Schedule
Schedule 3(a) – 3rd Table at p 298, encl. 4) as compared to the total sum claimed of RM59,673,097.83 (see the summary which is tabulated at pp 283 and 284, encl. 4). In my considered view, it would be unjust for this Court to grant the declarations as sought by the Plaintiff in encl. 1 when the Defendant has raised many other issues and claims as evident in the Adjudication Claim. (g) With regards to the Plaintiff’s reliance on the SDs and the submission that the Defendant did not file any affidavit to rebut the allegations in the SDs, I was persuaded by the Defendant’s argument that the content of the SDs is hearsay evidence and the truth or otherwise of the statements in the SDs was not S/N YInncqdPIkympUecivD5w tested. Furthermore, the SDs are highly prejudicial to the Defendant (see Datuk Seri Anwar bin Ibrahim v Public Prosecutor [2014] 3 MLJ 882, Pacific & Orient Insurance Co Bhd v Thayamal a/p M Raman & Ors [2014] 7 MLJ 18 and Citibank Bhd v Pembangunan Cahaya Tulin Sdn Bhd (receivers and managers appointed) & Ors and other suits [2012] 9 MLJ 181). Therefore, the SDs are not admissible as evidence and assuming that I am wrong on this point, minimal weight is given to the SDs because no contemporaneous documents were tendered to support the statements in the SDs; the statements were not made contemporaneously with the occurrence or existence of the facts stated; and the statements are not subject to cross-examination. To be clear, the Defendant’s submissions regarding the issue of the SDs involve questions of law and the fact that the Defendant did not affirm any affidavit to challenge the SDs is of no consequence. [42] In addition, I find that the Defendant had submitted other compelling reasons to support a finding in its favour, which are as follows: (a) The Adjudication Proceedings is an exercise of a statutory right conferred by the CIPAA as envisaged by Parliament (see Martego Sdn Bhd v Arkitek Meor & Chew Sdn Bhd and another appeal [2020] 6 MLJ 224). In this regard, the Courts have taken a cautious approach and is slow to interfere with adjudication proceedings as it is an exercise of the parties’ statutory right. This is more obvious in this case where the AD has yet to be delivered. In Macly Equity Sdn Bhd v Prestii Mega Construction S/N YInncqdPIkympUecivD5w Sdn Bhd [2021] MLJU 537, Lim Chong Fong J (as His Lordship then was) said: “[25] I must therefore ensure that the objects of the CIPAA are not thwarted by unfairly restraining parties off the starting block of the statutory adjudication to have their disputes resolved swiftly. This is a policy consideration to avoid and discourage non paying parties stifling statutory adjudication initiated by unpaid parties.”. (b) A specific remedy for fraud is provided for in s 15(a) of the CIPAA where, in the event the Plaintiff is aggrieved by the outcome of the Adjudication Proceedings, it may apply to set aside the AD on the ground that the AD was improperly procured through fraud (see SG South Ltd v King's head Cirencester LLP and another [2009] EWHC 2645 (TCC), Gumi Asli Elektrikal Sdn Bhd v. Dazzling Electrical (M) Sdn Bhd & Another Case [2020] 1 LNS 189 and KPF Niaga Sdn Bhd v Vigour Builders Sdn Bhd and another case [2021] MLJU 229). The Plaintiff has cited provisions in the CJA 1964 and the RC 2012 in its applications. These are general legislations. It is trite that where a special provision is enacted, that special provision excludes the operation of a general legislation (see Lau Keen Fai v Lim Ban Kay@ Lim Chiam Boon & Anor [2012] 2 MLJ 852 and Protasco Bhd v Tey Por Yee & Another and other appeals [2021] 6 MLJ 1). S/N YInncqdPIkympUecivD5w The purpose and objective of the CIPAA have been explicated in numerous case authorities since the CIPAA came into operation [see, among others, UDA Holdings Bhd v Bisraya Construction Sdn Bhd & Anor and another case [2015] 11 MLJ 499 and Martego’s case (supra)]. If respondents in adjudication proceedings which are pending are allowed to easily resort to general statutory provisions to circumvent or suspend the process of adjudication instead of relying on the specific remedies provided under the CIPAA, except in a clear case of absolute lack of jurisdiction, this will defeat the purpose of the ClPAA in providing a speedy mechanism for settling payment problems in construction contracts even if this may be on a provisional interim basis. In Liew Piang Voon v WLT Project Management Sdn Bhd [2020] MLJU 1431, the court said: “[20] I have in Multazam Development Sdn Bhd v Felda Global Ventures Plantations (M) Sdn Bhd [2020] 6 AMR 258 stated that the extent of court intervention in statutory adjudication under the CIPAA is limited. The permissible court interventions including challenges on jurisdiction have been expressly prescribed in the statute and these challenges are only available after the adjudication decision has been made.”