Muhammad Shahrani Bin Muhammad Sani v Public Prosecutor (WA-42JSKS-5-07/2019; WA-42JSKS-6-07/2019)

Selepas kejadian ini, OKT telah keluar bekerja. 15 SP 11 tidak menceritakan kejadian-kejadian ini kepada kakaknya, SD 2 kerana bimbang akan dimarahi dan tidak dipercayai. SP 11 hanya menceritakan kejadian ini kepada SP 10 dan SP 12 apabila SP 12 menceritakan bahawa semasa SP 11 berada di Semenyih menjaga SD 2 dalam 20 pantang, OKT telah menyentuhnya. SP 11 berasa terkejut kerana menjangkakan hanya dia seorang yang diperlakukan sebegitu oleh OKT. 5 SP 11 hanya menceritakan tentang kejadian ini setelah dipaksa oleh SP 10 semasa mereka berada dalam kereta di tempat meletak kereta di Aeon. SP 11 akhirnya menceritakan tentang kejadian-kejadian yang berlaku ke atas dirinya dan telah memberi kerjasama kepada pihak polis apabila satu 5 laporan polis telah dibuat oleh SP

Penyiasatan kes mengenai kejadian terhadap SP 11 telah dijalankan apabila SP 12 telah membuat laporan polis mengenai kejadian rogol seperti dalam Laporan Polis 10 Wangsa Maju No. 12310/17 yang dikemukakan sebagai Eksibit P 12. SP 12 telah menceritakan kepada pihak polis bahawa SP 11 juga mengalami perkara yang sama. Siasatan kes telah dijalankan oleh SP 13 dan SP 11 dengan 15 konsisten telah menceritakan perbuatan amang seksual fizikal dan kejadian persetubuhan yang bertentangan dengan aturan tabii yang berlaku terhadap dirinya oleh OKT pada 14.9.2017. 20 Lanjutan dari laporan polis tersebut, SP11 telah menjalani pemeriksaan perubatan di Hospital Kuala Lumpur dan hasil pemeriksaan mendapati “loss of hymenal ring from 10 - 1 o'clock. Old hymenal tear at 3, 5, 6, 7, 9 o'clock.” Laporan 6 perubatan Hospital Kuala Lumpur telah ditandakan sebagai Eksibit P 5. Siasatan kes yang diketuai oleh SP 13 telah pergi ke tempat kejadian bersama-sama dengan jurufoto. Gambar-gambar di 5 tempat kejadian seperti di Eksibit P 2A-J telah diambil. OKT telah ditangkap pada 10.10.2017 pada jam lebih kurang 1 petang di rumahnya. Satu Laporan Polis Wangsa Maju 12334/17 iaitu Eksibit P 1 telah dibuat oleh SP1 selaku 10 pegawai tangkapan. Pada akhir kes pendakwaan, mahkamah mendapati pihak pendakwaan telah berjaya membuktikan elemen-elemen pertuduhan di bawah Seksyen 14(b) Akta Kesalahan- 15 Kesalahan Seksual Terhadap Kanak-Kanak 2017 dan dibaca bersama dengan Seksyen 16 akta yang sama dan seksyen 377B Kanun Keseksaan. Kes pembelaan 20 Pihak pembelaan telah memanggil 3 orang saksi iaitu SD 1 yang merupakan OKT sendiri, SD 2 adalah isteri kepada OKT dan SD 3 adalah adik kepada OKT. 7

the views of the trial Judge on the credibility of the witnesses;

the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused;

the right of the accused to the benefit of any doubt; and

the slownesss of an appellate Court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a Judge who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses. 10 Lord Reid reiterated this same principle in Benmax v. Austin Motor Co. Ltd. [1955] AC 370, 375 where he quoted from Lord Thankerton's judgment in Thomas v. Thomas [1947] 1 All ER 582, that: 15 ‘Where a question of fact has been tried by a Judge without a jury, and there is no question of misdirection of himself by the Judge, an appellate Court which is disposed to come to a 20 different conclusion on the printed evidence, should not do so unless it is satisfied that any advantage enjoyed by the trial Judge by reason of having seen and heard the witnesses, could 13 not be sufficient to explain or justify the trial Judge's conclusion. The learned appellate Judge held that the learned President had ‘misdirected himself on 5 the explanation of the accused’. Given the facts as stated in the appeal record, can it be said that there was a misdirection? Or can it be said that the decision of the learned President was ‘plainly unsound’? (Thomas v. Thomas (supra). 10 On the facts of this case we do not think so.’ In Wilayat Khan v. The State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 1953 SC 122, 123, 125, Chandrasekhara Aiyar J, when delivering the judgment of Supreme Court said: 15 ‘Even in appeals against acquittals, the powers of the High Court are as wide as in appeals from conviction. But there are two points to be borne in mind in 20 this connection. One is that in an appeal from an acquittal, the presumption of innocence of the accused continues right up to the end; the second is 25 14 that great weight should be attached to the view taken by the Sessions Judge before whom the trial was held and who had the opportunity of seeing and hearing the witnesses. ... 5 Interference with an order of acquittal made by a Judge who had the advantage of hearing the witnesses and observing their demeanour can only for compelling reasons and not on a nice balancing of probabilities and improbabilities, 10 and certainly not because a different view could be taken of the evidence of the facts.’” [5] The learned Sessions Court judge in her grounds stated that she believed the evidence of the complainant SP11. She found SP11 to be a 15 credible witness. She further warned herself of the danger of accepting SP11’s evidence without corroboration although she made a finding that there was corroboration of SP11’s evidence. This is so even though section 18 of the Sexual Offences Against Children Act 2017 states as follows: 20 15

“Evidence of child witness Notwithstanding anything contrary in any other written law, in any proceedings against any person relating to any offence under this Act, or any offence specified in the Schedule where the victim is a child, the court may convict such person of such 5 offence on the basis of the uncorroborated evidence of a child, given upon oath or otherwise.” [6] The learned Sessions Court judge was I believe, acting ex-abundanti cautela. 10 [7] She also found that the defence of the accused was a bare denial and an afterthought. It did not manage to create a doubt in the prosecution’s case. She found the accused, SD2 and SD3 not to be credible witnesses. 15 [8] The only issue that I take with the learned Sessions Court judge is that she has invoked an adverse inference under section 114(g) of the Evidence Act against the accused for failure to produce certain evidence in support of his case. 20 16 [9] This is what she said in her judgment: “Pihak pembelaan telah gagal untuk mengemukakan sebarang keterangan atau bukti seperti kad perakam waktu untuk tarikh 14.9.2017 bagi membuktikan kebenaran mereka 5 telah masuk bekerja untuk shift 1 petang. OKT juga telah gagal memanggil saksi-saksi lain seperti penyelia atau rakan sekerja yang boleh menyokong versi pembelaan OKT ini. Kegagalan pihak pembelaan untuk memanggil penyelia atau 10 rakan sekerja OKT atau mengemukakan kad perakam waktu OKT telah membangkitkan anggapan bertentangan terhadap OKT di bawah Seksyen 114(g) akta Keterangan 1950. Jika benar waktu bekerja OKT bermula pada 1 petang maka 15 kad perakam waktu OKT untuk tarikh 14.9.2017 dan saksi penyelia atau rakan sekerja perlu dikemukakan dan dipangggil untuk membantu OKT dalam pembelaannya.” [10] This is clearly a misdirection on her part. The failure at any trial of 20 any accused to give evidence should not be made the subject of adverse criticism by the court. 17 [11] In the case of Goh Ah Yew v Public Prosecutor [1949] 1 MLJ 150 it was held by Spenser-Wilkinson, J as follows: “No such inference, however, can be drawn against an accused in a criminal trial. There is no duty upon an accused 5 to call any evidence. He is at liberty to offer evidence or not as he thinks proper and no inference unfavourable to him can be drawn because he adopts one course rather than the other. Emperor v Dhunno Kazi 8 Cal 121 at page 125 and see Woodroffe on Evidence 9th Edition at page 10 813; Sarkar on Evidence 5th Edition 865.” [12] The above case was quoted with approval in Public Prosecutor v Tan Gong Wai & Anor [1985] 1 MLJ 355 where Edgar Joseph Jr J stated: 15 “I realise that no adverse inference against an accused person may be drawn by reason of his failure to call any witness or indeed to even give evidence on his own behalf for all he has to do is to raise a reasonable doubt: (Goh Ah Yew 20 v Public Prosecutor [1949] MLJ 150). However, the failure to call any particular witness is a matter which the Court may take into account in assessing the weight of evidence (without drawing any adverse inference) especially so when the 18 potential witnesses were persons in respect of whom the prosecution had probably no means of knowing that they might have any relevant evidence to give until the accused himself came to give evidence (Regina v Gallagher [1974] 1 WLR 1204; Public Prosecutor v Lira Kuan Hock [1967] 2 5 MLJ 114, 115; Tay Choo Wah v Public Prosecutor [1976] 2 MLJ 95, 100.” [13] See also the case of Public Prosecutor v Pills & Potions Pharmacy Sdn Bhd [2020] MLJU 1389. 10 [14] Be that as it may, upon perusing the evidence in this case as a whole I find that the conviction of the Appellant is safe as the evidence of the complainant is credible and consistent. Therefore, I see no reason to disturb the findings made by the learned Sessions Court judge. 15 Approach of an Appellate Court on sentence [15] In Chan Sit Hong v PP [1975] 1 MLJ 261; [1974] 1 LNS 19 Ajaib Singh J said: 20 “The High Court sitting in its appellate jurisdiction will not normally alter a sentence imposed by a subordinate court 19 unless it is satisfied that the sentence is excessively severe or inadequate to such an extent that the subordinate court must have failed to apply the right principles in assessing the sentence.” 5 [16] In the case of Abu Bakar Bin Alif v. R [1952] 1 LNS 4; [1953] 1 MLJ 19 the court quoted the case of Rex v. Ball 35 Cr App R 164 as follows: “‘It is only when a sentence appears to err in principle that this 10 Court will alter it. If a sentence is excessive or inadequate to such an extent as to satisfy this Court that when it was passed there was a failure to apply the right principles, then this Court will intervene’. In my opinion these remarks apply with equal force to appeals to the High Court from the Subordinate 15 Courts.” [17] An appellate court will not interfere with the sentence imposed by the court below unless it is shown that the sentence imposed was unreasonable or manifestly excessive. See the Federal Court case of Tan 20 Soo Har v PP [1975] 2 MLJ 32; [1975] 1 LNS 180. 20 [18] Based on the above case law, I reduced the sentence of the accused on both the charges from ten to eight years imprisonment and for case number WA-42JSKS-6-07/2019 I reduced the whipping from two to one stroke. Both the imprisonment sentences were ordered to run concurrently. 5 Ergo cadit quaestio DATED: 27th MAY 2021 10 ASLAM B ZAINUDDIN JUDICIAL COMMISSIONER 15 HIGH COURT IN MALAYA KUALA LUMPUR 20 21 Deputy Public Prosecutor: Zahida Binti Zakaria Timbalan Pendakwa Raya Jabatan Peguam Negara Malaysia Bahagian Pendakwaan 5 Aras 5, No. 45, Persiaran Perdana Presint 4 62100 Putrajaya 10 Counsel for the Respondent: Shaharuddin Bin Mohamed Tetuan Shaharuddin Hidayu & Marwaliz (Peguambela & Peguamcara) No.5578-E, Lot 347 15 Tingkat 1, Wisma SHM Seksyen 23, Taman Desa Telipot, Kota Bharu 15050 Kelantan 20 References: - Cases referred to:

Dato Mokhtar Bin Hashim & Anor v Public Prosecutor [1983] 2 MLJ 232; [1983] 2 CLJ 10

Periasamy s/o Sinnappan & Anor v Public Prosecutor [1996] 2 MLJ 25 557; [1996] 3 CLJ 187

Goh Ah Yew v Public Prosecutor [1949] 1 MLJ 150

Public Prosecutor v Tan Gong Wai & Anor [1985] 1 MLJ 355 22

Public Prosecutor v Pills & Potions Pharmacy Sdn Bhd [2020] MLJU 1389

Chan Sit Hong v PP [1975] 1 MLJ 261; [1974] 1 LNS 19

Abu Bakar Bin Alif v. R [1952] 1 LNS 4; [1953] 1 MLJ 19

Rex v. Ball 35 Cr App R 164 5

Tan Soo Har v PP [1975] 2 MLJ 32; [1975] 1 LNS 180 Legislation referred to:

Sexual Offences Against Children Act 2017

Penal Code 10

Evidence Act 1950