on leaving any building or work, 220 and shall enter the muster in the Journal and shall sign the same. [9]. Further statutory duties arising under the Prisons Act 1995 and the Prison Regulations 2000 are, among others, summarised 225 as follows: Regulation 18(1): states that Every prisoner shall, as soon as possible after his admission, be separately examined by the Medical Officer, who shall enter in the Prisoner's Record particulars of the prisoner's state of 230 health and any other particulars as he may deem necessary Regulation 230 states that prison shall have, if possible, a resident Medical Officer who shall attend at the prison . This, read together with Regulation 235 231 and 232, imposes the duty on the Medical Officer to examine prisoners, keep a Case Book, and record the state and treatment of every sick prisoner Regulations 232 to 235 impose duties on the Medical Officer to keep a Case Book and Journal recording 240 every illness, treatment, and health condition, and to report any sickness, mental disorder, or unfitness for confinement to the Officer-in-Charge for necessary action. S/N 6LvaCyT5EyJ/6tqz3M6cg Regulations 236 and 244 collectively reinforce the duty 245 to isolate or hospitalise prisoners who are infected or medically deteriorating. Regulation 210 specifically requires prison authorities to notify the next-of-kin without delay. ( argument is that this mandatory duty was wholly 250 disregarded.) [10]. At the constitutional level, Article 5(1) of the Federal Constitution guarantees: person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty 255 save in accordance with [11]. The Federal Court in Tan Tek Seng v Suruhanjaya Perkhidmatan Pendidikan & Anor [1996] 1 MLJ 261; [1996] 2 AMR 1617; [1996] 2 CLJ 771, 260 to include the right to live with dignity and access to adequate health care. In the context of custodial detention, this includes access to medical attention, humane treatment, and the safeguarding of personal integrity. In failing to provide adequate medical care and in amputating body parts without consent or 265 notification, the authorities are alleged to have contravened this constitutional guarantee. [12]. The breach of these statutory duties, when left unremedied, forms the legal basis for civil action. The Federal Court in Government of Malaysia v Lay Kee Tee [2009] 1 MLJ 1; 270 [2009] 1 CLJ 663; [2009] 1 AMR 509, held that: S/N 6LvaCyT5EyJ/6tqz3M6cg a statutory duty is imposed for the benefit of a class of persons, and the breach of that duty causes loss, a cause of action may arise at common 275 The case affirms that statutory duties, particularly those intended to protect vulnerable classes such as detainees, carry legal significance and that failure to comply with such duties may give rise to a private law remedy. In the present context, the deceased was clearly within the protected class of persons 280 deprived of liberty. Accordingly, the plaintiff contends that the cumulative failure to observe these statutory obligations constitutes a breach that invokes the jurisdiction to award damages. Common Law Duty of Care in Custodial Contexts 285 [13]. Under common law, a duty of care is imposed on individuals or authorities with custody or control over another person. This duty becomes particularly pressing in custodial settings, where the detained individual wholly relies on the custodian for care and protection. The foundational test for establishing a duty of 290 care is laid out in Caparo Industries plc v Dickman [1990] 1 All ER 568, which requires three elements: a) that the harm was foreseeable, b) that there was sufficient proximity between the parties; and 295 c) that it is fair, just, and reasonable to impose a duty. S/N 6LvaCyT5EyJ/6tqz3M6cg This framework is well-suited to custodial environments, where the relationship between detainee and custodian is involuntary, continuous, and inherently dependent. [14]. In Howard v Jarvis 98 CLR 177, the Australian High Court 300 held: was depriving Jarvis of his liberty... it necessarily followed... that he came under a duty to exercise reasonable care for the safety of his person during the 305 [15]. Similarly, in New South Wales v Bujdoso [2005] HCA 76, the court recognised that: prison authority is under no greater duty than to take reasonable care, but the content of that duty in relation 310 to a prison is obviously the authority is charged with the custody and care of persons involuntarily [16]. The English House of Lords in Reeves v Commissioner of 315 Police of the Metropolis [2000] 1 AC 360 likewise affirmed that: The police and prison service have long been aware that prisoners are more than usually likely to attempt suicide or self-injury 320 S/N 6LvaCyT5EyJ/6tqz3M6cg The risk of suicide is particularly high among prisoners on remand facing a new environment and an uncertain future The duty, as I have said, is a very unusual one, arising from the complete control which the police or prison 325 authorities have over the prisoner, combined with the special danger of people in prison taking their own lives [17]. This reflects the settled principle that complete control over a detainee's movements and well-being amplifies the standard of 330 care owed. [18]. referred to by responsible for one of Her Majesty's prisons is to take reasonable care for the safety of those who are within, including 335 Halsbury's Laws of Malaysia [380] - Tort (Volume 13(2)), 2000), Lexis Nexis, [380.144] on liability for omission, which recognises that: duty to act may be imposed in circumstances where the defendant has undertaken a responsibility for the 340 plaintiff The responsibility for the plaintiff may be founded on the general nature of the relationship between the parties, or by reason of the specific conduct of the defendant either by exposing the plaintiff to danger, or by creating an expectation that the 345 defendant will act to protect the S/N 6LvaCyT5EyJ/6tqz3M6cg In essence, once the State assumes physical control over a person, a non-delegable duty arises to safeguard that person's health and safety. 350 [19]. In Malaysia, judicial recognition of this duty can be seen in Suzana Md Aris v DSP Ishak Hussain & Ors [2010] 6 CLJ 712; [2009] AMEJ 0230, where the High Court found that police officers owe a duty of care to detainees. Though the Federal Court in Tan Sri Norian Mai & Anor v Suzana Md Aris [2011] 355 1 CLJU 1912 allowed the appeal on pleading grounds, it did not displace the principle that custodial authorities may owe a duty of care at common law. [20]. In the case of Fadhelah bt Othman (administrator for the estate and dependant of Mohd Fadzrin bin Zaidi, deceased) 360 v Mohamad Sukri bin Hat & Ors [2024] 11 MLJ 488; [2024] 7 CLJ 916; [2024] AMEJ 1309, decided by Justice Anand Ponnudurai in the High Court of Malaya, Penang, reaffirmed that where the State deprives an individual of liberty, it assumes . Breaches arising 365 from negligent supervision or denial of medical attention attract tortious liability. The court observed: deceased, having been under the complete control of the State, was entirely dependent on the Defendants for his medical and physical needs. The failure to 370 provide prompt and adequate treatment, in the face of visible deterioration, amounted to a breach of the S/N 6LvaCyT5EyJ/6tqz3M6cg common law duty to preserve life and prevent foreseeable 375 [21]. More significantly, in a recent case of Kartik a/l Purosothmen v Mohamad Ferdaus bin Mohamad Asri & Ors [2025] MLJU 901; [2025] AMEJ 0700; [2025] CLJU 694, decided by Justice Abdul Wahab Mohamed, where he reaffirmed that the constitutional right to life under Article 5(1) of the Federal 380 Constitution is not confined to mere existence or the right not to be unlawfully deprived of life. His Lordship followed the Federal Court's pronouncement in Tan Tek Seng v Suruhanjaya Perkhidmatan Pendidikan & Anor (supra), where Gopal Sri Ram JCA (as he then was) interpreted "life" to 385 include "the right to live with dignity [22]. In Kartik a/l Purosothmen (supra), the court reiterated: right to life includes the right to live with dignity and the right to access to basic needs such as adequate health care, proper nutrition and humane treatment, 390 especially when the person is under the custody of the This passage supports the proposition that detainees are entitled to proper medical care, and any failure by authorities to 395 provide such care can amount to a constitutional breach. This interpretation is directly applicable to the present case involving custodial death and medical neglect. S/N 6LvaCyT5EyJ/6tqz3M6cg [23]. The principle of duty of care owed by detaining authorities to prisoners is also clearly reaffirmed in Rahaya Salleh v. Nik 400 Mohd Ghazali Nik Zul Azhar & Ors and Another Appeal [2022] 8 CLJ 591; [2022] 5 MLJ 337; [2022] 5 AMR 621. The Court of Appeal held that the prison and police authorities owe a legal duty of care to ensure the physical and mental welfare of persons under their custody. The court stated emphatically: 405 is duty of care on the part of the detaining authority to ensure the welfare and well-being of the person under detention, in the physical as well as the mental aspects... medical treatment or care is available and to be provided readily... Every cry of pain cannot be 410 brushed aside... There is a duty... to ensure that the detained person be