DS 33 to DS 27 – Laying of U Drain 900 U 1200 mm. (South Bound) We hereby issuing Notice of Delay and will closely will monitor your progress of Drainage works and if there is no any significant improvement and we will withdraw your scope of works to others without any further notification and all the cost incurred will be back charge to your accordingly. Attached are the relevant pictures indicating very slow progress of work for the past 2 months.” [32] Despite having being issued with the Notice of Delay, there was no significant improvement on the progress of works done by the Plaintiff. The delay in progress of work by the Plaintiff is evidenced by the progress claims submitted by the Plaintiff which shows that from April 2015 until November 2015, the Plaintiff had only completed 21% of the works prescribed under the sub-contract. It was not even disputed by the Plaintiff that since the end of November 2015, there was no manpower placed at site by the Plaintiff. Page 38 of 51 [33] The delay in the Plaintiff’s work was supported by the Plaintiff own witness i.e SP1 (Oon Hoon Teck – the Plaintiff’s Project Director) when he was being cross-examined by the counsel for the Defendant. Q: I put it to you Mr Oon, pursuant to progress claim no.7 as 20 November 2015, progress of works or completed works at site was only 21%. Do you agree? A: Correct. E. HIGH COURT’S DECISION UPON APPEAL [34] This Court does not hesitate to find the glaring error of the learned Sessions Court Judge in determining the parties’ dispute. For succinct understanding of this Court’s decision, the learned Sessions Court Judge’s error and misguidance can be digested in two tranches: i. Incorrect tangent and issue framed by the Sessions Court Judge; and Page 39 of 51 ii. The learned Session Court Judge’s incomplete analysis and failure to appreciate full facts, pleadings and evidence before the Sessions Court, and failure in fully examining balance of probabilities Incorrect tangent and issue framed by the Sessions Court Judge [35] At this juncture, this Court must take note that it was the Plaintiff’s pleaded case that even though the Notice of Termination was unilaterally issued by the Defendant, the Plaintiff had accepted the termination as the Plaintiff takes the stance that by December 2015, the Plaintiff had discovered that a third party was undertaking the works and using its material and thereby it was impossible for the Plaintiff to perform and continue with the Sub Contract works. [36] It is pertinent to note that the entire scheme of pleadings by both parties have no reference to the validity of the Notice of Termination or validity of the Defendant’s unilateral termination. The entire framework of the parties’ contentions largely contends of each party’s alleged breaches in either delayed works or delayed delivery of Page 40 of 51 possession, and right to appoint third party contractors. The factum of termination and validity of termination was never put to dispute and was never an issue put before the Sessions Court Judge. [37] From the Plaintiff’s own pleadings, this Court is of the considered view that the Plaintiff, apart from stating that the repudiation of the sub contract by the Defendant was done unilaterally, the Plaintiff did not challenge the unilateral repudiation. In its action against the Defendant before the learned Sessions Court, the Plaintiff had not sought any declaratory relief or remedy challenging the notice of termination issued by the Defendant. Clearly, the Plaintiff had accepted the repudiation of Sub Contract and in fact in paragraph 8 its Statement of Claim, the Plaintiff has pleaded as follows: 8……The Plaintiff accepted the Defendant’s unilateral termination. [38] Nonetheless, despite the clear stance taken by the Plaintiff regarding the termination of the Sub Contract, the learned Sessions Court had gone beyond the pleaded case of parties by framing the first issue as: Page 41 of 51 i. Whether the Notice of Termination dated 15.12.2015 was validly issued by the Appellant? [39] The first issue was framed by the learned Sessions Court Judge despite he had in his grounds of judgment stated that the Plaintiff had accepted the termination. The learned Sessions Court Judge had emphasised that the Plaintiff had accepted the termination three times in his grounds of judgment namely; in para 2, 9 and 18 which stated : “Plaintif menerima penamatan ini tetapi telah menuntut bayaran berjumlah RM 684,099.14 untuk kerja-kerja yang telah dilakukan…” [40] Contrary to the pleaded case before him and his own assertion of the Plaintiff having accepted the termination, the learned Session Court Judge had determined the entirety of the case on the misguided issue of the validity of the termination (which again, was not an issue put before the learned Sessions Court