in any manner or to any extent involved, directly or indirectly, in the production of the document by the computer.” [42] The Court of Appeal in Gnanasegaran a/l Pararajasingam v Public Prosecutor [1997] 3 MLJ 1 explained the application of section 90A of the Evidence Act 1950 as follows: “On reading through s 90A of the Act, we are unable to agree with the construction placed by learned counsel. First and foremost, s 90A which has seven subsections should not be read disjointedly. They should be read together as they form one whole provision for the admissibility of documents produced by computers. As stated earlier, s 90A was added to the Act in 1993 in order to provide for the admission of computer-produced documents and statements as in this case. On our reading of this section, we find that under sub-s (1), the law allows the production of such computer-generated documents or statements if there is evidence, firstly, that they were produced by a computer. Secondly, it is necessary also to prove that the computer is in the course of its ordinary use. In our view, there are two ways of proving this. One way is that it ‘may’ be proved by the production of the certificate as required by sub-s (2). Thus, sub-s (2) is permissive and not mandatory…..” [43] A signed certificate under section 90A(2) of the Evidence Act 1950 (exhibit P17) was tendered through SP3 stating that Lans Coperal Ahmad Syabbir bin Abdullah was the person responsible for the management and the conduct of the activities for which the camera, together with the memory card and the printer was used. Thus, it is presumed that the camera, the memory card and the printer referred to in exhibit P17 was in good working order and was operating properly in all respects throughout the material part of the period during which the photographs were produced in accordance with section 90A(4) of the Evidence Act 1950. As such exhibits P2 a until e and P18 become admissible in evidence. [44] Notwithstanding the admissibility under section 90A(1), it should be noted, however, that section 90B of the Evidence Act 1950 provides that in estimating the weight, if any, to be attached to a document admitted by virtue of section 90A, the court may draw reasonable inference from circumstances relating to the document, including the manner and purpose of its creation or its accuracy or otherwise. [45] In the present case before me, it was pointed out during trial that the CD-R (exhibit P16) tendered through SP3 contained pictures that was created on 26/2/2025, a day before SP3 gave his testimony in court. This is clearly in contradiction with what SP3 testified earlier in his examination in chief where he stated that he received the CD-R from the photographer, one Lans Coperal Ahmad Syabbir bin Abdullah, on 19/3/2024. SP3 denied any editing or tampering of the photographs but he failed to give any satisfying reason to explain how the pictures were created only on 26/2/2025. [46] Given that there was no reason furnished by the prosecution witnesses on the difference of dates, only very little weight is to be given to the said photographs, namely exhibits P2 a until e and P18. However, this does not automatically render the prosecution’s case to fall. I refer to the case of Abdul Rahman bin Mohd v Public Prosecutor [2021] MLJU 971 where the Court of Appeal decided as follows: “[29] As we said earlier both SP2 and SP3 who had seen the exhibits and viewed the scene of arrest identified the photographs of them and no challenge was mounted by the defence in respect of said identification. In the premises, it is not relevant if the photographer was not called. Even if the photographs were inadmissible, the most crucial issue in this case in respect of the identification of exhibits was the physical identification of the drugs in question and evidence in respect of the chain of evidence from point of seizure to the time they were analysed by the chemist. Counsel for the appellant submitted identification was done only through the photographs. However, this submission is not supported by the evidence that we referred to earlier. The drugs were identified and marked by SP2, SP3 and SP1. SP2 recovered the drugs and handed it over to SP3 who personally sent it to the Chemistry Department. SP1, after completion of analysis, marked the package in which he placed the drugs and he identified the same in court. In the premises, we find no merit in this ground of appeal.” [47] On the issue of identification of drugs, all 3 prosecution witnesses had physically examined and positively identified the impugned drugs found on the accused, which are exhibits P6 and P7 a until l. Hence, I find this argument to be clearly untenable. [48] Even if the credibility of SP3 is questioned for failing to provide a reasonable explanation on the difference of dates for the pictures, I find that this does not render the prosecution’s case to fail. Reference is made to the case of PP v. Datuk Haji Harun bin Haji Idris (No 2) [1977] 1 MLJ 15 where it expounded as follows: “… In my opinion, the discrepancies there will always be, because in the circumstances in which the events happened, every witness does not remember the same thing and he does not remember accurately every single thing that happened. The question is whether existence of certain discrepancies is sufficient to destroy their credibility. There is no rule of law that the testimony of a witness must either be believed in its entirety or not at all. A court is fully competent, for good and cogent reasons, to accept one part of the testimony of a witness and to reject the other.” Furthermore, in the case of Khoon Chye Hin v. PP [1961] MLJ 105, it has been held that if a witness demonstrably tells lies, his evidence must be looked upon with suspicion and treated with caution, but to say that it should be entirely rejected would be to go too far. [49] Accordingly, it is my judgment that after having conducted a maximum evaluation of all credible evidence made available before this Court, I find that the elements of the offence of possession of drugs charges have been proven by the prosecution, such that a prima facie case in respect of the charge against the accused under Section 12(2) of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 has been established. Thus, the accused is called to enter his defence. F. THE DEFENCE’S CASE [50] The three options under section 173(ha) of the CPC was explained to the accused through his counsel and the accused chose to give sworn evidence in the witness box. It was also highlighted to the court that the defence won’t be calling any other witnesses besides the accused himself. [51] The accused’s duty at the end of the defence’s case is to raise a reasonable doubt against the prosecution’s case. Reference is made to the case of PP v Chong Boo See [1988] 2 CLJ 206 where it was held as follows: “….it is fundamental that it is not for the defence to prove anything and that all is required of it is to render an explanation which is reasonable and probable and which casts a doubt either as to the truth of the prosecution or as to the guilt of the accused.” [52] In a nutshell, the accused’s defence was that the impugned drugs did not belong to him; rather, they were planted on him by an unknown policeman. G. THE COURT’S DUTY AT THE END OF THE CASE [53] The duty that the court bears at the conclusion of the trial is to consider all evidence produced by both the prosecution and the defence and to decide whether the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt. This is as laid down under section 182A of the CPC. [54] The Federal Court in Md Zainudin Raujan v PP [2013] 4 CLJ 21 decided as follows: “At the conclusion of the trial, s. 182A of the Criminal Procedure Code imposes a duty on the trial court to consider all the evidence adduced before it and to decide whether the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt. The defence of the accused must be considered in the totality of the evidence adduced by the prosecution, as well as in the light of the well-established principles enunciated in Mat v. PP [1963] 1 LNS 82; [1963] 1 MLJ 263 with regard to the approach to be taken in evaluating the evidence of the defence.” [55] I also refer to the landmark case of Mat v PP [1963] MLJ 263 where it states: “The correct law of Magistrates to apply is as follows. If you accept the explanation given by or on behalf of the accused, you must of course acquit. But this does not entitle you to convict if you do not believe that explanation, for he is still entitled to an acquittal if it raises in your mind a reasonable doubt as to his guilt, as the onus of proving his guilt lies throughout on the prosecution. If upon the whole evidence you are left in a real state of doubt, the prosecution has failed to satisfy the onus of proof which lies upon it”. [56] The definition of the term ‘reasonable doubt’ was elucidated by the High Court in Public Prosecutor v Aszroy bin Achoi [2018] MLJU 507 as the following: “[90] ’Reasonable doubt’ in criminal law is not any sort of doubt that is imaginary or even fanciful. An off-quoted definition on reasonable doubt was given in the case of PP v Saimin (supra) by Sharma J which is as follows: It has again been said that ‘reasonable doubt’ is the doubt which makes you hesitate as to the correctness of the conclusion which you reach. If under your oaths and upon your consciences, after you have fully investigated the evidence and compared it in all its parts, you say to yourself I doubt if he is guilty, then it is a reasonable doubt. It is a doubt which settles in your judgment and finds a resting place there. Or as sometimes said, it must be a doubt so solemn and substantial as to produce in the minds of the jurors some uncertainty as to the verdict to be given. A reasonable doubt must be a doubt arising from the evidence or want of evidence and cannot be an imaginary doubt or conjecture unrelated to evidence.” H. THE COURT’S FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS AT THE END OF THE DEFENCE’S CASE [57] The version of the accused’s story was that on 17/3/2024 at around 2.30 a.m., he had just returned from spending time with his friends. As he was returning to his rental apartment, he was apprehended by one policeman. The accused alleged that the said individual, without showing his authority card nor giving any explanation, inserted his hand into the pocket of the accused’s trousers, from which the impugned drugs were subsequently recovered. The accused further alleged that he saw the said individual holding the impugned drugs prior to placing them into the pocket of the accused’s trousers. [58] The accused’s version clearly differs from the prosecution’s version of the story as SP1 had during examination-in-chief testified that he had apprehended the accused firsthand at the scene of the crime. Then, he had showed his authority card before conducting a pat-down search upon him. SP1 also testified that it was the accused himself who took out the impugned drugs from his own pocket trousers after SP1 felt a bulge inside it. During cross-examination, SP1 explained further that he stopped his motorcycle beside the accused and said to the accused that he was a policeman and showed his authority card to the accused. SP1 also denied that