given decent meals and medicines and be given medical treatment by competent medical personnel and medical aid at the earliest opportunity when required 415 The court also made a broader constitutional observation and expressed the general duty of the detaining officers: fact that a person is being detained... does not and cannot be construed as giving the detaining authority 420 [license] to trifle with... constitutional right to life, in particular, of the right to be treated with dignity. We must say in no uncertain terms that brutality is not acceptable and has no part in any criminal investigation and death in custody is an anathema or antithetical to 425 humanity. There is a general duty on the part of the detaining authority to protect and ensure that no S/N 6LvaCyT5EyJ/6tqz3M6cg violence or abuse is visited upon by the detained person by any one including the detaining authority 430 Rahaya Salleh (supra) aligns squarely with Tan Tek Seng (supra) and Kartik a/l Purosothmen (supra), supporting the plaintiff that neglecting medical needs while in custody is a breach of both common law and constitutional duties. 435 [24]. In Selvi Narayan & Anor (Administrators of the Estate of Chandran Perumal, Deceased) v Koperal Zainal Mohd Ali & Ors [2017] 5 CLJ 84; [2017] 9 MLJ 300; [2017] 5 AMR 270, the High Court (Nantha Balan J, as he then was) firmly recognised both a common law and statutory duty of care owed 440 by detaining authorities to detainees. His Lordship held: [128] In my view, both under common law and under statute, there is a duty of care to ensure that the detainee is not harmed by the police or by other detainees or that they do not harm themselves. In so far 445 as the common law is concerned, the principle is well established by the cases referred to above and it is trite that detaining authorities do owe a duty of care to ensure that the detainees/prisoners are healthy and are given proper medical care during the period of incarceration. 450 Referring to R (Amin) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2003] UKHL 51, the learned judge endorsed Lord S/N 6LvaCyT5EyJ/6tqz3M6cg The state owes a particular duty to those involuntarily 455 in its custody. As Anand J succinctly put it in Nilabati Behera v State of Orissa (1993) 2 SCC 746 at 767: There is a great responsibility on the police or prison authorities to ensure that the citizen in its custody is not deprived of his right to life. 460 Such persons must be protected against violence or abuse at the hands of state agents. They must be protected against self-harm: Reeves v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2000] 1 AC 360. Reasonable care must be taken to safeguard their lives and persons 465 against the risk of avoidable harm Statutorily, His Lordship emphasised that: [129] my view, the Lock-Up Rules 1953 are a complete code which governs the handling and 470 management of detainees. Thus, detainees would be safe from harm or self harm if the detaining authorities abide by the Lock-Up Rules 1953 and ensure that they are fully complied with. 475 These legal provisions in the Lock-up Rules directly affirm the actionable duties relevant to custodial deaths in Malaysia. The case of Koperal Zainal Mohd Ali (supra) was challenged on appeal to the Court of Appeal, reported at [2018] 4 MLJ 133; [2018] 8 CLJ 529; [2018] AMEJ 0403; [2018] MLRAU 129, and 480 to the Federal Court, reported at [2021] 4 AMR 529; [2021] 6 CLJ 157; [2021] 3 MLRA 424; in both appeals t decision, which recognised the duty of care owed by detaining S/N 6LvaCyT5EyJ/6tqz3M6cg authorities to detainees, were affirmed. In the Federal Court, the majority further held 485 there is no denying the exacerbation of the abovementioned feelings by the very fact that the deceased had died due to the inaction of the ones who were there to enforce the law [para 31, [2021] 3 MLRA 424] 490 This emphasises that state inaction by custodial authorities resulting in death attracts liability. [25]. A combined effect of the statutory frameworks, common law 495 duties, and constitutional protections imposes a positive obligation on the State and its officers to ensure health, safety, and dignity. Breach occurs not only through active harm but also omission, delay, or negligent inaction, particularly where the custodial authorities have exclusive 500 control over the individual. The cited authorities make clear that reasonable care and timely medical attention are essential duties, and their absence gives rise to civil liability. Breach of Duty of Care by the Defendants 1st Defendant Mohd Sabri bin Ladisma (Medical Attendant at 505 the Prison) S/N 6LvaCyT5EyJ/6tqz3M6cg [26]. The 1st defendant, as Medical Attendant, bore the statutory and common law duty to ensure the initial health screening and custody conditions of the deceased during remand. Rule 10 of the Lock-Up Rules 1953 510 examined by the medical officer as soon as possible after SP1 indicates that the plaintiff was never informed of the deceased's condition after his arrest, and no proof was tendered that such an examination was conducted. The Federal Court had stated in Kerajaan Malaysia 515 & Ors v Lay Kee Tee & Ors [2009] 1 AMR 509; [2009] 1 CLJ 663; [2009] 1 MLJ 1, that a plaintiff may maintain an action for breach of statutory duty when specific conditions are met. The court held that such a cause of action arises if the statutory duty in question was enacted for the benefit of a particular class of 520 persons (in this case, prisoners) to which the plaintiff belongs. The plaintiff has suffered a type of harm that the statute was intended to prevent. [27]. In Fadhelah bt Othman (supra), the High Court affirmed that the failure of prison authorities to initiate timely medical 525 intervention and maintain proper medical records amounted to gross negligence. This principle aligns with the Court of Rahaya Salleh (supra), where it was emphasised that the duty of care extends to ensuring prompt and competent medical treatment, sensitivity to medical needs, 530 and safeguarding dignity for those in custody. Also, in Selvi Narayan & Anor v Koperal Zainal Mohd Ali & Ors (supra), the High Court treated the denial of family access, despite S/N 6LvaCyT5EyJ/6tqz3M6cg repeated requests, together with the withholding of necessary medication and failure to act on urgent medical needs, as part 535 of the breach of duty. These authorities show that custodial duty of care is not confined to physical treatment but also encompasses facilitating essential communication with the family welfare. 540 [28]. In Reeves v Commissioner of Police (supra), the court held that silence and non-disclosure in custody can lead to an adverse inference, as custody carries a higher duty of care. By not arranging prompt medical checks or telling prison staff about ant 545 contributed to the systemic failure that led to the deterioration of 2nd Defendant (SD1) and 3rd to 8th Defendants (Prison Warders assigned at the prison) [29]. The 2nd defendant (SD1) was a prison officer on duty on the day 550 the deceased allegedly collapsed. He admitted under cross-phone numbers were recorded in prison documents and had However, no attempt was made to inform the family of the 555 S/N 6LvaCyT5EyJ/6tqz3M6cg [30]. The 2nd defendant also confirmed that the prison clinic is under constant CCTV surveillance. However, no CCTV footage was produced in court to support his claim that the deceased collapsed and showed signs of breathing difficulty. He 560 conceded that the CCTV would have been the best evidence, but none was preserved or tendered. He further admitted he made no memo, report, or documentation of the alleged incident. These omissions suggest a serious failure in duty to report, document, and 565 unreliable and undermining the credibility of the official version. [31]. The 2nd to the 8th defendants also had direct statutory obligations under the Prisons Regulations 2000, notably Regulations 18 (medical examination), Regulations 60 (dietary), Regulations 214 (impairment requires reporting), 570 Regulations 231 (making entries of medical examination in Reg 18), Regulations 236 (special observation by monitoring health, sanitation, diet, weight), Regulations 210 (reporting of deaths to family), and Regulations 272 (report unwell or distressed prisoners). These provisions collectively impose a 575 continuing duty to oversee health, safety, and dignity. [32]. From the evidence of PW3 (the forensic pathologist), it is apparent that the deceased had undergone amputations (all toes on the left foot) and suffered from necrotising fasciitis, which was left untreated until the deceased succumbed to it. 580 There is no evidence of timely intervention or a record of referral to specialist care. There is no CCTV footage, treatment records, S/N 6LvaCyT5EyJ/6tqz3M6cg or written notification to family members about the amputation or his medical condition adduced by the defence. [33]. Also, the evidence of Dr Ng Chee Leng (SD6) significantly 585 reinforces the negligence of the 2nd to 8th defendants. As the medical officer on duty, he confirmed systemic failures in healthcare, record-keeping, and treatment within the prison. He acknowledged that key medical forms were incomplete, infections were unrecorded, diets were not monitored, and the 590 -compliant with Prison Regulations supports the finding that the d 595 [34]. In