Subsection
(18) years and by definition under Section 2 of the Child Act 2001 were all children ("child"). [2] They were all charged with various offences and sentenced accordingly. Their respective backgrounds such as are relevant to the present applications are reflected as follows: Nomalan A/L Ramayah i) The Applicant was arrested on 12.12.2009 and charged under Section 302 of the Penal Code ("PC") for murder. ii) The Applicant was convicted by the High Court under Section 304(b) of the PC and on appeal the Court of Appeal allowed the Public Prosecutor's appeal and the Applicant was found guilty under Section 302 of the PC on 5.5.2015. As the Applicant was a minor at the time of the offence, the Court of Appeal ordered that he be detained in prison at the pleasure of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong (YDPA) in accordance with Section 97(2) of the Child Act 2001. iii) The Applicant's appeal to the Federal Court was dismissed, thereby affirming his conviction and sentence. iv) The Applicant has now been in custody for approximately 15 years from the date of arrest, 11 years since his conviction at the High Court. i) The Applicant was arrested on 12.5.2011 and charged under Section 302 of the Penal Code ("PC") for murder. ii) The Applicant was convicted by the High Court on 14.6.2012 and as the Applicant was a minor at the time of the offence, the High Court ordered that he be detained in prison at the pleasure of the Yang diPertuan Agong (YDPA) in accordance with Section 97(2) of the Child Act 2001. iii) The Applicant's appeals to both the Court of Appeal and the Federal Court were dismissed, thereby affirming his conviction and sentence. iv) The Applicant has now been in custody for approximately 13 years from the date of his conviction at the High Court. Harichandran A/L S. Nadarajan i) The Applicant was arrested on 16.2.2012 and charged under Section 302 of the Penal Code ("PC") for murder. ii) The Applicant was convicted by the High Court on 14.3.2017 and as the Applicant was a minor at the time of the offence, the High Court ordered that he be detained in prison at the pleasure of the Yang diPertuan Agong (YDPA) in accordance with Section 97(2) of the Child Act 2001. iii) The Applicant's appeals to both the Court of Appeal and the Federal Court were dismissed, thereby affirming his conviction and sentence. iv) The Applicant has now been in custody for approximately 13 years at from the date of arrest, 8 years since his conviction at the High Court. Leong Soon Long i) The Applicant was arrested on 15.9.2008 and charged under Section 302 of the Penal Code and Section 3(1) of the Kidnapping Act 1961 for kidnapping and murder. ii) The Applicant was convicted by the High Court on 31.3.2011 and as the Applicant was a minor at the time of the offence, the High Court ordered that he be detained in prison at the pleasure of the Yang diPertuan Agong (YDPA) in accordance with Section 97(2) of the Child Act 2001. iii) The Applicant's appeals to both the Court of Appeal and the Federal Court were dismissed, thereby affirming his conviction and sentence. iv) The Applicant has now been in custody for approximately 16 years from the date of arrest, 14 years since his conviction at the High Court. i) The Applicant was arrested on 15.9.2008 and charged under Section 302 of the Penal Code and Section 3(1) of the Kidnapping Act 1961 for kidnapping and murder. ii) The Applicant was convicted by the High Court on 31.3.2011 and as the Applicant was a minor at the time of the offence, the High Court ordered that he be detained in prison at the pleasure of the Yang diPertuan Agong (YDPA) in accordance with Section 97(2) of the Child Act 2001. iii) The Applicant's appeals to both the Court of Appeal and the Federal Court were dismissed, thereby affirming his conviction and sentence. iv) The Applicant has now been in custody for approximately 16 years from the date of arrest, 14 years since his conviction at the High Court. Nguyen Doan Nhan i) The Applicant was arrested on 20.2.2015 and charged under Section 302 of the Penal Code ("PC") for murder. ii) The Applicant was convicted by the High Court on 23.7.2017 and as the applicant was a minor at the time of the offence, the High Court ordered that he be detained in prison at the pleasure of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong (YDPA) in accordance with Section 97(2) of the Child Act 2001. iii) The Applicant's appeals to both the Court of Appeal and the Federal Court were dismissed, thereby affirming his conviction and sentence. iv) The Applicant has now been in custody for approximately 9 years from the date of arrest, 8 years since his conviction at the High Court. Mohamad Aiman Al-Rashid bin Yaakob i) The Applicant was arrested on 4.1.2006 and charged under Section 39B(1)(a) of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 ("DDA") for a drug trafficking offence. ii) The Applicant was convicted by the High Court on 25.3.2009 and as the Applicant was a minor at the time of the offence, the High Court ordered that he be detained in prison at the pleasure of the Yang diPertuan Agong (YDPA) in accordance with Section 97(2) of the Child