MUHAMMAD SYAFIQ BIN ULOGANATHAN v Pendaftar Muallaf Wilayah Persekutuan (WA-25-391-11/2025)

PENDAFTAR MUALLAF WILAYAH PERSEKUTUAN KUALA

2.

KERAJAAN MALAYSIA ... RESPONDENTS

This was an application by the Applicant which was filed on 10.11.2025 (encl. 1) for leave to apply for judicial review under O. 53, r. 2 of the Rules of Court 2012 (‘RC 2012’).

Essentially, the Applicant essentially sought leave for judicial review to challenge the alleged omission on the part of the 1st Respondent (‘R1’) to decide on his application to renounce Islam.

The Attorney General (‘AG’) objected to the application on the grounds that the ultimate subject matter of the application was not amenable to judicial review by virtue of Article 121(1A) of the Federal Constitution and the application as framed by the Applicant was frivolous and vexatious.

After having read the cause papers and the written submissions and having heard the oral submissions by the learned counsels for the parties, I had, on 2.4.2026 decided that there are serious arguments to be determined at the substantive stage of the judicial review proceedings and the AG’s objection was accordingly dismissed. Order in terms for leave in encl. 1 was granted.

The Respondents are dissatisfied with my decision and have filed their Notice of Appeal.

These are my full grounds of decision.

The salient facts as discerned from the Statement which was filed by the Applicant pursuant to O. 53, r. 3(2) of the RC 2012 are as follows.

The Applicant is a Malaysian citizen of age residing at Jalan Klang Lama, Petaling, Kuala Lumpur.

R1 is the Registrar of Muallafs established under s 88 of the Administration of Islamic Law (Federal Territories) Act 1993 [Act 505].

The 2nd Respondent (‘R2’) is a statutory body established under sub-s 4(1) of Act 505 to, among others, advise the Yang di-Pertuan Agong in matters relating to Islam and promote the economic and social development of the Muslim community in the Federal Territories consistent with Islamic Law.

The 3rd Respondent (‘R3’) is the Federal Government of Malaysia.

The Applicant was born as Mugundn a/l Uloganathan on 15.9.1993 to Hindu parents.

Since birth, the Applicant has been raised as a Hindu by his parents and he has continued to profess Hinduism until today.

In 2017, the Applicant entered into a relationship with a girl named Anusha. In the early stages of their relationship, Anusha held herself out to be a Hindu. Eventually, the Applicant came to know that Anusha is a Muslim.

Despite this revelation, the Applicant did not want to end the relationship solely on the basis of religion.

The relationship matured to the point that the couple began taking serious steps towards marriage. Eventually, the Applicant discussed with Anusha’s parents on their prospects of marriage where he was told that his conversion into Islam was a necessary precondition.

The Applicant then converted to Islam on 28.3.2018 at Jabatan Agama Islam Wilayah Persekutuan (‘JAWI’) and was thereafter registered as a muallaf with R1.

The Applicant alleged that, at JAWI, he was directed by the JAWI officer who facilitated his conversion process to read a piece of paper with several Arabic verses that have been romanised without any prior explanation on their meaning or on the religion of Islam and its tenets and practices.

The Applicant read what was written on the piece of paper without understanding its meaning and thereafter, he was told that his conversion was completed.

The Applicant was issued a Kad Muallaf by JAWI, but he later misplaced the same while studying in the United Kingdom (‘UK’).

In April 2024, the Applicant wrote to JAWI to request for a new Kad Muallaf. However, JAWI informed him that they no longer issued Kad Muallaf, and instead a Surat Perakuan Masuk Islam dated 19.4.2024 certifying that the Applicant had converted into Islam and was registered as a muallaf on 28.3.2018 was issued to him.

Subsequent to his conversion into Islam, the Applicant took further steps towards being married with Anusha. However, Anusha chose to end their relationship in August 2018.

Shortly after this, the Applicant received an offer to pursue his studies in the UK and he left on 8.9.2018 for a period of three years.

Throughout his residence in the UK, the Applicant claimed that he continued to profess and practise the Hindu faith and he did not profess nor practised Islam notwithstanding his conversion. The situation was the same after the Applicant returned to Malaysia upon completion of his studies in 2020.

Despite his continued profession and practise of the Hindu faith, the Applicant did not take any active steps to renounce Islam as his parents had health issues, and as the main breadwinner of the family, especially during the trying times of the Covid-19 pandemic and its post-effects, he had to focus on his career.

In late 2024, the Applicant eventually told his parents of his previous conversion into Islam. His parents urged him to take immediate steps to formally renounce Islam and re-embrace Hinduism.

The Applicant sought advice from several lawyers on the legal recourse that is available to him. The Applicant then wrote to JAWI to request a new Kad Muallaf so that the details of his conversion are clarified.

On 21.7.2025, the Applicant affirmed a statutory declaration that –

he does not accept or believe the six pillars of faith or Rukun

he believes in the teachings of Hinduism and the existence and supremacy of the deities as his Gods; recognises the sanctity of Veda as the holy scriptures of Hinduism; adheres to the principle of Catur Purushartha, which refers to the four main objectives of life; and believes in the concept of reincarnation or rebirth.

Upon obtaining legal advice, the Applicant instructed his solicitors, Messrs. Fahri, Azzat & Co, to send a letter dated 22.7.2025 to R1 (‘First Letter’) requesting for his name to be removed from the Register of Muallafs.

A follow up letter dated 5.8.2025 was sent to R1 requesting for a prompt response to the First Letter (‘Second Letter’).

On 11.8.2025, R1 responded to the Second Letter addressing the request that was made by the Applicant in the First Letter (‘Rejection Letter’). R1 rejected the Applicant’s request on the grounds that the application to remove the Applicant’s name from the Register of Muallafs cannot be considered; the process of the Applicant’s conversion into Islam was completed; and any application to remove the records of the Register of Muallafs can only be made after having received a court order from the Syariah Court (‘Impugned Decision’).

The grounds of judicial review relied upon by the Applicant are as follows:

the definition of a Muslim person under s 2(d) and (e) of Act 505 is unconstitutional (‘First Ground’);

s 91 of Act 505 is unconstitutional as it is in contravention with Article 11(1) of the Federal Constitution and/ or Item 1 of the State List under the Ninth Schedule of the Federal

sub-s 85(1) of Act 505 is unconstitutional as it is in contravention with Article 11(1) of the Federal Constitution and/ or Item 1 of the State List under the Ninth Schedule of the Federal Constitution (‘Third Ground’);

R1’s refusal to remove the Applicant’s name from the Register of Muallafs is unlawful because R1 has the exclusive power and/ or jurisdiction to remove a person’s name from the Register in accordance with the decision by the Federal Court decision in Soon Singh Bikar Singh v Pertubuhan Kebajikan Islam Malaysia (PERKIM) Kedah & Anor [1999] 2 CLJ 5 read together with the decision by the Court of Appeal in Jenny bt Peter v Director of Jabatan

the Syariah Courts of the Federal Territories (‘FTSC’) do not have jurisdiction to hear and decide applications to renounce Islam (‘Fifth Ground’); and

R1’s conduct during the Applicant’s conversion on 28.3.2018 amounts to procedural impropriety due to its failure to comply with s 85 of Act 505 and Rule 19 of the Administration of Islamic Law (Federal Territories) (Method of Registration, Care and Teaching of Mualaf) Rules 2013 (‘2013 Rules’) (‘Sixth Ground’).

The Applicant is seeking the following reliefs:

a declaration that –

the definition of a Muslim person under sections 2(d) and (e) of Act 505 is unconstitutional as they are in contravention of Item 1 of the State List under the

(ii) s 91 of Act 505 is unconstitutional as it is in contravention with Article 11(1) of the Federal Constitution and/ or Item 1 of the State List under the Ninth Schedule of the Federal Constitution;

(iii) sub-s 85(1) of Act 505 is unconstitutional as it is in contravention with Item 1 of the State List under the Ninth Schedule of the Federal Constitution;

(iv) the Applicant is no longer a Muslim and as such –

(A) the Applicant is no longer to be regarded as a person “professing the religion of Islam” within the meaning of Item 1 of the State List under the Ninth Schedule of the Federal Constitution, and therefore is no longer subjected to the jurisdiction of the Syariah Courts;

(B) all laws enacted by the legislative authority of the respective States and Federal Territories in accordance with Item 1 of the State List under the Ninth Schedule of the Federal Constitution shall henceforth no longer have any application nor effect onto the Applicant; and

(C) the Applicant is entitled to profess and practise his religion in accordance with Article 11(1) of the Federal Constitution;

(v)

(vi) the FTSC do not have jurisdiction to hear and decide applications to renounce Islam;

(vii) R2 has the directive power to remove the Applicant’s name from the Register of Muallafs pursuant to Rule 35 of the 2013 Rules;

(viii) R1’s conduct of the Applicant’s conversion on 28.3.2018 amounts to procedural impropriety due to its failure to comply with s 85 of Act 505 and Rule 19 of the 2013 Rules; and

(ix) R1’s refusal to make a decision on the Applicant’s application in its letter dated 11.8.2025 is unlawful and unreasonable;

a certiorari order to quash R1’s decision contained in its letter dated 11.8.2025;

a mandamus order that R1 shall remove the Applicant’s name from the Registrar of Muallafs, and to issue any appropriate legal document to certify the Applicant’s renunciation of Islam; and

in the alternative to the relief prayed for above, a consequential order by this Court to give meaning and effect to the Applicant’s renunciation of Islam.

The following excerpt from the decision of this Court in Kelab Pembina-Pembina Selangor (Selangor Builders’ Club) v Ketua Pengarah Hasil Dalam Negeri [2025] MLJU 4674 encapsulates the role of the AG at the leave stage of judicial review proceedings: “24. The learned SFC had cited several case authorities which have expounded on the role of the AG and these may be summarised as follows:

under O. 53 of the RC 2012, the application for judicial review must be served on the AG because judicial review is a principal tool of public law applicable to public bodies. As the guardian of public interest, the AG is a nominal party in all judicial review applications. This is to ensure that the AG vets all judicial review applications in order to ascertain if his participation is warranted. The AG’s function is to safeguard public authorities or public institutions from unwarranted litigation and to deter ill-founded claims that might otherwise paralyse the administration of public functions. This role serves to balance access to judicial review with the need for efficient governance [see Peguam Negara Malaysia v Nurul Izzah bt Anwar & Ors [2017] 4 MLJ 656 (CA) and Messrs Tai Choi Yu & Co, Advocates (suing as a firm and Tai Choi Yu as sole proprietor) v Arifin bin

if the AG elects to appear at the leave stage, he does so, not as a representative of the respondent, but in his own right as the AG, in discharging his public duty [see Kijal Resort Sdn Bhd v Pentadbir Tanah

as the leave stage is not concerned with the merits of the judicial review application, the AG is not required under the law to file any affidavit in reply (‘AIR’). The AG’s role is to assist the court in sieving out frivolous applications by showing whether the applicant has an arguable case and has met the threshold for leave for judicial review as explicated by the Court of Appeal in Dato’ Sri Mohd Najib bin Tun Hj Abdul Razak v Attorney General & Ors [2020] 3 MLJ 114 as follows: “[33] A court hearing a judicial review application must determine whether ‘prima facie there is a genuine case for review’. It is accepted that the threshold requirement is low, for leave will only be refused where an application is:

frivolous and vexatious or hopeless;

made by busybodies with misguided or trivial complaints of administrative errors;

misconceived;

unarguable or groundless;

where there is a more appropriate alternative procedure; or

where an application for judicial review is an inappropriate procedure.” (see too, Peguam Negara Malaysia v Chin

if, for instance, the applicant is a busybody; the application is made out of time or against a person or body that is immunised from being impleaded in legal proceedings; or the subject matter of the review is one which by settled law is non-justiciable, and the court is satisfied that the threshold is not met, the application for leave should be refused and dismissed in limine [see Tang Kwor Ham & Ors v Pengurusan Danaharta

In this regard, the Applicant had argued that the AG did not address the principal matter highlighted by the Applicant, namely the validity of the Respondent’s imposition of ad valorem duty on the transfer of the Property and that the AG has failed to file an AIR.

However, based on the cases as abovementioned, the Applicant’s argument is clearly misconceived as the AG’s role at the leave stage of judicial review is not to defend the IRB’s decision but rather to ensure that the threshold criteria for judicial review are met. The AG’s involvement does not create an obligation to contest or verify evidence; it merely grants the AG a procedural right to be heard in determining whether the threshold for leave has been met.”.

The Federal Court in WRP Asia Pacific Sdn Bhd v. Tenaga Nasional Berhad [2012] 4 CLJ 478 at p 488 said: “[12] … At the leave stage, on a quick perusal of the material available, if the court thinks that subsequently at the substantive hearing stage an arguable case may be disclosed, and the relief sought may be granted, leave should be granted (IRC v. National Federation of Self-Employed and Small Businesses Ltd [1982] AC 617). In Malaysia, the Federal Court in Mohd Nordin Johan v. The Attorney-General, Malaysia [1983] 1 CLJ 130; [1983] CLJ (Rep) 271 when allowing the appeal, opined that ‘the point taken was not frivolous to merit refusal of leave in limine and justified argument on a substantive motion for certiorari’. Without the need to go into depth of the abundant authorities, suffice if we state that leave may be granted if the leave application is not thought of as frivolous, and if leave is granted, an arguable case in favour of granting the relief sought at the substantive hearing may be the resultant outcome. A rider must be attached to the application though ie, unless the matter for judicial review is amenable to judicial review absolutely no success may be envisaged.”.

The applicable test in determining whether leave for judicial review is to be allowed or otherwise was also laid down in the following case authorities:

Tang Kwor Ham & Ors v. Pengurusan Danaharta Nasional Bhd & Ors [2006] 5 MLJ 60 at p 69 (CA) “[10] To paraphrase in less elegant language what has been said in these cases, the High Court should not go into the merits of the case at the leave stage. Its role is only to see if the application for leave is frivolous. If, for example, the applicant is a busybody, or the application is made out of time or against a person or body that is immunised from being impleaded in legal proceedings then the High Court would be justified in refusing leave in limine. So too will the court be entitled to refuse leave if it is a case where the subject matter of the review is one which by settled law (either written law or the common law) is nonjusticiable, eg, proceedings in Parliament (see art 63 of the

Dato’ Sri Mohd Najib bin Tun Hj Abdul Razak v Attorney General & Ors [2020] 3 MLJ 114 at p 129 (CA) “[33] A court hearing a judicial review application must determine whether ‘prima facie there is a genuine case for review’. It is accepted that the threshold requirement is low, for leave will only be refused where an application is:

frivolous and vexatious or hopeless;

made by busybodies with misguided or trivial complaints of administrative errors;

misconceived;

unarguable or groundless;

where there is a more appropriate alternative procedure; or

where an application for judicial review is inappropriate procedure.”.

It can therefore be surmised that leave for judicial review should be refused by the Court if –

the application is frivolous and vexatious or filed out of time;

the applicant has no locus standi and is a busybody or has no arguable case;

the subject matter is not amenable to judicial review or is non-justiciable; and

there is a more appropriate alternative procedure and judicial review is an inappropriate procedure.

In gist, the learned SFC submitted for the AG that leave for judicial review should be refused by the Court because –

the application is not amenable to judicial review as the FTSC have jurisdiction over applications to renounce Islam, thereby attracting the application of Article 121(1A) of the

the application as framed by the Applicant is frivolous and vexatious as there is no legal duty on R1 to decide the Applicant’s application to renounce Islam.

Section 46(2)(b)(x) of Act 505 reads as follows: “Jurisdiction of Syariah High Court

(1) …

A Syariah High Court shall –

…

in its civil jurisdiction, hear and determine all actions and proceedings in which all the parties are Muslims and which relate to – …

other matters in respect of which jurisdiction is conferred by any written law.”.

Articles 74(1) and (2) and 121(1) and (1A) of the Federal Constitution provide that: “Subject matter of federal and State laws

(1) Without prejudice to any power to make laws conferred on it by any other Article, Parliament may make laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in the Federal List or the Concurrent List (that is to say, the First or Third List set out in the Ninth Schedule).

Without prejudice to any power to make laws conferred on it by any other Article, the Legislature of a State may make laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in the State List (that is to say, the Second List out in the Ninth Schedule) or the Concurrent List. … Judicial power of the Federation

(1) There shall be two High Courts of co-ordinate jurisdiction and status, namely –

one in the States of Malaya, which shall be known as the High Court in Malaya and shall have its principal registry at such place in the States of Malaya as the Yang di-Pertuan Agong may determine; and

one in the States of Sabah and Sarawak, which shall be known as the High Court in Sabah and Sarawak and shall have its principal registry at such place in the States of Sabah and Sarawak as the Yang di-Pertuan Agong may determine;

(Repealed), and such inferior courts as may be provided by federal law; and the High Courts and inferior courts shall have such jurisdiction and powers as may be conferred by or under federal law.

The courts referred to in Clause (1) shall have no jurisdiction in respect of any matter within the jurisdiction of the Syariah courts.”.

Upon having considered the oral and written submissions of the Applicant and the AG, I find that there was merit in the Applicant’s arguments which are summarised as follows:

s 46(2)(b)(x) of Act 505 does not contain any express provision which confers on the Syariah High Court jurisdiction over applications to renounce Islam;

the phrase “in respect of which jurisdiction is conferred by any written law” in s 46(2)(b)(x) of Act 505 suggests that there must be some other written law which specifies what other matters the Syariah High Court has jurisdiction over. In other words, the FTSC have jurisdiction over matters which have been expressly conferred by written law, leaving no room to imply jurisdiction;

the Federal and State Lists in the Federal Constitution do not ipso facto confer jurisdiction to the Syariah Courts on matters pertaining to applications to renounce Islam. The relevant legislature must first enact a law on the said subject matter before any form of powers and/ or jurisdiction may be exercised. Notably, Rosliza Ibrahim v. Kerajaan Negeri Selangor & Anor [2021] 3 CLJ 301 and Dahlia Dhaima bt Abdullah v Majlis Agama Islam Selangor and another appeal [2025] 1 MLJ 334 are cases emanating from Selangor where s 61(3)(b)(x) of the Administration of the Religion of Islam (State of Selangor) Enactment 2003 expressly provides that the Syariah High Court shall, in its civil jurisdiction, hear and determine all actions or proceedings which relate to a declaration that a person is no longer a Muslim;

if the FTSC do not have jurisdiction over applications to renounce Islam, Article 121(1A) of the Federal Constitution is not applicable; and

the cases cited by the learned SFC which have held that the decisions by the Syariah Court are not amenable to judicial review are irrelevant for present as there has been no determination of the Applicant’s case by the FTSC.

In Aaishah Healther Bong Bt Colin v Pendaftar Muallaf Wilayah Persekutuan Kuala Lumpur & Ors [2024] 9 MLJ 180, the High Court held that the application to renounce Islam falls within the jurisdiction of the Syariah Court, and the civil courts have no jurisdiction to determine or decide on such applications. However, the Court of Appeal set aside the said decision (see [2025] CLJU 1209) based on the following reasoning: “[5] The learned High Court judge in gist denied the Appellant leave on two grounds, to wit:

the Appellant’s application is not amenable to judicial review by reason that the First Respondent has no jurisdiction to determine the Appellant’s application which is the province of the Syariah Court; and

(ii) the relief of mandamus cannot be ordered because the First Respondent did not have the jurisdiction and in consequence has no legal duty to decide the Appellant’s application. [6] Upon hearing the parties, we find this is not plain and obvious unarguable case that the Appellant’s application is frivolous. [7] We are satisfied there are serious and formidable arguments advanced by the parties here on the ground whether the Wilayah Persekutuan Syariah Court is vested and clothed with jurisdiction in light of s. 46(2)(b)(x) of the Administration of Islamic law (Federal Territories) Act 1993 (Act 505). [8] There is uncertainty as to whether the remedy/relief-based approach, exemplified by, among others, SIS Forum (Malaysia) v. Kerajaan Negeri Selangor; Majlis Agama Islam Selangor (Intervener) [2022] 3 MLRA 131 FC or the subject matter approach based on, also amongst others, Rosliza bt Ibrahim v. Kerajaan Negeri Selangor & Anor [2021] 2 MLRA 70 FC and Dahlia Dhaima Abdullah v. Majlis Agama Islam Selangor & Another Appeal [2024] CLJU 943 FC, is applicable and determinative of the Appellant’s application. [9] There is also uncertainty on the proper interpretation of s. 46(2)(b)(x) of the Administration of Islamic law (Federal Territories) Act 1993 (Act 505) because there is no statute/enactment conferring specific power on the Syariah Court to decide on apostacy cases in the Federal Territories. There is presently conflict on whether it should be the adoption of the “by implication” approach based on Soon Singh a/l Bikar Singh v. Pertubuhan Kebajikan Islam Malaysia (PERKIM) Kedah & Anor [1999] 1 MLRA 115 FC or the “specific statutory conferment” approach based on Latifah bte Mat Zin v. Rosmawati bte Sharibun & Anor [2007] 5 MLJ 101 FC and Subashini Rajasingam v. Saravanan Thangathoray & other Appeals [2008] 2 CLJ 1 FC. In this regard, we also observed that there is no express overruling pronounced on the conflicting approaches adopted by different panels of the Federal Court; thus, the law as it stands is still in a state of flux. [10] Consequently, we find that the learned High Court judge erred by having imposed a higher burden on the Appellant to demonstrate that her application is not frivolous. It seems to us that the learned High Court judge, in rejecting leave, prematurely delved into answering the merits of the opposing arguments of the parties instead of to be merely satisfied that these are serious arguments to be determined at the judicial review hearing proper which may result in the Appellant obtaining the reliefs as sought. [11] As to the other ground on the unavailability of the remedy of mandamus, this is clearly dependent on the answer to the first ground on its merits. That notwithstanding, we observed that besides the prayer of mandamus, the Appellant has also applied for six other declaratory prayers. Thus, the leave ought not have been denied to the Appellant on the basis of lack of duty of the First Respondent per se with respect to the mandamus prayer. [12] In conclusion, the Appellant’s appeal is therefore meritorious and appellate intervention is justified. The appeal is allowed and the decision of the High Court is set aside. Costs shall be costs in the cause.”.

The present case is analogous to the case of Aishah Healther Bong where the decision of the High Court in not allowing leave was reversed by the Court of Appeal, which was of the view that –

there were serious arguments on whether the FTSC is vested with jurisdiction in light of s 46(2)(b)(x) of Act 505; and

there was uncertainty on –

whether the remedy/ relief-based approach or the subject matter approach is applicable and determinative of the application; and

(ii) the proper interpretation of s 46(2)(b)(x) of Act 505 and whether the “by implication” approach or the “specific statutory conferment” approach should be adopted.

In the premises, I was inclined to similarly find that there were serious legal issues to be determined as to whether the FTSC have jurisdiction over applications to renounce Islam. Clearly, this was not a plain and obvious case of the Appellant’s application being frivolous and vexatious.

In view of the foregoing, I was of the opinion that there were serious arguments for determination at the substantive stage of the judicial review proceedings. Hence, the AG’s objection was dismissed and the Applicant’s application for leave in encl. 1 was allowed.

A case management date via e-review before the Deputy Registrar was accordingly fixed on 16.4.2026. DATED: 26.5.2026 (ALIZA SULAIMAN) JUDGE HIGH COURT IN MALAYA KUALA LUMPUR (BKK1) Solicitors for the Applicant: Iqbal Harith Liang Bin Danial Liang Messrs. Fahri, Azzat & Co. Solicitors for the Respondents: Shahidah Nafisah binti Leman