Misappreciation of the defence and failure to consider the whole of the evidence objectively and from all angles. Our Analysis and Findings [26] In the present appeal, although several grounds were raised by the Appellant, we find it unnecessary to address each of them. In our judgment, the appeal may be disposed of on a single decisive issue, namely whether the prosecution had established beyond reasonable doubt the identity of the drugs which formed the subject matter of the charges. [27] It is settled law that in drug trafficking cases the identity of the drug exhibits must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution must establish that the substance allegedly recovered from the accused is the very same substance that was analysed by the chemist and subsequently produced in court as the corpus delicti of the offence. This principle was clearly articulated in Gunalan a/l Ramachandran & Ors v Public Prosecutor [2004] 4 MLJ 489, where it was emphasised that the prosecution must prove that the substance seized from the accused is the very exhibit sent to the chemist for analysis. [28] The law further requires that the movement of the drug exhibits be properly accounted for at all material times, from the moment of seizure until their production in court. The chain of evidence must therefore remain intact so as to eliminate any possibility of tampering, substitution or confusion of exhibits. This principle was reaffirmed in Public Prosecutor v Hariswaran a/l Vasu Devan & Ors [2018] 8 MLJ 330, where the court held that any gap in the chain of evidence affecting the identity of the drug exhibits would be fatal to the prosecution’s case. [29] In the present case, the prosecution relied principally on the evidence of three witnesses to establish the identity of the drugs: a) SP2, the arresting officer who allegedly seized the drugs; b) SP7, the investigating officer who received the exhibits from SP2; and c) SP6, the chemist who analysed the substances and confirmed their type and weight. [30] Having carefully scrutinised the record of appeal, we find that serious discrepancies arose in the evidence of SP2 concerning the description of the drugs allegedly seized from the Appellant. The contemporaneous documents, namely the Borang Senarai Geledah (P8), the police report (P15) and the prosecution’s opening statement, described the seized items as transparent plastic packets containing crystalline substances. However, during his examination-in-chief SP2 testified that the drugs were found inside a black plastic packet. This account stands in clear contrast with the documentary evidence and with his own testimony during cross-examination. [31] More significantly, when the exhibits were produced in court, no such black plastic packet was tendered. Instead, the exhibit marked “B” consisted of a transparent plastic packet. Despite this discrepancy, SP2 identified the transparent packet as the item allegedly seized from the Appellant. [32] The inconsistencies did not end there. During cross-examination, it was further revealed that SP2 had described the contents of the packets differently at various stages of his testimony. In some instances, the substances were described as ‘hablur kristal’, while in others they were described as ‘serbuk kristal’. SP2 himself agreed that these descriptions referred to substances of different physical characteristics. [33] These discrepancies were expressly raised during the trial. However, the prosecution did not seek to clarify or reconcile these contradictions during re-examination. The law is clear that where evidence elicited during cross-examination casts doubt on a witness’s testimony, the prosecution bears the responsibility of addressing the matter during re-examination. In the absence of such clarification, the testimony in question remains unresolved and its reliability becomes questionable. In this regard, we refer to Muhammad Akmal Zuhairi bin Azmal & Ors v Public Prosecutor [2025] 3 MLRA 609 and Nasrul Annuar Abd Samad v PP [2005] 1 CLJ 193. [34] The matter is further complicated by evidence that a second raid was conducted at Sky Garden Condominium after the Appellant’s arrest but before the exhibits were brought back to the police station. It was undisputed that drugs were also seized during this second operation. [35] The evidence of SP2 on this point was inconsistent. At certain stages he stated that the Appellant was brought directly to the police station after the arrest. At other stages he acknowledged that another raid had taken place at Sky Garden where further drugs were seized. [36] Crucially, the prosecution did not adduce evidence explaining how the drugs allegedly seized from the Appellant were kept during the course of the second raid. SP7 herself testified that SP2 had not informed her how the exhibits were stored prior to their handover to her. Nor was she able to confirm whether the drugs seized during the two separate operations might have been mixed. [37] It is also significant that the drug exhibits were only marked and recorded at the police station after the Sky Garden raid had concluded. They were not sealed, initialled or otherwise formally identified at the scene of the arrest. In those circumstances, the possibility of confusion or mix-up of exhibits cannot be lightly dismissed. [38] Notwithstanding these matters, the learned JC concluded that the chain of evidence remained intact on the basis that the exhibits had been in SP2’s custody. With respect, we are unable to agree with that conclusion. As observed in Public Prosecutor v Khoo Chong Ban [2015] 2 CLJ 36, even where the movement of exhibits is continuous, the integrity of the chain of evidence may nonetheless be compromised if there is a possibility of tampering or confusion of exhibits. [39] In our judgment, the discrepancies relating to the description of the drugs, the colour of the packaging, and the circumstances surrounding the second raid give rise to a real possibility that the identity of the drug exhibits had not been satisfactorily established. These are not minor inconsistencies but matters which go directly to the identity of the very substance forming the subject matter of the charge. [40] The law is clear that where material discrepancies affecting the identity of the drug exhibits remain unexplained, the resulting doubt must be resolved in favour of the accused. This principle was affirmed by the Federal Court in Zaifull bin Muhammad v Public Prosecutor [2013] 2 MLJ 348 and reiterated by this Court in Lim Pah Soon v Public Prosecutor [2013] 6 MLJ 252, which emphasised that the identity and integrity of the drug exhibits, being the very corpus delicti of the offence, must be established beyond reasonable doubt. [41] Similarly, in Teoh Hoe Chye v PP [1987] 1 MLJ 220, the Supreme Court held that where doubt arises as to the identity of an exhibit, the failure to adduce evidence to bridge the gap in the chain of evidence would be fatal to the prosecution’s case. [42] In the circumstances of the present case, we are satisfied that the discrepancies and evidential gaps highlighted above were never satisfactorily explained. The resulting doubt as to the identity and integrity of the drug exhibits is therefore fatal to the prosecution’s case. [43] For this reason alone, the conviction recorded for the offence under section 39B (1) (a) (the Trafficking Charge) against the Appellant cannot safely be sustained. Conclusion [44] We are satisfied that the discrepancies relating to the description of the drug exhibits, coupled with the unresolved issues surrounding the second raid at Sky Garden Condominium and the handling of the exhibits prior to their marking at the police station, give rise to a serious and unresolved doubt as to the identity and integrity of the drugs which formed the subject matter of the charge. [45] In our judgment, these are not minor or peripheral inconsistencies. They go to the very core of the prosecution’s case, namely the identity of the drug exhibits which constitute the corpus delicti of the offence. In the absence of a satisfactory explanation from the prosecution to reconcile these discrepancies and dispel the possibility of confusion or mix-up of exhibits, the integrity of the chain of evidence cannot be said to have been established beyond reasonable doubt. [46] It follows that the conviction recorded against the Appellant under section 39B (1) (a) DDA is unsafe and cannot be allowed to stand. In light of our finding on this decisive issue, it is unnecessary for us to consider the remaining grounds of appeal advanced by the Appellant. [47] Accordingly, the appeal is allowed for the Trafficking Charge. The conviction and sentence imposed by the High Court are hereby set aside. The Appellant is acquitted and discharged of the charges. [48] The sentence and conviction for the Possession Charge under section 39A (1) DDA are upheld. Dated: 16 March 2026 Sgd NOORIN BINTI BADARUDDIN Judge Court of Appeal Malaysia LIST OF COUNSELS: