Mudajaya Corporation Berhad v Topway Builders Sdn Bhd (BA-24C-56-10/2025)

There are two originating summonses before this Court which were heard together :- S/N ho85HuMGCkWyqTvoP7Axcg

BA-24C-56-10/2025 (“OS 56”) which is an application by Mudajaya Corporation Berhad (“Mudajaya”) to set aside an adjudication decision dated 118.9.2025 pursuant to s.15(b) and s.15(d) of the Construction Industry Payment and

(ii) BA-24C-61-10/2025 (“OS 61”), an application by Topway Builders Sdn Bhd (“Topway”) to enforce the said decision as a judgement of this Court under s.28 CIPAA.

By virtue of an Order dated 30.10.2025 both applications were heard together as they arise from the same Adjudication Decision dated 18.9.2025 (the AD”).

Vide the AD, the Adjudicator awarded Topway the sum of RM341,242.57 and adjudication costs of RM53,401.51.

On 28.4.2026, I dismissed OS 56 with costs whilst allowing OS 61 with costs.

Not satisfied, Mudajaya appealed against both decisions. I set below my grounds for dismissing OS 56 and allowing OS 61.

This case yet again, exemplifies the narrow supervisory jurisdiction of this Court under Section 15 of the Construction Industry Payment and Adjudication Act 2012 (“CIPAA”). S/N ho85HuMGCkWyqTvoP7Axcg

Mudajaya premised its application to set aside the AD on S. 15 (b) & (d) of CIPAA in that :-

there has been a denial of natural justice; and

(ii) the adjudicator has acted in excess of jurisdiction.

The relevant cause papers for OS 56 are as follows:-

Mudajaya’s Affidavit in Support affirmed by Chew Chee Wai on 7.10.2025 (Enclosures 2-5);

(ii) Topway’s Affidavit in Reply affirmed by Chin Kee Chuan on 29.10.2025 (Enclosure 13); and

(iii) Mudajaya’s Reply Affidavit affirmed by Chew Chee Wai on 8.11.2025 (Enclosure 15). OS 61

This application is made by TBSB to enforce the AD and the relevant cause papers are as follows :-

Topway’s Affidavit in Support affirmed by Chin Kee Chuan on 29.1.2025 (Enclosure 2);

(ii) Mudajaya’s Affidavit in Reply affirmed by Chew Chee Wai on 18.11.2025 (Enclosure 6-10); and

(iii) Topway’s Affidavit in Reply affirmed by Chin Kee Chuan on 3.12.2025 (Enclosure 11). S/N ho85HuMGCkWyqTvoP7Axcg

12.

Parties agreed that the contractual relationship between parties are governed by the LoA and, inter alia, the General Conditions of the Subcontract (“the General Conditions”) and the Bill of Quantities (“BQ”).

Topway’s appointment as a subcontractor was subsequently terminated by Mudajaya via a Notice of Termination dated 4.11.2024.

Following the termination and in accordance with Clause 9(a) of the LoA, Topway submitted its Progress Claim No. 11 dated 16.1.2025 for RM341,242.57, purportedly calculated based on the agreed quantities in the Joint Measurement Sheet (“JMS”) for the period between January 2024- September 2024 which were verified, approved and accepted by Topway, Mudajaya and the employer of the project prior to termination, and in accordance with the contractual rates set out in the BQ.

No certification for payment was issued, nor was any payment made by Mudajaya within the 30-day period stipulated under Clause 9(a) S/N ho85HuMGCkWyqTvoP7Axcg of the Letter of Award (“LoA”). This consequently necessitated Topway to issue Invoice No. TBSB/MJSB/P019/INV/2024-0011 dated 21.2.2025 in the sum of RM341,242.57.

As payment was not forthcoming, Topway invoked the statutory adjudication mechanism under CIPAA.

