Schedule
Jadual Akta Mahkamah Kehakiman 1964 Dan Dalam Perkara mengenai Perkara 5, 7, 8 dan 132 Perlembagaan Persekutuan Dan Dalam Perkara mengenai Peraturan-Peraturan Pegawai Awam (Kelakuan & Tatatertib 1993 dan Peraturan-Peraturan Pegawai Awam (Kelakuan & Tatatertib) (Pindaan 2002) ANTARA MURUGAN A/L SUBRAMANIAM (K/P NO: 770806-06-5235) ...PEMOHON DAN 1. PENGERUSI LEMBAGA TATATERTIB KUMPULAN SOKONGAN (NO.1) JABATAN DAN INSTITUSI KEMENTERIAN KESIHATAN MALAYSIA 2. LEMBAGA TATATERTIB KUMPULAN SOKONGAN (NO.1) JABATAN DAN INSTITUSI KEMENTERIAN KESIHATAN MALAYSIA 3. PENGERUSI LEMBAGA RAYUAN TATATERTIB PERKHIDMATAN AWAM SURUHANJAYA PERKHIDMATAN AWAM 4. LEMBAGA RAYUAN TATATERTIB PERKHIDMATAN AWAM SURUHANJAYA PERKHIDMATAN AWAM 5. KERAJAAN MALAYSIA ... RESPONDEN-RESPONDEN GROUNDS OF JUDGEMENT A. Introduction 1. This is a motion filed by the Applicant, Murugan a/l Subramaniam, for the following reliefs: (a) an Order of Certiorari to quash in its entirety the decision of the 1st and/or 2nd Respondents dismissing the Applicant from service by letter dated 24th July 2023; (b) an Order of Certiorari to quash in its entirety the decision of the 3rd and/or 4th Respondents rejecting the Applicant's appeal by letter dated 7th January 2025; (c) a Declaration that the punishment of dismissal (Buang Kerja) imposed upon the Applicant is null and void, and is of no effect and is set aside; (d) an Order of Mandamus directing the Respondents to reinstate the Applicant to his original position as Public Health Assistant (Pembantu Kesihatan Awam) Grade U19, together with all benefits properly due to him and without any loss of qualification, or other privileges. 2. Leave to commence judicial review proceedings was given on 2.7.2025. B. Salient Facts 3. The Applicant, Murugan a/l Subramaniam, commenced his public service career in 2008. Prior to his dismissal, he served as a public health assistant (Pembantu Kesihatan Awam Gred U19) stationed at the Triang Health Office in Bera, Pahang, Malaysia. 4. In or around June 2021, the Applicant was charged at the Temerloh Magistrate Court under Section 292(a) of the Penal Code for being in possession of obscene material. On 25.8.2022, the case concluded, and the Magistrate Court placed the Applicant on a two- year Bond of Good Behaviour with a surety of RM3,000 pursuant to S173A of the Criminal Procedure Code, with no recording of conviction. 5. Following the Magistrate Court's decision, the 1st and 2nd Respondents issued the Applicant with letters dated 24.7.2023, which suspended and summarily dismissed the Applicant from his employment. The Respondents took the legal position that the criminal proceedings had taken away the Applicant's constitutional right to be heard. 6. Aggrieved by the dismissal, the Applicant appealed to the Public Services Disciplinary Appeal Board (the 3rd and 4th Respondents). In his appeal, he highlighted that he had a clean 15-year disciplinary record, was the sole breadwinner supporting four dependents, was merely a passive recipient of the shared media in the WhatsApp group, and promised to be more careful in the future. On 7.1.2025, the Appeal Board rejected his appeal and upheld the original decision of dismissal. 7. In response to the final rejection, the Applicant filed an application for Judicial Review at the High Court of Malaya at Temerloh. The Applicant’s primary argument is that the dismissal constitutes procedural impropriety, breaches the principles of natural justice because he was denied the right to be heard (as the Magistrate did not record an explicit finding of guilt), and violates the principle of proportionality by imposing the harshest possible punishment without considering alternative disciplinary actions. C. The Applicant's Contentions 8. The Applicant contends that the 1st and 2nd Respondents’ decision to summarily dismiss him from his public service position, as well as the 3rd and 4th Respondents' subsequent affirmation of that decision, is legally flawed and should be quashed on the grounds of procedural impropriety, a breach of natural justice, and a violation of the principle of proportionality. Structurally, the Applicant asserts that his constitutional rights and the basic rules of administrative fairness were stripped away when he was terminated without being granted the opportunity to explain his side of the case or offer a mitigation plea. 9. A central pillar of the Applicant's argument addresses the interpretation of his criminal court proceedings. The Respondents argued that because a criminal offence was proved against him, his right to be heard was entirely extinguished under Article 135(2)(a) of the Federal Constitution and