tested the evidence by the accused against the ingredients of the offence that had been proved by the prosecution. There was no requirement to revisit the prosecution’s case on the findings. This was because I had made a maximum evaluation of the evidence and found the witnesses were credible and reliable. As such, it is wrong in law to revisit the findings. [59] The Federal Court in Duis Akim & Ors v. PP [2013] 9 CLJ 692 ruled that: [38] We note that when assessing the defence the learned trial judge surprisingly revisited his earlier findings upon which he called for the defence. Such approach is quite contrary to the principle of maximum evaluation of the evidence adduced at the close of the prosecution’s case. Indeed in his judgment the learned trial judge made it very clear that he had conducted a maximum evaluation of the evidence adduced by the prosecution before calling for the defence. [Emphasis added] [60] Therefore, it was my judgment that this court was only required to put to the test and compare the evidence by the accused at this stage with the evidence of the prima facie case that had been established by the prosecution. And to consider and decide whether the accused was able to raise any reasonable doubt on the prosecution’s case, and whether he was able to rebut the presumption under section 50(3) of the Act on the balance of probabilities. At the end of it, whether the prosecution would be able to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt on the charge. Accused’s evidence (DW1) [61] The accused denied that he accepted the bag containing the money at the restaurant, as testified by PW13 and PW15. His reason was that at the time the offence was allegedly committed, he was not at the restaurant but somewhere else. Therefore, his defence was one of alibi. For this purpose, he forwarded a notice of his alibi (D57) to the prosecution. The notice was tendered in court when the accused testified during his examination-in-chief. It sought to comply with section 402A of the Criminal Procedure Code (the CPC). [62] The current section 402A of the CPC came into effect on 1.6.2012 through the Amendment Act A1422/2012. It provides:

The court shall, at the time the accused is being charged, inform the accused as to his right to put forward a defence of alibi.

Where the accused seeks to put forward a defence of alibi, he shall put forward a notice of his alibi during the case management process.

Notwithstanding subsection (2), where the accused has not put a notice of his alibi during the case management process, he may adduce evidence in support of an alibi at any time during the trial subject to the following conditions:

the accused has given notice of the alibi to the Public

the Public Prosecutor is given a reasonable time to investigate the alibi before such evidence can be adduced.

The notice required under this section shall include particulars of the place where the accused claims to have been at the time of the commission of the offence with which he is charged, together with the names and addresses of any witnesses whom he intends to call for the purpose of establishing his alibi. [Emphasis added] [63] The notice of alibi was received by the prosecution on 30.12.2022. The accused claimed in the notice that on 2.10.2020 between about 9.45 pm and 10.30 pm, he was at the car park of Klinik Kesihatan Mahmoodiah, 80100, Johor Baru, Johor. This meant he was not at the Restoran Medina Baru accepting the money at 9.45 pm as stated in the charge. Further, he named in the notice two persons, DW2 and DW3, together with their addresses, for the purpose of establishing his alibi. [64] The said section 402A was enacted to prevent an accused from fabricating evidence of an alibi. The other purpose was to enable an investigation to be conducted within a reasonable time to ascertain the validity of such a defence. In essence, the alibi defence is that the accused was somewhere else other than at the time and place of the offence committed. With this defence, all the accused needed to do was to raise a reasonable doubt that he was the person at the place where the crime was committed. It was the usual evidential burden: Yau Heng Fang v. PP [1985] CLJ Rep 350 (SC); Illian & Anor v. PP [1988] CLJU 139 (SC). [65] In Arshad Masdin v.Public Prosecutor [2025] CLJU 460, Azmi bin Ariffin (JCA) held that: [60] It is trite that once an appellant pleads an alibi, he does not assume the burden to prove it is true. The onus is on the prosecution to prove by evidence that the alibi is false and to place the appellant squarely at the scene of the crime. The evidence of his alibi need only raise a reasonable doubt that he committed the crime. The alibi of the appellant does not have to be corroborated by independent evidence in order to raise a defence (see the Federal Court decision in Duis Akim & Anor v. PP [2013] 9 CLJ 692). [Emphasis added] [66] In Duis Akim & Anor (supra), the Federal Court held that: [82] However, alibi could not prevail over the positive identification of an accused person especially so in the face of