. S/N YInncqdPIkympUecivD5w I am in agreement with the Defendant that court intervention to halt and terminate the Adjudication Proceedings before the delivery of the AD must be sparingly entertained and this is certainly one such case. (c) As regards the Plaintiff’s submission that the Plaintiff’s application in encl. 1 has rendered the Adjudication Proceedings academic as there could be a risk of inconsistent findings being made by the Adjudicator and this Court and that the accuracy and veracity of the Progress Claims and IPC can only be determined in Suit 125, sub-s 37(1) of the CIPAA provides that a dispute in respect of payment under a construction contract may be referred concurrently to adjudication, arbitration or the court. (d) Although the Plaintiff discovered the Defendant’s purported fraud since the 2nd ACSB Report dated 10.5.2022, the Plaintiff did not make any allegation of fraud against the Defendant or take any legal action. Even when the Defendant commenced the Adjudication Proceedings, the Plaintiff did not raise the issue of fraud and instead, the Plaintiff referred to the 2nd ACSB Report and asserted that the Façade Window Works were defective works. The allegation of fraud was raised in this suit, 11 months after the purported discovery of fraud, and less than one month prior to the due date for the delivery of the AD. S/N YInncqdPIkympUecivD5w 2nd Issue: Whether the Adjudication Proceedings is unreasonable in view of the fact that the AD arising out of it is likely to be set aside under s 15(a) CIPAA or stayed under paragraph 16(1)(b) CIPAA pending the disposal of Suit 125 3rd Issue: Whether the Adjudicator has no jurisdiction to determine the Adjudication Proceedings, in view of the fraud, Suit 125, the Expert Application and the SD by the QS & Architect, which has the effect of questioning the integrity of the certification process of PC No. 38 and IPC No. 38 [43] In respect of the 2nd Issue, the Plaintiff took the position that the Adjudication Proceedings have been tainted with fraud and therefore, its decision is likely to be set aside under s 15(a) CIPAA. To continue with the prosecution of the Adjudication Proceedings in these circumstances would be a waste of time and the parties would incur abortive costs. [44] With regards to the 3rd Issue, the Plaintiff asserted that the Progress Claims and IPC have lost their ability to be enforced as the integrity of the certification process has been put to question by the alleged fraud, the Expert Application in Suit 125 and the SD by the QS. The Adjudicator having derived his jurisdiction from the Payment Claim and Payment Response, which centres around IPC No. 38, has lost his jurisdiction as IPC No. 38 is no longer reliable or enforceable, and could no longer be regarded as a validly issued certificate. S/N YInncqdPIkympUecivD5w [45] As the 2nd Issue and 3rd Issue are predicated on a finding that the Plaintiff has proven a prima facie case of fraud, and in the light of the findings of the Court in relation to the 1st Issue, primarily that the Plaintiff’s allegation of fraud has not been established, there is no necessity for the Court to consider and answer the 2nd Issue and 3rd Issue. Conclusion [46] Based on the foregoing reasons, the Plaintiff’s application in encl. was dismissed with costs in the cause and similarly, the Plaintiff’s application in encl. 1 was dismissed. The Plaintiff was ordered to pay costs of RM15,000.00 to the Defendant, subject to allocator. Dated: 7 January 2025 (ALIZA SULAIMAN) Judge High Court in Malaya Kuala Lumpur S/N YInncqdPIkympUecivD5w Counsels/ Solicitors: For the Plaintiff: Suria Juan Pillai (Sajitha Suresh with him) Messrs. Selva Mookiah & Associates Advocates & Solicitors No. 23A-02, Setia Avenue No. 2, Jalan Setia Prima S U13/S Section U13, Setia Alam 40170 Shah Alam Selangor For the Defendant: Terence Loh (Georgina Lim with him) Messrs. Belden Advocates & Solicitors Level 1B, Block B, Kompleks Pejabat Damansara Jalan Dungun Damansara Heights 50490 Kuala Lumpur S/N YInncqdPIkympUecivD5w