Seterusnya rujukan dibuat kepada kes Mahkamah Persekutuan Perbadanan Kemajuan Negeri Selangor v Teo Kai Huat Building [1982] 2 MLJ 165, khususnya kepada petikan berikut: “With reference to an action in detinue, Bullen & Leake 12th Edn, No. 5 p. 358 that – “An action lies for the specific recovery of personal chattels wrongfully detained from the person entitled to the possession of them and also for damages occasioned by the wrongful detainer (3 B1. Com 151). The technical name of this action is ‘detinue’. The gist of the action is the wrongful detention of goods, and, in general, therefore, it is an action for a wrong independent of contract, and is founded on tort (see Bryant v Herbert [1987] 3 CPD 389); there must be ‘some definite act or deliberate withholding as a necessary preliminary to the arising of this cause of action’ (Clayton v Le Roy [1911] 2 KB 1031 at 1048). And at p. 359 speaking of right action it is stated that – “to support the action, the plaintiff must have the right to the immediate possession of the goods at the time of commencing the action, arising out of an absolute or a special property; The injurious act being the wrongful detention of the goods, and not the original taking or obtaining of the possession, it is immaterial whether they were obtained by the defendant by lawful means, as by a bailment or finding, or by a wrongful act, as by a trespass or conversion. The usual evidence of the detention is that the defendant having the possession or control over the goods, does not deliver them to the plaintiff when demanded (Jones v Dowie [1841] 9 M & W 19). Where there was neither demand nor refusal, no action lay (Clayton v Le Roy, ante).” … In this regard we would refer to the judgement of Diplock LJ (as he was then) in General and Finance Facilities, Ltd v Cooks Cars (Romford), Ltd. [1963] 2 All ER 314 where at p. 317 he said that – There are important distinctions between a cause of action in conversion and a cause of action in detinue. The former is a single wrongful act and the cause of action accrues at the date of the conversion; the latter is a continuing cause of action which accrues at the date of the wrongful refusal to deliver up the goods and continues until delivery up of the goods or judgment in the action for detinue … Demand for delivery up of the chattel was an essential requirement of an action in detinue and detinue lay only when at the time of the demand for delivery up of the chattel made by the person entitled to possession the defendant was either in actual possession of it or was estopped from denying that he was still in possession.”