Muhamad Aliff Farhan Bin Mohd Faizal (CB-83-175-06/2025)

On 13 June 2025, the Accused was charged for an offence under subsection 42(1) of the Road Transport Act 1987 (“RTA”).

The Accused understood the charge and pleaded guilty. His guilty plea was accepted and the Accused was convicted as charged.

As the Accused was a youthful offender, learned Counsel for the Accused (“Counsel”) applied for an adjournment pending a probation report from a Probation Officer (“PO”) regarding a suitable punishment. This application was allowed. S/N 8rplUM1uj02zjra1MYZ68g

On 22 July 2025, the report from the PO recommended that instead of passing a sentence of imprisonment and fine, the Accused should be ordered to perform community service under subparagraph 293(1)(e)(i) of the Criminal Procedure Code (“CPC”) instead.

Counsel urged that this Court ought to act in accordance with the recommendation of the PO. There were no objections from the learned Deputy Public Prosecutor (“DPP”) on this matter. Consequently, this implies that both parties acknowledge that a custodial sentence would have been unsuitable for the Accused. The Court concurs with this view.

Although the PO, DPP and Counsel agreed that a community service order (“CSO”) was appropriate for the Accused, the principles of sentencing found in the cases of PP v. Jafa bin Daud [1981] 1 MLJ 315, Lim Guan Eng v. PP & Other Appeals [1998] 3 CLJ 769; [1998] 3 MLJ 14, and Public Prosecutor v. Morah Chekwube Chukwudi [2017] 1 LNS 864; [2017] MLJU 958 remain the paramount consideration of this Court.

Additionally, this Court is also aware of the principle that it is desirable that young offenders should be kept out of prison as enunciated in the case of Tukiran Bin Taib v. Public

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The issue for determination is whether a CSO and a fine in default of the CSO along with an endorsement of the conviction on the Accused’s driving licence and disqualification from holding a driving license can be imposed by this Court for an offence under section 42 RTA. CAN SECTION 293 CPC BE APPLIED TO A SENTENCE OTHER THAN IMPRISONMENT IN DEFAULT OF A FINE OR

It is apt to first refer to the case of Megat Najmuddin bin Dato’ Seri (Dr) Megat Khas v. Bank Bumiputra (M) Bhd [2002] 1 CLJ 645 where Ahmad Fairuz FCJ agreed with the Supreme Court of India on the basic principles of interpretation of statutes1 in Hiralal Ratan Lai v. The Sales Tax Officer, section III, Kampur AIR [1973] SC 1034 where it was explained: “In construing a statutory provision, the first and foremost rule of construction is the literary construction. All that we have to see at the very outset is what does that provision say? If the provision is unambiguous and if from that provision the legislative intent is clear, we need not call into aid the other rules of construction of statutes. The other rules of construction of statutes are called into aid only when the legislative intent is not clear.” 1 See also Chin Choy & Ors. v. Collector of Stamp Duties [1979] 1 MLJ 69 and Yeo Peck Chie v. KS Gill & Co [1946] MLJ 131. S/N 8rplUM1uj02zjra1MYZ68g

With this principle in mind, the relevant provisions of section 293 CPC are reproduced below:

“Youthful offenders

When any youthful offender is convicted before any criminal Court of any offence punishable by fine or imprisonment, the Court may, instead of awarding any term of imprisonment in default of payment of the fine or passing a sentence of imprisonment— …

(i) to make an order requiring the offender to perform community service, not exceeding 240 hours in aggregate, of such nature and at such time and place and subject to such conditions as may be specified by the Court;

(ii) in this paragraph, “community service” means any work, service or course of instruction for the betterment of the public at large and includes, any work performed which involves payment to the prison or local authority; and

(iii) the community service under this paragraph shall be under the Minister charged with the responsibility for women, family and community.” (emphasis is mine) S/N 8rplUM1uj02zjra1MYZ68g

The ordinary meaning in section 293 CPC is clear and unambiguous. As such, the intention of parliament can be seen clearly and the courts are not at liberty to adopt a different interpretation.

The words “instead of” may be understood as “in place of: as a substitute for or alternative to”2. Hence, the plain and literal reading of this section clearly shows that the courts are only able to substitute: a. an order for any term of imprisonment in default of payment of the fine; or b. a sentence of imprisonment with any of the orders listed in section 293 CPC. This includes a CSO under subparagraph 293(1)(e)(i) CPC.

Nothing in section 293 CPC empowers a court to substitute any other punishments such as a sentence of fine, whipping or further conditions placed upon an accused in the event of a conviction.

A comparison with the provisions of section 294 CPC might be helpful in understanding the intention of the legislators for section 293 CPC. Section 294 CPC reads as follows: 2 'instead of' (Merriam-Webster.com) <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/instead%20of> accessed 20 August 2025. S/N 8rplUM1uj02zjra1MYZ68g

“First offenders

When any person has been convicted of any offence before any Court if it appears to the Court that regard being had to the character, antecedents, age, health or mental condition of the offender or to the trivial nature of the offence or to any extenuating circumstances under which the offence was committed it is expedient that the offender be released on probation of good conduct, the Court may, instead of sentencing him at once to any punishment, direct that he be released on his entering into a bond with or without sureties and during such period as the Court may direct to appear and receive judgment if and when called upon and in the meantime to keep the peace and be of good behaviour.” (emphasis is mine)

On a comparative reading of the two sections, section 293 CPC states “instead of awarding any term of imprisonment in default of payment of the fine or passing a sentence of imprisonment” while section 294 CPC uses the words “instead of sentencing him at once to any punishment”.

If the legislators of section 293 CPC had intended for the courts to utilize this section to substitute any form of punishment, then S/N 8rplUM1uj02zjra1MYZ68g the same words of “any punishment” used in section 294 CPC should have also been used in section 293 CPC.

Furthermore, if the intention of the legislators for section 293 CPC was to empower a court to substitute the imposition of a fine, the words used in section 293 CPC would plainly read: “instead of passing a sentence of fine or imprisonment”.

For that reason, this Court is of the opinion that a plain reading of section 293 CPC in its current form explicitly excludes a sentence of fine. It only permits the courts to substitute any term of imprisonment in default of payment of a fine, and not the sentence of fine itself.

Accordingly, if an offence is punishable with a mandatory fine, the courts are not be able to invoke section 293 CPC to order an alternative order instead of meting out the mandatory fine. The courts are only able to invoke section 293 CPC to substitute an order for any term of imprisonment in default of payment of the mandatory fine.

Section 42 RTA is reproduced below in its authoritative text:

“Memandu secara melulu dan membahayakan

Mana-mana orang yang memandu suatu kenderaan motor di jalan dengan melulu atau dengan S/N 8rplUM1uj02zjra1MYZ68g kelajuan atau dengan cara yang, memandang kepada segala hal keadaan (termasuk jenis, keadaan dan luas jalan dan kesesakan lalu lintas yang ada atau mungkin ada di jalan itu) merbahaya kepada orang awam, melakukan suatu kesalahan dan apabila disabitkan hendaklah dihukum penjara selama tempoh tidak melebihi lima tahun dan didenda tidak kurang daripada lima ribu ringgit dan tidak lebih daripada lima belas ribu ringgit dan, dalam hal sabitan kali kedua atau kali kemudian, penjara selama tempoh tidak melebihi sepuluh tahun dan denda tidak kurang daripada sepuluh ribu ringgit dan tidak lebih daripada dua puluh ribu ringgit.

Mahkamah hendaklah memerintahkan butir-butir mengenai apa-apa sabitan di bawah seksyen ini diendorskan pada mana-mana lesen memandu yang dipegang oleh orang yang disabitkan itu.

Seseorang yang disabitkan di bawah seksyen ini hilang kelayakan daripada memegang atau mendapatkan suatu lesen memandu selama tempoh tidak kurang daripada lima tahun dari tarikh sabitan dan, dalam hal sabitan kali kedua atau kali kemudian, hilang kelayakan selama tempoh sepuluh tahun dari tarikh sabitan.

Walau apa pun subseksyen (1), jika seseorang yang memegang lesen memandu percubaan disabitkan di S/N 8rplUM1uj02zjra1MYZ68g bawah seksyen ini, mahkamah hendaklah sesudah itu membatalkan lesen memandunya itu.” (emphasis is mine)

Therefore, the punishments faced by the Accused under section 42 RTA are as follows: a. Under subsection 42(1) RTA, a mandatory imprisonment term of up to 5 years (herein after referred to as “Punishment A”); b. also under subsection 42(1) RTA, a mandatory fine of not less than RM5,000 and not more than RM15,000 (herein after referred to as “Punishment B”); c. under subsection 42(2) RTA, a mandatory endorsement of the particulars of his conviction on his driving licence (herein after referred to as “Punishment C”); and d. under subsection 42(3) RTA, a mandatory disqualification from holding a driving licence for a period of not less than five years from the date of the conviction (herein after referred to as “Punishment D”).

This Court is of the view that the operation of section 293 CPC, when applied to section 42 RTA, is confined only to aspects involving imprisonment or imprisonment in default of paying a fine. Accordingly, a CSO under section 293 CPC instead of Punishment A can clearly be given by this Court. S/N 8rplUM1uj02zjra1MYZ68g

However, other mandatory punishment or conditions must still be enforced by the Court. I find support for this proposition in the case of Nor Azlee Shah Muhammad Noor lwn. Pendakwa Raya [2022] 1 LNS 676 (“Nor Azlee”) where Roz Mawar Rozain JC explained: “… hujahan Perayu bahawa pilihan untuk perintah di bawah s. 293 KTJ terpakai untuk kesemua hukuman bukan sahaja penjara dan denda yang diperuntukkan di dalam s. 41 (1) APJ [sic], namun dipanjangkan hingga s. 42(2) dan s. 42(3) APJ adalah tidak bermerit. … Untuk hukuman tambahan lain, jika undang-undang diwajibkan, adalah berbeza sama sekali dan pilihan di bawah s. 293 KTJ tidak terpakai. Ini berdasarkan objektif pemakaian perintah di bawah s. 293 KTJ adalah untuk mengelakkan dan menghindarkan pesalah muda daripada pemenjaraan sahaja. Ia tidak bermaksud pesalah muda akan sepenuhnya terlepas daripada hukuman apabila disabitkan dengan kesalahan. Oleh yang demikian Mahkamah ini tidak dapat terima hujahan Perayu yang cuba menyatakan bahawa hukuman di bawah s. 42(2) dan (3) APJ yang diperintahkan oleh Hakim Bicara adalah bercampur aduk kerana semua itu adalah perintah tambahan kepada hukuman penjara dan denda di bawah s. 41(1) APJ [sic].” S/N 8rplUM1uj02zjra1MYZ68g

As such, the courts must still mete out Punishment C and Punishment D as they are mandatory for an offence faced by the Accused even if the Accused is given a CSO instead of Punishment A.

Furthermore, if the Accused is not exempted from Punishment C and Punishment D because they are both mandatory, there are no grounds for the Accused to be exempted from Punishment B as well. A fine (Punishment B) must still be imposed by this Court since it is one of the 4 mandatory punishments provided for in section 42 RTA. Under paragraph 283(b)(iv) CPC, this Court is empowered to direct that in default of payment of the fine, the Accused shall be imprisoned for a certain term.

It is worth mentioning that the Accused would likely be unable to pay the minimum fine under subsection 42(1) RTA as evidenced from the PO’s report concerning his family’s financial status. Hence, there remains the possibility that the Accused may serve a term of imprisonment in default of payment of the mandatory fine.

On this issue, it is pertinent to refer to the case of PP lwn. Redzohan Abdullah & Yang Lain [2015] 2 CLJ 109 where Mohd Azman Husin J explained that the purpose of the section 293 CPC is to enable the courts to avert sending a youthful offender to prison. His Lordship held: S/N 8rplUM1uj02zjra1MYZ68g “Tuan Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen tidak boleh menggunapakai peruntukan s. 293(1)(c) apabila dalam masa yang sama beliau juga telah menjatuhkan hukuman penjara kepada kedua-dua responden tersebut. Perintah-perintah di bawah s. 293 ini merupakan satu pilihan kepada mahkamah bagi mengelakkan pesalah-pesalah muda seperti responden-responden ini dihantar ke penjara dan bercampur dengan pesalah-pesalah dewasa yang lain.” (emphasis is mine)

Thus, there is no point in invoking section 293 CPC to order a CSO in lieu of a term of imprisonment (Punishment A) when in the event the Accused is unable to pay the fine imposed by the Court (Punishment B), he ends up in prison anyway. This would frustrate the purpose of section 293 CPC.

Accordingly, this Court is of the opinion that section 293 CPC may also be invoked to ensure that even if the Accused defaults in paying the fine, he will not be committed to prison. As in the case of Nor Azlee (supra), this cannot be considered as a mixture3 of punishments from section 293 CPC with section 42 RTA nor is it a combination of sentencing from section 293 CPC 3 The actual words used in Nor Azlee Shah Muhammad Noor lwn. Pendakwa Raya [2022] 1 LNS 676 are ‘bercampur aduk’. S/N 8rplUM1uj02zjra1MYZ68g itself4. In sentencing the Accused, every mandatory punishment must be accounted for according to the law. The courts should not overlook certain mandatory punishment for the sake of convenience in sentencing.

Having considered the principles laid down in the foregoing authorities, and upon a careful reading of the relevant statutes, the following sentence was passed by this Court towards the Accused: A. An order to perform 120 hours of community service in aggregate within one year of conviction, instead of passing a sentence of imprisonment; B. An order to pay a fine of RM5500. In the event the Accused defaults in paying the fine on the date of conviction, an order requiring the Accused to perform 120 hours of community service in aggregate within one year of the date of conviction, instead of awarding a term of imprisonment in default of payment of the fine; C. Particulars of this conviction to be endorsed on the driving licence held by the Accused; and D. A disqualification from holding a driving licence for a period of five years from the date of the conviction. 4 See PP lwn. Branden Yap Hong Sheng [2023] 8 CLJ, PP lwn. Redzohan Abdullah & Yang Lain [2015] 2 CLJ 109, PP v. Muhamad Syafiq Abd Wahab [2009] AMEJ 0188 and Teo Siew Peng & 4 Ors v. PP [1984] CLJU 71; [1984] 1 LNS 71. Incidentally, the youthful offenders in these cases were convicted for offences that did not carry a sentence of both mandatory imprisonment and mandatory fine/whipping, unlike the present case. S/N 8rplUM1uj02zjra1MYZ68g Bertarikh 27hb Ogos 2025 TAN CHIEW KING MAJISTRET MAHKAMAH MAJISTRET (1) TEMERLOH PAHANG Pihak-pihak: Pihak Pendakwaan: Siti Sarah Aqilah binti Lokman (Timbalan Pendakwa Raya) Peguambela bagi Mazieera binti Ra Sharifudin Tertuduh: (Khairul Anuar, Mazieera & Associates) S/N 8rplUM1uj02zjra1MYZ68g