The chronology of the Adjudication Proceedings under CIPAA are as follows :-

Topway served a Payment Claim dated 18.4.2025 for a claim of RM341,242.57;

(ii) Topway filed the Notice of Adjudication dated 6.5.2025;

(iii) Topway filed its Adjudication Claim dated 9.7.2025;

(iv) Mudajaya filed its Adjudication Response dated 23.7.2025;

Topway submit is Adjudication Reply dated 30.7.2025;

(vi) the Adjudicator delivered the AD dated 18.9.2025 where the Adjudicator allowed Topway’s claim of RM341,242.57 and the adjudication cost of RM53,401.51. Legal Framework of CIPAA

The Construction Industry Payment and Adjudication Act 2012 (“CIPAA”), which came into force on 15th April 2014, was introduced to address payment disputes within the construction industry, its primary objective being to facilitate regular and timely payment for construction work. S/N ho85HuMGCkWyqTvoP7Axcg

Under the Act, the adjudication mechanism established under CIPAA is intended to provide a speedy and interim dispute resolution process.

Zulkefli Ahmad Makinudin PCA in View Esteem Sdn Bhd v Bina Puri Holdings Berhad (2018) 2 MLJ 22 held that : “[6] It is noted that CIPAA was enacted to introduce statutory adjudication to address lengthy payment times that affected the contractors in the Construction Industry. It is intended as an interim measure to ease the contractors’ cash flow.”

CIPAA under S. 15 provides very limited circumstances in which an adjudication decision may be set aside.

Section 15 of CIPAA provides as follows :-

Improperly Procured Adjudication Decision An aggrieved party may apply to the High Court to set aside an adjudication decision on one or more of the following grounds:

The adjudication decision was improperly procured through fraud or bribery;

There has been a denial of natural justice;

The adjudicator has not acted independently or impartially; or

The adjudicator has acted in excess of his jurisdiction. S/N ho85HuMGCkWyqTvoP7Axcg

When considering an application under this provision, the Court is not required to delve into the facts of the dispute and / or look into or review the merits of the case. It follows that the Court must adopt a minimalist intervention and in the words of the Court of Appeal in the case of ACFM Engineering & Construction Sdn Bhd v Esstar Vision Sdn Bhd and another appeal [2016] MLJU 1776, the Court’s function is simply to look at the manner at which the Adjudicator conducted the hearing and whether the Adjudicator had committed an error of law during that process, such error relates to whether he had accorded procedural fairness to the parties.

Further, in the case of Enra Engineering and Fabrication Sdn Bhd v Gemula Sdn Bhd and another case [2020] 7 MLJ 482 where it was held that: “[61] In Bina Puri Construction Sdn Bhd v Hing Nyit Enterprise Sdn Bhd [2016] 7 MLJcon 119; [2015] MLJU 941, the High Court dismissed the applicant’s application to set aside the adjudication decision which was granted in favour of the claimant subcontractor in the adjudication proceedings. Ravinthran Paramaguru J observed as follows: [9] … It must be noted that under CIPAA, there is no right of appeal against the decision of the adjudicator which is interim in nature or of temporary finality only. Section 15 has provided limited grounds on which the decision of the adjudicator may be set aside. Since an application under s 15 is not an appeal, the decision of the adjudicator cannot be reviewed on merits … [12] … As I said earlier, s 15 does not envisage that the decision of the adjudication can be reviewed on its merits. Therefore, it is immaterial if the adjudicator had erred in his finding of facts. The decision of an adjudicator is only of temporary finality pending final S/N ho85HuMGCkWyqTvoP7Axcg settlement of accounts. In the premises, unless there is a clear cut breach of natural justice or excess of jurisdiction, the court should be slow to set aside the decision of the adjudicator.”

It bears emphasis that the grounds for setting aside an adjudication decision under s.15 of CIPAA are circumscribed. In this regard, it is instructive to consider the observations of Lee Swee Seng J in PCP Construction Sdn Bhd v Leap Modulation Sdn Bhd and other suits (2017) MLJU 905, where His Lordship elaborated on the governing principles applicable to applications to set aside an adjudication decision: “[22] There are very limited grounds for setting aside an Adjudication Decision under section 15 CIPAA, with the common grounds being that under section 15(b) in that there has been a breach of natural justice or under section 15(d) in that the Adjudicator has acted in excess of his jurisdiction. [27] I agree with the Claimant that an adjudication decision may only be set aside if:

the learned Adjudicator has failed to answer the question referred to her or she has answered a question which was not referred to her; or

the manner in which she has gone about her task is obviously unfair; which may then amount to one of the grounds under

This Court also found reference to the case of Terminal Perintis Sdn Bhd v Tan Ngee Hong Construction Sdn Bhd and another case [2017] MLJU 242 where again Lee Swee Seng J held that the Court would uphold the decision made by the adjudicator unless it S/N ho85HuMGCkWyqTvoP7Axcg can be proven that the said decision was made by the Adjudicator not in compliance within the prescribed law under CIPAA: “[48] I do not think the position under our CIPAA is materially different. Looking at the grounds for setting aside an Adjudication Decision, one can say that a Court of law would uphold the Decision unless it can be shown that it was procured through fraud or bribery, or that there was a breach of natural justice or that the Adjudicator was not independent or impartial or that the Adjudicator had acted in excess of jurisdiction or that the Decision was not in compliance with the provisions of CIPAA.”

Further, Wong Kian Kheong J in Alpha Galaxy Sdn Bhd v Euro Destar (M) Sdn Bhd & Anor [2021] 1 LNS 640; MLRHU 539 also provided the scope of power lies with the Court provided by Section 15 of CIPAA as below: “Scope Of Court's Power Under Section 15 CIPAA [26] This case serves as a reminder of the nature of the court's power in deciding an application under s 15 CIPAA (Setting Aside Application). I am of the following view regarding a Setting Aside Application:

an adjudication decision is provisional under s 13(a) to (c) CIPAA. The High Court may set aside an adjudication decision:-

if the adjudicator has no jurisdiction to adjudicate the matter - please refer to Uzma Engineering Sdn Bhd v. Khan Co Ltd [2020] MLRHU 992, at [22]; and/or

there is proof of any one or more of the circumstances stipulated in s 15(a) to (d) read with s 13(a) CIPAA; and S/N ho85HuMGCkWyqTvoP7Axcg

a Setting Aside Application is not an appeal to the High Court against an adjudication decision. Nor is a Setting Aside Application a Judicial Review of an adjudication decision. Accordingly, the court in a Setting Aside Application cannot review the merits of an adjudication decision and cannot set aside an adjudication decision merely on any one or more of the following grounds:-

an error of law has been committed by an adjudicator (unless the adjudicator has answered a "wrong" question of law which does not arise from the dispute to be adjudicated upon) - please see the judgment of Lee Swee Seng J (as he then was) in the High Court case of Econpile

(M) Sdn Bhd v. IRDK Ventures Sdn Bhd & Another Case [2016] MLRHU 212; [2017] 7 MLJ 732; [2016] 5 CLJ 882, at [71];

an adjudicator has interpreted erroneously a provision in the construction contract - Econpile, at [67];

an adjudicator has misconstrued relevant documents;

relevant evidence has been wrongly excluded by an adjudicator;

an adjudicator has erroneously admitted irrelevant evidence;

an adjudicator has failed to attach due weight to relevant evidence, oral or documentary;

undue weight has been given by an adjudicator to any piece of evidence;

an adjudicator has assessed erroneously the evidence presented to the adjudicator;

a plain error regarding a finding of fact has been made by an adjudicator;

an adjudicator has omitted to make a finding of fact which can be adequately supported by evidence; S/N ho85HuMGCkWyqTvoP7Axcg

an erroneous finding of mixed fact and law has been arrived at by an adjudicator - please refer to Lee Swee Seng J's decision in the High Court in Syarikat Bina Darul Aman Berhad & Anor v. Government Of Malaysia [2017] 4 MLRH 506; [2018] 4 CLJ 248, at [60];

an adjudicator has made a wrong inference from the evidence;

an adjudicator has erroneously omitted to make the right inference from the evidence;

errors have been made in the reasons given by an adjudicator in support of the adjudication decision; and

an adjudicator has erred in his or her reasoning with regard to the adjudication decision.”