Act 2001. iii) The Applicant's appeals to both the Court of Appeal and the Federal Court were dismissed, thereby affirming his conviction and sentence. iv) The Applicant has now been in custody for approximately 18 years and 11 months from the date of arrest, 16 years since his conviction at the High Court. [3] All the Applicants seek a review of the sentences of the Federal Court affirming the sentence that the Applicant be detained in a prison for an indefinite period in accordance with Section 97(2) of the Child Act 2001 which is at the pleasure of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong or the Ruler or the Yang di-Pertua Negeri following their respective convictions. [4] The main premise of the review is that the passing of the Abolition of Mandatory Death Penalty Act 2023 (Act 846) and the Revision of Sentence of Death and Imprisonment for Natural Life (Temporary Jurisdiction of the Federal Court) Act 2023 (Act 847) which provides for determinate sentences for adults is incompatible with the indefinite detention for juveniles sentenced under section 97(2) of the Child Act 2001. B) SUBMISSIONS OF PARTIES Applicants [5] The Applicants' submission which is summarised here, comprises two parts. [6] Part A relates to the history of death penalty reforms and children's rights framework that allegedly renders indefinite detention incompatible with Malaysia's current legal landscape. [7] Part B concerns the Applicant's Rule 137 Application and the alleged specific constitutional violations arising from the Applicant's indefinite detention. Note : （"All references to the Applicant includes all the Applicants herein"） Part A Malaysia's Death Penalty Policy [8] The first part traces the evolution of Malaysia's death penalty policy since 2012. Learned counsel for the Applicants submitted that the mandatory death penalty has been part of the Malaysian criminal justice system since the British colonial administration as a punishment for murder under Section 302 of the Penal Code which discussions for reform must necessarily also include offences under section 39B of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952. [9] It was then submitted that there was a watershed moment which made a significant change to Malaysia's legal landscape with the introduction of Section 39B into the DDA, which provided for discretionary death sentences in cases of drug trafficking. [10] The year 2012 marked a turning point when the Malaysian government undertook a comprehensive series of studies and discussions aimed at reforming its death penalty policy, with particular focus on abolishing mandatory death sentences. [11] This reform process culminated in 2017, when Section 39B was amended to introduce "limited discretion" in sentencing drug trafficking offences which represented a crucial intermediate step between mandatory and fully discretionary sentencing. [12] As part of the reform process, a Special Committee on the Study of Alternative Punishments to Mandatory Death Sentences was established on 20 September 2019, following a Cabinet decision on 29 August 2019. [13] This committee was chaired by the former Chief Justice of Malaysia, Tun Richard Malanjum and comprised legal experts including the former Chief Judge of Malaya, a former Attorney General, legal practitioners, law lecturers and criminologists from public institutions. [14] On 11 February 2020, Tun Richard Malanjum presented a comprehensive 128-page report known as the "Malanjum Report" to the then Minister in the Prime Minister's Department. [15] The Malanjum Report proposed a new sentencing policy based on three fundamental principles: i) For offences resulting in death, the death penalty at the discretion of the Court is retained; ii) For other offences not resulting in death, the Court should not impose the death penalty; and iii) If the death penalty is not imposed by the Court, the offender may be subject to alternative punishments, including whipping. Reforms to the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 ("DDA") [16] The DDA was originally introduced by the colonial government to combat escalating drug-trafficking crimes, forming an integral part of British law during the preindependence era in Malaysia. [17] In 1975, Section 39B was incorporated into the DDA, establishing the discretionary death sentence for drug trafficking offences which granted courts the discretion to impose either the death penalty or life imprisonment with whipping. [18] In 2017, there was an amendment introduced to Section 39B(2A), which allowed courts to consider specific circumstances (as below) in deciding whether to impose the death penalty or a custodial sentence: i) no evidence of buying and selling drugs at arrest; ii) no involvement of agent provocateur; iii) limited involvement (transport, carry, send or deliver); iv) Public Prosecutor's certification of assistance to enforcement agencies. [19] It was submitted however, that this "limited discretion" proved problematic with its arbitrary application and different enforcement agencies adopting varying approaches to investigating information provided by accused individuals. [20] It was also