he had taken out the impugned drugs on his own volition during the cross-examination. [59] A bare assertion, such as what was given by the accused, without more that the impugned drugs were planted by an unknown policeman into the accused’s trousers simply cannot raise a reasonable doubt in the prosecution’s case. On this matter, I refer myself to the Court of Appeal case of Sahrul Mazlee Mohd Khalid v. PP [2022] CLJU 4 where the following was held: “[55] There was no evidence of any prior relationship or any evidence that the appellant knew any members of the police raiding team or vice versa. Thus, the learned trial judge concluded that there was nothing to suggest that the police might have had any motive to frame the appellant….” [60] I am also guided by the Court of Appeal case of Dickson Levy Maria George v. PP [2018] CLJU 135 where Zawawi Salleh JCA (as His Lordship then was) cited with approval Goh Han Heng v. Public Prosecutor [2003] SGHC 226 where Yong Pung How CJ (Singapore) held that: "where the accused can show that the complainant has a motive to falsely implicate him, then the burden must fall on the prosecution to disprove that motive. This does not mean that the accused merely needs to allege that the complainant has a motive to falsely implicate him. Instead, the accused must adduce sufficient evidence of this motive so as to raise a reasonable doubt in the prosecution's case. Only then would the burden of proof shift to the prosecution to prove that there was no such motive. To hold otherwise would mean that the prosecution would have the burden of proving a lack of motive to falsely implicate the accused in literally every case, thereby practically instilling a lack of such a motive as a constituent element of every offence." [61] Upon carefully sifting through the accused’s defence, I find that the accused had merely concocted a half-baked story with not an iota of evidence to lend support. Despite the fact that frame-up of innocent citizens by the police cannot be discounted in some cases, the court must give weight to that defence only on credible evidence that suggests it and not on mere speculation; otherwise prosecution of criminal cases in this country would be frustrated at every turn (see Sri Ganesh Jaya Balan v. PP & Another Appeals [2022] 2 CLJ 546). [62] In response to further probing by the learned Deputy Public Prosecutor, the accused conceded that he had not lodged any police report alleging that he had been framed by the said individual. As rightly pointed out by the learned Deputy Public Prosecutor, the accused had ample opportunity to lodge a police report alleging that he was framed from the very moment he received the documents from the prosecution under section 51A of the Criminal Procedure Code, yet he failed to do so. The accused’s failure undermines the credibility of his claim and suggests that the allegation of being framed is a recent fabrication rather than a genuine grievance. Additionally, if the accused was truly innocent, it would only be logical for the accused to take leaps and bounds to exonerate himself, particularly given that the offence with which he is charged carries a mandatory sentence of imprisonment and whipping. [63] Moreover, it is rather peculiar that the accused expressed dissatisfaction in his examination-in-chief over the said individual’s failure to display his authority card, instead of showing outrage or concern over the far more serious allegation of having been falsely implicated. This misplaced focus raises serious doubts about the truthfulness of the accused’s narrative of events. A person who is genuinely innocent and wrongfully accused would be expected to vehemently deny the allegations and show greater concern about the implications of the false accusation, rather than fixate on a relatively minor procedural omission. [64] In addition to that, the accused only raised the defence of a frame-up at the defence stage, and not earlier in the proceedings. The Court of Appeal in Muhammad Faizal Dzulkifli v. PP [2017] 3 CLJ 424 succinctly explained the concept of an afterthought as follows: “[34] So, an afterthought defence is a defence that smacks of a recent invention on the part of an accused person. It is a defence that was never revealed during investigation, nor confronted to the relevant prosecution witnesses during their cross-examination in the prosecution stage. Such being its nature, it is quite incapable, or difficulty of belief. Indeed, it arouses suspicion as to its veracity. But, the fact that it is unbelievable does not relieve the prosecution of its attendant duty throughout the entire case, to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. Neither does it automatically mean that the court must therefore convict the accused person, on account that the defence has been a mere afterthought. Rather, on authority of the case of Mat v. PP [1963] CLJU 82; [1963] 1 LNS 82; [1963] MLJ 263 it is still incumbent on the court to consider the entire evidence before it to see whether the accused person has raised a reasonable doubt in the prosecution's case. If such a lingering, as opposed to a fleeting or whimsical, doubt is created in the mind of the court, then the accused person is entitled, as a matter of law, to be acquitted and discharged forthwith, from the charge levied against him.” [65] The accused claims that he was initially apprehended by an individual whose identity he cannot recall and that individual had allegedly planted the impugned drugs on the accused. However, the accused merely provided a superficial and bare assertion, which then leaves me in serious doubt whether that individual is a real or fictitious character. In addition, the accused’s delay in disclosing this character for the police to carry out a thorough investigation into the probability of his defence entitles this court to disbelieve the accused as decided by the Federal Court in Teng Howe Sing v. PP [2009] 3 CLJ 733. [66] Viewing the defence story presented before me objectively, I am not convinced nor persuaded with it. The accused’s defence is unable to cause a dent on the prosecution case as established by evidence. Much less even raise a reasonable doubt. [67] As such, after having evaluated the entire evidence of this case, I find that the defence of the accused that he was framed did not hold water and did not raise any reasonable doubt on the case of the prosecution. I can find no reason to question the credibility or veracity of the police witnesses, namely SP1 and SP3, who testified for the prosecution. In scrutinizing the evidence of these two witnesses, I took into consideration not only the demeanour of each of the said witnesses but also the consistency of their evidence and in the final analysis I am satisfied that on the whole, they are truthful witnesses. I find no indication that SP1 and SP3 were motivated to embellish their evidence or to fabricate evidence in order to implicate the accused. [68] Having evaluated the evidence in its totality, I find that the prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt all the essential elements of the respective charge under section 12(2) of the DDA against the accused. The accused has failed to cast a reasonable doubt on other aspects of the prosecution’s case. Thus, I find the accused guilty as charged and convict him of the offence charged. I. SENTENCE [69] The accused relied on the the following grounds as mitigating factors: he was married and he was currently studying at Bera Community College, Pahang. [70] The learned Deputy Public Prosecutor, on the other hand, submitted to the court that a severe sentence accompanied by the maximum number of strokes should be imposed based on these grounds: the case involved 110 ecstasy pills weighing 10.11 grams; the accused had been charged in several other narcotics-related cases after being charged in the present matter, indicating a lack of remorse; and the prevalence of drug-related offences necessitates a deterrent sentence, both to serve as a lesson to the accused and to convey a strong message to the public. [71] In determining the sentence to be meted out to the accused, I have had regard to the following factors: Public interest [72] The legal framework governing penalties for drug offences has seen progressive changes over time. As expressed by Hashim Yeop A. Sani (as he then was) in Public Prosecutor v Loo Choon Fatt [1976] 2 MLJ 256: “It is common sense to say that behind these legislative exercises was the government’s realization albeit gradual, of the problem of drug abuse in this country, the degenerating effect of the misuse of dangerous drugs and the attendant dangers it has posed to society itself. The amendments passed by Parliament therefore reflect the public policy. It must be presumed that behind the public policy is the consideration of public interest. The change in the attitude of the legislature itself during the last three years reflects the seriousness of the problem. In my view the courts will not be performing their functions honestly if the seriousness of the situation is not reflected in the sentence imposed or if the sentence appears to defeat the object of the statute...” [73] The question of public interest is, and has always been, a central factor in sentencing decisions. On this point, I refer to the oft-quoted passage in Rex v Kenneth John Ball 35 CrAppR 164 as follows: "In deciding the appropriate sentence a court should always be guided by certain considerations. The first and foremost is the public interest. The criminal law is publicly enforced, not only with the object of punishing crime, but also in the hope of preventing it. A proper sentence, passed in public, serves the public interest in two ways. It may deter others who might be tempted to try crime as seeming to offer easy money on the supposition, that if the offender is caught and brought to justice, the punishment will be negligible. Such a sentence may also deter the particular criminal from committing a crime again, or induce him to turn from a criminal to an honest life. The public interest is indeed served, and best served, if the offender is induced to turn from criminal ways to honest living. Our law does not, therefore, fix the sentence for a particular crime, but fixes a maximum sentence and leaves it to the court to decide what is, within that maximum, the appropriate sentence for each criminal in the particular circumstances of each case. Not only in regard to each crime, but in regard to each criminal, the court has the right and the duty to decide whether to be lenient or severe." [74] An appreciation of public interest in drug-related offences warrants an examination of the evolution of section 39A, which dates back to 1973. [75] Section 39A of the DDA was first introduced and enforced on 1st June 1973 via Act A194 and that provision sought to increase the penalty for possession of either heroin or morphine, weighted 5 grammes or more, to an imprisonment of not less than three years but no more than fourteen years. The said provision is produced below: Section 4. New section 39A. There shall be inserted immediately after section 39 of the Ordinance, the following new section 39A - "Increased penalties in respect of certain offences, the subject matter of which was heroin or morphine.