Lampiran
Lampiran D, of every particular of the offence alleged against him, namely the date (2.10.2020), the time (approximately 9.45 p.m., as amended on 30.7.2024), the place (Restoran Medina Baru, No.17, Jalan Yahya Awal, Bandar Johor Bahru), his designation (Pengarah Zon Maritim, Gred T22, APMM, Zon Maritim Tanjung Sedili), the nature of the valuable thing (wang tunai berjumlah RM10,000.00), the giver (Wan Mohd Fauzi bin Wan Kamaruddin), the intermediary (Azmi bin Mohd Nor), the absence of consideration (tanpa balasan), the vessel in connection with which the official function arose (MT Singa Gangsa), and the date of its detention (17.9.2020). [32] The defence was conducted throughout the full trial on a proper understanding of the charge; four defence witnesses were called; and at no point was it suggested that the Appellant had been misled as to the case he had to meet. No failure of justice capable of vitiating the conviction has been shown. This ground is dismissed. Issue II: Failure to Explain Section 162 CPC Rights [33] The Appellant contends under ground 3.2 that the learned trial judge failed to inform the Appellant of his rights under section 162 of the CPC after allowing the fourth amendment to the charge on 30.7.2024, and that this failure prejudiced the Appellant, particularly because his lead counsel was on medical leave on that date and the amendment was allowed in his absence. [34] Section 162 of the CPC provides: “Whenever a charge is altered or added by the Court after the commencement of the trial the prosecutor and the accused shall be allowed to recall or resummon and examine, with reference to the alteration or addition, any witness who may have been examined, and may also call any further evidence which may be material.” [35] I accept that there is no positive record in the Notes of Proceedings to show that section 162 CPC rights were formally explained to the Appellant after the fourth amendment on 30.7.2024. However, whether this amounts to a material irregularity causing a miscarriage of justice must be assessed in the context of all the circumstances. [36] First, the fourth amendment was confined to a change of time in the charge, from “approximately 10 pm” to “9.45 pm”. This was the only amendment. It is not an amendment going to a new ingredient of the offence, nor to the identity of the parties, nor to the substance of the transaction. The amendment pertained to the time at which the accused was said to have agreed to accept the money. Critically, the Appellant’s own alibi defence was predicated precisely upon his whereabouts between 9.45 pm and 10.30 pm on 2.10.2020. The amendment thus aligned the charge with the very temporal window that the Appellant himself had placed in contention. [37] Secondly, although lead counsel Mohd Fazaly Ali was on medical leave on 30.7.2024, the Appellant was not unrepresented. He was represented by Danial Firdaus bin Derin on that date. The amended charge was read to the Appellant in the Malay language by the court interpreter, the Appellant confirmed he understood it, and he maintained his plea of not guilty. [38] Thirdly, and most significantly, the subsequent conduct of the defence demonstrates that no prejudice in fact occurred. After the amendment, trial resumed on 13.8.2024 with lead counsel present, and PW13 was recalled to continue his cross-examination. The record confirms that the Appellant through counsel proceeded to conduct a vigorous cross-examination of PW13. The Appellant ultimately called four defence witnesses. At no point during the entire trial, or at the close of the prosecution case, did counsel for the Appellant make any application under section 162 CPC to recall any prosecution witness in the light of the amendment. Section 162 confers a right, not an automatic obligation on the court. The right enures for the benefit of the accused; if the accused elects not to exercise it, he cannot subsequently complain of its denial. [39] The respondent correctly drew my attention to the Court of Appeal’s reasoning in Deepanraj Subramaniam v PP [2015] 3 CLJ 439, which squarely addressed a similar complaint. The court observed that an accused person who was represented by counsel and chose to call witnesses cannot be heard to say he was denied his right under section 162 CPC when he made no application to exercise that right throughout the trial. Applying the curative provision under section 422 CPC, any irregularity in the non-formal notification of rights under section 162 did not occasion a failure of justice on the particular facts of this case. This ground is dismissed. Issue III: Prima Facie Case under Section 165 of the Penal Code [40] Grounds 3.3 through 3.12 of the Petition collectively challenge the learned trial judge’s finding that a prima facie case had been established at the close of the prosecution’s case. The applicable standard is well-settled. In Balachandran v PP [2004] 2 MLRA 547, the Federal Court stated: “A prima facie case is therefore one that is sufficient for the accused to be called upon to answer. This in turn means that the evidence adduced must be such that it can be overthrown only by evidence in rebuttal. ……. The result is that the force of the evidence adduced must be such that, if unrebutted, it is sufficient to induce the court to believe in the existence of the facts stated in the charge or to consider its existence so probable that a prudent man ought to act upon the supposition that those facts exist or did happen.” [41] The Federal Court further made plain in Balachandran that the correct standard at the close of the prosecution’s case is prima facie proof, not proof beyond reasonable doubt; the latter standard applies only at the conclusion of the whole trial under section 182A CPC. The learned trial judge applied the maximum evaluation test consistently with this standard, as elaborated in PP v Lee Hock Lai [2004] 1 CLJ 57 (HC), and was satisfied that the totality of the evidence adduced was sufficient to warrant a conviction had the Appellant elected to remain silent. The Appellant has not demonstrated that the trial judge applied any erroneous standard, and this court does not depart from those findings of law. The First Ingredient: Public Servant [42] The first ingredient, namely that the Appellant was a public servant within the meaning of section 21(i) of the Penal Code, was plainly established and was not seriously contested before the learned trial judge or before this court. At the material time, the Appellant held the position of Pengarah Zon Maritim (Maritime Zone Director) of the MMEA, Zon Maritim Tanjung Sedili, at the rank of Kepten Maritim Gred T22, and was a person serving in the pay of the Government of Malaysia. Exhibit P14, a certificate issued pursuant to section 55(1) of the MACC Act 2009, confirmed his designation, rank, and terms of service. In relying upon P14, the learned trial judge correctly applied the proposition affirmed by the Federal Court in Mohd Khir Toyo v PP [2015] 8 CLJ 769 that a person in the service or pay of the Government performing public duties is a public servant within section 21(i) of the Penal Code. There was no challenge to P14, and the Appellant’s status as a public servant was not placed in genuine dispute at any stage of the proceedings. The Second and Third Ingredients: Acceptance of a Valuable Thing Without Consideration [43] The second and third ingredients, namely that the Appellant accepted a valuable thing for himself and that he did so without consideration or for a consideration which he knew to be inadequate, were established through the combined testimonies of PW11 (Wan Mohd Fauzi bin Wan Kamaruddin), PW13 (Azmi bin Mohd Nor), and PW15 (Samad bin Masturi). The prosecution’s factual narrative on these ingredients was, in its material respects, uncontradicted by any reliable evidence. On 30.9.2020, PW11 withdrew cash from his Maybank account and, in the conference room of the Alamgala Resources office at No. 5, 1st floor, the Keluli Warehouse, Plo 530, Jalan Keluli 3, Pasir Gudang, Johor, counted out RM10,000.00 in RM50.00 notes and placed the sum in a white envelope (subsequently marked ID45), which he then handed to PW13 with instructions to deliver it to the Appellant. [44] On 2.10.2020, the Appellant, having earlier communicated with PW15 to confirm the arrangement, directed PW15 that the meeting place would be Restoran Medina Baru, No. 17, Jalan Yahya Awal, Bandar Johor Bahru. At approximately 9.15 pm on that date, PW13 arrived at the restaurant, the white envelope tucked under his arm, and joined the Appellant and PW15 who were already seated at the same table. During the course of their meal, PW13 slid the white envelope towards the Appellant, at which point the Appellant said “Jangan bagi macam ini, masuk dalam beg” (“don’t give it like this, put it in a bag”). PW13 left the table, retrieved a blue-black Adidas shoe bag (P48) from his vehicle, placed the white envelope inside it, and returned to the restaurant. He placed the bag on the table close to the Appellant, who asked “ada dalam ni?” (“is it in here?”), to which PW13 replied in the affirmative. After PW13 departed, the Appellant took the shoe bag, instructed PW15 to wait in his vehicle, and subsequently came to PW15’s vehicle and placed the bag on the front passenger seat. PW15 thereafter found the bag empty, and the envelope with the money was no longer inside it. As the learned trial judge observed at paragraph [108] of his grounds of judgment: “The accused accepted a valuable thing for himself. He ordered a ship transporting its cargo that was bound for another country to be detained and inspected. Then he wanted something for his trouble.” [45] No consideration was offered or given at any point in this transaction. The money was paid entirely at the demand of the Appellant, and its receipt was in every sense unearned from the perspective of PW11, whose company ultimately bore the cost. The prosecution accordingly made out, at a prima facie level, that the Appellant accepted a sum of RM10,000.00 in cash, being a valuable thing, without consideration. The Fourth Ingredient: Knowledge of Connection with Official Functions [46] The fourth ingredient, namely that the Appellant knew that PW13 had a connection with his official functions, presented the central contested issue. The Appellant, through grounds 3.5 and 3.7 of the Petition, mounted two distinct attacks on the learned trial judge’s approach to this ingredient. Ground 3.5 contends that it was an error for the trial judge to find that it was unnecessary to prove that the Appellant was actually responsible for the investigation of the vessel, and that an investigation was in fact conducted. [47] The trial judge addressed this squarely at paragraph [44] of his grounds of judgment, holding that what was required for proof of this ingredient was simply that the accused knew PW13 had a connection with his official functions, and that it was consequently not necessary to also prove that the accused was actually responsible for an investigation of the ship detained, and whether or not an actual investigation was conducted. That finding was correct in law. Section 165 of the Penal Code is drafted in deliberately broad terms, as the Commentary on the section from Malal’s Penal Law states: “The taking of presents by public servants, when it cannot be proved that such presents were corruptly taken, is rendered penal by this section… the question of motive or reward is not material as the section prohibits the taking of a thing without consideration from a person having any connection with the official functions of the public servant.” [48] The gravamen of the offence is the existence of a connection, whether present, past, or prospective, between the giver and the official functions of the public servant. It does not require proof of a corrupt transaction or a quid pro quo for any specific act. The Appellant’s contention that the absence of a formal investigation negated this ingredient was accordingly misconceived as a matter of statutory construction, and the trial judge committed no error in rejecting it. Factual Evidence Establishing the Connection [49] The connection between PW13 and the Appellant’s official functions was in any event demonstrated on the evidence with considerable force. The Appellant, as Pengarah Zon Maritim Tanjung Sedili, was the commanding officer of the maritime zone in which MT Singa Gangsa, owned by Ocean Armada Resources Sdn Bhd and operated under PW11’s management, was detained on 17.9.2020 by KM Mulia acting under his authority. PW6 (Mohd Fairusnizam bin Abdul Razak), the Commanding Officer of KM Mulia, testified that the vessel was located and detained on the orders of the Appellant, acting in his capacity as MMEA Zone Director. On 17.9.2020 itself, PW13 came to the MMEA Tanjung Sedili office and met the Appellant in connection with the detained vessel. On the same evening, the Appellant directed PW12, his subordinate Navigation Officer, to hold the police report concerning the vessel, stating “Hold dulu repot”, and not to file it. This direction was acted upon by PW12. [50] On 23.9.2020, the Appellant met PW13 and PW15 at Restoran Yasin during a further nocturnal meeting in which, according to PW15, the Appellant indicated that a payment would be required, saying “mat banyak ni mat kalau nak kira” (“there is a lot here if one were to count”), and subsequently communicating a demand for RM20,000.00 in exchange for no further action by APMM against the vessel. That sum was negotiated down to RM10,000.00. The learned trial judge at paragraph [45] of his grounds correctly noted that PW13 met the Appellant not once but twice at night, the first being on 23.9.2020 and the second being on 2.10.2020, and observed pointedly that those meetings were “not some social gatherings between long-lost friends.” [51] The trial judge further found that the Appellant’s argument, namely that it was PW11 rather than PW13 who must be proved to have had a connection with the official functions, was without merit. As the trial judge correctly held at paragraph [47], the charge expressly identified the receipt as being from PW11 “through” PW13, and the prosecution was required only to establish that the Appellant knew PW13 had a connection with his official functions, which was incontrovertibly the case: PW13 was the operations manager of the vessel’s operators and had been the direct interlocutor with the Appellant from the date of detention. The fourth ingredient was accordingly established to a prima facie standard on the prosecution’s evidence. Ground 3.7: The Vessel Had Already Been Released [52] Ground 3.7 argues that the learned trial judge erred in failing to find and analyse the status of the vessel at the date of the alleged payment, given that MT Singa Gangsa had already been released on 18.9.2020, some fourteen days before the alleged payment on 2.10.2020. This argument is misconceived. The release of the vessel on 18.9.2020 did not dissolve the connection between PW13 (and through him PW11 and Ocean Armada Resources Sdn Bhd) and the Appellant’s official functions. The relevant question under section 165 is not whether the vessel was still detained, but whether PW13 was a person whom the Appellant knew to have been, or to be, or to be likely to be, concerned in any proceeding or business transacted or about to be transacted by the Appellant in his official capacity, or having any connection with the Appellant’s official functions. The handling of the vessel’s detention and the decision to halt the investigation constituted business transacted by the Appellant in his official capacity. [53] This was confirmed by two strands of evidence. First, the Appellant had directed his subordinate officer PW12 on the very night of 17.9.2020 to delay filing a police report, an instruction that was followed, with