asserted that retention of the word "only" in Section 39B(2A) constrained judicial discretion and violated the separation of powers. The Abolition of the Mandatory Death Penalty [21] It was submitted that the steady progress made in this country towards the abolition of the mandatory death penalty, the presumption in favour of life and the transformative vision resulted in the passing of The Abolition Act 2023 which was expressed to have retrospective effect. [22] The Applicants submitted that the Revision of Death Sentences and Life Imprisonment (Federal Court's Temporary Jurisdiction Act) 2023 ("Re-sentencing Act 2023") represents a progressive shift in Malaysia's criminal justice approach, granting the Federal Court temporary revisionary jurisdiction to review death sentences and imprisonment for natural life. [23] The Re-sentencing Act 2023 came into force on 12 September 2023, passed concurrently with the Abolition of Mandatory Death Penalty Act 2023. [24] The Re-sentencing Act 2023 enables review of death sentences notwithstanding pending pardon applications under Article 42 and imprisonment for natural life for those whose pardon has been determined. [25] The scope of review is limited to sentences and not convictions and each person may only make one application within 90 days which is extendable for good reason. [26] The Re-sentencing Act 2023 enables all death row prisoners and those serving the sentence of natural life previously deprived of presenting mitigating circumstances under the mandatory regime to have their individual circumstances considered. [27] Learned counsel submitted that this approach is consistent with Malaysia's broader objectives of promoting fairness, justice, and humane sentencing, especially for death penalty and natural life imprisonment cases. The Effect of the Abolition Act 2023 on section 39B DDA, section 302 Penal Code and other offences [28] Next, it was submitted that Section 54 of the Abolition Act 2023 amended Section 39B of the DDA by reducing whipping from 15 to 12 strokes minimum, deleting subsections (2A) and (2B) and granting courts absolute discretion without previously imposed conditions. [29] The effect of this is that a person shall now be punished on conviction with death or imprisonment for life and shall, if not sentenced to death, be punished with whipping of not less than twelve strokes. [30] The term "imprisonment for life" according to Section 3 of the Criminal Justice Act 1953 means "a sentence of imprisonment for 30 years". [31] Section 34 of the Abolition Act 2023 amended Section 302 Penal Code and now gives the court the discretion to either impose death sentence or a term of imprisonment of not less than 30 years but not exceeding 40 years. In addition to the term of imprisonment of the convicted person, an order of mandatory whipping of not less than 12 strokes would be imposed. [32] Section 3(1) of the Kidnapping Act 1961 was also amended by Section 52 of the Abolition Act 2023 by removing the sentence of death and substituting the sentence of death or imprisonment for life and shall, if he is not sentenced to death, also be liable to whipping and imprisonment for a term of not less than thirty years but not exceeding forty years and with whipping. [33] The death penalty was also abolished for some other offences. Summary of Legislative intent in Abolishing the Mandatory Death Sentence and Natural Life Imprisonment [34] Learned counsel then submitted that the broad legislative intent can be summarised in nine fundamental principles which he listed as follows: First Alternative Sentencing Approach - The shift towards flexible and nuanced sentencing, granting courts discretion between death penalty, 30-40 years' imprisonment, and minimum 12 strokes whipping. Second - Elimination of Natural Life - No prisoners in Malaysia shall be detained for an indefinite period. Third - Respect for the Right to Life - Unequivocal respect for every individual's right to life, recognising death penalty's irreversibility and the need for utmost care in its imposition. Fourth - Rehabilitation and Reintegration - Focus on providing offenders opportunities for personal growth and societal reintegration through counselling, education, and vocational training. Fifth - Strengthening Human Rights - Commitment to protect and uphold rights of all individuals, including those accused or convicted of serious offences. Sixth Adaptation to Current Needs - Recognition that criminal justice legislation must evolve with contemporary challenges and societal dynamics. Seventh - Right to Individualised Sentencing - The Resentencing Act 2023 provides opportunity for all prisoners serving the death sentence or natural life to have mitigating circumstances reviewed. Eighth - International Precedents and Comparative Analysis - Courts encouraged to draw insights from nations like India that abolished mandatory death penalties, making informed decisions aligned with international standards. Ninth - Maximum Imprisonment of 30 Years for Section 39B and 40 Years for Section 302 and Section 3(1) - "Imprisonment for life" defined as 30 years, allowing courts discretion to commute death sentences