In Guangxi Dev & Cap Sdn Bhd v Sycal Bhd & Anor (appeal)

1 CLJ 592, the Court of Appeal emphasised that a finding of breach of natural justice must relate to a material breach affecting the outcome. At paragraph 32, the Court of Appeal held as follows:- “This brings us to the final issue of whether the breach of natural justice was a material breach. It is accepted law that any breach of natural justice must not be peripheral but must be a material breach affecting the outcome of the resolution of the dispute (see Cantillon Ltd v. Urvasco Ltd [2008] EWHC 282 (TCC). However, in determining this question, it is not necessary to investigate all the facts to decide if the adjudicator would have arrived at a different conclusion if the matters included in the response were considered. All that needs to be considered is whether there was a real possibility of a different conclusion (see CJP Builders Ltd v. William Verry Ltd [2008] EWHC 2015 (TCC)).” S/N ho85HuMGCkWyqTvoP7Axcg Analysis of OS 56 (Setting Aside of AD) Issues for Determination

The principal grounds advanced by Mudajaya in support of its application to set aside the AD under s.15(b) and 15(d) of CIPAA may be summarised as follows:–

that the Adjudicator lacked jurisdiction and/or had acted in excess of his jurisdiction under s. 15(d) as the sum claimed was not “due’’ within the meaning of Section 5 of CIPAA;

(ii) that there was a denial and/or breach of natural justice under s. 15 (b) when the Adjudicator failed to consider Majujaya’s defence and/or set-off and/or backcharges.

There was also an attack on the AD being a “non-speaking” decision thereby rendering the same unreasoned contrary to s. 12(4) of CIPAA and that the AD did not state the manner of payment of the adjudicated sum contrary to s. 12 (5) of CIPAA.

I shall deal with each issue in turn.

The Adjudicator acted in excess of jurisdiction (s. 15(d))

Mudajaya contended that the Adjudicator acted in excess of his contingent jurisdiction because the sum claimed by Topway in the S/N ho85HuMGCkWyqTvoP7Axcg adjudication proceedings was not "due" within the meaning of Section 5 of CIPAA.

S. 5 (2) of CIPAA provides that : “The payment claim shall be in writing and shall include –

the amount claimed and due date for payment of the amount claimed;

details to identify the cause of action including the provision in the construction contract to which the payment relates;

description of the work or services to which the payment relates;

a statement that it is made under the Act.”

Mudajaya advanced the argument that as Progress Claim No. 11 (“PC 11”) was issued by Topway post termination, the subsequent Invoice issued would necessarily attract the provisions of Clause 18 LoA and Clause 26.7 General Conditions where the post-termination payment regime would apply namely that payment(s) are suspended until the issuance of a Certificate of Making Good Defects (“CMGD”).

A perusal of the Adjudication Claim confirms that Topway’s claim was premised on the following matters, presented in the chronology set out therein:–

(i)

4.11.2024 : Termination of Topway by Mudajaya

(ii)

16.1.2025 : PC 11 issued by Topway to Mudajaya for an amount of RM341,242,57

(iii)

27.2.2025 : Invoice issued by Topway to Mudajaya for an amount of RM341,242,57 S/N ho85HuMGCkWyqTvoP7Axcg

Topway relied on Clause 9 of the LoA as the basis of its cause of action. The relevant portion of Clause 9 is reproduced below . “9. Interim Payment The Subcontractor shall prepare all necessary document for submission in request for interim claim as follows :- a) The Subcontractor shall prepare and submit a monthly written interim payment application (IPA) of the work done on the 15th of each month as the cut-off date and submit to the Contractor in the form approved by the Contractor. Within 30 days from the cut-off date, the Contractor shall issue an interim progress certificate (IPC)… b) The Contractor will process the Subcontractor payment after receiving the invoice. Payment will be made forty-five (45) days thereafter… c) The certified payment shall be based on the actual progress of work done and supported by joint measurement sheet (JMS) and site inspection request (SIR) certified by Contractor/SO’s Representative/ Quantity Surveyor including value of 76% of material delivered to site…”

Evidently, PC 11 and the subsequent Invoice issued by Topway were supported by the accumulated Joint Measurement Sheet (JMS) dating January – September 2024, 2 months prior to the cessation of Topway’s appointment as the subcontractor.