categorical statements coming from credible witnesses who had no ill motives in testifying. [83] Thus, in Mutachi Stephen v. Uganda ([2003] UGCA 9), the accused said that on the night the offence took place he was already asleep with his wife. However, there was a witness who had positively identified him. As such his alibi collapsed. He has been squarely put at the scene of crime. [Emphasis added] [67] As alluded to, the accused’s alibi was that he was not at the restaurant, but he was somewhere else between 9.45 pm and 10.30 pm. He said he was at the clinic’s car park because he was called by his wife, who was involved in a road collision. Therefore, he was not at the restaurant at 9.45 pm when PW13 and PW15 said he accepted RM10,000.00. [68] I had carefully considered this defence and juxtaposed it with the testimonies of PW11, PW13 and PW15 previously. [69] The accused did not admit to accepting the money at all. He also denied accepting the money at the time and place as charged. However, PW11 testified that he gave RM10,000.00 to PW13 because the accused wanted the money. The source of the money was his own from a cash cheque no. 840477. His bank statement, which was P10(1-6), showed that RM20,000.00 was in his account with the printed particulars “inward clearing cheque debit 840477”. Another of PW11’s bank statements, which was P11(1-6), supported his evidence that he was reimbursed with RM10,000.00 by Alamgala Resources Sdn Bhd after he gave his own money to PW13. Additionally, the email printout (P44) fortified the evidence of P11(1-6). Apart from all the documents adduced, PW14 confirmed that he transferred RM10,000.00 to PW11 as a refund to him. [70] As alluded to earlier, I found PW11 to be a credible witness who had no reason to fabricate the evidence against the accused. What he testified was supported by the documents tendered. Pertinently, the real evidence adduced did not lie. Therefore, I was satisfied that he gave the RM10,000.00 to PW13 to give to the accused. [71] As for PW13, he said he arrived with the money at the restaurant at about 9.15 pm on 2.10.2020. He saw that the accused was already there with PW15. He gave the RM10,000.00 to the accused and left the place at about 9.45 pm. It must be noted that the accused never challenged or disputed that PW13 left at about 9.45 pm. [72] For PW15, he arrived at the restaurant at about 8.20 pm. He testified that the money was given to the accused on the same night between 9.40 pm and 9.45 pm. His evidence was consistent with what PW13 testified, and he too remained unshaken in the cross-examination by the accused. [73] Therefore, the evidence by PW13 and PW15 precisely puts the accused at the time and place where he accepted the money. This was not a case where nobody saw what the accused did in committing a crime for which he was charged. When he committed the crime, two witnesses were in close proximity and saw the accused take the money. I accepted and believed the evidence of PW13 and PW15 because they were credible witnesses who were instructed by PW11 to give the money to the accused. I found there was no reason for them to concoct a false narration just to fix the accused. Why would they? They had to pay up because that was what the accused wanted. And as decided in Duis Akim & Anor (supra), the alibi by the accused collapsed because the accused had been squarely put at the scene of the crime and not somewhere else. [74] The investigation officer, PW16, had investigated the notice of alibi. He managed to record the statement of DW2. However, PW16 could not do the same to DW3 because he could not be found. Further, he could not locate the house or the address given. Based on his investigation, PW16 found the accused was with PW13 and PW15 at the Restoran Medina Baru on 2.10.2020 between 8.30 pm and 9.45 pm. He disagreed with what was put to him during the cross-examination that between 9.45 pm and 10.30 pm, the accused was with DW2 at the parking place of the clinic. Thus, nothing turned out for the accused as well. [75] From the totality of the evidence adduced, I did not accept and believe the alibi that the accused was somewhere else when the offence was committed. There was no doubt in my mind that the accused accepted the money as stated in the charge against him. I found that PW11 had to come out with his own money for the accused before he was reimbursed. Further, both PW13 and PW15 were steadfast and cogent in their narration that at the time and place stipulated in the charge, the accused accepted the money. In the circumstances, there was no reasonable doubt in the evidence adduced by the prosecution and the alibi put forward by the accused was rejected. The evidence by DW2 [76] DW2 was the accused’s wife. She was named in the notice of alibi (D57) for the purpose of establishing the alibi of the accused. [77] In the examination-in-chief, she said that she was at the Restoran Medina Baru between 9.45 pm and 10.30 pm. The notes of evidence showed: S : Boleh puan beritahu mahkamah di mana puan berada pada 2.10.2020 jam 9.45 malam sehingga 10.30 malam?

9.45 hingga 10.30 malam saya berada di Restoran Medina Baru. [Emphasis added] Further, S : Setelah itu suami puan ajak dia pergi berbincang di Restoran Medina Baru kemudian apa yang berlaku? Saya bergerak dengan kenderaan saya ke restoran itu bersama suami. ……………….. ……………….. S : Tiba di Restoran Medina lebih kurang jam berapa? Tiba dalam 9.45. S : Kemudian bila tiba di Restoran Medina apa yang berlaku? Saya duduk dengan suami bersama dengan yang langgar kereta saya itu bincang pasal bayaran gantirugi. [Emphasis added] [78] The answer given by DW2 was diametrically opposed to the alibi of the accused. As stated, his alibi was that on 2.10.2020 between 9.45 pm and 10.30 pm, DW2 was with him at the car park of the clinic, and not at the restaurant. And what DW2 said was the exact opposite of what the accused claimed to be. Further, DW2 testified that when she arrived at the restaurant at 9.45 pm, the accused was with her, together with someone who was involved in the accident with her. Significantly, there was no attempt by the defence to explain this grave contradiction through the rest of her testimony. [79] To conclude, the evidence by DW2 failed to support and establish the accused’s alibi that he was with her at the car park between 9.45 pm and 10.30 pm on 2.10.2020. The evidence by DW3 [80] DW3 was the person who said he was involved in the accident with DW2 at night on 2.10.2020. He was named in the notice of alibi together with DW2. He testified that the accident happened at 9.30 pm. He said DW2 then called the accused to come to the place where it happened. According to DW3, the accused came about 15 minutes later. So he arrived at 9.45 pm. Later, DW3 came to the restaurant at about 10.30 pm. [81] The time that he said he arrived at the restaurant contradicted what DW2 said earlier. This was because she testified that the three of them arrived together at the restaurant at 9.45 pm, and not 10.30 pm. In my considered view, the time difference was certainly significant because the accused was relying on his alibi. It was also a material contradiction that the defence failed to explain throughout the testimony of DW3. [82] Given that the contradiction remained unresolved, I found that the evidence of DW3 failed to establish the alibi of the accused. The evidence by DW4 [83] DW4 worked as a cashier at the Restoran Medina Baru. He was not named as a witness in the notice of alibi of the accused for the purpose of establishing his alibi. Undoubtedly, producing a witness who was not named in the notice had prevented the MACC from investigating and determining the truth of the alibi defence. In an adversarial system, the accused has to play fair. After all, it has been well-established that the requirements of section 402A of CPC must be complied with and the non-compliance will cause the evidence in support of an alibi to be inadmissible: Hussin Sillit v. Public Prosecutor [1988] 1 CLJ (Rep) 128; Amin Hatai v. PP [2017] 1 LNS 87. Therefore, I did not accept his testimony as evidence in support of the defence of the alibi of the accused. [84] Despite the rejection, I had considered the evidence of DW4 and compared it with the rest of the evidence presented by the defence. According to DW4, the accused came to the restaurant with his wife at about 10.30 pm on 2.10.2020. He saw their car that was involved in the accident, and he asked the accused about it. The accused replied that the car had met with an accident. Further, DW4 said he recognised the accused because the accused frequented the restaurant. About three minutes after the couple arrived, a Chinese man came and joined them there. DW4 did not know what they were discussing. The three of them were at the restaurant for about 30 minutes, after which the Chinese man left the restaurant, leaving the couple behind. [85] In the analysis of the evidence above, I found that it did not create any doubt in the prosecution’s case. The prosecution had proved that the accused accepted the money at about 9.45 pm. A short while after that, PW13 and PW15 left and were no longer present in the restaurant. If it were true that DW4 saw the accused and his wife arrive later at about 10.30 pm, it did not prove that the accused did not accept the money earlier at 9.45 pm. He had the opportunity to do so when he met PW13 and PW15 earlier. In addition, DW4’s evidence that the couple arrived at 10.30 pm was opposed to what DW2 said. She said she arrived at the restaurant with the accused at about 9.45 pm. [86] Further, in his examination-in-chief, DW4 denied that there was anyone else who joined the accused with his wife at the restaurant. DW4 also said that no one greeted them when the couple was about to leave the restaurant at about 11 pm. The notes of evidence showed: S : Selain daripada lelaki Cina tersebut yang duduk dengan Abang Zul dan isterinya, ada orang lain yang duduk bersama-sama dengan mereka bertiga? Tiada sesiapa. S : Ada kamu nampak ada orang yang menegur Abang Zul dan isterinya ini semasa mereka nak beredar daripada restoran ini dalam pukul 11 malam itu? Tiada sesiapa tuan. [87] DW4 explicitly said there was no one. The denials by DW4 as shown above contradicted what DW2 said, too. She said that before she left the restaurant, two men came to join them. This was what she testified: S : Kemudian puan kata puan habiskan minuman dekat kedai itu kemudian beredar. Sebelum puan beredar, ada sesiapa yang datang ke arah puan dan suami puan? Sebelum beredar ada dua lelaki datang. S : Kemudian? Kemudian dia duduk di hadapan saya dan suami. Suami cakap duduklah sebab kita orang dah nak balik. S : Puan kenal 2 orang lelaki yang datang itu? Tidak kenal. [88] The same denials by DW4 also contradicted what the accused testified. The accused testified that before he left the restaurant with DW2, PW13 and PW15 came to the place. The notes of evidence read: S : Sebelum kamu beredar daripada kedai ada sesiapa yang datang ke arah kamu dan isteri? Samad dengan Azmi datang macam nak makan dekat situ. So bila dia orang datang meja macam penuh, so dia senyum dekat saya. Macam terserempak terus senyum terus duduk depan saya. Saya pun faham macam dia minta meja itu lah, so saya siap makan saya terus balik. S : Semasa Samad dan juga Azmi sampai ke kedai tersebut, ada kamu dengan dia bertegur sapa? Hanya salam dan terus balik. [89] In the upshot, the evidence of DW4, DW2 and the accused was riddled with contradictions concerning the claim that PW13 and PW15 came much later to the restaurant. The contradictions and opposing versions were not resolved or explained away by the defence. [90] Hence, I found the accused failed to raise any reasonable doubt that he accepted the money at 9.45 pm from PW13 at the said restaurant. [91] To conclude, I did not accept or believe the accused’s explanation, and it did not raise in my mind any reasonable doubt as to his guilt: Mat v. PP [1963] 1 LNS 82. The decision in Miller v. Minister of Pensions [1947] 2 All ER 347 further illustrated: That degree is well settled. It need not reach certainty, but it must carry a high degree of probability. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond the shadow of a doubt. The law would fail to protect the community if it admitted fanciful possibilities to deflect the course of justice. If the evidence is so strong against a man as to leave only a remote possibility in his favour which can be dismissed with the sentence ‘of course it is possible, but not in the least probable’, the case is proved beyond reasonable doubt, but nothing short of that will suffice. [Emphasis added] Whether the accused managed to rebut the presumption of section 50(3) of the Act on the balance of probabilities. [92] Now, did all the accused manage to rebut the presumption of section 50(3) of the Act on the balance of probabilities? It was well-settled that this legal burden was heavier than raising a reasonable doubt in the prosecution’s case for them to obtain an acquittal. It was for him to give an innocent explanation which the court considered more likely than not that it was true, i.e on the balance of probabilities, the test applied in civil proceedings: Thavanathan Balasubramaniam v. Public Prosecutor [1997] 3 CLJ 150 FC. Based on the analysis made earlier, I was constrained to find that the accused failed to rebut the presumption. [93] What, then, will constitute sufficient proof to rebut the presumption on the balance of probabilities? I think that the proof must relate to the probabilities of each particular case. Based on the evidence adduced, this court could not find that it was more probable than not that the accused managed to do so. It would be against all probabilities of the case to find that he managed to discharge the burden. Lord Denning in Miller v. Minister of Pensions (supra) said: If the evidence is such that the tribunal can say ‘We think it more probable than not’ the balance is discharged, but if the probabilities are equal, it is not. [94] My other point is this. If he failed to succeed in his defence on the lighter burden of raising a reasonable doubt, then I did not think that he could be found to have successfully rebutted the legal presumption on the heavier burden. This heavier burden could not be discharged merely by bare denials and conjectures. [95] Section 50(3) of the Act placed an onus on them to discharge their legal burden. A heavier burden was on him to rebut the statutory presumption on the balance of probabilities. The duty was on him to prove his defence that he did not commit the crime. I found that he failed to do so. In Mohd Khir Toyo v. PP (supra), the Federal Court observed: [105] A presumption stands “unless the contrary is proved”. “The words ‘unless the contrary is proved’ mean that the presumption raised … has to be rebutted by proof and not by mere explanation which may be merely plausible …” (State of Assam v. Krishna Rao (1973) 3 SCC 227 at 237; see also T Shankar Prasad v. State of AP at 766, SN Bose v. State of Bihar [1968] 3 SCR 563 at 571). [Emphasis added] [96] “Proved” is defined in section 3 of Act 56. A fact is said to be “proved’ when, after considering the matters before it, the court either believes it to exist or considers its existence so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that it exists. Further, it must be distinguished between the duty to cast a reasonable doubt in the prosecution’s case and the duty to prove a defence on the balance of probabilities. The distinction between the two burdens was explained by the Court of Appeal in Abdul Aziz Miew Yiong v. PP [2014] 1 LNS 1875 where Abdul Rahman Sebli JCA (as he then was) opined: In law there is a distinction between the duty to merely cast a reasonable doubt in the prosecution case and the duty to prove a defence on the balance of probabilities. In the former case all that the accused needs to do to entitle him to an acquittal is to cast a reasonable doubt in the trial judge’s mind as to his guilt: Mat v. PP (supra). He has no duty to prove or disprove anything whereas in the latter case affirmative admissible evidence of the facts constituting the defence must be established, failing which he will be convicted of the offence charged. [Emphasis added] [97] Based on the reasons discussed earlier, I found that none of what the accused alleged in his defence and argued in the written submission could be accepted as proof of affirmative admissible evidence. The accused failed in his duty to rebut the presumption on the balance of probabilities under section 50(3) of the Act. Conclusion at the close of the defence’s case [98] At the conclusion of the trial, this court found that not only did the accused fail to raise any reasonable doubt in the case for the prosecution, but he also failed to rebut the legal presumption on the balance of probabilities on the three charges. [99] Irrespective of whether a court is otherwise convinced in its own mind of the guilt or innocence of the accused, its decision must be based on the evidence adduced and nothing else: Sia Soon Suan v. Public Prosecutor [1966] 1 MLJ 116. Having considered all the evidence adduced, it was my firm finding that the prosecution had proved its case beyond reasonable doubt against the accused: see section 173(m)(i) of the Criminal Procedure Code. [100] Therefore, I found the accused guilty of the charge, for he was indicted. Accordingly, the accused was convicted of the charge. The sentence [101] Section 165 of the Code provides for a punishment of imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years or with fine or with both. [102] It was important that any sentence passed by the court must be in accordance with the law. A sentence according to the law must not only be within the ambit of the punishable section but must also be assessed and passed according to the established judicial principles: PP v. Jafa bin Daud [1981] 1 LNS 26 at page 2. [103] In the mitigation by his Counsel, it was submitted that the accused was 44 years old and had four children. He was suspended from his job and only received half of his emoluments. During the suspension, he worked as a Grab driver and an electrician without a steady income. The accused had gout, migraine and gastritis. He prayed for a fine or any other alternative without any sentence of imprisonment being imposed. [104] The prosecution applied for an appropriate sentence with regard to the public interest and for a firm message given to the public at large. It condemned any form of corruption in the country. [105] Both parties also submitted and argued on the trend of sentencing for offences under section 165 of the Code imposed by other courts. I had considered them. However, they were only guidelines for this court to come out with a decision. At the end of the day, this court had to decide on an appropriate sentence based on the particular facts and circumstances of the instant case. [106] The accused’s plea in mitigation was considered despite being found guilty after a full trial. It must be equally considered with the public interest as represented by the prosecution. In my view, this was the proper way to strike a balance to decide on the sentence. Having said that, no sentence could be assessed by a simple mathematical formula because many factors had to be taken into consideration based on the facts and circumstances in each case: Mohamed Jusoh bin Abdullah and Another v. Public Prosecutor [1947] 1 LNS 73. [107] The accused was found guilty after a full trial had taken place. Many witnesses had come to testify, and a lot more time was needed for the trial to end. If he had pleaded guilty, it would have saved a lot of time for everybody. Further, if he had done so and said he was remorseful, then it would have been more convincing than after a full trial if he said he had repented. And he would have deserved a lesser sentence than what he was sentenced to in the instant case. However, the accused chose to claim trial as was his right. Be that as it may, I had also considered that this was his first criminal conviction. [108] He was found guilty of accepting a valuable thing for himself without consideration. He ordered a ship transporting its cargo that was bound for another country to be detained and inspected. Then he wanted something for his trouble. He initially asked for RM20,000.00, but later accepted RM10,000.00, which was still a lot of money. He did not think twice about abusing his position as a Director for an enforcement agency. The accused was not a low-ranking government officer who asked for RM100.00 bribe. He was a high-ranking officer for the MMEA. As an important government agency, the MMEA was established to enforce law and order for the preservation of peace, safety and security in the Malaysian maritime zones. [109] Much has been said about the damaging impacts of corruption involving enforcement agencies. The economic effects on maritime business and commercial activities went beyond the accused to the erosion of trust by the public as well. What the accused did was a despicable and shameless crime impacting the nation. As such, in my view, the public interest must override the interest of the accused. A deterrent sentence must be imposed. [110] Thus, it was my considered opinion that the imprisonment sentence against the accused was just and appropriate. The sentence was not manifestly excessive on the facts and the circumstances of the case. Dated on this day, 4th of July 2025 (DATUK AHMAD KAMAL ARIFIN BIN ISMAIL) Judge Sessions Court Johor Bahru For the prosecution : Xander Lim Wai Keong Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission For the accused : Mohd Fazaly Ali bin Mohd Ghazaly