accordingly for Section 39B. The Court has the discretion to commute a prisoner's death sentence and replace it with a term of imprisonment between 30 to 40 years and whipping of not less than twelve strokes for Section 302 and Section 3(1). The Outcome of Review Cases under the Re-Sentencing Act 2023 [35] Learned counsel submitted that pursuant to the Federal Court's undertaking of the comprehensive review of death sentences which resulted in a substantial number of successful applications, there arise 3 fundamental legal principles that support the case for the Applicants. [36] These are firstly, the presumption in favour of life, secondly, the burden on the prosecution to establish that death is the only appropriate sentence and thirdly, the "Rarest of rare" cases where no other sentence would meet the ends of justice other than death. [37] The third principle was anchored on the Privy Council case of Trimmingham v The Queen [2009] UKPC 25 which distilled this into two requirements as follows: i) The case must be most extreme and exceptional; ii) There must be no reasonable prospect of reform and punishment objectives cannot be achieved by any other means. History of Children and Capital Offences [38] It was submitted that the Indian Penal Code of 1860 was the first to formally differentiate between children and adults. It treated children below the age of seven (7) as doli incapax and recognised a rebuttable presumption of incapacity for those aged 7 to 12. [39] The British influence in Malaya saw the introduction of the Penal Code based upon the Indian equivalent which underwent several historical legislative amendments until present times. [40] The Juvenile Courts Act 1947 established the first court specifically to cater for children, the Juvenile Court which is currently known as the Court for Children under the Child Act 2001. [41] Section 16 of the Juvenile Courts Act 1947 (repealed by the Child Act 2001) forbids the sentence of death on a juvenile. [42] Instead, the Court shall order the juvenile offender to be detained during the pleasure of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong (for offences committed in federal territories) or the Ruler/Yang di-Pertua Negeri (for offences committed in states). [43] It was submitted by learned counsel that the phrase "during the pleasure of" in Section 97(2)(b) was an archaic formulation incorporated from English law as a mechanism to avoid imposing the death penalty on juvenile offenders while still recognising the seriousness of their offences. [44] In reality however, it was submitted, the sentence of detention "during the pleasure of" removed the death penalty without providing a fixed term of imprisonment or any statutory review mechanism. [45] It was submitted that when Malaysia acceded to the Convention on the Rights of the Child ("CRC") on 17 February 1995, this marked a significant commitment by the Malaysian government to uphold and protect the rights of children within the country although it had some reservations to the convention which allowed the government to disagree with certain provisions of the CRC. [46] It was submitted that Malaysia has since withdrawn some of these reservations which demonstrated a progressive approach towards aligning with international standards on children's rights. [47] The passing of the Child Act 2001 was enacted to fulfil Malaysia's commitment to the CRC and are based on the four core principles of the CRC that is, non-discrimination, best interest of the child, the right to life, survival and development and respect for the views of the child. [48] It was further submitted that while the Child Act 2001 represented a major step forward in aligning domestic law with CRC standards, Section 97(2) retains a colonial-era approach to sentencing children convicted of capital offences. [49] It was asserted that its indeterminate and executive-controlled nature sits in contradiction alongside the Act's otherwise rehabilitative and reintegrative approach. [50] It was submitted that Section 97(2) violates Article 37 of the CRC which prohibits capital punishment and life imprisonment without the possibility of release for persons under 18, mandates detention as a last resort and for the shortest appropriate period. [51] It was contended by learned counsel that although the Federal Court in Public Prosecutor v Kok Wah Kuan [2008] 1 MLJ 1 by a majority upheld the constitutionality of Section 97 of the Child Act 2001, it was time to revisit the subject. Comparative jurisdictions [52] Learned counsel submitted that courts in other jurisdictions have progressively moved towards a more rights-oriented approach, recognising that indeterminate juvenile detention, especially where the executive determines the length of detention, violates fundamental guarantees of fairness, separation of powers, proportionality and children's rights. [53] The sentencing regime for juveniles in the United Kingdom, Kenya, Barbados and South Africa were cited as progressive examples. [54] The comparative jurisprudence, it was submitted, reflected clear and consistent trend rejecting indeterminate, executive-controlled or non-reviewable