Mudajaya’s main objection in relation to both PC 11 and the Invoice is that both documents were issued after the termination of the contract. Mudajaya further contends that PC 11 was, in substance, a final claim for work carried out up to 16.1.2025. S/N ho85HuMGCkWyqTvoP7Axcg

The Adjudicator dealt with Topway’s claim at page 5 of the AD in the following manner : “ii. Claimant’s Claim of RM341,242.57 This Progress Claim No. 11 based on Joint Measurement Sheet (JMS) from Jan 2024 to Sept 2024 (referred to in CBOD 2 & CBOD 3) which had clear quantities of work and they have been jointly signed by the Claimant’s, Respondent’s and Employer’s representatives and furthermore, these have been the basis for payment of the previous Progress Claims to the Claimant. The Respondent in Para 64 of the Adjudication Response argued that PC 11 was submitted in Jan 2025 which is about 3 months after the termination of the Subcontract. I do not see any problem/conflict in this Progress Claim which is based on JMS certified prior to termination. Termination does not mean the Respondent is exempt from paying for work done before that date. The argument that the JMS is insufficient to justify payment also does not hold water as the quantities of work until Sept 2024 has been validated and endorsed by the representatives of the 3 parties. This claim is not for work done after the last JMS dated 30th Sept 2024 until termination. Therefore, I find this Claimant’s PC No. 11 amounting to RM341,242.57 valid and due for payment by the Respondent.” [emphasis added]

In determining whether the Payment Claim discloses a sum “due” within the meaning of Section 5(2) of CIPAA, this Court does not proceed on the mere existence of work done or quantified.

The operative inquiry is whether, on a proper construction of the LoA and the General Conditions, Topway had an accrued and presently S/N ho85HuMGCkWyqTvoP7Axcg enforceable entitlement to payment at the time the Payment Claim was issued.

In this regard, although the Adjudicator was of the view that Topway’s appointment was validly terminated, the evidence established that the claim advanced in the adjudication was confined to work completed and jointly measured prior to termination, as reflected in the Joint Measurement Sheets agreed by the parties.

Whether Clause 18 of the LoA and Clause 26.7 of the General Conditions operate to defer payment following termination was itself a disputed question of contractual construction placed before the Adjudicator. The existence of competing interpretations does not deprive the Adjudicator of jurisdiction to determine which interpretation should prevail. Nothing in the post-termination provisions, including Clause 18 of the LOA and Clause 26.7 of the General Conditions, expressly extinguishes or defers payment for such pre-termination certified work; rather, those provisions regulate the ascertainment of the final account and residual balances, and do not operate to retrospectively suspend sums which have already accrued under the interim payment mechanism.

The dispute referred to the Adjudicator concerned the valuation of work done prior to termination. The Adjudicator evaluated the evidence, specifically the JMS accepted by all parties, and concluded that the sum was for work already verified and validated. S/N ho85HuMGCkWyqTvoP7Axcg

The Adjudicator, in substance, accepted that the claim as one grounded on pre-termination entitlement, and determined that the contractual payment period had lapsed without payment.

Whether that conclusion is right or wrong on the merits is not the present concern. The critical point in that the dispute was whether such pre-termination work was payable notwithstanding termination falls squarely within the Adjudicator’s jurisdiction to determine.

Even if the Adjudicator erred in his interpretation of the contract or his assessment of the "due date," such an error is one made within jurisdiction. As emphasized in Terminal Perintis Sdn Bhd v Tan Ngee Hong Construction Sdn Bhd [2017] MLJU 242, the Court should not interfere with the merits of the Adjudicator’s findings under the guise of a jurisdictional challenge.

Accordingly, this is not a case of a non-existent or premature claim, but at its highest a contest on contractual interpretation, valuation and fact finding, which does not engage Section 15(d) of CIPAA

(ii) Denial of Natural Justice (s. 15(b))

Mudajaya submitted that the Adjudicator failed to consider material defences, specifically backcharges for electricity (RM1,182.20), 3rd Party completion costs (estimated at RM2,372,601.90), and rectification costs for defective works (RM6,500).

An adjudicator is not required to address every submission exhaustively and with forensic precision, it suffices that the AD demonstrates that the issue was considered. S/N ho85HuMGCkWyqTvoP7Axcg

At page 3 of the AD, the Adjudicator addressed Mudajaya’s issues of completion costs of 3rd Party and rectification costs. “In item(vi) The Respondent’s Counter Claims and/or Set Off, the Respondent alleged that the Claimant’s failure and/or negligence had caused the delays which caused the Respondent having to employ a third party contractor Ikrar Jaya Bina Sdn Bhd to continue the with the Subcontract work left over by the Claimant and to the date of the Adjudication Response, the Respondent stated that they had paid out a sum of RM4,985,256.79 to third party contractor Ikrar Jaya Bina Sdn Bhd and that the Claimant is liable for this sum paid. The Respondent also reiterated their entitlement to the backcharge of RM6,500 for the rectification of the defective cement screed & damaged GI conduit at L1 & M1.”

The AD read fairly shows that the Adjudicator did consider Mudajaya’s contention of backcharges and the 3rd Party completion costs but rejected them. At page 5 of the AD, the Adjudicator found that the Counter Claims and/or Set Offs were not justified. “iii. Respondent’s Counter Claims and/or Set Offs … Further, this Counter Claim/Set Off had obviously be put together in a haphazard manner and as an afterthought in response to the Adjudication Claim, eg in Para 101 of the Adjudication Response, the Respondent alleged that there is a calculation difference between the Claimant’s Claim & the Respondent’s certificate but did not provide any proof or reference as to the difference. Then in para 103, the Respondent stated a sum of RM600,500.31 is unjustifiable and without basis but Tab 33 of the RBOD (12 pages long with probably more than 100 numbers) which they referred to does not contain any figure of 600,500.31. The Respondent also raised the issue of losses due to the Claimant’s failure to complete their work from Para 104 to 109. Tab 34 of the RBOD just shows invoices and payments to the third party contractors without S/N ho85HuMGCkWyqTvoP7Axcg any reference to the Claimant’s list of remaining responsibilities or the like and I cannot reconcile them in any way in order to process these claims, let alone justify them. Lastly, with regards to the backcharge of RM6,500 for the rectification of the defective cement screed and damaged GI conduit at L1 and M1, I am not persuaded that the Claimant is liable for this; mainly because I find it difficult to understand why it took the Respondent a period of 7 months to discover this defect and in the Adjudication Reply, the Claimant had even found evidence (Pg 256 of CBOD1) that LNC Technologies Sdn Bhd, the third party contractor were the contractor that carried out the works to begin with. In conclusion, I am not persuaded that these Counter Claims and/or Set-Offs are justified.” [Emphasis added]

It is evident that not only had the Adjudicator considered Mudajaya’s contention of backcharges and the 3rd Party completion costs, the Adjudicator had rejected them on the grounds of:-

being “haphazard and an afterthought”;

(ii) failure of the Respondent to link the 3rd Party contractor work to complete the works left by Topway as there was no “reference to the Claimant’s list of remaining responsibilities” ; and

(iii) not only Mudajaya took an unreasonably long time to identify the defective cement screed but there was evidence to show that “LNC Technologies Sdn Bhd, the third party contractor were the contractor that carried out the works to begin with.”

At its highest, I find that the complaints above relate to either the weight attributed to the evidence or the sufficiency of reasoning. S/N ho85HuMGCkWyqTvoP7Axcg Either way, an alleged failure to give weight to a particular contention is a merits complaint, are not reviewable and not a breach of natural justice.

As such, it is clear that the Adjudicator applied his mind to the defences but found them wanting in terms of evidentiary proof.

Dissatisfaction with the weight accorded to evidence or the conclusions drawn therefrom does not constitute a breach of natural justice.

The absence of demonstrable prejudice is fatal to a complaint under S. 15 (b) of CIPAA. I therefore find that there was no denial of natural justice under this complaint.

In my judgment, this ground amounts to disagreement with the Adjudicator’s reasoning and it does not amount to a denial of natural justice.

Thus, the complaint fell short of the threshold required under S. 15(b) of CIPAA. Consequently, the challenge under S.15 (b) of CIPAA failed.

(iii) Non-speaking AD

The complaint by Mudajaya was that the Adjudicator has failed to state his reasons in the AD for allowing Topway’s claim and rejecting Mudajaya’s defence, and also that the Adjudicator has failed to state the manner of payment of the adjudicated sum. S/N ho85HuMGCkWyqTvoP7Axcg

According to Mudajaya the AD was in breach of s. 12(4) of CIPAA which requires “the adjudication decision shall be made in writing and shall contain reasons for such decision unless the requirement for reasons is dispensed with by parties.”

