Muhammad Razzaq Bashir Ahmed … Perayu v Pendakwa Raya … Responden (B-05-296-08/2016)

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1 DALAM MAHKAMAH RAYUAN MALAYSIA DI PUTRAJAYA (BIDANGKUASA RAYUAN) RAYUAN JENAYAH NO : B-05-296-08/2016 ANTARA MUHAMMAD RAZZAQ BASHIR AHMED … PERAYU (W/PAKISTAN)(NO.PASSPORT: KH 380680) DAN PENDAKWA RAYA … RESPONDEN [Dalam perkara mengenai Perbicaraan Jenayah No. 45A-30-04/2014 Dalam Mahkamah Tinggi di Shah Alam, Selangor Antara Pendakwa Raya Dan Muhammad Razzaq Bashir Ahmed (W/Pakistan)(No. Passport: KH 380680) Yang diputuskan oleh Yang Arif Hakim Dato’ Indera Haji Abd Halim bin Aman di Mahkamah Tinggi Shah Alam, Selangor pada 29 Julai 2016] CORAM : MOHD ZAWAWI SALLEH, HMR KAMARDIN HASHIM, HMR YAACOB HAJI MD. SAM, HMR 2 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT Introduction [1] The appellant was charged for trafficking in dangerous drugs, to wit 1816.1 grams of methamphetamine, an offence punishable under section 39B(2) of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 (“the Act”). The offence was said to have been committed on 16.4.2013 at around 3.30 p.m. at “kawasan menuju keluar Pemeriksaan Kastam, Balai Ketibaan Antarabangsa, Aras 3, MTB, Kuala Lumpur International Airport” (“KLIA”). [2] At the conclusion of the trial, the appellant was found guilty and convicted by the High Court on the charge and sentenced to death. [3] Dissatisfied with the impugned decision, the appellant now appeals to this Court against the decision of the High Court. We heard the appeal on 30 October 2017 and we unanimously dismissed it. We now give our reasons. The case of the prosecution [4] Briefly, the prosecution’s case may be shortly stated are as follows. On 16 April 2013, at about 3.30 pm., Sgt 16415 Noor Diana binti Mohamod, the complainant (SP1) together with her team of narcotics police officers were 3 on observation duty at the Baggage Claim Area at Arrival Hall, Level 3, Kuala Lumpur International Airport, Sepang, Selangor. While carrying out observation, Det/Cpl 152895 Mohammad Fazlee bin Kesot (SP3) and one Insp. Khana spotted the appellant walking along the lane of bagagge claim area of the arrival hall. According to SP3, the appellant appeared to be “pergerakan perjalanan dia ganjil seolah-olah tampung sesuatu”. SP3 and Insp. Khana then approached the appellant. Insp. Khana introduced himself as police officer and asked the appellant for his passport. At that time, the appellant was seen pulling a luggage bag (P22) heading toward the custom inspection area at the carousal. The appellant then was instructed by Insp Khana and SP3 to scan his luggage at the custom scanning machine (mesin pengimbas kastam) and nothing incriminating was found. The appellant was then taken by SP3 and Insp. Khana to the Pejabat Siasatan Jenayah Narkotik, KLIA, Level 3, MTB KLIA and handed over to SP1. SP1 then instructed SP3 to conduct body search on the appellant. SP3 discovered a white package tied to the appellant’s right calf (betis kanan) and another white package tied to the appellant’s left calf (betis kiri). The appellant was wearing a long trouser. According to SP1 and SP3, the appellant appeared to be “takut dan gelisah” and shocked upon the discovery of the two white packages from his person. The appellant was then asked by SP1 to untie the two packages from both his calves and handed over to SP3. SP3 then handed over the two packages to SP1. In the present of the appellant, SP1 examined the contents of the two white packages by slightly cut open the packages for drug testing and discovered that it contains crystalline substance suspected to be methamphetamine. SP1 then resealed both the packages with white paper sellotape. Thereafter, the appellant was placed under arrest and the police report was lodged by SP1 vide KLIA 4 Sepang/004181/13 (P5). Subsequently, the appellant was taken by SP1 to Ibu Pejabat Polis Daerah Sepang and handed over the appellant together with the two white packages (P29A and P29B), search list (P4), arrest report (P5), passport under the name of the appellant (P9), boarding pass under the name of the appellant (P11), luggage bag (P22), and other personal belongings of the appellant to SP6, Insp. Murugan Suppiah, the investigating officer. The handing over was acknowledged by SP6 as evinced in Borang Serah Terima Barang Kes (P6). [5] The two white packages and their content were later sent to the Chemistry Department for chemical examination and analysis. The chemist, Zulkfeli bin Mohd Edin (SP5), confirmed that the two white packages contained a total of 1816.1 grams of methamphetamine. Methamphetamine is listed in the First Schedule of the Act. Findings at the end of the prosecution’s case [6] At the end of the prosecution’s case, the learned trial judge found as follows (pages 17 - 21 of ROA Volume 1): “Dari keterangan jelas bahawa tertuduh sememangnya mempunyai kawalan dan jagaan terhadap barang kes dadah tersebut kerana dadah tersebut memang terjumpa pada fisikal tertuduh iaitu terikat pada betis-betis kakinya. 5 Berdasarkan keterangan tersebut jelas bahawa tertuduh sememangnya mempunyai milikan terhadap dadah yang dirampas daripadanya. …. Dari aspek pengetahuan pula, untuk menghubungkan tertuduh sebagai mempunyai pengetahuan terhadap dadah-dadah jenis Methamphetamine tersebut, prinsip yang diputuskan melalui kes Gunalan a/l Ramachandran & Ors v. PP [2004] 4 MLJ 489 adalah relevan, bilamana diputuskan “Knowledge is to be inferred from the surrounding circumstances of a case”. Dari aspek pengetahuan juga, terdapat keterangan mengenai kelakuan dan keadaan tertuduh di dalam kes ini yang relevan dan juga konsisten untuk menunjukkan dia memang mempunyai pengetahuan terhadap barang kes dadah tersebut, barang kes diikat pada kedua-dua betis kakinya. Keterangan jelas menunjukkan tertuduh sememangnya tahu terdapat sesuatu yang terikat pada kakinya. Tertuduh boleh pada bila-bila masa membuka dan memeriksa bungkusan yang mengandungi dadah tersebut. Tempat 6 dimana dia ikat juga menunjukkan dia membawa sesuatu yang terlarang atau tidak dibenarkan masuk ke negara ini dari segi undang-undang. Malah melalui keterangan SP1 dan juga SP3, semasa dadah tersebut dibuka dan diserahkan kepada SP1, reaksi tertuduh adalah takut, gelisah serta terperanjat. Reaksi sedemikian jelas memperlihatkan akan pengetahuannya tentang dadah-dadah tersebut. Ini berdasarkan kepada keterangan bahawa terdapatnya: a. Dadah disembunyikan – keadaan dimana ia disorok dengan diikat di kedua-dua betis kiri dan kanan kaki beliau. b. Mengangkut dan mengimport – membawa masuk dari luar negara dadah berbahaya ke dalam Malaysia. Di dalam kes ini, tertuduh telah menaiki pesawat dari Lahore, Pakistan menuju ke Kuala Lumpur, yang mana dadah tersebut sentiasa berada bersamanya, diikat di kedua-dua betisnya dengan tujuan untuk diedarkan di negara ini. Kemasukan tertuduh ke Malaysia disahkan oleh Jabatan Imigresen melalui laporannya. c. Membawa – tertuduh telah membawa dadah tersebut apabila dadah tersebut telah disorokkan di dalam dua 7 ikatan bertali putih yang dibungkus di dalam bungkusan-bungkusan berselotape putih. ……. Dapatan Mahkamah Setelah saya meneliti keterangan yang disampaikan melalui 6 orang saksi pendakwaan ini, meneliti kepada kedudukan kesemua 38 eksibit yang dikemukakan itu, menimbang kes ini secara keseluruhannya, mengaplikasikan prinsip ‘maximum evaluation of all witnesses’ sepenuhnya seperti yang ditetapkan di bawah undang-undang, dengan ini saya memutuskan bahawa di akhir kes pihak pendakwaan ini, pihak pendakwaan telah berjaya membuktikan wujudnya suatu kes yang ‘prima facie’ terhadap tertuduh ini seperti mana pertuduhan.” [7] Having found that the prosecution had succeeded in proving a prima facie case against the appellant, the learned trial judge called upon the appellant to enter his defence. 8 The case for the defence [8] In his evidence given under oath, the appellant did not dispute that the drugs were showed to him. However, it was the appellant’s version that the drugs were not found on his person. The appellant averred that a body search was conducted on him and nothing incriminating was found. The appellant further averred that he was then taken into a room where he was asked to be seated in a sofa and his luggage was taken into another room. The appellant further averred that half an hour later, 4 officers approached him and one of them showed the impugned drugs to him. It is the appellant’s version also that SP1, the complainant, was never with the appellant at all material time. The appellant said that he had no knowledge of the said impugned drugs. Findings at the end of the defence’s case [9] After evaluating all the evidence adduced before the Court, the learned trial judge made the following findings and conclusion at the conclusion of the trial (p.33 of ROA Volume 1): “Keputusan 9 Setelah saya meneliti serta menghalusi akan keterangan dari saksi-saksi pendakwaan yang seramai 6 orang kesemuanya, setelah mendengar dan menghalusi akan keterangan dari tertuduh sendiri, setelah meneliti serta menimbangkan akan penghujahan di setiap peringkat, meneliti kepada kedudukan undang-undang yang berkaitan dengannya, mengkaji otoriti-otoriti kes yang dikemukakan, menilai serta menimbang kepada keterangan secara keseluruhannya, dengan ini mencapai suatu keputusan iaitu pihak pembelaan diakhir kes pembelaan ini telah gagal menimbulkan sebarang keraguan yang munasabah terhadap kes pihak pendakwaan. Tiada keterangan berjaya dikemukakan bagi menyangkal kesahihan keterangan pihak pendakwaan bagi tujuan menimbulkan keraguan yang munasabah. Sehingga di akhir kes pembelaan ini, jelas bahawa pihak pendakwaan telah berjaya membuktikan kes mereka melampaui keraguan yang munasabah. Oleh itu, tertuduh dengan ini disabitkan di atas kesalahan seperti mana pertuduhan.” [10] The appellant was thus convicted and sentenced to death. The Appeal [11] Before us the learned counsel for the appellant advanced two main grounds to challenge the learned judge’s decision: 10

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(ii) passive possession. [12] However, in the course of submission before us, the learned counsel for the appellant had indicated to us that, although he had listed two grounds of appeal in his written submission, he would nevertheless not proceeding with the second ground, i.e. a case of passive possession, thus focusing his submission only in respect of the first ground of appeal, i.e. credibility of SP1. [13] On the first ground, learned counsel submitted that SP1, the complainant as the arresting officer, is not a credible witness. It was submitted that SP1 in her testimony gave two different versions of the event and that SP1 had concocted her evidence concerning the arrest of the appellant. At the first instance (first version), SP1 testified that she was the one who noticed that the appellant was walking rather suspicious and she introduced herself as police and instructed the appellant to scan his luggage bag and later took the appellant to the narcotics office. Her evidence however, was contradicted by SP3. SP3 testified that the appellant was spotted by Insp. Khana and it was Insp. Khana who had instructed the appellant to scan his luggage. SP3 further testified that it was Insp. Khana that took the appellant to the narcotics office and SP1 was there. Learned counsel further contended that SP1 had changed her testimony (second version) and admitted that she was wrong in saying that she saw the appellant was walking 11 at the luggage area. SP1 further admitted that the appellant was taken to the narcotics office by SP3 and Insp. Khana. CCTV (P23) also showed that SP1 was not at the carousal where the appellant was first noticed by Insp. Khana and SP3. [14] According to learned counsel, had the learned trial judge directed his mind to the contradiction obtaining in the evidence of SP1 as discussed above, His Lordship would have found that SP1 was not a credible witness. [15] However, that was not the end of the matter. Learned counsel further submitted that the learned trial judge erred in calling for the defence of the appellant at the end of prosecution case by relying on direct evidence to prove the element of trafficking as defined under section 2 of the Act and at the same time invoking the statutory presumption under section 37(da) of the same Act. Learned counsel vehemently was submitted that the learned judge had placed two different burdens to be discharged by the appellant. This is a serious misdirection on the part of the learned judge (see: Victor Chidiebere Nzomiwu & Ors v PP [2013] 2 MLJ 690; Noor Azman Abidin v PP [2014] 1 CLJ 58). 12 Our Decision Credibility of SP1 [16] In considering whether the learned trial judge had misdirected himself when he failed to make a finding on the credibility of the SP1, it is essential for us to reproduce the material part of the learned trial judge’s conclusion at page 26 ROA Volume 1: “Meneliti serta menimbangkan kepada keterangan yang dikemukakan oleh saksi pendakwaan, didapati tidak ada sebab SP3 dan lain-lain anggota untuk mereka-reka cerita tentang kejadian yang berlaku. Tertuduh tidak pernah mengenali SP1, SP3 serta saksi polis yang menahan beliau pada hari tersebut dan begitu juga disebaliknya. Jadi isu penganiayaan terhadap tertuduh oleh pihak polis tidak timbul sama sekali. Keterangan saksi pendakwaan khususnya SP1 dan SP3 jelas menunjukkan bahawa SP3 telah melihat sendiri tertuduh telah membuka sendiri kedua-dua ikatan kain putih yang diikat di kedua-dua betis kaki kanan dan kiri tertuduh yang apabila diperiksa oleh SP3, ia mengandungi bungkusan berselotape 13 putih yang di dalamnya mengandungi bahan kristal jernih disyaki dadah. Meneliti keterangan secara keseluruhannya, saya mendapati keterangan yang diberikan oleh SP3 jelas menerangkan akan kedudukan sebenar apa yang terjadi diwaktu dan ditempat pemeriksaan terhadap tertuduh dilakukan. Keterangan tertuduh yang pemeriksaan badan dibuat di kawasan pemeriksaan pengimbas kastam, jelas tidak berasas. Mahkamah telah menunjukkan dan melihat rakaman CCTV di mana adalah jelas dalam rakaman tersebut hanya pemeriksaan terhadap bagasi sahaja dilakukan dimeja di belakang mesin pengimbas kastam, tiada pemeriksaan badan dibuat di kawasan itu.” [17] At page 29 ROA Volume 1, the learned trial judge stated: “Juga, saya mendapati bentuk pembelaan yang dikemukakan oleh tertuduh itu adalah berbentuk penafian semata. Saya memutuskan apa yang disampaikan oleh SP1 dan SP3 itu adalah merupakan kejadian sebenar.” 14 [18] With respect, we disagree with the submission. The learned trial judge had critically examined the evidence of SP1 and SP3 and found them to be credible and trustworthy witnesses. [19] On the issue of the discovery of the drugs on his person, the learned trial judge had concluded that the evidence of SP1 is consistent with the evidence of SP3. There is no cogent reasons to reject their evidence. The fact that the impugned drugs was found on his person when body search was conducted in the narcotics office was amply supported by the evidence on record. The trial judge had seen the CCTV recording of the event and concluded that a body search did not take place at baggage claim area as claimed by the appellant. The body search was conducted at the office of SP1. [20] We are satisfied that the learned judge was perfectly correct in accepting SP1’s evidence. As such, we do not find any error by the learned trial judge. [21] In the case of Selvam a/l Arjunan v Public Prosecutor [2012] 4 MLJ 755, it was argued that the credibility of the main witness for the prosecution SP2 was at stake since he did not prepare a search list. The Court of Appeal held that the absence of the search list is not fatal to the prosecution case bearing in mind that the accused was caught 15 red handed with the drugs. So too here. The case of the prosecution is that the appellant was in physical custody and control of the two packages. They were tied to his right and left calf, respectively. The evidence against the appellant is overwhelming. Misdirection [22] Concerning the appellant’s complaint that the trial judge had committed error and misdirection of law by relying on direct evidence and the same time invoking presumption 37(da) of the Act, we are unable to agree with the submission. Looking at the grounds of judgment as a whole, we are of the view that the learned trial judge reached at the correct conclusion. This is what the learned judge concluded at the end of prosecution’s case at page 18 of ROA Volume 1 : “Tindakan serta perlakuan tertuduh semasa kejadian jelas menunjukkan bahawa tertuduh bukan sahaja berada di dalam milikannya dadah-dadah tersebut, malahan berlakunya perbuatan mengedar sepertimana yang diperuntukkan di bawah seksyen 2 Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 yang mentakrifkan maksud pengedaran. Walau pun ‘milikan’ tidak termasuk di bawah definasi mengedar, perbuatan tertuduh mengangkut dan membawa dadah dari satu tempat ke tempat yang lain itu, ia adalah terjumlah daripada perbuatan mengedar.” 16 [23] As regards the issue of trafficking, the trial judge stated as follows at page 31 of ROA Volume 1: “Fakta dan keterangan jelas membuktikan bahawa tertuduh telah mengedarkan dadah jenis Methamphetamine berjumlah 1816.1 gram, secara langsung yang jelas melebihi berat yang diperuntukkan di bawah seksyen 37(a)(xvi) Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 tersebut. Juga, terdapat keterangan langsung di dalam kes ini yang menunjukkan tertuduh melakukan perbuatan pengedaran dadah sebagaimana yang ditakrifkan di bawah seksyen 2 Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 iaitu mengangkut dan membawa dadah-dadah tersebut ke Malaysia, bagi tujuan pengedaran.” [24] The learned trial judge went on to explain at page 33 of ROA Volume 1: “… menilai serta menimbang kepada keterangan secara keseluruhannya, dengan ini mencapai suatu keputusan iaitu pihak pembelaan diakhir kes pembelaan ini telah gagal menimbulkan sebarang keraguan yang munasabah terhadap kes pihak pendakwaan. Tiada keterangan berjaya 17 dikemukakan bagi menyangkal kesahihan keterangan pihak pendakwaan bagi tujuan menimbulkan keraguan yang munasabah. Sehingga di akhir kes pembelaan ini, jelas bahawa pihak pendakwaan telah berjaya membuktikan kes mereka melampaui keraguan yang munasabah.” [25] We entertain no doubt that the learned trial judge relied on the direct evidence in concluding that the appellant did engage in drug trafficking as defined by section 2 of the Act. The learned trail judge did refer to section 37(da)(xi) of the Act in passing but did not rely on the said presumption. Conclusion [26] On the foregoing reasons, we find that no substantial miscarriage of justice had occurred to the appellant that would warrant appellate intervention (see: Sheo Swamp v King Emperor AIR [1934] PC 22; Reza Malek Zadeh Sahabali v PP [2014] MLRHU 1815, [2014] 3 MLJ 380). There are no appealable errors committed by the trial judge. In our view, the conviction is safe. [27] We, therefore, dismissed the appeal and affirmed the conviction and sentence of the High Court. 18 Sgd (YAACOB BIN HAJI MD. SAM) Judge Court of Appeal Malaysia Dated 10 November 2017 Counsel for the Appellant: Dato’ Rajpal Singh Messrs Rajpal, Firah & Vishnu Advocates & Solicitors No. 42-1A, First Floor Jalan Medan Batu Caves 1 68100 Batu Caves Selangor Darul Ehsan Counsel for the Respondent: Nurshafini binti Mustafha Timbalan Pedakwa Raya Jabatan Peguam Negara Bahagian Perbicaraan & Rayuan Aras 5, No. 45, Lot 4G7, Presint 4, Persiaran Perdana 62100 Putrajaya