the result that no police report was ever made in connection with the detention. The continuation of that instruction post-release demonstrated that the Appellant retained control and authority over the matter beyond the physical release of the vessel. Second, PW11 testified (corroborated by PW13 and PW15) that his underlying concern, which motivated the payment, was to ensure that no further investigation or proceedings would be pursued against the vessel or its operators in connection with the events of 17.9.2020. That concern was well-founded: the vessel’s operators remained exposed to formal enforcement proceedings for the alleged offences under the Merchant Shipping Ordinance for so long as the Appellant, in whose zone the offences had taken place, chose to act or to refrain from acting. The money was thus paid in connection with official functions that remained live and subsisting well beyond the date of the vessel’s physical release. Ground 3.6: Alleged Contradictions and Conclusion [54] Ground 3.6 submits that the prosecution witnesses gave contradictory evidence about the existence of an investigation into the vessel. Upon examination, no material contradiction in the core account of these three witnesses was identified by the Appellant. PW11, as the ship owner and Director of Ocean Armada Resources Sdn Bhd, was not present at the APMM office or at the restaurants, and his account was accordingly limited to the events within his personal knowledge, namely the negotiated demand conveyed to him through PW13, his withdrawal of RM20,000.00 from his Maybank account on 30.9.2020, the preparation of the white envelope containing RM10,000.00, and his instruction to PW13 to deliver it. [55] PW13’s account of the meetings at the APMM office, the meeting at Restoran Yasin on 23.9.2020, and the handover at Restoran Medina Baru on 2.10.2020, was corroborated by PW15 who was present throughout. Whether or not a formal investigation report had been filed was a peripheral matter which, as held above, was not an ingredient of the offence under section 165. The evidence of PW11, PW13, and PW15 was consistent on every critical particular: the demand, the negotiation, the sum agreed upon, the identity of the recipient, the date, time and place of delivery, and the physical mechanics of the transfer. [56] The learned trial judge, having had the advantage of seeing and hearing all three witnesses testify, found them to be credible and accepted their evidence. No sufficient basis to disturb that finding has been advanced before this court. The prima facie finding was fully open to the learned trial judge on the evidence before him, and the Appellant has not demonstrated any error of law or manifest finding of fact against the weight of the evidence sufficient to warrant appellate intervention. This cluster of grounds is dismissed. Issue IV: Interpretation of “Menyetuju Terima” / “Accepts” [57] The Appellant argues under a separate ground that the learned trial judge erred in his grounds of judgment by consistently using the English word “accepted” as a translation of “menyetuju terima” in the charge, whereas the Appellant contends that “menyetuju terima” means “agrees to accept” (a different and arguably narrower formulation), not “accepts” simpliciter. It is submitted that this constitutes a misdirection, particularly because the prosecution’s evidence was directed to proving physical receipt whereas the charge used the phrase “menyetuju terima.” [58] This argument is without substance. The authoritative Malay language text of section 17(a) of the MACC Act 2009, which is a prescribed offence under section 165 of the Penal Code by virtue of the MACC Act 2009’s schedule, translates “accepts” as “menyetuju terima” and “obtains” as “memperoleh.” The English version of section 17(a) of the MACC Act 2009 reads: “A person commits an offence if— (a) being an agent, he corruptly accepts or obtains or agrees to accept or attempts to obtain, from any person, for himself or for any other person, any gratification as an inducement or a reward for doing or forbearing to do, or for having done or forborne to do, any act in relation to his principal’s affairs or business, or for showing or forbearing to show favour or disfavour to any person in relation to his principal’s affairs or business...” [59] The Malay language version of section 17(a) of the MACC Act 2009 reads: “Seseorang melakukan kesalahan jika - (a) sebagai seorang ejen, dia secara rasuah menyetuju terima atau memperoleh, atau bersetuju untuk menyetuju terima atau cuba untuk memperoleh, daripada mana-mana orang, untuk dirinya sendiri atau untuk mana-mana orang lain, apa-apa suapan sebagai suatu dorongan atau upah bagi melakukan atau tidak melakukan, atau kerana telah melakukan atau tidak melakukan, apa-apa perbuatan berhubungan dengan hal ehwal atau pemiagaan prinsipalnya, atau kerana memberikan atau tidak memberikan sokongan atau tentangan kepada mana-mana orang berhubungan dengan hal ehwal atau perniagaan prinsipalnya...” [60] That section 165 of the Penal Code is a prescribed offence within the meaning of the MACC Act 2009 is not in dispute: Section 165 of the Penal Code is explicitly listed as a prescribed offence within the meaning of the MACC Act 2009. Section 3 defines a “prescribed offence” as, among other things, “any offence under any written law as specified in the Schedule”. The Schedule to the Act (referenced in the definition of “prescribed offence”) specifically lists offences punishable under Section 165 of the Penal Code. The legal consequence of this is supplied by section 67 of the MACC Act 2009, which provides, in mandatory terms, that “notwithstanding any other written law to the contrary, the provisions of this Act shall apply to a prescribed offence.” It follows that, for all proceedings relating to section 165 of the Penal Code, the MACC Act 2009, including its authoritative Malay text, is the governing instrument for the purposes of translation and statutory construction. [61] The linguistic consequence of the foregoing analysis is clear and permits no ambiguity. In the authoritative Malay text of section 17(a) of the MACC Act 2009, the phrase “menyetuju terima” is the direct and unambiguous translation of “accepts.” The phrase “agrees to accept,” on the other hand, corresponds to an entirely different Malay phrase, namely “bersetuju untuk menyetuju terima”, which is separately provided for in the same section. These are distinct words expressing distinct elements of distinct offences, and Parliament, which legislated the MACC Act 2009 in both languages, did not do so in vain. The Appellant’s contention that “menyetuju terima” means “agrees to accept”, and therefore corresponds to yet another limb of the offence, conflates two separate statutory formulations that the legislature deliberately kept apart. [62] This was a point that the learned trial judge in the Sessions Court himself recognised and articulated with precision at paragraphs [21] and [22] of his grounds of judgment: “In the correct Malay language translation, accepting is ‘menyetuju terima’, obtaining is ‘memperoleh’ and receiving is ‘menerima’. In my view, to accept something is not the same as to obtain or receive something. In the context of the said three offences, the three words should not be used and applied interchangeably because the offences are distinct. Each word has a definite meaning in what the prosecution is required to prove against an accused. After all, Parliament did not legislate in vain to come out with the three distinct offences as provided for in the two statutes.” [63] The learned trial judge’s consistent use of “accepted” throughout his grounds of judgment is entirely consistent with, and is indeed demanded by, the charge, which employed the phrase “menyetuju terima” as the Malay equivalent of “accepts.” Far from constituting a misdirection, the usage reflects a correct and precise application of