whether, applying the threshold governing the grant of leave, the application discloses an arguable case fit for further consideration on a substantive motion, such that it is neither frivolous nor vexatious. [15] It is convenient to state, at the outset, what is not in issue at this stage. The Court is not required, and it would be wrong, to determine whether the impugned decision is in truth vitiated by any of the grounds relied upon. That is the province of the substantive hearing. The Governing Legal Framework [16] Order 53 rule 2(4) of the Rules of Court 2012 provides that any person who is adversely affected by the decision of any public authority is entitled to make the application. Rule 3(1) provides that no application under the Order may be made unless leave has first been granted. These two provisions frame the present inquiry: the first defines the class of decisions and persons to whom the supervisory jurisdiction extends; the second imposes the requirement of leave. [17] The meaning of a reviewable "decision" was considered by the Federal Court in Members of the Commission of Enquiry on the Video Clip Recording of Images of A Person Purported to be an Advocate and Solicitor Speaking on Telephone on Matters of Appointment of Judges v Tun Dato' Seri Ahmad Fairuz bin Dato' Sheikh Abdul Halim [2011] 6 MLJ 490 (FC). Adopting the formulation of the House of Lords in Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1984] 3 All ER 935 (HL), the Federal Court held that, for a decision to be susceptible to the Court's supervisory jurisdiction, there must first be a decision by a decision-maker (or a refusal to decide), and that decision must affect the aggrieved party by altering his rights or obligations, or by depriving him of a benefit which he has been permitted to enjoy. [18] It was on the second limb of that test that the application in Members of the Commission of Enquiry failed. The Federal Court held that the findings and recommendations of a Commission of Enquiry constituted under the Commission of Enquiry Act 1950 were not amenable to judicial review under Order 53, because such a commission makes no legal decision: its findings bind no one, not even the Government, and do not of their own force affect legal rights. The ratio of the case is therefore that mere findings and recommendations, devoid of binding legal effect, do not come within Order 53. That ratio must be kept distinct from the general principle of amenability which the Federal Court affirmed, and which is of present relevance. [19] As to leave, the threshold is a low one. In Members of the Commission of Enquiry the Federal Court stated that leave is normally granted where the application is neither frivolous nor vexatious and justifies further argument on a substantive motion. The same approach was taken by the Court of Appeal in Chin Mee Keong & Ors v Pesuruhjaya Sukan [2007] 6 MLJ 193 (CA), where the majority, adopting the guidelines approved by the Supreme Court in Tuan Hj Sarip Hamid & Anor v Patco Malaysia Bhd [1995] 2 MLJ 442 (SC) and the formulation of Ramly Ali J in YAM Tunku Dato' Seri Nadzaruddin Ibni Tuanku Ja'afar v Datuk Bandar Kuala Lumpur & Anor [2003] 5 MLJ 128 (HC), held that at the leave stage the Court does not embark upon any in-depth examination of the merits. It is enough that, on a perusal of the material then available, the case is one which might, on further consideration, turn out to be arguable in favour of the relief claimed. D. ANALYSIS AND DETERMINATION Whether the Impugned Decision Is Amenable to Judicial Review [20] The first question is whether the impugned decision answers the description of a decision of a public authority by which the Applicant is adversely affected. [21] That the Respondent is a public authority admits of little difficulty. It is a statutory body corporate established under the Universities and University Colleges Act 1971 and the Constitution of Universiti Teknikal Malaysia Melaka [P.U.(A) 470/2010], and falls within the definition of "public authority" in Article 160(2) of the Federal Constitution as a statutory authority exercising powers vested in it by federal law. Indeed, in Members of the Commission of Enquiry even a commission of enquiry was accepted to be a public authority; the difficulty there lay elsewhere. [22] The material distinction between the present case and Members of the Commission of Enquiry lies in the second limb of the amenability test. The instrument impugned there was a report consisting of findings and recommendations which bound no one. The instrument impugned here is of a different order. The decision conveyed by the letter of 21.01.2026 is an operative determination: it fixed the Applicant's LPPT score for 2024 at 80.28% and declared that score to be final. On the affidavit in support, that determination is said to bear directly upon the Applicant's standing within the Respondent's service. Unlike a set of findings which leaves rights untouched, an operative appraisal decision of that character is capable of altering or affecting the position of the officer assessed. [23] Whether, on full argument, such a decision is to be characterised as one affecting legal rights in the public-law sense as opposed to a matter of internal administration is a question upon which the Court expresses no concluded view. It is a question properly reserved to the substantive hearing. For the limited purpose of leave, it is sufficient to hold that the impugned decision is at least arguably a reviewable decision within Order 53 rule 2(4), and that it cannot be said, at this stage, to fall outside the reach of the supervisory jurisdiction in the manner that the commission's findings did in Members of the Commission of Enquiry. [24] The governing principle, drawn from the authorities already noted, is that leave is not the occasion for a determination of the merits. The Court's task is the limited one of deciding whether the application is frivolous or vexatious, or whether, on the contrary, it raises a matter fit for further consideration inter partes at a substantive hearing. The threshold is deliberately low, for the requirement of leave exists to exclude the plainly unarguable, not to pre-try the substantive challenge. To conduct at this stage the very inquiry reserved for the substantive motion would defeat the purpose of the two-stage procedure under Order 53. [25] It follows that the strength, or the ultimate prospects, of the grounds relied upon is not the measure. What must be asked is whether there is an arguable case which ought properly to proceed to a full hearing. Whether an Arquable Case Has Been Disclosed [26] Tested against that standard, the grounds set out in the Statement (Enclosure 2) and supported by the affidavit in support (Enclosure 3) are not, in my judgment, frivolous or vexatious. [27] The complaint of procedural impropriety may be taken as an illustration, and without thereby endorsing it. The affidavit in support deposes that Pekeliling Pentadbiran Bilangan 11 Tahun 2025 required written justification by the PPK where there was a significant divergence between the assessments of the PPP and the PPK. On the marks disclosed by the letter of 12.01.2026 84.28% awarded by the PPP and 76.28% awarded by the PPK a divergence of eight marks is apparent. Whether that divergence was "significant" within the meaning of the circular, whether written justification was in consequence required, and whether any such requirement was observed, are questions which cannot be resolved on the present application and which are fit for examination at a substantive hearing. [28] The remaining grounds that marks were reduced under the headings of discipline and interpersonal relations without prior notice or any disciplinary finding, and that a legitimate expectation is said to arise from the Respondent's media statement of 10.09.2025 likewise raise questions of natural justice and legitimate expectation which are properly arguable. It is neither necessary nor appropriate to weigh their merits now. It is enough that they are not shown to be unarguable. [29] The absence of opposition, though not determinative, is consistent with this conclusion. The letter of the Attorney General's Chambers dated 24.04.2026 records that no objection is taken to leave. That does not relieve the Court of its independent duty to be satisfied that the threshold is met; but where the application is, upon its own materials, neither frivolous nor vexatious, the want of objection dispels any suggestion that leave would be granted upon a contested but insubstantial foundation. [30] For completeness, I record that nothing in these grounds is to be understood as a view upon the substantive merits. The characterisation of the impugned decision as amenable to review, the construction of the governing circulars, and the sufficiency of the grounds of challenge all remain fully open to the Respondent at the substantive stage, in the same way that a threshold objection may be renewed there. E. CONCLUSION [31] The requirements of Order 53 rule 3 of the Rules of Court 2012 are satisfied. The impugned decision of 21.01.2026 is arguably a decision of a public authority amenable to judicial review, and the grounds advanced disclose an arguable case which is neither frivolous nor vexatious and which ought to proceed to a substantive hearing. The application for leave accordingly succeeds. F. ORDERS OF THE COURT [32] For the reasons set out above, I make the following orders: