Muhammad Irsyad Syamil Bin Abdul Aziz v Awang Nizam Bin Jusoh (TA-12B-18-10/2025)

AWANG NIZAM BIN JUSOH [NRIC NO. 810505-11-5351]

ERDA MARIANI BINTI RUNI [NRIC NO. 891125-11-5402] … RESPONDENTS (In the matter of the Sessions Court at Kuala Terengganu Civil Suit No. TA-B53KJ-7-04/2023) BETWEEN MUHAMMAD IRSYAD SYAMIL BIN ABDUL AZIZ … PLAINTIFF

AWANG NIZAM BIN JUSOH [NRIC NO. 810505-11-5351]

ERDA MARIANI BINTI RUNI [NRIC NO. 891125-11-5402] …DEFENDANTS GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT

This is an appeal by the Plaintiff/Appellant (“the Appellant”) against the decision of the learned Sessions Court Judge (“SCJ”) delivered on 23 October 2025 on the issue of quantum of damages arising from a road traffic accident that occurred on 21 July 2020. The Appellant, a 25‑year‑old motorcyclist, collided with a backhoe driven by the First Respondent and owned by the Second Respondent. Liability was determined at 100% against the Respondents and is not contested in this appeal.

The Appellant appeals only against the quantum awarded, specifically challenging five heads of damages: (i) loss of prospect of marriage; (ii) future surgery costs for implant removal; (iii) loss of actual earnings; (iv) loss of earning capacity; and (v) the cost of a prosthetic leg and its lifetime maintenance. The Appellant seeks an increase in the awards under these heads.

On the morning of 21 July 2020, the Appellant set out on a road he had travelled countless times before. He never reached his destination. Within seconds, a backhoe driven by the First Respondent emerged from a petrol station without warning, without a signal, without a pause. The collision that followed did not merely damage a motorcycle. It shattered a life.

The Appellant sustained, among others: a closed fracture of the left midshaft femur; a closed fracture of the right olecranon; an open fracture of the right tibia and fibula with infection; a closed fracture of the right lateral malleolus; a closed fracture of the right talus; cerebral concussion; left knee haematoma; multiple scars; muscle wasting; skin grafting; and left vocal cord immobility. The most severe consequence was a right below‑knee amputation.

After full trial with nine witnesses, the learned SCJ found the Respondents 100% liable. The total quantum awarded was RM747,107.50 comprising general damages of RM207,000.00, special damages of RM540,107.50, and costs of RM32,893.00. The Appellant, dissatisfied, filed the present appeal limited to quantum.

The Appellant filed an Amended Memorandum of Appeal on 7 January 2026 raising five principal grounds. The Respondents oppose the appeal, arguing that the learned SCJ’s awards were reasonable and that the appellate court should not interfere.

The issues for determination are:

Whether the learned SCJ erred in rejecting the claim for loss of prospect of marriage.

Whether the learned SCJ erred in awarding only one‑third of the claimed future surgery costs for implant removal.

Whether the learned SCJ erred in calculating actual loss of earnings for only 46 months instead of up to the date of judgment.

Whether the learned SCJ erred in rejecting the claim for loss of earning capacity.

Whether the learned SCJ erred in awarding RM468,000 for a mechanical prosthesis instead of RM1,285,149.30 for a bionic (microprocessor) prosthesis. COUNSELS’ CONTENTIONS On Loss of Prospect of Marriage

The Appellant contends that his unchallenged evidence – that “siapa yang mahu berkahwin dengan orang seperti saya” (who would want to marry someone like me) given his amputation and scars – should have been accepted. He relies on Parthipan a/l Ramasamy v Mohd Rizman b Saad [2010] 2 PIR 11 (Sess. Ct) and Ganaeson a/l Muniandy & Anor v Kumaresh a/l Rathakrishnan [2012] 1 PIR 53 (Sess. Ct), where the court took judicial notice that a young male amputee suffers reduced marriage prospects, awarding RM20,000. The Appellant argues that the learned SCJ wrongly required proof of loss of sexual function, which is not the test.

The Respondents submit that the claim is speculative. They cite Kalaiwanan Sundarajoo v Poo Cheng Hock & Anor [2016] 1 LNS 1206 (HC) and Khoo See Moi v Tay Teik Chang [1970] 1 LNS 48 (HC), where courts have been reluctant to award loss of marriage prospects to male plaintiffs absent proof of an existing engagement that was broken. They argue that the Appellant’s evidence was mere subjective feeling, not objective medical evidence.

The Appellant claims RM17,000 (femur) and RM13,750 (olecranon) for private hospital implant removal surgeries. He argues that the learned SCJ erred in applying the “one‑third rule” to allow only RM5,670 and RM4,585 respectively. The Appellant relies on Chong Kam Siong v Herman Baharuddin [1995] 2 CLJ 413 (HC) and Suriyati Takril v Mohan Govindasamy & Anor [2001] 2 CLJ 101 (HC) for the proposition that an injured person has the right to choose private treatment, and that a tortfeasor cannot dictate that treatment be obtained at the cheapest available institution.

The Respondents point to the orthopaedic expert’s evidence that the same surgery could be done at a government hospital for as little as RM1,000. They argue that the Appellant is obliged to mitigate his loss and that the one‑third rule, endorsed in Heng Poh Keat & Anor v Aphisist Sae Wong [2001] 1 CLJ 836 (HC) and Khairul Sham Ahmad & Anor v Yesudass Michaelsamy [2003] CLJU 689 (HC), is a well‑established principle to prevent over‑compensation.

The Appellant claims he lost RM800 per month (after living expenses) from the accident date (July 2020) until the date of judgment (October 2025). The SCJ awarded only 46 months (August 2020 to June 2024) totalling RM36,800. The Appellant argues that he could not work until he receives the judgment sum to buy a suitable prosthesis, and that the SCJ wrongly concluded he “berhenti secara sukarela” (voluntarily stopped working).

The Respondents counter that the Appellant himself returned to work in April 2024 using the hospital‑supplied prosthesis (cost RM8,000). He worked only two days and then voluntarily stopped. His employer confirmed that the Appellant was given light duties and could perform them, but he chose to stop. The Respondents submit that the SCJ was generous to allow loss up to June 2024, and that no further award is justified.

The Appellant, a young man now an amputee, argues he faces a real and substantial risk of unemployment or under‑employment in the future. He relies on Smith v Manchester Corporation [1974] 17 KIR 1 (CA) and Moeliker v A. Reyrolle & Co. Ltd [1977] 1 All ER 9 (CA), submitting that the test is whether there is a “substantial or real risk” of future job loss, not whether he is totally incapacitated. Both the Appellant’s orthopaedic expert and the Respondents’ expert agreed that he cannot return to his previous job as a car washer, which required standing on wet, slippery surfaces.

The Respondents argue that the learned SCJ correctly rejected this claim because the Appellant was awarded full costs for a lifetime prosthesis. With a prosthesis, they say, he can obtain sedentary or light work. Moreover, the national minimum wage (RM1,700 from February 2025) exceeds his pre‑accident earnings of RM1,040 per month. They rely on Devarajan Kunasekaran v Leon Ngim Chong & Anor [2025] MLRHU 548 (HC), where the court held that a claim for future loss of earnings fails if the plaintiff is not completely incapacitated and has not shown attempts to find alternative employment.

The Appellant’s prosthetist (SP2, a degree‑holder with specialist expertise) recommended a microprocessor‑controlled bionic foot (Endolite Elan IC) costing RM1,285,149.30 for life. She testified that this prosthesis: has an ankle joint (unlike the mechanical one); is waterproof (IP67); has a breathable silicone liner; provides variable resistance for different walking speeds; has a braking effect on slopes; and reduces the risk of future osteoarthritis by absorbing ground reaction forces.

The Respondents’ prosthetist (SD2, a diploma‑holder who never examined the Appellant) recommended a mechanical prosthesis (Triton foot) costing RM468,000. He conceded under cross‑examination that his product: is not waterproof; the warranty is void if exposed to salt, acid, or sand; has no ankle system (making it stiffer); has no breathing holes in the liner; and must be serviced abroad. He agreed that future‑oriented products are bionic and microprocessor‑based.

The learned SCJ preferred the cheaper mechanical prosthesis, reasoning that the bionic one was “terlalu robotik dan janggal” (too robotic and awkward) for the Appellant’s village lifestyle, that the Appellant might not cope with sophisticated equipment, and that the price difference was unreasonable. The learned SCJ also invoked the mitigation principle from Kasirin Kasmani v The Official Administrator & Anor [1991] 12 CLJ Rep 800 (HC) and Chua Kay Hock & Anor v Lee Hoon Poi [2022] 5 MLRA 625

The Appellant argues that the learned SCJ’s reasoning is contrary to Article 8 of the Federal Constitution (equality before the law) and the fundamental tort principle of restitutio in integrum – that the injured party should be restored, so far as money can do, to his pre‑accident position. He relies on Bong Chee Min v Jacknoris Golinjun [2020] 1 LNS 120 (HC), Appalasamy Bodoyah v Lee Mon Seng [1996] 3 CLJ 71 (HC), Mas Hanum binti Mohd Selamin v Fabian Yeow Fongze [2018] 2 PIR 28 (Sess. Ct), and Mohd Sidik Bin Muhamad Ketar v Zainal Hazril Zainal Mokhtar & Anor [2022] 1 LNS 1248 (HC), where courts awarded bionic or microprocessor prostheses to plaintiffs from ordinary backgrounds, holding that the test is suitability and ability to restore function, not the plaintiff’s wealth or occupation.

I begin by reminding myself of the well‑settled principles governing appellate intervention in quantum appeals. The Federal Court in Tan Kuan Yau v Suhindrimani Angasamy [1985] CLJ Rep 323 (FC) held that an appellate court will interfere only if the trial judge acted on a wrong principle of law, omitted relevant considerations, admitted irrelevant considerations, or made a wholly erroneous estimate of damages. The court must be convinced that the award is “very wrong” or “seriously wrong” (Elliot v Preston [1971] 2 Lloyds Rep 328 (CA)). This is a high threshold, but where the trial judge has misdirected herself on the law or made findings unsupported by evidence, intervention is not only permissible but obligatory.

The learned SCJ rejected this claim on three grounds: (a) future events cannot be predicted with certainty; (b) the Appellant had not proven loss of sexual function; and (c) many disabled persons do marry. With respect, these reasons misstate the law.

Loss of marriage prospects is a head of general damages subsumed under loss of amenities of life. It is not required that the claimant prove an existing engagement that was broken, nor loss of sexual capacity. The Court of Appeal in Wong Kuan Kay v Rohaizad Othman & Anor [2015] 4 CLJ 902 (CA) affirmed that this head of damages is available even for a 16‑year‑old boy, based solely on the nature of his injuries. The test is whether a reasonable person would recognise that the claimant’s injuries have materially reduced his or her chances of entering into a satisfactory marriage.

The authorities cited by the Respondents are distinguishable. Khoo See Moi v Tay Teik Chang (supra) was decided in 1970 when no male‑plaintiff authority was cited to the court; it is not a binding proposition that male plaintiffs can never recover. Modern cases, including Parthipan a/l Ramasamy v Mohd Rizman b Saad (supra) and Ganaeson a/l Muniandy & Anor v Kumaresh a/l Rathakrishnan (supra), have awarded RM20,000 to young male amputees. The fact that the Appellant is a man does not disqualify him. The loss of a leg, multiple scars, and the need to use crutches or a prosthesis are obvious physical impairments that would affect the perception of a potential spouse. The Appellant’s unchallenged evidence on this point – that he feels no one would marry him – was not cross‑examined and must be accepted as credible.

I therefore find that the learned SCJ erred in law by applying an overly stringent standard. The Appellant is entitled to an award under this head. A sum of RM15,000 is fair and reasonable, having regard to the awards in comparable cases and the fact that the Appellant is still young and may yet marry, but his prospects are undeniably reduced.

The Appellant claims the full cost of private hospital implant removal surgeries. The learned SCJ applied the “one‑third rule” and allowed only one‑third of the private quotations. I find no error in this approach.

The one‑third rule is a pragmatic tool to encourage mitigation. It does not deprive the claimant of his right to choose private treatment; rather, it recognises that where effective and safe treatment is available at a government hospital at nominal cost, the tortfeasor should not be liable for the luxury of private care. The Appellant’s own implants were inserted at government hospitals. There is no evidence that government hospitals cannot perform these elective removal surgeries, only that there may be waiting times. The Appellant did not adduce any evidence that he would suffer specific harm (such as pain, infection, or functional deterioration) if he waited.

The cases cited by the Appellant i.e. Chong Kam Siong v Herman Baharuddin (supra) and Suriyati Takril v Mohan Govindasamy & Anor (supra), are distinguishable because in those cases the claimants had legitimate reasons for choosing private care (e.g., unavailability of specialist care in government hospitals). No such reason was proved here. The SCJ was therefore correct to apply the one‑third rule. The appeal on this ground is dismissed.

The learned SCJ awarded loss of actual earnings for 46 months (August 2020 to June 2024) at RM800 per month. The Appellant argues for a longer period up to the date of judgment. I find that the learned SCJ’s decision was a reasonable exercise of discretion based on the evidence.

The critical finding, supported by the evidence, is that the Appellant returned to work in April 2024 using a hospital‑supplied prosthesis. His employer confirmed that the Appellant was given light duties and could perform them. The Appellant chose to stop after two days. While I accept that he experienced discomfort and swelling, the learned SCJ correctly observed that adaptation to a prosthesis requires time and perseverance. The Appellant did not seek medical advice for his difficulties, did not attempt to have the prosthesis adjusted, and did not explore other employment options. In these circumstances, the learned SCJ was entitled to conclude that the Appellant had failed to mitigate his loss from June 2024 onwards.

The Appellant’s argument that he could not work until he receives the judgment sum to buy a better prosthesis is circular and unsupported by authority. The duty to mitigate requires a claimant to take reasonable steps to minimise loss using available means, not to wait for a future award. The appeal on this ground is dismissed.

This is a more difficult issue. The learned SCJ rejected the claim essentially because the Appellant was awarded a prosthesis and because he might earn the minimum wage. With respect, this reasoning is flawed.

Loss of earning capacity is distinct from loss of future earnings. It compensates for the weakening of the claimant’s competitive position in the labour market, even if he is currently employed or capable of some work. The test, as stated in Moeliker v A. Reyrolle & Co. Ltd (supra) and adopted in Ngooi Ku Siong & Anor v Aidi Abdullah [1985] 1 MLJ 30 (FC) and Krishnan & Anor v Chow Wing Khuan [1987] 2 MLJ 691 (SC), is whether there is a “substantial or real risk” that the claimant will lose his job or be relegated to a less well‑paid job at some time in the future due to his injuries.

Here, the evidence is overwhelming. Both orthopaedic experts agreed that the Appellant cannot return to his pre‑accident job as a car washer. The Appellant has a right below‑knee amputation. He is registered as an OKU. His previous job was unskilled manual labour. Even with a prosthesis, he will face significant limitations: he cannot stand for long periods on wet surfaces, cannot run, cannot squat, and has reduced balance. The labour market for a young, able‑bodied person is already competitive; for an amputee with limited education and skills, it is far more difficult. The fact that the national minimum wage is RM1,700 does not guarantee that any employer will hire an amputee at that wage. The learned SCJ’s reliance on the minimum wage was speculative and not grounded in evidence.

The learned SCJ also reasoned that because the Appellant was awarded a prosthesis, he should not also receive loss of earning capacity. This is a non sequitur. The prosthesis is intended to restore some degree of mobility and independence; it does not restore the Appellant to his pre‑accident physical condition. The two heads of damages are not mutually exclusive.

However, the Appellant has not proved total incapacity. He can perform sedentary or light duties. The risk is that he may be unemployed or under‑employed for periods, or that he will have to accept lower‑paid work than he might have obtained had he not been injured. An award for loss of earning capacity should reflect that risk, but not as high as a claim for total future loss of earnings.

I assess the award for loss of earning capacity at RM50,000. This is a conventional, moderate sum recognising the real and substantial risk that the Appellant will suffer financial disadvantage in the future labour market. It is not intended to compensate for any specific period of unemployment but to compensate for the handicap itself.

This is the most significant issue in the appeal. The learned SCJ’s decision to award the cheaper mechanical prosthesis (RM468,000.00) over the bionic microprocessor prosthesis (RM1,285,149.30) was, with respect, an error of law and principle.

The fundamental principle of tort damages is restitutio in integrum: the claimant should be placed, so far as money can do, in the position he would have been in had the tort not occurred. This is not a principle of parsimony; it is a principle of full compensation. The claimant is entitled to the “best” prosthesis that is reasonably required to restore function, not merely the cheapest that provides basic mobility.

The evidence on the two prostheses is stark. The Appellant’s expert (SP2) was a degree‑holder who physically examined the Appellant and prepared a detailed report. She explained in clear terms why the bionic prosthesis is superior: it has an ankle joint that mimics natural gait; it is waterproof (critical in the East Coast’s climate); it has a breathable liner to prevent skin maceration; it adapts to walking speed and terrain; it has a braking effect on slopes; and it reduces long‑term risk of osteoarthritis by absorbing shock. The Respondents’ expert (SD2) never examined the Appellant, conceded his own lower qualification, admitted his product is not waterproof, has no ankle joint, cannot be exposed to salt/acid/sand, and that the warranty would be void in such conditions. He further agreed that the future of prosthetics is bionic and microprocessor‑based.

The learned SCJ’s reasons for rejecting the bionic prosthesis are problematic. First, the suggestion that a bionic prosthesis is “too robotic and awkward” is contradicted by the expert evidence that it is actually more natural in function. Second, the assumption that the Appellant “cannot handle sophisticated equipment” is based on no evidence; the Appellant is a young man who managed a motorcycle and a car wash job, and there is no finding of cognitive impairment. Third, the reliance on the Appellant’s village lifestyle and former job as a car washer to deny him advanced technology is, with respect, a form of socio‑economic discrimination that has no place in the law of tort. Muniandy Kannyappan J (as His Lordship then was) in Mohd Sidik Bin Muhamad Ketar v Zainal Hazril Zainal Mokhtar & Anor (supra) (upheld by the Court of Appeal) stated at para 42: “The plaintiff cannot be deprived of his entitlement under the law to an orthosis arm. The pivotal issue is the use and usefulness of an orthosis arm for him premised on medical evidence available on record, and never the costs of the orthosis equipment.”

The SCJ also invoked mitigation principles from Kasirin Kasmani v The Official Administrator & Anor (supra) and Chua Kay Hock & Anor v Lee Hoon Poi (supra). Those cases are distinguishable. In Kasirin Kasmani, the claimant chose an expensive wheelchair when a standard one was equally functional. Here, the mechanical prosthesis is not equally functional. It lacks an ankle joint, is not waterproof, does not adapt to walking speed, and increases the risk of future joint damage. The bionic prosthesis offers objectively superior function. In Chua Kay Hock, the Court of Appeal rejected a RM2 million bionic prosthesis because there was no evidence that it would place the claimant back in his pre‑accident position. That is not the case here; the expert evidence specifically detailed how the bionic prosthesis would restore near‑normal gait and function.

The learned SCJ’s comment that awarding RM1.28 million to a former car washer is “unreasonable” reflects a value judgment about the worth of the claimant. But tort law does not award damages based on the claimant’s social status or occupation. A manual labourer who loses a leg is entitled to the same restorative compensation as a professional. The cost of the best available prosthesis does not vary according to the claimant’s job. The measure of damages is not the plaintiff's worth in the market, but the measure of what is required to restore him, so far as money can do, to the position he would have occupied had the wrong not been done.

This conclusion finds firm support in a line of decided authorities. In Bong Chee Min v Jacknoris Golinjun (supra), the High Court (Evrol Mariette Peters J, as Her Ladyship then was) awarded a bionic prosthesis (Orion 2) worth approximately RM2.19 million to a young amputee, rejecting the defendant’s argument that a cheaper mechanical prosthesis was sufficient. The court held that the claimant was entitled to the prosthesis that would place him as near as possible to his pre‑accident condition. In Appalasamy a/l Bodoyah v Lee Mon Seng (supra), the High Court per Abdul Malik Ishak J (as His Lordship then was) awarded S$132,000 for an electronic artificial arm over a mechanical hand, holding that the claimant was entitled to the best available medical facility to restore his original position. In Mas Hanum binti Mohd Selamin v Fabian Yeow Fongze (supra), the Sessions Court per Nu’aman Mahmud Zuhudi scj, awarded the Endolite Elan microprocessor prosthesis (the same model as in this case) for a 34‑year‑old claimant, rejecting the mechanical alternative.

The Respondents’ concern about a “floodgate” of claims for bionic prostheses is not a valid reason to deny the Appellant his rightful compensation. Each case will turn on its own evidence. Where, as here, the evidence clearly establishes the functional superiority of the bionic prosthesis and the inadequacy of the mechanical alternative, the court must follow the evidence.

Accordingly, the appeal on this ground is allowed. The Appellant is entitled to the cost of the bionic microprocessor prosthesis as quoted by Endolite Asia Sdn Bhd (supplier), namely RM1,285,149.30 for the prosthesis and lifetime maintenance. To ensure that the Prosthesis Fund is applied strictly for its intended purpose, the Court orders that the sum of RM1,285,149.30 shall be paid directly to the supplier of the said bionic microprocessor prosthesis.

For the reasons set out above, I make the following orders:

The appeal against the rejection of loss of prospect of marriage is allowed. The Appellant is awarded RM15,000 under this head.

The appeal against the future surgery costs (implant removal) is dismissed. The learned SCJ’s award of RM5,670 and RM4,585 stands.

The appeal against the loss of actual earnings is dismissed. The learned SCJ’s award of RM36,800 stands.

The appeal against the loss of earning capacity is allowed. The Appellant is awarded RM50,000 under this head.

The appeal against the cost of prosthesis is allowed. The award of RM468,000 is set aside and substituted with RM1,285,149.30 (without interest). It is further ordered that the Respondents shall pay the said sum of RM1,285,149.30 for the bionic microprocessor controlled prosthesis (Endolite Elan IC) directly to Endolite Asia Sdn Bhd within thirty (30) days from the date of this Order. Upon such payment, the Respondents shall be deemed to have fully discharged their liability for the cost of the prosthesis, and the Appellant shall take all reasonable steps to facilitate the fitting of the prosthesis.

Save for the enhancements to general damages (namely RM15,000 for loss of prospect of marriage and RM50,000 for loss of earning capacity) and the substitution of the award for the cost of prosthesis, all other orders of the learned SCJ in respect of the remaining heads of general and special damages, as well as her orders on interest, shall remain undisturbed and shall apply mutatis mutandis to the varied awards.

The Appellant is awarded costs of RM10,000.00 for this appeal. Dated: 16 June 2026 Yusrin Faidz Bin Yusoff Judge High Court of Malaya Kuala Terengganu For the Appellant / Plaintiff Elango A/L Manivel (together with Nargis Binti Kasam) Messrs Nargis Kasam & Associates No. 1081-S, Tingkat 1, Jalan Sultan Sulaiman, 20000 Kuala Terengganu, Terengganu Darul Iman. For the Respondents / Defendants Amalina binti Abdul Ghani (together with Kajendra Balan A/L R. Sandrian) Messrs V.P. Nathan & Partners No. 4A, Tingkat Satu, Jalan Air Jernih, 20300 Kuala Terengganu, Terengganu Darul Iman. CASE REFERENCE:

Parthipan a/l Ramasamy v Mohd Rizman b Saad [2010] 2 PIR 11 (Sess. Ct).

Ganaeson a/l Muniandy & Anor v Kumaresh a/l Rathakrishnan [2012] 1 PIR 53 (Sess. Ct).

Kalaiwanan Sundarajoo v Poo Cheng Hock & Anor [2016] 1 LNS

Khoo See Moi v Tay Teik Chang [1970] 1 LNS 48 (HC).

Chong Kam Siong v Herman Baharuddin [1995] 2 CLJ 413 (HC).

Suriyati Takril v Mohan Govindasamy & Anor [2001] 2 CLJ 101

Heng Poh Keat & Anor v Aphisist Sae Wong [2001] 1 CLJ 836

Khairul Sham Ahmad & Anor v Yesudass Michaelsamy [2003]

Smith v Manchester Corporation [1974] 17 KIR 1 (CA).

Moeliker v A. Reyrolle & Co. Ltd [1977] 1 All ER 9 (CA).

Devarajan Kunasekaran v Leon Ngim Chong & Anor [2025]

Kasirin Kasmani v The Official Administrator & Anor [1991] 12 CLJ Rep 800 (HC).

Chua Kay Hock & Anor v Lee Hoon Poi [2022] 5 MLRA 625 (CA).

Bong Chee Min v Jacknoris Golinjun [2020] 1 LNS 120 (HC).

Appalasamy Bodoyah v Lee Mon Seng [1996] 3 CLJ 71 (HC).

Mas Hanum binti Mohd Selamin v Fabian Yeow Fongze [2018] 2 PIR 28 (Sess. Ct).