the statutory text. [64] It remains to examine whether the evidence adduced at trial was sufficient to establish the element of “accepts” - that is, “menyetuju terima” - as charged. Section 50(3) of the MACC Act 2009 provides that, where it is proved that a person “has accepted or attempted to obtain any valuable thing without consideration,” the presumption is triggered. The use of the word “accepted” in section 50(3) is itself translated by reference to the same authoritative Malay text as “menyetuju terima,” confirming internal consistency across the statute. The English version of section 50(3) of the MACC Act 2009 reads: “Where in any proceedings against any person for an offence under section 165 of the Penal Code it is proved that such person has accepted or attempted to obtain any valuable thing without consideration or for a consideration which such person knows to be inadequate, such person shall be presumed to have done so with such knowledge as to the circumstances as set out in the particulars of the offence, unless the contrary is proved.” [65] The Malay language version of section 50(3) of the MACC Act 2009 reads: “Jika dalam mana-mana prosiding terhadap mana-mana orang atas sesuatu kesalahan di bawah seksyen 165 Kanun Keseksaan adalah dibuktikan bahawa orang itu telah menyetuju terima atau cuba untuk memperoleh apa-apa benda berharga tanpa balasan atau dengan balasan yang orang itu tahu tidak memadai, orang itu hendaklah dianggap telah berbuat demikian dengan mengetahui hal keadaan yang dinyatakan dalam butir kesalahan itu, melainkan jika akasnya dibuktikan.” [66] The learned trial judge defined “accepting” at paragraph [22] of his grounds of judgment as implying “a voluntary and conscious decision to take possession of something that is offered,” adding that “it is a matter of choice for someone whether to accept or not to accept something that is offered, submitted or befallen upon him.” The evidence of PW13 (Azmi bin Mohd Nor) and PW15 (Samad bin Masturi) described a deliberate and conscious physical act: the Appellant took the envelope, looked inside it, transferred the money into a shoe bag, and directed PW15 to wait in his vehicle while he secured the money. Each step in this sequence is inconsistent with passive or involuntary receipt; it is the conduct of a person exercising a conscious choice to take possession of what was offered. The learned trial judge’s finding at paragraph [22] that this constituted “a voluntary and conscious decision to take possession of something offered” was fully and properly supportable on the evidence before him. No misdirection as to the applicable element of the offence occurred. This ground is dismissed. Issue V: Status of PW11, PW13, and PW15 — Accomplice Evidence [67] The Appellant submits under ground 3.12 that PW11 (Wan Mohd Fauzi), PW13 (Azmi bin Mohd Nor), and PW15 (Samad bin Masturi) are accomplices whose evidence requires corroboration, and that the learned trial judge failed to warn himself of the danger of convicting on their uncorroborated testimony. In support of this contention, the Appellant relies upon two authorities. The first is Public Prosecutor v Dato’ Saidin bin Thamby [2012] 3 MLJ 476, from which the Appellant extracts the proposition that in a corruption trial there will always be an interested witness and his evidence must be considered with great caution and can only be accepted when it is corroborated in material particulars by other evidence adduced by the prosecution. The second is Daimon bin Banda v Public Prosecutor [1951] MLJ 11, for the proposition that evidence of a participatory witness must be treated with circumspection and may only be relied upon where adequately corroborated. [68] The Appellant argues that all three witnesses, namely PW11 as the source and provider of the RM10,000.00, PW13 as the admitted intermediary who physically delivered the sum, and PW15 as a witness present at critical stages of the transaction, actively participated in the alleged gratification and thereby stood as accomplices in the ordinary legal sense. It is further submitted that each of these witnesses had a personal interest in shifting responsibility away from themselves and onto the Appellant, and that this tainted their evidence with a motive to fabricate which the learned trial judge failed adequately to address. [69] This ground fails for a clear statutory reason that is decisive of the issue and renders the Appellant’s reliance upon pre-MACC authorities misconceived. Section 52(1) of the MACC Act 2009 provides in express and unambiguous terms: “Notwithstanding any written law or rule of law to the contrary, in any proceedings against any person for an offence under this Act — (a) no witness shall be regarded as an accomplice by reason only of such witness having — (i) accepted, received, obtained, solicited, agreed to accept or receive, or attempted to obtain any gratification from any person; (ii) given, promised, offered or agreed to give any gratification; or (iii) been in any manner concerned in the commission of such offence or having knowledge of the commission of the offence…” [70] The offence for which the Appellant was charged and convicted is an offence under section 165 of the Penal Code, which is a prescribed offence within the ambit of the MACC Act 2009. By operation of section 52(1), the legislative intent is manifest: none of PW11, PW13, or PW15 can, in law, be regarded as an accomplice by reason only of their respective roles in the transaction, whether PW11 as the giver of the gratification, PW13 as the intermediary who conveyed and delivered the sum of RM10,000.00, or PW15 as a person with knowledge of and present at the material events. The learned trial judge was therefore wholly correct in treating their evidence without the strict corroboration requirement that would otherwise attach to accomplice testimony at common law. [71] The authorities relied upon by the Appellant are principally drawn from the pre-MACC era and cannot displace an express and specific statutory provision that operates notwithstanding any written law or rule of law to the contrary. The Federal Court in Mohd Khir Toyo confirmed that section 44 of the Anti-Corruption Act 1997 (which is in pari materia with section 52 of the MACC Act 2009) constitutes a complete exception to the ordinary rules governing accomplice testimony in prosecutions brought under or in connection with corruption legislation. That confirmation is binding and applies with full force to the present proceedings. The Respondent’s submission that PW11, PW13, and PW15 were not accomplices within the meaning of the law is well-founded and is accepted. This limb of ground 3.12 is accordingly dismissed. [72] Separately, the Appellant challenges the adequacy of the prosecution’s evidence on the ground that the Call Detail Records (“CDRs”) obtained by the investigation do not corroborate PW13’s testimony concerning a telephone call made to the Appellant on 26.9.2020. The Appellant points to the acknowledgement by PW16, the investigation officer, who conceded during cross-examination that no CDRs were obtained in respect of that specific date. It is submitted on behalf of the Appellant that this lacuna is fatal, in that the prosecution relied upon the telephone call of 26.9.2020 as part of the factual narrative leading to the meeting and transfer of money at Restoran Medina Baru on 2.10.2020, and that the absence of corroborating CDR data undermines the credibility of PW13’s account at a material point. [73] The Respondent counters that the CDRs which were in fact produced, establishing outgoing calls from the Appellant’s number to the number registered in PW13’s name on 17.9.2020 and 22.9.2020, and corroborated by the WhatsApp exchanges between the Appellant and PW13 that were admitted in evidence, form a sufficiently coherent evidentiary picture. The Respondent further submits that the question of a specific call on 26.9.2020 is at most a collateral detail in the broader chronology of events, and that the weight of direct eyewitness testimony given by PW13 and PW15 as to the circumstances, time, and manner of the delivery of RM10,000.00 is not contingent upon telecommunications records for its probative force. [74] The principle enunciated in PP v Sabudin Mohd Salleh [2024] 9 CLJ 117 (HC) is applicable: direct eyewitness testimony may properly be accepted even where there are gaps in documentary or digital evidence, provided that the oral evidence is credible and consistent. The learned trial judge accepted the oral testimony of PW13 and PW15 as credible, and the absence of CDRs for 26.9.2020 in those circumstances was a matter of evidential weight, not a fatal lacuna going to admissibility or sufficiency. That exercise of discretion was within the competence of the trial judge and discloses no reviewable error. [75] On the related question of adverse inference, the Appellant invites this court to draw an adverse inference against the prosecution pursuant to section 114(g) of the Evidence Act 1950 on account of the non-production of the CDRs for 26.9.2020. This submission cannot be sustained as a matter of law. The Supreme Court in Munusamy Vengadasalam v PP [1986] 1 MLRA 292 laid down the governing principle in clear terms: “Adverse inference under that illustration can only be drawn if there is withholding or suppression of evidence and not merely on account of failure to obtain evidence. It may be drawn from withholding not just any document, but material document by a party in his possession, or for non-production of not just any witness but an important and material witness to the case.” [76] In the present case, the CDRs for 26.9.2020 were not in the possession of the prosecution and withheld; they were not obtained at all. PW16 acknowledged this in cross-examination. The distinction between suppression of evidence that exists and is withheld on the one hand, and failure to obtain evidence on the other, is fundamental to the operation of section 114(g). A party cannot be said to have suppressed a document that was never in its possession. Accordingly, no adverse inference can properly be drawn against the prosecution for the absence of CDRs referable to 26.9.2020, and the Appellant’s submission on this point is rejected. For all the foregoing reasons, the entirety of the challenge under Issue V is dismissed. Issue VI: Application of the Section 50(3) Presumption [77] The Appellant contends under ground 3.11 that the presumption under section 50(3) of the MACC Act 2009 was wrongly invoked because the prerequisites had not been properly established. Section 50(3) provides: “Where in any proceedings against any person for an offence under section 165 of the Penal Code it is proved that such person has accepted or attempted to obtain any valuable thing without consideration or for a consideration which such person knows to be inadequate, such person shall be presumed to have done so with such knowledge as to the circumstances as set out in the particulars of the offence, unless the contrary is proved.” [78] The Appellant’s essential complaint is two-fold: first, that the primary facts founding the presumption were not proved to the requisite standard; and second, that the learned Sessions Court judge applied the presumption prematurely, before satisfying himself that the condition precedents were in place. The Respondent maintains, on the contrary, that the learned trial judge followed a methodologically sound and legally unimpeachable sequence, establishing the foundational facts through evidence before invoking the presumption, and that the Appellant’s challenge misreads both the record and the applicable authorities. [79] The condition precedent to invoking the presumption is proof that the accused has accepted a valuable thing without consideration. As I have found at Issue III above, the learned trial judge was entitled to find that this condition precedent was established by the credible and cogent evidence of PW11, PW13, and PW15. The trial judge expressly stated at paragraphs [51] to [52] of his grounds that he had first proved the primary facts before invoking the presumption: “As I had discussed and found earlier, the primary facts and ingredients required to apply the presumption were proved for the charge. In other words, the prosecution had proved the prerequisites or the condition precedents to apply section 50(3) of the Act. In the absence of those, the presumption should not be invoked.” [80] In adopting this approach, the learned trial judge correctly followed the principle articulated by Thomson CJ in Ng Kim Huat v Public Prosecutor [1961] 1 LNS 73, where his Lordship opined: “It is surely elementary to observe that while a statutory presumption when it arises may operate in place of evidence and so reverse the onus of proof on any point the bare potential existence of such a presumption cannot of itself dispense with proof of any fact the existence of which is a condition precedent of the presumption arising. To say otherwise would fly in the face of all the rules of logic.” [81] The trial judge’s approach was in full accord with this principle. The Appellant’s reliance on Mohd Khir Toyo for the proposition that proof of acceptance or attempt to obtain alone is insufficient to trigger the presumption does not assist the Appellant. The Federal Court’s concern in that case was with whether the mere receipt of property, without more, sufficed to trigger the presumption; the Federal Court held that the full ingredients had to be first established. The learned trial judge here did precisely that. Specifically, the trial judge found, on the evidence of PW11, PW13, and PW15, that on 2.10.2020 the Appellant accepted the cash sum of RM10,000 delivered by PW13 at Restoran Medina Baru, without any consideration, in circumstances where PW13 had a connection with his official functions concerning the detained vessel Singa Gangsa. Having proved those primary facts, the invocation of the presumption was proper. [82] Once the presumption arose, the burden shifted to the Appellant to rebut it. The applicable standard is proof on a balance of probabilities: Public Prosecutor v Yuvaraj [1969] 2 MLJ 89 (Privy Council). That standard is heavier than the ordinary burden of raising a reasonable doubt in the prosecution’s case. As the learned trial judge observed at paragraph [92], adopting the test in Thavanathan Balasubramaniam v Public Prosecutor [1997] 3 CLJ 150 (Federal Court), the Appellant was required to give an innocent explanation which the court considered more likely than not to be true, that is to say, applying the civil standard. The nature and quality of proof demanded to discharge that burden was further explained by the Federal Court in Mohd Khir Toyo v PP (supra) at paragraph [105]: “The words ‘unless the contrary is proved’ mean that the presumption raised … has to be rebutted by proof and not by mere explanation which may be merely plausible …” [83] Bare denials and conjectures, in other words, are insufficient. The learned trial judge at paragraph [94] expressly held that if the Appellant had failed to raise a reasonable doubt on the lighter burden, a fortiori he could not have successfully rebutted the presumption on the heavier one. The Appellant was thus confronted with a formidable statutory obstacle which could only be overcome by cogent and affirmative evidence. [84] Having regard to the totality of the defence evidence, the learned trial judge found at paragraphs [97] to [98] of his grounds that none of what the Appellant alleged in his defence and argued in his written submission could be accepted as proof of affirmative admissible evidence, and that the Appellant had failed in his duty to rebut the presumption on the balance of probabilities under section 50(3) of the Act. [85] The trial judge further found that not only did the Appellant