juvenile detention. [55] It was asserted that modern constitutional democracies require that a child's sentence be judicially determined subject to regular review and tailored to the child's evolving development and circumstances in accordance with the principle that detention must be a measure of last resort and imposed only for the shortest appropriate period. [56] It was finally submitted in conclusion to Part A that the current sentencing landscape reveals a fundamental anomaly in that every category of serious offender, adults convicted under Section 302 and Section 3(1), drug traffickers convicted under Section 39B, those previously sentenced to death or natural life imprisonment, has received or has access to determinate sentences while those detained under Section 97(2) of the Child Act 2001 remain subject to indefinite detention without review. Part B [57] In this part, the submission of the Applicant addresses the application under Rule 137, and challenges the constitutionality of his continued indefinite detention, which is in alleged violation of Article 5(1) and Article 8(1) of the Federal Constitution. [58] Learned counsel for the Applicant submits that exceptional circumstances exist in this case for the exercise of the review jurisdiction of this court. The reason is that the sentencing framework under which the Applicant was sentenced has now been fundamentally altered by Parliament and the Applicant's sentence is now incompatible with the current statutory framework. Breach of Article 5(1) [59] This has resulted in injustice arising from a constitutional and statutory misalignment between the sentence imposed and the law as it stands. It is submitted that the Applicant's continued indefinite detention violates Article 5(1) since the Abolition Act 2023 that removed the punishment of natural life imprisonment is no longer "in accordance with law". [60] Learned counsel cited the Federal Court decision in Lee Kwan Woh v Public Prosecutor [2009] 5 MLJ 301 which established that the term "law" in Article 5(1) encompasses not merely validly enacted legislation but requires substantive fairness. Deprivation of liberty thus, must be in accordance with law that is reasonable, fair, and just in both procedure and substance. [61] It was submitted that it is the duty of a court to adopt a "prismatic approach" when interpreting the fundamental rights guaranteed under Part II of the Federal Constitution. [62] It was contended that the rights encompassed in Article 5(1), including the right to proportionate punishment, the right to certainty in sentencing, and the right to rehabilitation were inherent in the language employed in the said Article. [63] The prismatic interpretation of the Constitution, it was argued, gives life to abstract concepts such as "life" and "personal liberty" in Article 5(1) and inherent in the concept of due process or natural justice is that an accused has a right to a fair trial and absent that, no deprivation of life is lawful. A fair trial includes a fair sentencing hearing. [64] It was argued that the continued detention under a provision, namely s.97(2) of the Child Act 2001, that operates as a substitute for punishments that Parliament has abolished (mandatory death) cannot satisfy the requirement that deprivation of liberty be "in accordance with law" within the meaning of Article 5(1). [65] It was still further argued that a law providing for disproportionate sentences violates Article 5(1) as it cannot be considered "in accordance with law" in the substantive sense required by the Constitution citing Alma Nudo Atenza v Public Prosecutor [2019] 5 CLJ 780 as authority. [66] It was argued thus that the Applicant's indefinite detention is manifestly disproportionate as compared to adult offenders convicted of murder face maximum sentences of 40 years. [67] It was contended that this also violated the certainty principle. [68] Unlike those serving the death sentences and natural life prior to the Abolition Act 2023 and Re-sentencing Act 2023, the Applicant has no statutory right to review where there is no defined criteria for the Applicant's release, and no certainty regarding when his detention will end. [69] The continued detention of the Applicant's therefore defeats the rehabilitation objectives meant for these offenders. [70] Article 8(1), it was argued, demands that transformative legislation must be applied equally to all individuals without arbitrary discrimination and the exclusion of any class of offenders from its benefits must satisfy strict constitutional scrutiny. [71] Learned counsel submitted that the Federal Court in the case of Alma Nudo Atenza v PP & Another Appeal (supra) held that Article 8(1) imports the principle of substantive proportionality i.e., not only must the legislative or executive response to a state of affairs be objectively fair, it must also be proportionate to the object sought to be achieved. [72] The language of the Federal Court in so espousing this principle was expressed in the following manner: "[118] In other words, art 8(1) imports the principle of substantive proportionality. 