Whilst s. 12 (4) requires reasons, the threshold is minimal. Even brief reasons suffice. The brevity of the AD does not equate to it being non-speaking.

As the reasons for allowing Topway’s claim and the rejection of Mudajaya’s backcharges and completion costs by the 3rd Party by the Adjudicator were reproduced in full at paragraphs 40 and 53 above, I am unable to accept Mudajaya’s contention that the Adjudicator has failed to provide reasons in the AD.

As such, I find that the Adjudicator has provided discernible basis for his findings at paragraphs (ii) and (iii) of his AD (as set out verbatim above) by referencing to the JMS in allowing Topway’s claim and explaining why he rejected Mudajaya’s defence.

Mudajaya further argued that the AD failed to stipulate the time and manner of payment as required under Section 12(5) of CIPAA.

Regarding the time for payment of the adjudicated sum, I refer to Pasukhas Sdn Bhd v Empire Multiple Sdn Bhd [2019] MLJU 1393, which unequivocally held that in the absence of a stipulated date for payment in the AD, it implies that payment is due forthwith or within the statutory timeframe. It does not render the decision void. S/N ho85HuMGCkWyqTvoP7Axcg

When reviewed in its entirety, Mudajaya’s case is an attempt to challenge the Adjudicator’s evaluation of evidence presented, and revisit factual findings.

Such matters lie outside the scope of S. 15 of CIPAA.

Having carefully considered the affidavits and submissions, I am satisfied that :-

Mudajaya was accorded procedural fairness throughout the adjudication process;

(ii) the Adjudicator had acted within the jurisdiction conferred by CIPAA; and

(iii) the complaints advanced are, in substance, attempts to reopen the merits of the AD.

This Court will not interfere with an AD unless one of the limited statutory grounds under S. 15 is clearly made out. That threshold has not been met in the present case.

CIPAA is designed to ensure cash flow in the construction industry through swift adjudication process. The Court’s role is supervisory, not appellate. Unless a clear case of procedural injustice or jurisdictional transgression is established, the Adjudicator’s decision must stand.

In summary, Mudajaya’s complaints are essentially merits-based objections disguised as jurisdictional or procedural errors. The S/N ho85HuMGCkWyqTvoP7Axcg Adjudicator acted within the scope of his authority and accorded both parties a fair opportunity to present their respective cases.

S. 28(1) of CIPAA states as follows: Enforcement of adjudication decision as judgment “A party may enforce an adjudication decision by applying to the High Court for an order to enforce the adjudication decision as if it is a judgment or order of the High Court.”

In Inai Kiara Sdn Bhd v Puteri Nusantara Sdn Bhd (2019) 2 CLJ 229, the Court of Appeal held that the court may exercise its discretion to grant leave under S.28(1) and (2) of CIPAA to enforce an adjudication decision if 3 conditions are met :-

the adjudication decision has been made in favour of the party applying for leave;

(ii) the party against whom an adjudication decision has been made, has failed to pay the adjudicated amount on the date specified in the adjudication decision; and

(iii) there is no prohibition on the court’s discretionary power to grant leave to enforce the adjudication decision.

As there are no merits in the setting aside application, the AD remains valid and in force which remained unpaid by Mudajaya to Topway. S/N ho85HuMGCkWyqTvoP7Axcg

The threshold laid down by the Court of Appeal in Inai Kiara has accordingly been met by Topway for an enforcement order under S. 28 of CIPAA.

The following orders were made on 28.4.2026 :-

OS 56 is dismissed with cost of RM10,000 to be paid by Mudajaya Corporation Berhad to Topway Builders Sdn Bhd, subject to allocator fee.;

(ii) OS 61 is allowed with cost of RM5,000 to be paid by Mudajaya Corporation Berhad to Topway Builders Sdn Bhd, subject to allocator fee. Dated : 15th June 2026 t.t ………………………………………… Shahriza Zalina Binti Abdul Shukor Judicial Commissioner High Court of Malaya Shah Alam For Mudajaya : Felicia Lai Wai Kim (Harold Lam & Partnership) For Topway Builders : Yeoh Leng Yang Yew Ansen (PDK) (Messrs. YY Chin & Co.) S/N ho85HuMGCkWyqTvoP7Axcg