MUHAMMAD FIRDAUS BIN ZAILANI v Kerajaan Malaysia (KA-25-22-12/2023)

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KEDAH CHIEF OF POLICE ROYAL MALAYSIA POLICE (PDRM) --- RESPONDENTS GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT Introduction 1. This application for judicial review, filed by the Applicant pursuant to Order 53 of the Rules of Court 2012 (“this Judicial Review”), seeks And In the matter of the decision made by the Disciplinary Board of the Royal Malaysia Police, effective on 17.09.2023 certiorari and declaratory orders to quash the Second Respondent's decision effective 17.09.2023, dismissing him from the Royal Malaysia Police (PDRM) force.

The Applicant seeks to invalidate the disciplinary punishment of dismissal imposed on him following a Syariah Court conviction, and further seeks an order of mandamus for his reinstatement into the service.

The Applicant was a Lance Corporal serving at the Pokok Sena Police Station, Kedah. On 23.09.2021, he was arrested for khalwat (close proximity with a member of the opposite sex who is not a spouse or close blood relative) under Section 25(a) of the Syariah Criminal Offences Enactment (Kedah Darul Aman) 2014. In Malaysia's dual legal system, Syariah courts have jurisdiction over Muslims for certain religious offences and personal matters. The Applicant was charged in the Syariah Lower Court on 19.10.2022, pleaded guilty, and was fined RM2,500 (in default 4 months imprisonment), which he paid. Following this conviction, he was suspended from federal duty on 19.01.2023 under Regulation 45(1) of the Public Officers (Conduct and Discipline) Regulations 1993 ("the Regulations").

On 17.09.2023, the PDRM Disciplinary Board (the 2nd Respondent) (“Disciplinary Board”) convened to consider the case under Regulation 33(1) of the Regulations (disciplinary action based on criminal conviction). The Board decided to dismiss the Applicant from service effective that same date.

Dissatisfied, the Applicant filed for this Judicial Review, seeking certiorari to quash the dismissal, a declaration that the dismissal was void, and mandamus for reinstatement. The Applicant’s Case 6. The cornerstone of the Applicant's argument is that he was denied procedural fairness and the fundamental right to be heard (audi alteram partem) before being dismissed from the police force. The Disciplinary Board strictly relied on his Syariah Court conviction for khalwat and summarily dismissed him without issuing a show-cause letter, allowing written representations, or convening a disciplinary hearing. The Applicant argues that this violated Article 135(2) of the Federal Constitution, which guarantees public servants a reasonable opportunity to be heard, as well as Articles 5 (Right to Life/Livelihood) and 8 (Equality before the law).

To support the requirement of procedural fairness and the right to be heard, the Applicant relies on several key legal cases such as Ketua Pengarah Kastam v Ho Kwan Seng [1975] CLJU 72, Yusof Sudin v Suruhanjaya Perkhidmatan Polis & Anor [2012] CLJ 448, Shenmuga Sundrum v Dr Noor Hisham Abdullah & Ors [2023] CLJU 453 and Musa Matal v Ng Siew Hiang & Ors [2023] CLJU

2446.

The Applicant argued that the punishment was excessive. He claimed the khalwat offence was not serious enough to warrant dismissal, especially since he paid the fine and subsequently married the woman involved. He argued the Board failed to consider these mitigating factors.

The Applicant strongly accuses the Respondents of acting in bad faith and failing to be honest with the court during this Judicial Review proceedings. Specifically, the Applicant points out a severe contradiction: the official minutes of the Disciplinary Board meeting on 17.09.2023 show that the Board considered only the khalwat conviction when deciding to dismiss him. However, in their affidavits to the High Court, the Respondents claimed the severe punishment was justified because the Applicant had multiple "past disciplinary offences".

When challenged to produce documentation or records of these alleged past offences during discovery, the Respondents failed to provide any evidence. The Applicant argues this proves the Respondents fabricated hearsay evidence retroactively to justify their harsh decision.