'Not only must the legislative or executive response to a state of affairs be objectively fair, it must also be proportionate to the object sought to be achieved" [73] Learned counsel submitted that the Federal Court case of Ketheeswaran a/l Kanagaratnam & Anor v Public Prosecutor [2024] 1 MLJ 851 crystallised the test under Article 8(1) into two essential elements, the first of which is that there must be intelligible differentia between the classes of persons who are treated differently and secondly, there must be a rational nexus between the differentiation and a legitimate legislative objective. [74] The current sentencing framework creates an irrational classification system that places the Applicant in a fundamentally disadvantaged position compared to all other categories of serious offenders. This classification fails both limbs of the Article 8(1) test and violates the principle of substantive equality. [75] It was argued that legislative reforms have created distinct classes of offenders with markedly different treatment as follows: i) Adults convicted under Section 39B DDA, Section 302 Penal Code and Section 3(1) Kidnapping Act 1961 after July 2023 receive determinate sentences with maximum terms of 30 years and 40 years respectively; ii) Adults convicted under Section 39B, Section 302 and Section 3(1) previously sentenced to death or life imprisonment have access to review under the Resentencing Act 2023 and are receiving determinate sentences; iii) Drug traffickers under Section 39B of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952, once subject to mandatory death, now face maximum determinate sentences of 30 years; and iv) The Applicant, as a juvenile sentenced under Section 97(2), faces indefinite detention with no maximum limit and potentially for periods exceeding the new statutory maximum. [76] This classification system therefore places the Applicant, a child offender with inherently reduced culpability, in a worse position than adult offenders who committed identical or more serious crimes. This inversion of expected sentencing outcomes violates the fundamental principle recognised globally that juvenile offenders should receive more lenient, not harsher, treatment than adults. [77] It was argued that the situation faced by the Applicant's fails the two-stage test enunciated in the case of Ketheeswaran. [78] At the first stage, no intelligible differentia exists to justify treating the Applicant worse than adult murderers, death row prisoners, or current juvenile offenders. The only distinction is that the Applicant was sentenced under Section 97(2) of the Child Act 2001, which is a procedural accident of timing rather than a substantive difference relating to culpability, dangerousness, or any other legitimate sentencing consideration. [79] At the second stage, no rational nexus exists between the differential treatment and any legitimate legislative objective. Public protection does not require indefinite detention when determinate sentences of 30 years for Section 39B and 30-40 years for Section 302 and Section 3(1) are deemed sufficient for adult offenders. [80] As there must be a reasonable nexus between the discrimination and that legislative aim, denying the Applicant's the opportunity for their sentences to be reviewed in light of the Abolition Act 2023 violates their right to equal protection of the laws. [81] The indefinite detention of a juvenile offender while adult offenders receive determinate sentences is grossly disproportionate to any conceivable legitimate objective. [82] Learned counsel for the Applicant's said that the disproportionality was heightened by the complete absence of review mechanisms for Section 97(2) detainees. [83] It was submitted that the Applicant's have exhausted all ordinary judicial remedies through trial, appeal to the Court of Appeal, and appeal to the Federal Court and that no further appellate remedies exist. [84] Rule 137 is therefore, the only available judicial remedy capable of addressing the continued constitutional breach. [85] The Re-sentencing Act 2023 provides for review of death sentences and natural life imprisonment but does not expressly cover detention under Section 97(2) of the Child Act 2001 which creates a legislative gap that leaves the Applicant without any statutory mechanism for review. [86] Learned counsel said that the pardon process under Article 42 of the Federal Constitution, the child report under Section 97(4)(a) and (b) of the Child Act 2001 and the quadrennial report and petition under Regulations 54 and 113 of the Prison Regulations 2000, although running in parallel, do not constitute an alternative remedy to Rule 137. [87] It was argued that the doctrine of separation of powers means that pardon is an executive act while sentencing and review of sentence are judicial functions. [88] The case of Public Prosecutor v Dato' Yap Peng [1987] 2 MLJ 311 was cited as authority for this proposition. [89] It was additionally submitted that judicial power of the Court resides in the judiciary and no other. The Federal Court case of Semenyih Jaya Sdn Bhd v Pentadbir Tanah Daerah Hulu Langat [2017] 3 MLJ 561 was cited in support. [90] It was finally submitted that these multiple factors create special circumstances justifying this Court's intervention under Rule 137. Respondent Rule 137 of the Rules of Federal Court 1995 [91] It is argued by the Respondent that this application has not passed the threshold for leave for review based upon the contents of the Notice of Motion and the Affidavits of all Applicants filed herein. [92] The Respondent submitted that according to the case of Asean Security Paper Mills Sdn Bhd v Mitsui Sumitomo Insurance (Malaysia) Bhd [2008] 6 CLJ 1, which laid down the criteria for review of cases, the Applicants have raised no exceptional or special circumstances that justify a review. [93] It was submitted that the doctrine of finality must be strictly observed as otherwise the opening of doors for a further review upon a review would be opening the floodgates and would cause more uncertainty in the law. The case of Harcharan Singh Piara Singh v PP [2011] 6 CLJ 625 was cited in support. [94] The Respondent in their written submissions displayed in tabulated form, the process of review carried out by the Board of Visiting Justices under section 97(4) (a) and (b) of the Child Act 2001, Quadrennial Report on prisoners under Regulation 54 and petition by prisoners under Regulation 113 of the Prison Regulations 2000 by the Secretariat for the Pardons Board Perak, Johor, Negeri Sembilan and Selangor where each Applicants applications were to be presented to the Pardons Board in the respective states for deliberation by the DYMM Paduka Seri Sultan Perak, DYMM Sultan Johor, DYMM Yang di-Pertuan Besar Negeri Sembilan and DYMM Sultan Selangor according to Article 42 of the Federal Constitution. [95] The Respondents submitted therefore that there are already alternative remedies provided for under the law for the Applicants to be dealt with according to Section 97(4) of the Child Act 2001, Regulation 54 and 113 of the Prison Regulations 2000 read together with power of pardon under Article 42 of the Federal Constitution respectively. [96] It was submitted that whether these available alternative remedies would be successful or not are matters to be dealt with according to the existing legal framework and the contention that the Applicants have no effective alternative remedy and that the only remedy available is under Rule 137 does not constitute limited and exceptional case for leave for review to be granted based on the established principles of law relating to Rule 137. [97] The Respondent further submitted that Rule 137 cannot be invoked when there is an alternative remedy provided by law. The remedy provided for under section 97(4) of the Child Act 2001, Regulations 54 and 113 of the Prison Regulations 2000 and Article 42 of the Federal Constitution have not been exhausted by all the Applicants and using Rule 137 is a backdoor step tantamount to abuse of the process of court. [98] It was argued that the Applicants are currently pursuing all remedies under the existing legal framework. It was submitted that according to the respective Secretariat of the Pardons Board, they have received all the relevant papers from all Applicants and these are to be presented to the Pardons Board for deliberation by the DYMM Paduka Seri Sultan Perak, DYMM Sultan Johor, DYMM Yang di-Pertuan Besar Negeri Sembilan and DYMM Sultan Selangor. Resort therefore to Rule 137 of the Rules of the Federal Court 1995 has no legal basis. [99] The remedies sought for is within the royal prerogative of the respective DYMM Paduka Seri Sultan Perak, DYMM Sultan Johor, DYMM Yang di-Pertuan Besar Negeri Sembilan and DYMM Sultan Selangor as the case may be. [100] As these Applicants have an avenue for release pursuant to section 97(4) of the Child Act 2001, Regulation 54 and Regulation 113 of the Prison Regulations 2000, their applications have no merit and are not reviewable under Rule 137. [101] The Respondent argues that the nub of the Applicants case is whether Abolition of Mandatory Death Penalty Act 2023 (Act 846) and Revision of Sentence of Death and Imprisonment for Natural Life (Temporary Jurisdiction of the Federal Court) Act 2023 (Act 847), which introduced changes to the sentencing framework of mandatory death sentences and natural life imprisonment which have now have been abolished and replaced with imprisonment of not less than 30 years and not more than 40 years or, at the Court's discretion, the death penalty, constitute a fundamental change in circumstances. [102] The Respondent argued that Act 847 established a temporary jurisdiction for the Federal Court to review and revise sentences of death and imprisonment for natural life. [103] This law allows individuals previously sentenced to mandatory death or natural life imprisonment to apply for a review of their sentences in the Federal Court. [104] After drawing our attention to the wording of section 2 of Act 847, the Hansard reports explaining the Bill concerned, and the Explanatory Statement to the said Bill, the Respondent submitted that the manifest intention of Parliament under Act 847 was to grant temporary jurisdiction to the Federal Court to review death sentences or life imprisonment in the following circumstances: