display on or affix to any vehicle, any material containing any emblem, title or award or any replica thereof.” [8] Section 3(3) provides that any person who contravenes subsection (1) commits an offence and shall, on conviction, be liable to a fine of not less than RM250,000 and not more than RM500,000 or to imprisonment for a term of not less than one year and not more than five years or to both. [9] Section 17 of the Offences Relating to Awards Act 2017 (Act 787) (“Act 787”), which did not appear in the charge, provides: “Any person who contravenes any provision of a State law specified in the Second Schedule outside the territory of that State commits an offence under this Act and shall, on conviction, be liable to the penalty provided under the State law.” [10] Section 3 of the Enactment is listed in the Second Schedule to Act 787. Section 17 of Act 787 is thus the parliamentary provision enabling federal-level prosecution for conduct falling within the scheduled state offence when that conduct occurs outside the territory of the state in question. BACKGROUND [11] The Appellant was charged in the Sessions Court of Johor Bahru with the offence set out at paragraph 6 above. The charge alleges that on 11 February 2024, at approximately 4.40 p.m., at Jalan Dato Jaafar, Larkin, in the district of Johor Bahru, in the State of Johor Darul Takzim, the Appellant displayed a material bearing the words “Darjah Indera Mahkota Pahang D.I.M.P Dato’” on the front and rear of motor vehicle registration number UUU 9839 without the written permission of His Royal Highness the Sultan of Pahang. The alleged locus of the offence, Johor Bahru, is situated outside the territorial boundaries of the State of Pahang. [12] Before trial commenced and before any evidence was adduced, counsel for the Appellant filed a Notice of Preliminary Objection dated 7 November 2025, which was taken up on the first mention date of 18 November 2025. The ground of the objection was, in substance, that the charge against the Appellant was illegal: first, because the Pahang Enactment No. 18 of 2017 had no legal force outside the territorial boundaries of the State of Pahang; and second, that the Sessions Court accordingly lacked jurisdiction to try a charge founded upon that Enactment. The Appellant sought an order that the charge be set aside and that he be discharged. [13] At the initial hearing before the Sessions Court, the prosecution was not afforded the opportunity to submit on the preliminary objection as it was at that time awaiting a decision on representations submitted by the defence. The learned Sessions Court Judge thereafter raised the applicability of Section 17 of Act 787 from the bench. Following this, the defence filed further written submissions on the point, but the prosecution was not given an opportunity to submit in reply before the ruling was delivered. [14] On 24 January 2026, the learned Judge dismissed the preliminary objection. In her written grounds, the learned Judge addressed both issues raised. On the jurisdictional issue, she held that Section 17 of Act 787 provided the legal basis conferring jurisdiction on the Sessions Court to hear and determine proceedings under the Enactment even where the conduct alleged occurred outside Pahang. On the charge defect issue, the learned Judge held that Section 17 operated as a jurisdictional enabling provision and not as an element of the offence that was required to be particularised in the charge pursuant to Section 152(4) CPC. The preliminary objection was dismissed and the matter directed to proceed to trial. ISSUES [15] The Appellant’s Petition of Appeal raises, in essence, the following legal issues which this court has identified and restated as follows: a) Issue I: Whether the Sessions Court of Johor Bahru has territorial jurisdiction to hear and determine a charge framed under the Pahang Emblems, Titles or Awards (Prevention of Improper Use) Enactment 2017 in respect of conduct alleged to have occurred in the State of Johor. b) Issue II: Whether the omission from the charge of any reference to Section 17 of the Offences Relating to Awards Act 2017 (Act 787) constitutes a defect that is fatal to the charge within the meaning of Section 152(4) of the Criminal Procedure Code, rendering the charge invalid and incapable of cure and requiring the discharge of the Appellant. c) Issue III: Whether the learned Sessions Court Judge erred in law by invoking Section 17 of Act 787 of her own motion, without an express invitation from the prosecution to do so, in concluding that the charge was competent. [16] These are pure questions of law. They are addressed in turn. LEGAL ANALYSIS Issue I: Territorial Jurisdiction of the Sessions Court [17] The Appellant’s central submission is that the Enactment, being a state enactment of Pahang, has no extraterritorial effect beyond the borders of Pahang by virtue of Article 73 of the Federal Constitution. Accordingly, it is said, a court sitting in Johor Bahru cannot exercise jurisdiction to try a charge founded on a Pahang state law in respect of conduct in Johor. The Appellant drew this court’s attention to Re Datuk James Wong Kim Min; Minister of Home Affairs, Malaysia & Ors v Datuk James Wong Kim Min [1976] 1 MLRA 132, where the Federal Court held that a Sarawak law had no legal effect outside the borders of Sarawak, and that a detention order made under that law and served on the detainee while he was in Kuala Lumpur was accordingly inoperative. The Appellant relied on this authority as firmly establishing the