Fadhelah bt Othman (supra), the High Court held that the maintain proper records, or notify the family of the deteriorating health of an inmate constituted gross negligence. Similarly, the failure of the 2nd defendant to act on observable signs of 600 infection and physical deterioration, and to ensure sustained medical attention or palliative support, amounts to a breach of duty. As emphasised in New South Wales v Bujdoso (supra), the content of the duty of care in prisons is distinct due to the involuntary nature of confinement, where inmates have no free 605 access to their surroundings or means of safety. Consequently, custodial authorities bear exclusive control and responsibility for S/N 6LvaCyT5EyJ/6tqz3M6cg of care was clearly unmet. [35]. Further, as reiterated in Reeves v Commissioner of Police 610 (supra), the duty of care includes positive obligations to act on medical symptoms. The absence of contemporaneous records and failure to inform next-of-kin violated Prisons Regulations 214 and 210, which require documentation and communication. The omission amounts to a breach of both statutory and 615 common law duties. Lord Hoffmann in Reeves v Commissioner of Police (supra), emphasised that custodial authorities, including medical officers, are under a positive duty to act to preserve life, especially where the individual is wholly . 620 [36]. The 2nd to 8th defendants, especially the 4th defendant (SD3), who had served as a senior warden at Tapah Prison for 36 years, remained silent on the deceased's movements, treatment, and supervision up to the time of death. This failure shows a breach of both statutory and fiduciary duties of care. 625 9th Defendant (Mat Husain Bin Abdullah) [37]. The 9th defendant, Ketua Balai Polis Tapah Road, allegedly failed to discharge his responsibility professionally and diligently. He did not conduct a thorough inquiry into the actual cause of death, as material witnesses were not properly 630 examined. Crucial CCTV footage from both the police lock-up S/N 6LvaCyT5EyJ/6tqz3M6cg and prison, which could have clarified the events, was not secured. Furthermore, the death was not promptly referred to proper photographs of the deceased were taken during the 635 post-mortem examination. 10th Defendant (Investigating Officer, Insp Nurul Farahdiana Binti Md Saad) [38]. Insp. Nurul Farahdiana binti Md Saad (SD-4), the investigating officer assigned to probe the custodial death of the deceased, 640 exhibited a troubling lack of seriousness and investigative rigour throughout her testimony. Her evidence revealed a dismissive attitude and superficial engagement with material facts from the outset. One of the most glaring failures was her omission to secure or produce any CCTV footage from Tapah prison. When 645 confronted with a question on CCTV footage, she admitted to the court Tidak ambil, Yang Arif further to justify keterangan daripada saksi-saksi lebih baik daripada CCTV fundamental misunderstanding of evidentiary value, especially 650 when video recordings provide objective, time-stamped records of custodial events. When questioned, she refused to admit the importance of the CCTV footage. Instead, she claimed that it can be manipulated ( boleh dimanipulasi ), a remark that was speculative and without any basis. 655 S/N 6LvaCyT5EyJ/6tqz3M6cg [39]. Her demeanour during cross-examination was at times vain and dismissive, which compelled the court to admonish her. When she smirked while giving a convoluted answer about time-of-death calculations, the court interjected: - to which 660 she reluctantly answered, The court then cautioned her: Her testimony further revealed an inability to comprehend basic chronological logic, as she did not know how to count backwards from 8.30 a.m. to estimate the time of death. 665 [40]. Insp Nurul also failed to produce any memo or report to corroborate her excuse that photographs could not be taken during the post-mortem due to a camera malfunction. She repeatedly claimed she had intimated to the DPP ( minit kepada DPP , but when asked to produce such documentation, she 670 finally admitted to the court: Tiada, Yang Arif. Her investigation appeared reactive rather than proactive, for instance, she only visited the prison clinic two years after the incident, and that too only after a High Court order for an inquest was made. Even then, she did not obtain the post-mortem 675 report until more than two years later, a fact she reluctantly admitted. [41]. originated from a dog bite. There is no record from the prison or police indicating that the deceased had ever suffered such an 680 injury before his incarceration. She produced no photographs, S/N 6LvaCyT5EyJ/6tqz3M6cg medical entries, or contemporaneous reports to substantiate this claim, conceding that no inquiry was conducted to verify its source. The court regarded this unexplained reliance on an uncorroborated narrative as a serious shortcoming in the quality 685 of her investigation. [42]. procedural failure and a lack of logical reasoning, objectivity, and professional judgment. Her investigative conclusions were not supported by documentary evidence or independent verification. She 690 rejected scientific findings by a qualified doctor, only to later agree with them when pressed. [43]. When viewed cumulatively, these failures demonstrate a breach of statutory duties under the Police Act 1967 and the Police General Orders. As held in Suzana Md Aris v DSP 695 Ishak Hussain (supra), police officers bear a duty to investigate custodial deaths thoroughly and transparently. The delayed and cursory investigation, coupled with inconsistencies in her testimony, renders her an unreliable witness and highlights a systemic breakdown in custodial death 700 investigations, one that, rather than fostering public confidence, severely undermines it and obstructs access to justice for the 11th Defendant (Pengarah Penjara Tapah) [44]. The 11th defendant, as Tapah Prison Director, failed to ensure 705 proper supervision of prison officers under his command. S/N 6LvaCyT5EyJ/6tqz3M6cg Systemic lapses in oversight, record-keeping, and response to of his duty to manage and control staff, failing to prevent custodial harm. In Lay Kee Tee (supra), the court affirmed that 710 failure to act under duties conferred by regulation, mainly concerning liberty and life, may give rise to liability. 12th Defendant (Chief of Police - Tan Sri Khalid Abu Bakar at the material time) [45]. The 12th defendant, the Inspector-General of Police at the 715 material time, bore overall supervisory responsibility for the conduct of all police personnel under his command. The plaintiff that the 12th defendant failed to monitor and control the actions of his subordinates is not without legal foundation. As affirmed in Selvi Narayan & Anor v Koperal 720 Zainal Mohd Ali & Ors (supra), a duty of care arises not only at the level of operational officers but also at the supervisory echelon of the force. Justice Nantha Balan J, held that the police owe a duty to ensure that the detainees are not harmed by the detaining authorities or by other inmates or even by self-harm 725 or suicide. [46]. The 12th defendant failed to ensure proper discipline, training, and procedures in handling custodial deaths, especially where records were missing and medical care was neglected. This shows a severe system failure. As the Federal Court observed 730 in Koperal Zainal Mohd Ali & Ors v Selvi Narayan & Anor S/N 6LvaCyT5EyJ/6tqz3M6cg (supra), the inaction of those who were there to enforce the law can aggravate liability. The 12th defendant's dereliction thus breaches both common law and constitutional duties of custodial care. 735 13th Defendant (Government of Malaysia) [47]. Having found that the relevant individual defendants, being police or prison officers who acted negligently and in breach of statutory and common law duties within the course of their official functions, this court is satisfied that vicarious liability is 740 established against the Government of Malaysia pursuant to Sections 5 and 6 of the Government Proceedings Act 1956. The proposition of law in Fadhelah bt Othman(supra) supports that the Government, as principal, is liable when its agents commit torts while performing official duties. 745 [48]. Similarly, in Kartik a/l Purosothmen (supra), the High Court affirmed that even unauthorised acts may give rise to vicarious liability if they are closely connected with official duties to form part of their improper execution. In the present case, the ased occurred 750 during lawful custody, within the institutional and operational structure controlled by the Government. The acts and failures complained of, i.e. neglect, delayed medical response, and failure to adhere to prescribed regulations, are sufficiently connected to the scope of employment. Accordingly, the 755 S/N 6LvaCyT5EyJ/6tqz3M6cg Government of Malaysia is held vicariously liable for the wrongful acts of its officers Further findings of the court [49]. The deceased was in the complete custody and care of the police and subsequently the prison authorities. Under 760 Malaysian law, the custodians of detained persons owe a non-delegable duty to take reasonable steps to protect life and ensure health. This duty is enshrined in both common law and specific statutory frameworks. [50]. In Reeves v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis 765 [2000] 1 AC 360, Lord Hoffmann observed: duty... arises from the complete control which the police or prison authorities have over the prisoner, combined with the special danger of people in prison taking their own 770 [51]. The plaintiff correctly referred to this duty, further supported by Suzana Md Aris v DSP Ishak Hussain (supra) and Selvi Narayan & Anor v Koperal Zainal Mohd Ali & Ors (supra) which affirms that prison authorities must take reasonable care 775 for the safety of those who are within and that actions will lie when and where a prisoner sustains injury as a result of the S/N 6LvaCyT5EyJ/6tqz3M6cg [52]. Here, it is undisputed that the deceased was under the custody of the defendants throughout. Therefore, the defendants 780 undeniably owed a legal duty of care to ensure his health and safety during detention. Breach of Duty of Care [53]. Evidence adduced shows systemic failures on several fronts: a) Medical Neglect 785 [54]. The post-mortem determined the cause of death as necrotising fasciitis with disseminated intravascular coagulopathy, a testified could have been treated had it been identified and managed at an earlier stage. 790 [55]. In open court, the defendants SD8, conceded that the Deceased had not been taken to the hospital despite express recommendations by the prison doctor. SD8 testifies: telah bagi rekomendasi untuk dihantar ke hospital, tapi atas alasan yang saya tidak tahu apa, si 795 mati tidak dihantar hospital. So, di situ pun adalah pada saya satu pengabaian [56]. The failure to transfer the deceased despite medical instructions, coupled with unclear prison health records and 800 omissions in weight loss monitoring, amounts to a clear breach S/N 6LvaCyT5EyJ/6tqz3M6cg of the Prisons Regulations 2000 as referred to in the earlier paragraphs. b) Lack of Record Keeping and Monitoring [57]. There were no proper logs on diet, weight changes, or medical 805 check-ups as required under the Prisons Regulations 2000. These omissions are material, as the deceased was found to have lost significant weight, indicative of progressive medical decline, without adequate intervention. c) CCTV Non-Disclosure and Adverse Inference 810 [58]. Although the prison was equipped with CCTV cameras, the full footage showing the d was never produced in court. The defendants admitted the CCTV was operational but claimed it only captured one angle. No plausible explanation was given for the failure to produce 815 the complete footage. [59]. In Fadhelah Othman (supra), the court stated as follows: court was deprived of the best evidence... when no evidence was led to explain why the actual CCTV recordings could not be produced in full... As such, this 820 was a fit and proper case to draw an adverse inference under s 114(g) of the Evidence Act 1950 S/N 6LvaCyT5EyJ/6tqz3M6cg [60]. The same principle applies here. The failure to disclose the CCTV recordings despite specific pleadings and opportunity 825 invites the court to draw an adverse inference under s.114(g) of the Evidence Act 1950, against the defendants. d) Misfeasance in Public Office [61]. The tort of misfeasance in public office is a distinct common law remedy that arises when a public officer abuses the powers 830 entrusted to him in a manner that causes foreseeable harm to a claimant. The legal foundation for this tort requires more than mere negligence; it demands proof of deliberate misconduct or recklessness. [62]. As articulated in Three Rivers District Council v Governor 835 and Company of the Bank of England [2000] 2 WLR 1220, and adopted by the Malaysian Federal Court in Ketua Polis Negara & Ors v Nurasmira Maulat Jaffar & Ors [2017] 8 AMR 829; [2018] 1 CLJ 585; [2018] 3 MLJ 184; [2017] 6 MLRA 635, misfeasance arises in either of two situations: 840 a) where the public officer acts in bad faith with a specific intent to harm (known as "targeted malice"); or b) where the officer knowingly acts unlawfully or with reckless indifference to the possibility of harm resulting to the claimant. 845 [63]. Lord Steyn in Three Rivers (supra) elaborated: S/N 6LvaCyT5EyJ/6tqz3M6cg there is the case of targeted malice by a public officer, i.e. conduct specifically intended to injure a person or The second form is where a public 850 officer acts knowing that he has no power to do the act complained of and that the act will probably injure the Further, as clarified by Lord Millett: 855 is no accident that the tort is misfeasance in public office, not non-feasance in public The failure to act must be deliberate, not negligent or arising from a only where (i) the circumstances are such that the discretion whether to act can only be 860 exercised in one