Through discovery of the Disciplinary Board's meeting minutes, the Applicant argued that the Board actually considered his past offences rather than just the khalwat conviction. He pointed out that the minutes indicated that the khalwat offence warranted only a warning, but he was dismissed because of his cumulative disciplinary record.

The Applicant further argued this constitutes double jeopardy (Article 7(2) of the Federal Constitution) because he is being punished again for previous offences that had already been settled.

The Applicant cited a robust line of cases establishing the duty of candour required of public authorities, to condemn this behaviour, including Dato’ Sri Mohd Najib Tun Hj Abd Razak v Menteri Dalam Negeri & Ors [2025] 9 MLJ 611 and Datuk Bandar Kuala Lumpur v Perbadanan Pengurusan Trellises & Ors [2023] 5 MLJ 167. The Respondents’ Case 14. The Respondents argued that under the proviso to Article 135(2) of the Federal Constitution, the right to be heard does not apply if a public servant is dismissed based on a criminal conviction. They cited Regulation 33(1) of the Regulations, which allows the disciplinary authority to make a decision based on the criminal court's decision, the service record, and the head of department's recommendation, without a fresh hearing. Since the Applicant had already been convicted in the Syariah Court (where he had his day in court), the disciplinary process does not require a further hearing. Decision and Findings of the Court 15. Before delving into the substantive merits of this Judicial Review, this Court finds it necessary to record the abundance of court filings, particularly the multiple interlocutory applications and their supporting affidavits, filed by the Applicant throughout this proceeding.

Apart from the primary cause papers for the substantive Judicial Review, which include the Applicant's Statement (Enclosure 2), the Main Supporting Affidavit (Enclosure 3), and subsequent Reply Affidavits (Enclosures 19 and 25), the Applicant also initiated several interlocutory applications that required the filing of numerous supplementary affidavits and submissions. These include: a) Application for Discovery of Documents (Enclosure 20), supported by an Affidavit sworn on 31.07.2024 (Enclosure 21); b) Application for Cross-Examination (Enclosure 33), supported by an Affidavit sworn on 26.02.2025 (Enclosure 34); c) Application to Amend the Statement (Enclosure 57), which was filed late into the proceedings; and d) Late Additional Submission (Enclosure 70), which was filed by the Applicant right before the date set for the court's decision, drawing objections from the Respondents.

The multitude of these interlocutory applications generated a voluminous exchange of affidavits in reply by the Respondents (e.g., Enclosures 18, 24, and 35) and extensive written submissions from both parties for each respective enclosure. The Court has meticulously perused all these enclosures in arriving at its decision.

Furthermore, regarding the Applicant's application to cross-examine the deponents (Enclosure 33), this Court dismisses the application since the power to allow cross-examination in judicial review is highly restricted.

As established in Rekapacific Bhd v Securities Commission [2005] 2 CLJ 108, cross examination of deponent(s) is only permitted in "very rare cases" where fundamentally important questions of fact are in serious dispute. The Applicant's attempt to engage in a fishing expedition for statistics regarding other officers is wholly irrelevant to the legality of his own dismissal.

Furthermore, guided by the High Court in Teguh Kemajuan Sdn Bhd v. Pentadbir Tanah, Kota Tinggi & Anor [2014] MLJU 1887, the strict test for allowing cross-examination in a judicial review is whether it is an absolute 'necessity' for the fair disposal of the dispute, not merely 'relevancy'. The Applicant's request to fish for statistics regarding the dismissal of other officers does not meet this threshold of necessity, as it is wholly irrelevant to the legality of his own specific dismissal.

Lastly, the Court formally rejects the Applicant's Late Additional Submission (Enclosure 70). As noted by this Court during the proceedings, the oral submissions by both parties had already concluded approximately a month prior. The Applicant failed to seek the Court’s permission during the oral hearing to file any further submissions. Entertaining a last-minute submission without prior leave would result in a never-ending process and is highly prejudicial and unfair to the Respondents. Therefore, Enclosure 70 is dismissed.

It was only after the disposal of these interlocutory applications— some of which were filed even after the exhaustion of written submissions and replies, but before oral submissions and/ or the final decision—and following a prolonged delay occasioned by them, that this Court managed to set the matter down for the hearing and decision of the substantive application for this Judicial Review. Having considered the written submissions, affidavits, and oral arguments from both parties, this Court dismisses the application in its entirety. Herein are the reasons. A. The Issue of Unpleaded Grounds and Enclosure 57 23. Before addressing the merits of the Applicant's claims, this Court must address a fundamental procedural flaw. As correctly pointed out by the Respondents during oral submissions, the specific grievances that the Applicant was “denied the right to be heard” and subjected to “double jeopardy” were never pleaded in the Applicant's original Statement (Enclosure 2).

It is a trite principle of law that parties are strictly bound by their pleadings. Relying on the Apex Court's decision in Ranjit Kaur S Gopal Singh v Hotel Excelsior (M) Sdn Bhd [2010] 8 CLJ 629, this Court cannot entertain or act upon an unpleaded issue.

This strict adherence to pleadings in judicial review proceedings is further fortified by the Federal Court's decision in Dr A. Dutt v Assunta Hospital [1981] 1 MLJ 304, which was rightfully cited by the Respondents. The court can only consider issues that have been expressly pleaded in the Statement filed under Order 53; matters not stated in the Statement, even if subsequently exhibited or averred to in affidavits, should not be entertained.

This strict principle was recently reaffirmed by the Court of Appeal in Lembaga Tatatertib Kumpulan Sokongan (No.1) Jabatan Perlindungan Hidupan Liar dan Taman Negara & Ors v. Mariani Bt Ramli [2021] 5 MLJ 857. The Court of Appeal in Mariani held that an applicant is strictly confined to the grounds set out in the statement under Order 53 rule 3(2) of the Rules of Court 2012, and it constitutes a reversible error of law for a court to decide on issues that were not pleaded in the grounds of the application. Thus, the Applicant's failure to plead these central issues is fatal to those arguments.

The Applicant’s subsequent attempt to amend the Statement late in the proceedings via Enclosure 57 is also rejected. It was filed by the Applicant only after the parties' written submissions and replies were duly filed and exchanges. In fact, it was only after the Respondent raised the objection in their written reply (to the Applicant’s written submission), objecting that this particular issue was never pleaded, that the Applicant filed their Encl 57 a week later in their attempt to rectify this glaring mistake.

Under Order 53 rule 7 of the Rules of Court 2012, an amendment may only be allowed if it deals with 'new matters arising out of any affidavit of any other party'. The Applicant failed to show that the amendment was necessitated by new matters. Following the reasoning by Ahmad Kamal J (as he then was) in Detik Hartamas Sdn Bhd v Ketua Pengarah Hasil Dalam Negeri [2022] 12 MLJ 233, a late amendment filed as an afterthought to circumvent the opponent's objections is highly prejudicial and an abuse of process. On this procedural ground alone, the Applicant's argument regarding the right to be heard fails. B. The Limits of Supervisory Jurisdiction 29. Before evaluating the Disciplinary Board's specific findings, it is paramount to establish the strict perimeters of this Court's jurisdiction. It is a well-settled principle of public law that in an application for judicial review, the High Court does not sit as a Court of Appeal. This Court exercises a purely supervisory function. As authoritatively stated by the Supreme Court in Harpers Trading (M) Sdn Bhd v National Union of Commercial Workers [1991] 1 MLJ 417, judicial review is not an appeal from a decision, but a review of the manner in which the decision was made. The court is not entitled to consider whether the decision itself, on the merits of the facts, was fair and reasonable.

In the specific context of disciplinary proceedings involving public officers, this Court is strictly guided by the Federal Court's landmark pronouncement in Kerajaan Malaysia & Ors v Tay Chai Huat [2012] 3 MLJ 149. In that case, Ariffin Zakaria CJ authoritatively held as follows: “[36] The courts have very limited review powers over administrative determinations of public bodies and are constrained to confirm the findings in disciplinary hearings. The courts will only intervene in disciplinary cases where there was a fundamental procedural flaw. The courts cannot exceed its role in cases of this genre as the instant appeal. The courts cannot interfere merely because it may come to different conclusions on facts on the same basis of the same evidence. Weighing and assessing the evidence is the function of the disciplinary authority which is the body to which the legislature has entrusted the responsibility of deciding the issue, and not the courts. Hence, the court should approach cases of this genre as the instant appeal in the following way, namely, whether there has been an error in the process or whether there was procedural irregularity in the decision-making proceedings leading to the public officer’s dismissal.” [Emphasis added]

The Federal Court explicitly warned that the courts cannot exceed their role or interfere merely because they might come to a different conclusion on the facts based on the same evidence.

This strict limitation on the court's power must be rigorously observed. As famously pronounced by Lord Brightman in Chief Constable of the North Wales Police v Evans [1982] 3 All ER 141, which the Federal Court has repeatedly endorsed in cases such as Tay Chai Huat (supra), "Judicial review is concerned, not with the decision, but with the decision-making process. Unless that restriction on the power of the court is observed, the court will, in my view, under the guise of preventing the abuse of power, be itself guilty of usurping power”.

The core inquiry is strictly confined to the decision-making process. The court's role is solely to determine whether there has been a fundamental procedural flaw, an error in the process, or a procedural irregularity leading to the public officer's dismissal. Relying on the universally accepted principle enunciated by Lord Brightman in Chief Constable of the North Wales Police v Evans (supra), which was also adopted by the Court of Appeal in T. Ganeswaran v. Suruhanjaya Polis Diraja Malaysia [2005] 3 CLJ 302 and the ratio of the Federal Court in Tay Chai Huat (supra), the court must observe this restriction; otherwise, under the guise of preventing the abuse of power, the court would itself be guilty of usurping power.

The law is well-settled that it is not the function of the court to interfere with the severity or quantum of punishment meted out by a disciplinary authority. As the Federal Court powerfully articulated in Ng Hock Cheng v Pengarah Am Penjara & Ors [1998] 1 MLJ 153, and recently reaffirmed by the Court of Appeal in Saiful Bahari bin Yunus v. Dato’ Jamil bin Rakon (Setiausaha Suruhanjaya Pasukan Polis) & Ors [2023] 3 MLJ 645, "Just like a professional body being the best tribunal to judge the seriousness of misconduct of its members, in a similar vein, an employer, including a government, is the best person to judge similarly the seriousness of misconduct of an employee". [Emphasis added]

The court intervenes only on the nature and manner of the accusation or procedural flaws, not to substitute the punishment with its own measure. It is emphatically not the function of this Court to rehear the case or to substitute the order of dismissal imposed by the Disciplinary Board with its own measure of punishment. C. The Right to be Heard (Article 135(2))

The crux of the Applicant's grievance under this issue is that the decision-making process was tainted by a breach of natural justice. The Applicant vigorously argued that he was denied the right to be heard, as he was never called to defend himself and was not allowed to make representations before the Disciplinary Board before being handed the heaviest punishment of dismissal. This Court has carefully considered the Applicant's contention and finds it to be without merit.

Indeed, it is a trite principle of public law that Article 135(2) of the Federal Constitution guarantees a public officer a reasonable opportunity to be heard before they can be dismissed or reduced in rank. However, this constitutional safeguard is not absolute. Proviso

to Article 135(2) of the Federal Constitution explicitly provides an exception, stating that the right to be heard does not apply where a member of the service is dismissed or reduced in rank "on the ground of conduct in respect of which a criminal charge has been proved against him".

The legal position on this exception is well-settled. As highlighted by the Respondents, the Federal Court in Pengerusi Lembaga Tatatertib Polis Diraja Malaysia v. Mohd Azuan bin Aniffa (Rayuan Sivil No. 01(f)-57-11/2015(W) of the Federal Court) has firmly established that the right to be heard is not afforded when a disciplinary action is initiated following a criminal conviction. Furthermore, as pertinently ruled by the Court of Appeal in Saiful Bahari (supra), "there cannot be a breach of duty where none exists at law". Because the 1993 Regulations and the Federal Constitution expressly exclude the requirement for an opportunity to be heard or make representations in cases of conviction, the Respondents cannot be said to have deprived the Applicant of any procedural fairness.

In the present case, it is an undisputed fact that the Applicant was arrested and subsequently charged in the Syariah Subordinate Court of Pokok Sena for the offence of khalwat under Section 25(a) of the Syariah Criminal Offences (Kedah Darul Aman) Enactment 2014. On 19.10.2022, the Applicant pleaded guilty to the charge and was fined RM2,500.00. Therefore, a criminal charge had been definitively proved against him within the ambit of Proviso (a) to Article 135(2).

Since the Applicant's dismissal was the direct consequence of a criminal conviction, the strict requirement to call him for a separate disciplinary defence was legally dispensed with. Instead, the Respondents were required to adhere to the specific procedures governing convicted officers under the Regulations.

This Court finds that the Respondents have strictly complied with these statutory procedures: a)

The evidence shows that the Disciplinary Board convened on 17.09.2023, comprehensively weighed these exact documents, and lawfully exercised its power under Regulation 33(1) read with Regulation 38(g) of the 1993 Regulations to dismiss the Applicant. There is no statutory requirement under Regulation 33(1) for the Disciplinary Board to conduct an oral hearing or issue a show-cause letter before deciding on the punishment for a convicted officer.

This Court is guided by the Federal Court's landmark decision in Tay Chai Huat (supra), which establishes that the courts have very limited review powers over the administrative determinations of public bodies and are constrained to confirm the findings of disciplinary hearings. The court will only intervene where there is a fundamental procedural flaw or an irregularity in the decision-making process.

The Applicant's grievance that he was denied the opportunity to mitigate his sentence is also without legal basis. As affirmatively ruled by the Court of Appeal in Saiful Bahari (supra), in cases involving statutory orders or criminal convictions, there is no right or opportunity of mitigation afforded to the officer. The decision rests within the sole purview of the disciplinary authority, which relies entirely on the documentary evidence before it—namely, the court report, the service records, and the head of department's recommendation. Furthermore, guided by the Federal Court in Tay Chai Huat (supra), it is not the function of this Court to step into the shoes of the disciplinary authority to regulate its procedures or substitute its findings, so long as the express statutory process has been followed.

The Applicant's reliance on Yusof bin Sudin (supra) is, again, distinguishable and misplaced. That case involved an officer facing ordinary disciplinary charges who explicitly requested an oral hearing. In stark contrast, the present Applicant's dismissal was the direct result of a proven criminal conviction in a court of law, which squarely triggers the absolute exception under Proviso (a) to Article 135(2) and Regulation 33(1), dispensing with the need for any further hearing.

The Applicant cannot now claim a denial of natural justice or demand a separate opportunity to defend himself. The Applicant had already been given his day in court when he elected to plead guilty to the Syariah criminal charge. The Disciplinary Board merely acted upon the uncontroverted fact of this conviction, which was entirely lawful and procedurally sound. Consequently, this Court rules that the Disciplinary Board's decision was not vitiated by any procedural impropriety. D. The Allegation of Double Jeopardy 47. The Applicant advanced a secondary argument relying on the minutes of the Disciplinary Board's meeting. The Applicant alleged that during the board's deliberations, a lesser punishment of a warning was purportedly considered or recorded for the specific khalwat offence. Still, he was ultimately given the heavier punishment of dismissal due to his disciplinary record. The Applicant vehemently argued that relying on his previous infractions to justify his current dismissal amounted to punishing him twice for those past wrongs, thereby violating the legal rule against double jeopardy.

This Court firmly rejects the Applicant’s contention, as it is based on a fundamental misconception of the law and the applicable disciplinary procedures.

The actions of the disciplinary authority are strictly governed by the Public Officers (Conduct and Discipline) Regulations 1993 ("the 1993 Regulations"). When an officer has been convicted of a criminal offence, the disciplinary authority does not mete out punishment in a vacuum. Regulation 33(1) of the 1993 Regulations explicitly mandates the disciplinary authority to comprehensively evaluate three specific elements before deciding on the appropriate penalty: a) The report of the court's decision; b) The recommendation of the Head of Department; and c) The officer's records of service.

Therefore, examining the Applicant's past disciplinary history was not an arbitrary or malicious act by the Respondents; it was a strict statutory requirement imposed upon the Disciplinary Board by Regulation 33(1) to aid in their deliberation. Consequently, this Court wholly rejects the Applicant's unfounded allegations that the Respondents acted in bad faith or fabricated evidence to justify the punishment.

The Applicant's reliance on the doctrine of double jeopardy is wholly misplaced. The rule against double jeopardy strictly prohibits a person from being tried or punished twice for the same offence. It is a universal principle of employment and administrative law that evaluating an employee's past disciplinary record to determine the gravity of punishment for a new, proven conviction does not constitute a second punishment. The Applicant was not being re-charged for his past offences; rather, the Disciplinary Board lawfully utilised his cumulative service record to assess his ongoing fitness and suitability to be retained in the police force following his fresh Syariah Court conviction.

Furthermore, the official notification letter and the affidavit evidence confirm that the operative decision to dismiss the Applicant was lawfully made under Regulation 33(1) read with Regulation 38(g) of the 1993 Regulations, as a direct consequence of his Syariah Court conviction. The Disciplinary Board acted squarely within its statutory powers, and the consideration of the Applicant's records did not, in any way, amount to double jeopardy.

In advancing the double jeopardy argument, the Applicant’s counsel during oral submissions relied on the case of Zakaria Abdul Rahman v Ketua Polis Negara [2001] 6 CLJ 273. However, this Court finds that the reliance on that case is fundamentally flawed and distinguishable. That case concerned a public officer being subjected to a second disciplinary proceeding based on the same facts for which he had already been acquitted or punished. In stark contrast, the Applicant here was facing a completely new and distinct primary charge—his Syariah Court conviction for khalwat. The Disciplinary Board did not charge him again for his past offences; it merely took his cumulative service record into account to determine the appropriate quantum of punishment for the new khalwat conviction, which is a standard and lawful sentencing mechanism.

In addressing the Applicant's allegation that the Respondents breached their duty of candour by allegedly hiding the true reasons for his dismissal, this Court finds the argument to be without merit. As rightfully submitted by the Respondents, the minutes of the Disciplinary Board meeting cannot be read in isolation.

The meeting minutes must be read comprehensively alongside the other contemporaneous documents, specifically the Notice of Disciplinary Punishment (Exhibit A-6 in Enclosure 3) and the appointment letter of the Disciplinary Board. These documents unequivocally state that the disciplinary action and subsequent dismissal were initiated under Regulation 33(1) as a direct result of the Applicant's Syariah Court conviction. The mention of past disciplinary records in the background of the minutes does not negate the primary charge, nor does it prove bad faith or a lack of candour on the part of the Respondents.

Consequently, the Applicant's reliance on Dato’ Sri Mohd Najib Tun Hj Abd Razak (supra) and Perbadanan Pengurusan Trellises (supra) is completely distinguishable. Those cases dealt with the deliberate suppression or non-disclosure of vital and relevant materials by public authorities. In the present case, there was no suppression or active concealment. The meeting minutes were disclosed, and, when read in context with the dismissal letter, they accurately reflect the Board's compliance with the 1993 Regulations. There is simply no breach of the duty of candour.

Finally, the Applicant contended that the punishment of dismissal handed down by the Disciplinary Board was too harsh, unjust, and disproportionate to the offence committed. In essence, the Applicant invited this Court to review the severity of the sentence, arguing that it defied logic and ought to be quashed on the grounds of Wednesbury unreasonableness.

In response, this Court must at all times remind itself of the strict perimeters of its supervisory jurisdiction. In an application for judicial review, the court is concerned with the decision-making process, not the merits of the decision itself.

To succeed on the ground of irrationality or Wednesbury unreasonableness, the Applicant bears a formidable burden. As formulated by Lord Diplock in Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374 and consistently adopted by the Malaysian appellate courts (see Booi Kim Lee v Menteri Sumber Manusia & Anor [1999] 3 MLJ 515 and Akira Sales & Services (M) Sdn Bhd v Nadiah Zee Abdullah & Another Appeal [2018] 2 CLJ 513), 'irrationality' applies exclusively to a decision which is "so outrageous in its defiance of logic or of accepted moral standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the question to be decided could have arrived at it". The Disciplinary Board's decision to dismiss an officer following a valid criminal conviction by a Syariah Court falls squarely within the express parameters of the 1993 Regulations. It cannot, by any stretch of legal imagination, be categorised as outrageously illogical or perverse.

It is a trite and well-settled principle of law that the disciplinary authority is the best judge of the seriousness of an employee's misconduct and the corresponding punishment it warrants, as propounded in Ng Hock Cheng (supra).

Peh Swee Chin FCJ in Ng Hock Cheng (supra) further stressed the danger of judicial interference in the measure of punishment, holding that at p.412 (para h-i): “…. The court, in truth, is not substituting the order of dismissal with its own measure of punishment, and if in the latter case, it would amount to the court forcing the employer/government to still employ him, or specifically enforcing a contract of personal service.” [Emphasis added]

In other words, a reviewing court is not to substitute an order of dismissal with its own measure of punishment, as doing so would amount to the court forcing the employer or government to retain an employee against its will, effectively usurping the functions of the executive branch.

This principle was recently reaffirmed by the Court of Appeal in Saiful Bahari (supra), which reiterated that a court should not substitute its discretion for that of the decision-maker to decide what it thinks is the correct decision.

Relying on these authorities, it is crystal clear that it is not the function of this Court to evaluate whether a lesser punishment, such as a warning or a reduction in rank, would have been more appropriate.

Applying these principles to the factual matrix of the present case, the Royal Malaysia Police (PDRM) is a uniformed law enforcement body that rightfully demands and enforces the highest standards of discipline, morality, and integrity from its personnel. The Applicant’s conviction for a Syariah criminal offence is a serious transgression that inherently tarnishes the image and compromises the integrity of the public service.

This Court agrees with the Respondent’s submission that the decision to dismiss a law enforcement officer who has pleaded guilty to a criminal offence is neither irrational, outrageous, nor in defiance of logic or accepted moral standards. The decision comfortably survives the Wednesbury test of reasonableness. The imposition of the punishment of dismissal falls squarely within the statutory powers and absolute discretion of the Disciplinary Board pursuant to Regulation 33(1) read together with Regulation 38(g) of the Regulations.

Consequently, the Applicant has failed to demonstrate any irrationality, illegality, or procedural impropriety that would warrant appellate or supervisory intervention by this Court.

Documents and Payment of Fine For completeness, this Court must address the explicit grounds pleaded by the Applicant in his Statement (Enclosure 2). The Applicant alleged that the Second Respondent failed to consider the report and recommendation from the head of department, his service record, and the fact that he had paid the fine for his Syariah Court conviction.

Based on the affidavit evidence, specifically the Respondents' Affidavit in Reply (Enclosure 18) and the Notice of Disciplinary Punishment (Exhibit A-6), it is factually evident that the Disciplinary Board did, in fact, consider the head of department's report, the recommendation, and the Applicant's service record on 17.09.2023. The Applicant's assertion that these documents were ignored is factually incorrect and contrary to the documentary evidence before this Court.

Furthermore, regarding the Applicant's payment of the RM2,500 fine in the Syariah Court, this Court agrees with the Respondents' submission. The fact that a public officer has confessed to a crime and paid a fine in a criminal Court does not prejudice or estop the disciplinary authority from executing its administrative duties. Payment of a criminal fine does not absolve a public officer from the separate administrative consequences of that conviction under the 1993 Regulations, which include dismissal.

In conclusion, the Respondents have strictly adhered to the procedural and statutory requirements mandated by the 1993 Regulations. The decision to dismiss the Applicant was a direct and lawful consequence of a valid criminal conviction, evaluated alongside his service record. The Applicant has failed to demonstrate any illegality, irrationality, or procedural impropriety that would invite or justify the supervisory intervention of this Court.

Accordingly, the application for Judicial Review is dismissed with costs. Dated: 4th March, 2026 -------------------------------------------------------------------- YA Dr. Hj. JOHN LEE KIEN HOW @ MOHD JOHAN LEE JUDGE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA ALOR SETAR Table of Authorities Cases Akira Sales & Services (M) Sdn Bhd v Nadiah Zee Abdullah & Another Appeal [2018] 2 CLJ 513 Booi Kim Lee v Menteri Sumber Manusia & Anor [1999] 3 MLJ 515 Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374 Dato’ Sri Mohd Najib Tun Hj Abd Razak v Menteri Dalam Negeri & Ors [2023] 9 MLJ 611 Dr. A. Dutt v Assunta Hospital [1981] 1 MLJ 304 Kerajaan Malaysia & Ors v Tay Chai Huat [2012] 3 MLJ 149 Ketua Pengarah Kastam v Ho Kwan Seng [1975] CLJU 72 Lembaga Tatatertib Kumpulan Sokongan (No.1) Jabatan Perlindungan Hidupan Liar dan Taman Negara & Ors v. Mariani Bt Ramli [2021] 5 MLJ 857 Musa Matal v Ng Siew Hiang & Ors [2023] CLJU 2446 Ng Hock Cheng v Pengarah Am Penjara & Ors [1998] 1 CLJ 405 Pengerusi Lembaga Tatatertib Polis Diraja Malaysia v. Mohd Azuan bin Aniffa (Rayuan Sivil No. 01(f)-57-11/2015(W) of the Federal Court) R. Rama Chandran v The Industrial Court of Malaysia & Anor [1997] 1 CLJ 147 Raja Abdul Malek Muzaffar Shah Raja Shahruzzaman v Setiausaha Suruhanjaya Pasukan Polis & Ors [1995] 1 CLJ 619 Saiful Bahari bin Yunus v Dato’ Jamil bin Rakon (Setiausaha Suruhanjaya Pasukan Polis) & Ors [2023] 3 MLJ 645 Shenmuga Sundrum v Dr Noor Hisham Abdullah & Ors [2023] CLJU 453 Solicitor for the Applicant : Mior Faridalathrash bin Wahid & Aiman Hakim bin Kamaruzzaman Messrs. Mior Faridalathrash & Associate Advocates & Solicitors Solicitors for the Respondents : Norshuhada Mohd Yatim Kedah State Legal Advisor's Office T. Ganeswaran v Suruhanjaya Polis Diraja Malaysia & 1 lagi [2005] 3 CLJ 302 Tan Tek Seng v Suruhanjaya Perkhidmatan Pendidikan & Anor [1996] 2 MLJ 771 Yusof Sudin v Suruhanjaya Perkhidmatan Polis & Anor [2012] 1 CLJ 448 Zakaria Abdul Rahman v Ketua Polis Negara [2001] 6 CLJ 273