proposition that state legislation cannot have extraterritorial reach. [18] The proposition that state legislation is territorially circumscribed by Article 73 of the Federal Constitution is, in itself, entirely correct. Under that Article, a State legislature may not make laws having effect outside the territory of that State. The Pahang State Assembly accordingly could not, through the Enactment alone, create an offence having extraterritorial reach into Johor. The Appellant is right to identify this constitutional constraint, and Re Datuk James Wong Kim Min correctly reflects it. [19] However, the Appellant's argument then proceeds from a sound constitutional premise to an erroneous legal conclusion, for it overlooks the critical constitutional and statutory mechanism which Parliament has specifically enacted to address precisely this situation. Article 76 of the Federal Constitution confers upon Parliament the power to make laws with respect to any matter enumerated in the State List for the purpose of promoting uniformity of law as between the States. More pertinently for present purposes, Parliament's legislative competence under Article 74(1) of the Federal Constitution, which extends to any matter enumerated in the Federal List or the Concurrent List (that is to say, the First or Third List set out in the Ninth Schedule), is not territorially constrained in the same manner as State legislation. [20] Parliament exercised this competence by enacting the Offences Relating to Awards Act 2017 (Act 787). Section 17 thereof is a federal provision that creates a discrete offence at the federal level: where any person contravenes a provision of a state law listed in the Second Schedule outside the territory of that state, that person “commits an offence under this Act.” The punishment for that federal offence is the penalty prescribed by the relevant state law. The Pahang Enactment is listed in the Second Schedule to Act 787. [21] The constitutional significance of this architecture is pivotal. Section 17 of Act 787 does not purport to extend the territorial reach of Pahang’s Enactment. Instead, it creates a parallel federal offence, an offence under the federal Act, which is triggered when conduct that would have violated the scheduled state provision occurs outside the state’s borders. Parliament has the legislative power under the Federal Constitution to create such an offence, and it has done so. The effect is that the conduct alleged in this case, the display of the Pahang emblem on a vehicle in Johor Bahru, is rendered an offence under federal law by virtue of Section 17 of Act 787, and not merely by virtue of the Pahang Enactment acting alone. The principle in Re Datuk James Wong Kim Min remains intact and is not contradicted: the Enactment itself has no reach outside Pahang, but Section 17 of Act 787, a federal law, operates independently to make the same conduct an offence at the federal level when it occurs outside that state. [22] The Hansard of the Dewan Rakyat during the passage of Act 787 confirms this legislative purpose in unambiguous terms. The parliamentary record discloses that a specific clause was inserted into the bill “bagi mengatasi masalah kelompangan undang-undang berhubungan kesalahan yang dilakukan oleh pihak yang tidak berwibawa di luar wilayah sesuatu negeri” and that “jika kesalahan tersebut dilakukan di luar wilayah negeri, ia akan menjadi satu kesalahan Persekutuan.” The statutory mechanism is thus precisely designed to close the extraterritorial enforcement gap that would otherwise arise from the territorial limitations on state legislation. [23] The jurisdictional consequence follows directly from the federal character of the offence activated by Section 17. The Sessions Court of Johor Bahru has jurisdiction over criminal matters arising within Johor Bahru. If the conduct in question constitutes a federal offence committed in Johor Bahru, the court sitting in Johor Bahru has both territorial and subject-matter jurisdiction to try that offence. Section 17 of Act 787 provides exactly the jurisdictional bridge that brings the conduct, a state-law violation occurring outside that state, within the reach of federal criminal jurisdiction and accordingly within the competence of the Sessions Court at the place where that conduct allegedly occurred. [24] There is, in the result, no jurisdictional deficiency. The Sessions Court of Johor Bahru is the proper and competent court to hear and determine this charge. The learned Judge was correct in law in so holding. Issue I is resolved against the Appellant. Issue II: The Alleged Fatal Defect — Omission of Section 17 of Act 787 from the Charge [25] The Appellant’s second and related submission is that the omission of any reference to Section 17 of Act 787 from the charge constitutes a fatal defect under Section 152(4) of the CPC. Section 152(4) CPC provides: “The law and section of the law against which the offence is said to have been committed shall be mentioned in the charge.” It is argued that because Section 17 of Act 787 creates the offence, and because without it, no offence cognisable by a Johor court could arise, its omission means the charge does not comply with this mandatory requirement and is incurably defective. [26] During the oral hearing, counsel for the Appellant articulated an additional dimension to this submission. It was argued that Section 17 has two distinct limbs: first, a jurisdictional limb that extends the reach of federal courts to conduct outside the relevant state; and second, an offence-creating limb, since Section 17 specifically uses the words “commits an offence under this Act.” On this basis it was contended that Section 17 is not merely jurisdictional but is itself substantive, and that a charge which omits it is therefore substantively defective. This submission was put squarely to the court. [27] This court is unable to accept that analysis. The submission conflates two analytically distinct functions performed by the provisions of a criminal statute: the definitional function (which specifies what conduct constitutes an offence and is the “law and section” against which the offence is committed), and the jurisdictional enabling function (which provides the legal basis for extending liability to circumstances not otherwise covered by the definitional provision alone). Section 152(4) CPC requires the charge to state the former. It does not require the citation of every peripheral statutory provision that may be relevant to the procedural, constitutional or jurisdictional underpinnings of the prosecution. [28] The substantive ingredients of the offence, the elements which the prosecution must prove and which the Appellant must know in order to answer the charge, are entirely and exhaustively defined by Section 3(1)(d) of the Enactment. Those elements are: a) the accused; b) displayed on or affixed to a vehicle; c) material containing any emblem, title or award or any replica thereof; and d) without the written permission of His Royal Highness the Sultan. [29] These elements and no others constitute “the matter with which he is charged” within the meaning of Section 152(3) CPC. Section 17 of Act 787 adds nothing to this factual matrix. It neither creates a new element that the prosecution must prove at trial, nor removes any element that the Appellant must confront and answer. [30] What Section 17 does is to provide the parliamentary gateway which extends federal criminal liability to conduct of this description when it occurs outside Pahang. This is a jurisdictional enabling function. Section 17 is not an element that needs to be proven; it is essentially the provision conferring jurisdiction. The accused does not need to know or answer Section 17 at trial in order to meet the case against him. He needs to know: a) what he allegedly did; b) where he allegedly did it; and c) what law he allegedly broke. [31] All three matters are plainly set out in the charge. The date, time, place, vehicle registration number, the emblem displayed, and the specific sub-section of the Enactment are all particularised with precision. The Appellant had, from the moment the charge was read to him, complete and precise notice of the matter with which he is charged. [32] The analogy drawn by the Appellant during oral argument, that Section 17 is analogous to Section 34 of the Penal Code (common intention) or Section 107 of the Penal Code (abetment) and must therefore be expressly cited, does not withstand scrutiny. As counsel himself acknowledged when the point was put to him, Section 34 and Section 107 are substantive ingredients of the offence itself when they are invoked: common intention alters the nature of each accused’s liability for acts done by others, and abetment creates a distinct form of secondary liability. Their citation in a charge is mandatory because their presence fundamentally changes what the accused must answer, the accused in a common intention charge must specifically answer the element of common intention. Section 17 of Act 787, by contrast, does not alter the conduct alleged against the Appellant, does not add any element to be answered, and changes nothing that the Appellant must meet at trial. It is a gate-opening provision, not an offence-defining one. The analogy accordingly fails. [33] The Appellant further relied on Pendakwa Raya v Mohad Zaize Che Sulaiman & 3 Yang Lain [2025] CLJU 1204, where the High Court held that a charge which stated that the accused committed the offence of kidnapping under Act 365, when in truth the act of kidnapping was an offence under Act 578 and not under Act 365, was substantively defective and constituted a miscarriage of justice. That case is entirely distinguishable. There, the prosecution had cited entirely the wrong Act, thereby defining the wrong offence and causing the accused to face a charge that did not exist in law. The entire definitional basis of the charge was misconceived. In the present case, the definitional provision, Section 3(1)(d) of the Enactment, is correctly identified. The conduct alleged, the elements of the offence, and the penalty applicable are all accurately stated. What is absent is not the offence-defining provision but the enabling federal provision that confers the jurisdictional reach. These are fundamentally different situations. [34] The Appellant also cited Ravindran a/l Ramasamy v PP [2015] 6 MLJ 509 in the context of arguing that a charge which fails to disclose a known offence in law is fatally defective. That proposition is correct as a general principle, and the case itself involved a charge that was confusing and not cognisable in law. However, it does not assist the Appellant here. The charge in the present case is neither confusing nor unknown to law. It correctly identifies Section 3(1)(d) of the Enactment, a provision that clearly defines and prohibits the conduct alleged, and gives the Appellant full and precise notice of the case against him. The situation is the opposite of what obtained in Ravindran: there, the charge was defective because it failed to disclose any recognisable offence; here, the charge discloses a recognised offence with precision. [35] The non-fatal nature of the omission is further confirmed by a body of authority as follows. [36] In Zaim Ikhwan Zahari & Satu Lagi lwn Pendakwa Raya [2025] MLRHU 937, the High Court held that a failure to state the particulars of the manner in which an offence was committed is an evidentiary matter, not a defect in the charge itself. The principle is directly applicable here: if details of the manner of commission are not mandatory particulars of the charge, a fortiori a jurisdictional enabling provision, one that neither defines the conduct alleged nor changes what the accused must answer, cannot be an indispensable element of the charge. [37] Ahmad Zubair v Public Prosecutor [2014] 3 MLRA 617 is to like effect. The Court of Appeal there held that the omission to state the specific mode or direction of law in a charge is not fatal at the pre-trial stage, and that whether an accused was misled can, in the usual case, only be determined at the conclusion of the trial. Here, no trial has taken place and there is nothing on the materials before this court to suggest that the omission of the reference to Section 17 has in any way misled the Appellant. Indeed, his own submissions and oral argument demonstrate a thorough and sophisticated appreciation of Section 17, its effect, and its relevance to his case. He has suffered no prejudice. [38] Hee Nyuk Fook v Public Prosecutor [1988] 1 MLRA 482 confirms the approach of the Supreme Court. The court there held that technical omissions in a charge are curable under Section 422 CPC provided no failure of justice has occurred. A failure of justice requires actual prejudice, not abstract theoretical prejudice, but real, demonstrable prejudice to the accused’s ability to conduct his defence. None has been shown here. [39] Periasamy a/l Karuppiah & Anor v Public Prosecutor [1993] 2 MLJ 551 is not authority for the contrary proposition. In that case, the charge failed entirely to disclose a valid offence cognisable in law, thereby fundamentally undermining the basis of the proceedings. In the present case, the charge is fully recognisable in law, discloses a known offence with precision, and leaves the Appellant in no doubt as to what he is required to answer. The principle from Periasamy, that a defect in a charge must be assessed for actual prejudice, in fact supports the conclusion reached here: there is no prejudice, and no failure of justice. [40] In summary: Section 152(4) CPC requires the charge to state the law and section against which the offence is committed. The offence here is committed against Section 3(1)(d) of the Enactment, which is correctly cited in the charge. Section 17 of Act 787 is a jurisdictional enabling provision, not an offence-creating or element-defining provision requiring mandatory citation. The charge is neither confusing nor unknown to law. The omission is not fatal. The learned Judge was correct in law. Issue II is resolved against the Appellant. Issue III: The Court Acting of Its Own Motion on Section 17 [41] The Appellant contends that the learned Judge erred by invoking Section 17 of Act 787 of her own motion. The Appellant’s position, as articulated in oral argument, was that Act 787 was not raised by the prosecution at any stage before the Sessions Court; that the prosecution neither filed submissions in response to the preliminary objection nor invited the court to rely on Section 17; and that the learned Judge accordingly acted improperly when she identified and applied Section 17 in her own right, thereby effectively rescuing the prosecution’s case and acting in the dual role of judge and prosecutor. Counsel for the Appellant, Dato’ Abdul Raman put it plainly: a judge cannot act as judge and prosecutor at the same time in relation to a defective charge. [42] Having considered these submissions, the court is unable to accept them. The submission proceeds on a fundamental mischaracterisation of what a court is required to do when confronted with a preliminary objection to the competency of a charge. A court sitting in criminal jurisdiction does not adjudicate in a vacuum. When a preliminary objection is raised, the court must determine the legal question placed before it. In determining whether it has jurisdiction, and whether the charge is competent, a court is entitled, and indeed obliged, to consider all relevant legislation. It is not confined to considering only those statutory provisions that counsel have chosen to mention. The law is what it is, and a court’s duty to identify and apply the applicable law does not depend on either party’s having drawn attention to it. [43] It is also pertinent to record the procedural reality. It was the defence itself that, in raising the preliminary objection, brought Section 17 of Act 787 squarely into play, the entire premise of the objection was that Section 17 had not been cited in the charge, meaning both parties were fully aware of its existence and significance before the matter came before the Sessions Court. [44] The learned Judge, having been presented with a jurisdictional objection founded in part on the territorial limitation of state legislation, was fully entitled to examine the entire statutory landscape bearing on jurisdiction. Section 17 of Act 787 is part of that landscape. Moreover, as the record discloses, the defence filed further written submissions addressing Section 17 before the ruling was delivered, but the prosecution was not given an opportunity to submit in reply. The Appellant thus availed himself of the opportunity and filed supplementary submissions specifically on this issue. There is no procedural unfairness to the Appellant on the facts of this case. [45] Furthermore, the court’s act of identifying Section 17 of Act 787 without an express invitation from either party was not procedurally improper. It was an application of the principle of iura novit curia: the court knows the law, and in adjudicating a legal question, a court is not confined to the statutory provisions that counsel choose to advance. The parties are the masters of the facts; the court is the master of the law. More particularly, the question of whether a court possesses jurisdiction is one that the court must satisfy itself of independently. A court cannot assume jurisdiction it does not have, nor decline jurisdiction it does have, merely because the parties have framed their contentions on an incomplete legal basis. [46] The learned Judge was not rescuing the prosecution when she considered Section 17, she was discharging her independent judicial obligation to determine whether the court before which the matter was placed was the legally competent forum. That obligation required her to survey the full statutory framework bearing on jurisdiction, regardless of whether counsel had drawn attention to every part of it. Procedural fairness was fully observed: once Section 17 was raised from the bench, both parties were afforded the opportunity to file further written submissions addressing it before the ruling was delivered. The Appellant in fact availed himself of that opportunity. There is no basis for complaint. [47] The submission that the court acted improperly would, if accepted, place courts in an untenable position: compelled to determine jurisdictional questions by reference only to such provisions as counsel choose to invoke, and barred from considering other plainly applicable statutory provisions that bear directly on the question. No authority supports such a proposition, and this court declines to adopt it. Issue III is resolved against the Appellant. The Power to Amend and the Curative Provisions of the CPC [48] Even if this court were persuaded, which it is not, that the omission of Section 17 from the charge constitutes a defect of some description, the consequence urged by the Appellant, that the charge is incurably defective and the Appellant must be discharged, does not follow as a matter of law. [49] Under Section 158 CPC, the court has express statutory authority to alter or add to a charge at any time before judgment. Under Section 422 CPC, an appellate court shall not reverse any finding or order on the ground of an error, omission or irregularity in the charge unless a failure of justice has been occasioned thereby. These provisions reflect the legislative policy that criminal proceedings are not to be derailed by technical imperfections in the charge where no real prejudice has resulted. [50] In Yee Fok Chong lwn PP [2003] 1 MLRH 543, the High Court held that the power to amend a charge extends throughout the proceedings and that the court is under a statutory duty to exercise that power when necessary to ensure justice. In PP v Steven Lani [2010] 11 MLRH 765, the High Court confirmed its statutory power under Section 158(1) of the CPC to amend or alter a charge even at the close of the prosecution case. The amendment jurisdiction is a flexible curative mechanism. [51] The Appellant also cited PP v Tan Kim Kang [1962] 1 MLRH 99 (High Court) for the proposition that a court should not amend a charge before the close of the prosecution case. That authority, properly understood, does not advance the Appellant’s case. The proposition is that a court exercises its amendment power in the ordinary course at or after the close of the prosecution case, it does not stand for the proposition that the curative provisions of the CPC are unavailable or that a charge cannot be regarded as curable at an earlier stage. Still less does it stand for the proposition that a charge which omits a peripheral enabling provision is incurably defective such that proceedings must be terminated at the threshold. The curative mechanism of Sections 158 and 422 CPC is precisely designed to prevent such a result. [52] Finally, even treating the omission as an irregularity of some kind, the curative provision of Section 422 CPC independently forecloses the consequence the Appellant seeks. Section 422 CPC provides that no finding, sentence or order of a court of competent jurisdiction shall be reversed or altered on account of any error, omission or irregularity in the charge or other proceedings unless that error, omission or irregularity has occasioned a failure of justice. In Hee Nyuk Fook v Public Prosecutor, the Supreme Court held that the failure to read and explain an amended charge to the accused, a breach of a provision expressed in mandatory terms using the word “shall”, did not vitiate the conviction where the amendment was “purely technical and in no way substantial” and no failure of justice had been occasioned. [53] If Section 422 CPC prevents the reversal of a conviction already recorded where the procedural omission is technical and occasions no prejudice, it follows a fortiori that the same omission cannot justify the termination of proceedings at the preliminary objection stage, before any evidence has been led and before any question of actual prejudice can even arise. No failure of justice has been demonstrated here; none could plausibly be demonstrated on these facts.