fail to raise any reasonable doubt in the prosecution’s case, but he also failed to rebut the legal presumption on the balance of probabilities. Having reviewed the defence evidence, I find that the trial judge was entitled to reach that conclusion for the reasons developed further below under Issue VII. The Appellant’s challenge to the invocation of the section 50(3) presumption is therefore without merit. This ground is dismissed. Issue VII: The Alibi Defence Legal Principles Governing the Alibi Defence [86] Grounds 3.13 through 3.18 of the Petition challenge the rejection of the alibi and contend that the trial judge gave insufficient weight to the defence evidence. The law on alibi is settled. The burden of proof does not shift to an accused who raises alibi; it remains throughout upon the prosecution to disprove the alibi beyond reasonable doubt. As the trial judge correctly noted, citing Yau Heng Fang v PP [1985] CLJ Rep 350 (SC) and Illian & Anor v PP [1988] CLJU 139 (SC), all that an accused must do is raise a reasonable doubt in the prosecution’s case. In Shanmugam v PP [1962] 1 LNS 186 (SC), where the Supreme Court stated that “where the defence to a criminal charge is an alibi it was not necessary that the accused prove his alibi beyond reasonable doubt. All that he has to do is to cast a doubt upon the prosecution story.” The defence is correct as a matter of law. However, the corollary is equally well established: an alibi that is internally inconsistent, or that is contradicted by the alibi witnesses themselves, cannot discharge even this limited burden. The question, therefore, is not the standard of proof but whether the Appellant’s alibi, on the evidence adduced, was capable of raising any doubt at all. Internal Inconsistency between the Notice of Alibi and Oral Evidence [87] The Appellant’s alibi, as set out in the Notice of Alibi (exhibit D57) filed pursuant to section 402A of the Criminal Procedure Code on 29.12.2022, was that on 2.10.2020 between approximately 9.45 pm and 10.30 pm, he was at the car park of Klinik Kesihatan Mahmoodiah, Jalan Mahmoodiah, 80100 Johor Bahru, and not at Restoran Medina Baru, Jalan Yahya Awal, Bandar Johor Bahru, where the transfer of RM10,000.00 was alleged to have taken place. The alibi was premised upon his wife having been involved in a road collision at that car park, necessitating his presence. The prosecution drew attention to a contradiction within the Appellant’s own case: exhibit D57 asserted that the Appellant remained at the car park throughout the entire period from 9.45 pm to 10.30 pm, whereas the Appellant’s oral evidence under examination-in-chief placed him at the car park only from 9.45 pm to approximately 10.10 pm, after which he, his wife, and DW3 proceeded to Restoran Medina Baru. This internal divergence between the filed notice and the Appellant’s sworn testimony was not satisfactorily reconciled. It was a material inconsistency going to the core of the alibi and provided an early and independent basis for treating it with caution. The Evidence of DW2 [88] The alibi was critically and fatally undermined by the Appellant’s own witnesses. The evidence of DW2 (Noor Syahira binti Arifin @ Ismail, the Appellant’s wife) was, on the central issue, diametrically opposed to the alibi as stated in D57. Under examination-in-chief, DW2 testified that she arrived at Restoran Medina Baru at 9.45 pm together with the Appellant and the person who had collided with her car. The trial judge noted this in stark terms at paragraph [78] of the grounds of judgment: “The answer given by DW2 was diametrically opposed to the alibi of the accused. As stated, his alibi was that on 2.10.2020 between 9.45 pm and 10.30 pm, DW2 was with him at the car park of the clinic, and not at the restaurant. And what DW2 said was the exact opposite of what the accused claimed to be. Further, DW2 testified that when she arrived at the restaurant at 9.45 pm, the accused was with her, together with someone who was involved in the accident with her. Significantly, there was no attempt by the defence to explain this grave contradiction through the rest of her testimony.” [89] The trial judge concluded at paragraph [79] that DW2’s evidence failed to support and establish the alibi. That conclusion was inevitable. While the defence submitted in this appeal that DW2’s evidence was consistent with the defence version as a whole and that the prosecution failed to effectively challenge her account, that submission fails in the face of DW2’s own examination-in-chief testimony, which placed the Appellant at the restaurant at 9.45 pm, the precise time at which the prosecution’s witnesses, PW13 and PW15, placed him there as well. The contradiction did not arise from cross-examination by the prosecution; it arose from DW2’s own evidence-in-chief, which the defence was unable to explain. The Evidence of DW3 [90] DW3’s evidence (Chaw Zee Yong, of 11, Jalan Ulu Slim, Kampung Pasir, Ulu Slim, 35800 Slim River, Perak) fared no better. DW3 testified that the road accident between his vehicle and DW2’s vehicle occurred at 9.30 pm at the car park of Klinik Kesihatan Mahmoodiah, that DW2 telephoned the Appellant thereafter, and that the Appellant arrived at the car park at approximately 9.45 pm. DW3 then stated that he himself arrived at Restoran Medina Baru at 10.30 pm. The material contradiction was patent. DW2 had testified under examination in chief that all three of them, namely herself, the Appellant, and DW3, arrived together at the restaurant at 9.45 p.m., whereas DW3 placed his own arrival at the restaurant at 10.30 p.m., a difference of forty-five minutes. This was a significant and unresolved discrepancy. The trial judge addressed it squarely at paragraph [81]: “This was because she testified that the three of them arrived together at the restaurant at 9.45 pm, and not 10.30 pm. In my considered view, the time difference was certainly significant because the accused was relying on his alibi. It was also a material contradiction that the defence failed to explain throughout the testimony of DW3.” [91] The trial judge concluded at paragraph [82] that DW3’s evidence also failed to establish the alibi. The defence submitted that DW3’s overall evidence was consistent with the defence version and corroborated the Appellant’s presence at the car park. That submission, however, does not address the irreconcilable contradiction on the time of arrival at the restaurant, which was the crux of the alibi. The alibi stood demolished by the Appellant’s own witnesses. The Evidence of DW4: Admissibility [92] DW4, Sriraman a/l Appana, who testified as a cashier at Restoran Medina Baru, was rightly rejected as an alibi witness. His name and address did not appear in the Notice of Alibi (D57) filed pursuant to section 402A CPC. The trial judge correctly observed, at paragraph [83] of the grounds of judgment, that the production of a witness whose existence was not disclosed in the notice of alibi had prevented the MACC from investigating and determining the truth of the alibi defence. As the trial judge stated: “In an adversarial system, the accused has to play fair.” The requirements of section 402A are mandatory, and non-compliance renders evidence in support of the alibi inadmissible: Hussin Sillit v Public Prosecutor [1988] 1 CLJ (Rep) 128; Amin Hatai v PP [2017] 1 LNS 87. The purpose of the notice requirement was explained by the trial judge at paragraph [64]: it was enacted to prevent fabrication of alibi evidence and to enable a timely investigation to verify the validity of the alibi. Calling a witness whose existence was undisclosed to the prosecution deprives the prosecution of that opportunity and violates the adversarial principle. The defence did not contest the legal proposition but argued that DW4’s evidence was nonetheless credible and consistent with the defence version. That argument is considered below. The Evidence of DW4: Substantive Consideration [93] Notwithstanding the inadmissibility of DW4’s evidence as alibi testimony, the trial judge proceeded at paragraph [84] to consider and compare it against the totality of the defence evidence. DW4 testified that the Appellant arrived at the restaurant with his wife at about 10.30 pm on 2.10.2020, that he recognised the Appellant as a frequent patron of the restaurant, that he observed the car bearing signs of an accident, and that a Chinese man joined them approximately three minutes later, staying for about thirty minutes before leaving. DW4 further claimed that PW13 and PW15 were not present at the restaurant at the material time. The defence urged that DW4’s evidence had not been challenged by the prosecution on the basis that he was not employed at the restaurant on the date in question, and that his account was therefore credible and supportive of the defence version. [94] However, the trial judge correctly noted that DW4’s evidence fell to be assessed against the totality of the evidence before the court. The prosecution highlighted that DW4 had, during the course of his testimony, initially stated that he was employed at “Restoran Medina” before altering his account to refer to “Restoran Medina Baru,” the precise location of the alleged offence. Further, no documentary evidence, whether a pay slip, contract, or otherwise, was tendered to substantiate his claimed employment at the restaurant. At paragraph [85], the trial judge concluded that DW4’s evidence “did not create any doubt in the prosecution’s case.” That finding, reached after careful consideration of the evidence even in the face of inadmissibility, was entirely justified. The Alibi as Afterthought: Failure to Disclose and to Put to Prosecution Witnesses [95] A further matter militates against giving any weight to the alibi. The trial judge noted that the alibi was not disclosed to the investigating officer PW16 during the recording of the Appellant’s statement; it was not put to the prosecution witnesses during cross-examination at trial; and it emerged only at the defence stage. This is the hallmark of a recent invention or afterthought. The Court of Appeal in Megat Halim Megat Omar v PP [2009] 1 CLJ 154 observed that an accused person’s failure to put his alibi to the prosecution witnesses during their cross-examination may move the trial court to dismiss the alibi as an afterthought. The prosecution correctly drew my attention to the Appellant’s own admission under cross-examination that the alibi was not disclosed to PW16 during the recording of his statement. [96] I turn to the broader contention that the trial judge was selective in his evaluation of evidence and failed to properly weigh the defence evidence (grounds 3.16–3.18). The task of weighing and evaluating evidence is quintessentially the function of the trial judge. The Federal Court’s principle in Duis Akim & Ors v PP [2013] 9 CLJ 692 is instructive: once a maximum evaluation of the prosecution’s evidence has been conducted at the close of the prosecution’s case and a prima facie finding made, it is wrong for a trial judge to revisit that finding when assessing the defence; the question at the close of the defence is whether the accused’s evidence has raised a reasonable doubt or rebutted the presumption. The learned trial judge applied this principle correctly. His evaluation of the defence evidence was not superficial. He engaged individually with DW1, DW2, DW3, and DW4 and gave particularised reasons for rejecting each. His conclusion at paragraph [98] that the Appellant had failed to raise any reasonable doubt and had failed to rebut the presumption was fully supported by the analysis. This cluster of grounds is dismissed. Issue VIII: The Sentence [97] The Appellant submits that the sentence of twenty months’ imprisonment imposed by the learned Sessions Court Judge is manifestly excessive having regard to the sentencing trend for offences under section 165 of the Penal Code. In particular, the Appellant contends that cases involving smaller sums of gratification attracted substantially shorter custodial terms, and that accused persons who pleaded guilty received markedly more lenient sentences. The Appellant further advances his personal mitigation, namely his status as a first offender, his family circumstances, and his medical conditions, as grounds warranting a reduction in sentence or, alternatively, the substitution of a fine or other non custodial order in lieu of imprisonment. [98] The applicable test governing appellate intervention in matters of sentence is well settled. An appellate court will only interfere where the sentence is manifestly excessive or manifestly inadequate, where the sentencing court acted on a wrong principle of law, or where it failed to take into account relevant considerations or gave weight to irrelevant ones. The threshold is a high one. In Bhandulananda Jayatilake v PP [1982] 1 MLJ 83, the Court of Appeal articulated the governing standard in the following terms: “Is the sentence harsh and manifestly excessive? We would paraphrase it in this way. As this is an appeal against the exercise by the learned judge of a discretion vested in him, is the sentence so far outside the normal discretionary limits as to enable this court to say that its imposition must have involved an error of law of some description?” [99] The question, therefore, is not whether this court might have imposed a different sentence; it is whether the sentence passed by the learned trial judge falls so far outside the proper exercise of judicial discretion as to disclose an error of law. This is a stringent standard that the Appellant must satisfy. [100] The statutory maximum for an offence under section 165 of the Penal Code is imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years, or a fine, or both. A sentence of twenty months’ imprisonment thus falls squarely within the lawful range. The learned trial judge was not obliged to impose a sentence below the maximum merely because previous courts had done so in other cases. The Sessions Court correctly observed at paragraph [105] of the grounds of judgment that, while both parties had submitted on the trend of sentencing for section 165 offences, such trends were “only guidelines for this court to come out with a decision” and that “at the end of the day, this court had to decide on an appropriate sentence based on the particular facts and circumstances of the instant case.” [101] This is entirely consistent with the principle affirmed in Mohamed Jusoh bin Abdullah and Another v Public Prosecutor [1947] 1 LNS 73, which was applied by the learned trial judge at paragraph [106], to the effect that “no sentence could be assessed by a simple mathematical formula because many factors had to be taken into consideration based on the facts and circumstances in each case.” The learned trial judge thereafter weighed the plea in mitigation against the public interest, as represented by the prosecution, and concluded that the two considerations had to be assessed in balance which was a correct and principled approach. [102] Having regard to the specific facts and circumstances of this case, the learned trial judge identified a number of significant aggravating considerations at paragraphs [107] and [108] of the grounds of judgment. First, the Appellant had claimed trial, and the proceedings necessitated the attendance and examination of sixteen prosecution witnesses and four defence witnesses, consuming considerable court time and resources. Had the Appellant pleaded guilty and expressed genuine remorse, a shorter sentence would have been warranted; having elected to contest the matter to conclusion, no such discount was appropriate. Second, the Appellant was not a low-ranking government officer: he held the position of Director of the Maritime Zone of the MMEA, a senior and high-ranking post. [103] The Sessions Court observed at paragraph [108] that “He did not think twice about abusing his position as a Director for an enforcement agency... He was a high-ranking officer for the MMEA. As an important government agency, the MMEA was established to enforce law and order for the preservation of peace, safety and security in the Malaysian maritime zones.” Third, the gratification involved was substantial. The Appellant had initially demanded RM20,000.00 and ultimately accepted RM10,000.00 in connection with the detention of a commercial vessel. The negotiated reduction in quantum does not diminish the gravity of the initial demand or the deliberate and premeditated character of the offence. [104] The learned trial judge addressed the broader dimension of the offence at paragraph [109] of the grounds of judgment in the following terms: “Much has been said about the damaging impacts of corruption involving enforcement agencies. The economic effects on maritime business and commercial activities went beyond the accused to the erosion of trust by the public as well. What the accused did was a despicable and shameless crime impacting the nation. As such, in my view, the public interest must override the interest of the accused. A deterrent sentence must be imposed.” [105] The learned trial judge concluded at paragraph [110] that the imprisonment sentence was “just and appropriate” and was “not manifestly excessive on the facts and the circumstances of the case.” These findings demonstrate a conscious and principled exercise of the sentencing discretion. The learned trial judge correctly identified deterrence, both specific and general, as the paramount consideration, given the serious harm that corruption in enforcement agencies inflicts upon commercial activity and the public’s confidence in the administration of law. [106] I have given careful consideration to the mitigation advanced on the Appellant’s behalf. It was submitted that the Appellant was forty-four years of age, a first offender, and married with four young children. He had been suspended from duty since 23.5.2021 and during his suspension received only half of his emoluments, necessitating additional employment as a Grab driver and electrician without a steady income. He also suffered from medical conditions comprising gout, migraine, and gastritis. His counsel prayed for a fine or any other alternative without any sentence of imprisonment being imposed. These matters were expressly considered by the learned trial judge at paragraph [103] of the grounds of judgment and weighed in the balance. Nonetheless, the principle is firmly established that in corruption cases involving enforcement officers, personal mitigation cannot override the public interest in deterrence. As the High Court held in PP v Loo Choon Fatt [1976] 2 MLJ 256: “One of the main considerations in the assessment of sentence is of course the question of public interest… In deciding the appropriate sentence a court should always be guided by certain considerations. The first and foremost is the public interest. The criminal law is publicly enforced, not only with the object of punishing crime, but also in the hope of preventing it. A proper sentence, passed in public, serves the public interest in two ways. It may deter others who might be tempted to try crime as seeming to offer easy money on the supposition, that if the offender is caught and brought to justice, the punishment will be negligible.” [107] The same case further makes clear that a superior court “will not normally alter the sentence unless it is satisfied that the sentence of the lower court is either manifestly inadequate or grossly excessive or illegal or otherwise not a proper sentence… It is a firmly established practice that the Court will not alter a sentence merely because it might have passed a different sentence.” Applying this principle, the learned trial judge was entitled to place the weight of public interest above the personal circumstances of the Appellant. [108] The comparison with other section 165 cases cited by the Appellant, involving lower sums, guilty pleas, or materially different circumstances, does not establish that the sentence in the present case is manifestly excessive within the test in Bhandulananda Jayatilake. Sentencing trends furnish no more than guidelines; the calibration of an appropriate sentence must ultimately rest on the specific facts. [109] Here, those facts disclose: a senior officer of the MMEA holding the rank of Director of the Maritime Zone; a deliberately contrived scheme involving the detention of a commercial vessel as leverage; an initial demand of RM20,000.00, subsequently negotiated to RM10,000.00; a full trial contested to conclusion with twenty witnesses; and consequences that extended beyond the immediate parties to the erosion of public trust in a critical maritime enforcement agency. [110] Measured against these circumstances, a sentence of twenty months’ imprisonment, representing five-sixths of the statutory maximum, cannot be described as so far outside the range of proper judicial discretion as to disclose any error of law. The learned trial judge committed no misdirection of law or principle, took into account all relevant considerations, and excluded irrelevant ones. I decline to interfere with the sentence. This ground of appeal is dismissed. A Note on the Respondent’s Arguments [111] Having addressed the issues as raised in the Petition of Appeal, I note that the Respondent advanced arguments that bear mention independently of the Appellant’s grounds. [112] The Respondent relied on Che Din Ahmad v PP [1975] CLJU 7 for the proposition that it is not incumbent on the prosecution to prove that the money was found in the possession of the Appellant, so long as the evidence satisfies the court that it was the Appellant who received it. This principle was well applied here. The absence of the RM10,000.00 cash being recovered from the Appellant’s possession is not fatal when three eyewitness accounts of the delivery are accepted as credible. [113] The Respondent also argued that the evidence of PW11, PW13, and PW15 does not require corroboration by virtue of section 52(1) of the MACC Act 2009, and that the principle in Martin Uchenna v PP [2014] 5 MLJ 455 (Court of Appeal), that an appellate court is slow to disturb credibility findings of a trial judge, applies with full force here. [114] I accept both propositions. ORDER [115] For all the reasons set out above, I am satisfied that: a) The conviction is safe. The learned trial judge committed no reversible error of law or fact. His findings on credibility were open to a court that had the advantage of seeing and hearing the witnesses. His application of the law, including the ingredients of the offence under section 165 of the Penal Code and the statutory presumption under section 50(3) of the MACC Act 2009, was correct. The prima facie finding and the end-of-trial finding both disclosed no misdirection. b) The sentence is neither manifestly excessive nor inadequate. It was passed in the exercise of a proper judicial discretion having regard to all relevant factors. [116] Accordingly: a) The appeal against conviction is dismissed. b) The appeal against sentence is dismissed. c) The conviction of the Appellant under section 165 of the Penal Code and the sentence of twenty months’ imprisonment are affirmed. 20 February 2026 ATAN MUSTAFFA YUSSOF AHMAD Judge High Court of Malaya Johor Bahru COUNSEL: For the Appellant: Dato’ Sukri bin Hj Mohamed with Tuan Syed Muhd Syafiq bin Syed Abu Bakar Wan Haron Sukri & Nordin, PT 1180-1183, Tingkat 2, Jalan Kebun Sultan, 15350 Kota Bharu, Kelantan. Tuan Mohd Fazaly Ali bin Mohd Ghazaly The Law Chambers of Fazaly Ali, Peguambela & Peguamcara, No. 36C-1, Jalan Kolam Ayer, Taman Kolam Ayer, 80100 Johor Bahru. For the Respondent: DPP Puan Chan Lee Lee Pejabat Penasihat Undang-Undang Negeri Johor, Aras 2, Bangunan Dato’ Ja’afar Muhammad, Kota Iskandar, 79100 Nusajaya, Johor.