relevant public officer disciplinary regulations. However, the Applicant vigorously refutes this stance. He emphasizes that the Temerloh Magistrate Court did not enter a traditional criminal conviction against him but instead placed him on a Bond of Good Behaviour pursuant to Section 173A(2)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Code. Citing judicial precedent, the Applicant argues that such an order does not automatically strip a public servant of their absolute right to a fair disciplinary hearing. He claims the respondents acted entirely "mechanically" by issuing the dismissal order immediately upon finding out about the bond, failing to examine the actual underlying merits of his case. 10. Furthermore, the Applicant maintains that the decision to inflict the absolute harshest disciplinary penalty ie. termination of employment is unreasonable, irrational, and a failure to apply the principle of proportionality. He stresses that the respondents completely overlooked crucial mitigating factors surrounding the offence. Specifically, the obscene material in question was posted by another individual into a shared WhatsApp group, and the clips were automatically downloaded to his phone without his active knowledge or initiation. The Applicant emphasizes that he has a completely unblemished public service record dating back to 2008, has never faced previous disciplinary actions, and is the sole breadwinner supporting a family with four dependents. Depriving him of his livelihood over a minor infraction where the criminal court itself deemed a bond of good behaviour sufficient. D. The Respondents' Contentions 11. The Respondents contend that the application for judicial review is entirely devoid of merit and should be dismissed because the disciplinary proceedings and the ultimate punishment were executed in strict compliance with the law and established public service regulations. They argue that there is no procedural impropriety or illegality inherent in the decision-making process. The respondents maintain that the disciplinary authority and the subsequent appellate board properly exercised their statutory discretion to safeguard the integrity and reputation of the public service sector. 12. On the issue of the right to be heard and natural justice, the Respondents take the firm position that the Applicant's rights were not unlawfully violated or ignored. They argue that because the Applicant entered a plea of guilt to the criminal charge under Section 292(a) of the Penal Code for possession of obscene materials, the criminal charge against him was legally "proved". Consequently, the respondents submit that the right to a disciplinary hearing was legally and validly extinguished by virtue of Article 135(2)(a) of the Federal Constitution. Because this specific regulatory framework governs public officers involved in proven criminal offences, the respondents assert that the standard disciplinary process under Regulation 37 does not apply to this case. 13. Regarding the severity of the punishment, the Respondents reject the assertion that their actions were irrational, mechanical, or disproportionate. They maintain that the Disciplinary Board and the Disciplinary Appeal Board did not act blindly, but rather evaluated the full merits and grounds of the appeal submitted by the Applicant. The Respondents contend that despite the mitigation factors presented by the Applicant, a public health servant admitting to the possession of multiple explicit, obscene videos directly compromises the conduct expected of a public officer. Therefore, the respondents submit that the decision to remove him from service was an entirely lawful, rational, and justified administrative action that falls squarely within their institutional purview. E. The Applicable Law on Judicial Review 14. The applicable grounds of judicial review are well settled. In Minister of Home Affairs, Malaysia v Persatuan Aliran Kesedaran Negara [1990] 1 CLJ (Rep) 186 (SC), the Supreme Court, adopting the principles enunciated by Lord Diplock in Council of Civil Service Unions & Ors v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374, (“CCSU”), identified three primary grounds upon which administrative action is amenable to judicial review, namely (Headnote 1 at p 186): “(i) Illegality – the decision-maker must understand correctly the law that regulates his decision-making power and must give effect to it; (ii) Irrationality – a decision which is so outrageous in its defiance of logic or accepted moral standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the question to be decided could have arrived at it; and (iii) Procedural impropriety – which extends beyond a failure to observe the basic rules of natural justice or procedural fairness, and includes a failure by an administrative tribunal to observe procedural rules expressly laid down in the legislative instrument by which its jurisdiction is conferred, even where such failure does not involve a denial of natural justice.” 