Judge). Page 42 of 51 [41] This Court cannot ignore the trite law that parties are bound by their own pleadings. (See: i. ANJALAI AMMAL & ANOR v ABDUL KAREEM [1969] 1 MLJ 22 ii. GIGA ENGINEERING & CONSTRUCTION SDN BHD v YIP CHEE SENG & SONS SDN BHD & ANOR [2015] 6 MLJ 449.) [42] This Court agrees with the counsel for the Appellant that the learned Sessions Court was wrong when he made a finding that the termination of the Plaintiff’s employment under the Sub Contract was wrongful when the validity of termination is not even an issue put before him. The Plaintiff had conceded and accepted the termination. [43] Now, the error by the Learned Sessions Court Judge is this: He had canvassed the Defendant’s alleged failure to deliver site possession against an unpleaded issue (being the validity of termination). [44] In the case of Iftikar Ahmed Khan (as the executor of the estate for Sardar Mohd Roshan Khan, deceased) v Perwira Affin Bank Page 43 of 51 Bhd (previously known as Perwira Habib Bank Malaysia Bhd) [2018] 2 MLJ 292), the Federal Court has held that: “ A decision based on an issue which was not raised by the parties in their pleadings is liable to be set aside: Yew Wan Leong v Lai Kok Chye [1990] 2 MLJ 152. In The Chartered Bank v Yong Chan[1974] 1 MLJ 157 the Federal Court set aside the judgment of the trial judge as it was decided on an issue not raised on the pleadings. In that case the trial judge erred in concluding that the pleadings included a claim for breach of contract as well as a claim for libel.” [45] Thus, it is already clear at this juncture that the Learned Sessions Court Judge has determined the case based on an unpleaded issue before the Court. Page 44 of 51 The learned Session Court Judge’s incomplete analysis and failure to appreciate full facts, pleadings and evidence before the Sessions Court, and failure in fully examining balance of probabilities [46] Now, the entire breadth (though brief) of the learned Session’s Court Judge’s decision is wholly and singularly premised on the Defendant’s alleged breach in failure to deliver site possession in time. Now, it is pertinent to note that by balance of probabilities, it is incumbent for the learned Sessions Court Judge to do the balancing act between two probable contentions and assertions. One being the alleged breach by the Plaintiff in failing to perform the contract diligently and two, being the alleged breach by the Defendant in failing to fully deliver site possession in time. [47] Thus, this is a circumstance in which it is crucial for the judge to make a full appreciation of all of the parties’ contention, in determining, of the two breaches, which one is more probable than not to be the most real and reasonable catalyst in causing breakdown of the Page 45 of 51 contract. Thus, it is a grave err for the learned Sessions Court Judge to simply draw a hypothesis that ‘there is delay in delivering site possession and therefore there shall be reasonable delay in contract works’. The analysis must be in proper depth and cannot be dealt with in such a superficial manner. [48] If the learned Sessions Court Judge is willing to indulge in the reasonableness of the Plaintiff’s delay of works (which is a breach), then, in fairness and on the basis of balance of probability, the learned Sessions Court Judge should also indulge in the reasonableness of the Defendant’s inability of delivering full site possession to the Plaintiff (which is equally a breach). And this is the exact balancing act and factual appreciation that the learned Sessions Court Judge had unfortunately failed to do. [49] There is not an iota of mention of the Defendant’s side of the dispute on whether or not it is reasonable for the Defendant to be expected to grant full access of the site owing to the fact that the contract revolves Page 46 of 51 around works which is situated in a premise which is heavily laden with traffic and traffic congestions. [50] There is not an iota of discussion on whether or not the delay of the Plaintiff’s work was solely caused by the Defendant’s delay in delivering site possession. The factum of the Plaintiff’s sufficiency or insufficiency of workforce and staff was never put to the balancing act. [51] There was never any discussion and analysis on the Plaintiff’s work rate or performance notwithstanding the delay in site delivery. It might have equally been the case that the Plaintiff’s work in and of itself was slow and was not necessarily caused by the Defendant’s delay in delivering site possession. And this probability is even more crucial to be examined considering the Plaintiff’s delay in works is not only pertaining to the North Bound site, but also the South Bound site. [52] There must have been an in-depth examination (which was totally absent in the learned Sessions’ Court Judge’s decision) on the Page 47 of 51 Plaintiff’s own performance, work rate and sufficiency of workforce especially considering the delay in works also occurred in the South Bound site which the Plaintiff has never complained of insufficient access or delay in site possession. [53] It must have piqued the curiosity of the learned Sessions Court Judge (which it unfortunately has not) on why was there a delay in the Plaintiff’s works in the South Bound Site although there were never any complaints of insufficient access or delay in site possession by the Plaintiff. Verily here, the Plaintiff’s own diligence and work rate begs to be questioned (which the Learned Sessions Court Judge has failed to examine and analyse). [54] It is plain to see that it is incumbent for the Plaintiff, to prove that it has been diligent in its works and its works were only delayed by the delay in site possession, and vice versa, it is equally incumbent for the Defendant to prove that it is reasonable for the Defendant to give partial access and the Plaintiff instead was not diligently pursuing its work. Page 48 of 51 [55] Furthermore, there were also pleaded facts and documents tendered regarding the parties’ knowledge on the sites’ access or “site conditions” even on the contract documents themselves. There should have been (which there is not any) full deliberation and appreciation of facts and evidence on the parties’ knowledge on the actual or reasonable access and site conditions which could be expected under the contract document themselves. It was not deliberated at all by the learned Sessions Court Judge on the parties’ consensus, awareness and understanding on the extent of site access that the Plaintiff can and contractually can expect to be delivered. Without any basis and reference to any specific term of document or document in and of itself, the learned Sessions Court Judge simply declared that it was agreed in full consensus that the Defendant should have given 100% access to the site (notwithstanding traffic conditions and congestions) to the Plaintiff. Until and unless the Sessions Court Judge has properly referred to proper documents and evidence, this finding remain as a bare unsubstantiated finding by the Court. Succinctly, there is a gross absence of meaningful deliberation on what actually is “akses yang sepatutnya” or agreed “site conditions”. Page 49 of 51 [56] And these are the exact balancing acts that the learned Sessions Court Judge had failed to observe in disposing the case on the balance of probabilities. The learned Sessions Court Judge have not at all discussed the probabilities and reasonableness of each parties’ contention and had merely latched onto an incomplete and isolated hypothesis. And this is the exact hypothesis that the learned Sessions Court Judge had failed to test against the full facts, pleadings, and evidence before the Court. [57] Thus, there is already a glaring error in the learned Sessions Court Judge’s decision on liability. Thereto, logically gleaning from the learned Sessions Court Judge wrongful finding of liability, then the learned Sessions Court Judge’s finding on damages must also be in error. It is impossible for this Court to even consider the learned Sessions Court Judge’s finding on damages when it is already clear that the learned Sessions Court Judge is not even fully abreast with or fully appreciative of the facts, pleadings, and evidence before the Court. Page 50 of 51 [58] Likewise, in dismissing the Defendant’s counter claim, the Sessions Court had dismissed the counter claim solely on the ground that the termination of the Sub Contract was wrongful. There was no judicial appreciation by the Sessions Court on evidence which has been produced either oral or documentary in respect of Defendant’s entitlement for recover its costs for engaging new contractors to finish the incomplete job of the Plaintiff. [59] In this circumstances, it is therefore appropriate for this Court to exercise its powers of appellate intervention and disturb the findings of the learned Sessions Court. [60] In the present appeal, having considered the grounds (or lack thereof) on which the learned Sessions Court has made his findings, this Court finds that the decision of the Sessions Court must be set aside entirely. Hence, the appeal by the Appellant and the Cross Appeal by Respondent is allowed. Page 51 of 51 [61] Hence, this case shall be remitted back to the Sessions Court and to be heard before another Sessions Court Judge. [62] Finally, this Court orders that there will be no order as to costs in respect of both the appeal and the cross appeal. ………………………………………………………………………. (AZIMAH BINTI OMAR) Judge High Court of Kuala Lumpur 8 July 2019 For the Plaintiff - Messrs. Harold & Lam Partnership Rohan Arasoo Jeyabalah Teoh Yen Yee For the Defendant -