15. These principles have since been consistently reaffirmed by the apex courts, including the Federal Court in Peguam Negara Malaysia v Chin Chee Kow & Another Appeal [2019] 4 CLJ 561 (FC). 16. The unifying thread underlying these grounds was succinctly articulated by the House of Lords in Secretary of State for the Environment v Nottingham County Council [1986] AC 240, where it was observed that the CCSU grounds are ultimately concerned with conduct amounting to an abuse of power. Such abuse is not confined to closed categories and may manifest in the form of a mistake of law, procedural irregularity, unreasonableness, bad faith, improper purpose, or a failure to take into account relevant considerations. 17. Of particular relevance to the present case is the ground of procedural impropriety, as explained by Lord Diplock in CCSU. His Lordship made clear that this head of review is deliberately broad, encompassing all procedural defects which prejudice the affected person, including: “…the failure by the administrative tribunal to observe procedural rules expressly laid down in the legislative instrument by which its jurisdiction is conferred, even where the failure does not involve any denial of natural justice.” 18. This formulation is especially pertinent where, as here, statutory procedures governing disciplinary action against public officers are mandatory and confer substantive protections. 19. The Malaysian courts have unequivocally recognised procedural impropriety as a distinct and independent ground of challenge. In Malaysia Airline System Bhd v Wan Saadi Wan Mustafa [2015] 1 CLJ 295 (FC), the Federal Court provided a helpful exposition of the circumstances in which procedural impropriety arises: “[24] Procedural impropriety is said to have occurred when a decision-maker … in coming to a decision with consequences affecting a person, fails: (i) to observe the basic rules of natural justice; (ii) to act with procedural fairness towards the person affected; or (iii) to observe procedural rules expressly laid down in the legislative instrument by which its jurisdiction is conferred, even where such failure does not involve a denial of natural justice. [25] The basic rules of natural justice include the right to be heard, the rule against bias, and the duty to act fairly. [26] Procedural fairness concerns the decision-making process itself, and ordinarily requires a hearing appropriate to the facts and circumstances of the case, the availability of relevant material, and a genuine inquiry before a decision is made.” 20. Applied to the present facts, the Respondents’ failure to properly ascertain whether a criminal charge had in fact been “proven”, and their consequent denial of the Applicant’s right to be heard under Regulation 37, fall squarely within this category of procedural impropriety. 21. In addition to the three traditional CCSU grounds, Lord Diplock also adverted to proportionality as a developing ground of judicial review. This ground was expressly accepted in Malaysia by the Federal Court in R Rama Chandran v Industrial Court of Malaysia & Anor [1997] 1 CLJ 147 (FC), which recognised that proportionality permits the court to examine not only the process, but also whether the outcome is excessive or disproportionate to the objective sought to be achieved. 22. The authorities illustrate that where a decision-maker imposes the most severe sanction available, particularly in the absence of a proper hearing or a proven factual foundation, the resulting decision is vulnerable to being quashed as manifestly disproportionate. F. Issues for Determination (a) Whether the Applicant was entitled to be summarily dismissed pursuant to Regulation 29 of the Public Officers (Conduct and Discipline) Regulations 1993 and the proviso to Article 135(2)(a) of the Federal Constitution, without being afforded a right to be heard under Regulation 37, in circumstances where the order made under section 173A of the Criminal Procedure Code did not record any conviction or criminal sentence; and (b) Whether the Respondents acted on a fundamental misdirection of law and fact in treating the Applicant’s plea of guilt as a “proven” criminal charge amounting to a sabitan salah, thereby vitiating the disciplinary decision and rendering the Applicant’s dismissal procedurally unfair, unlawful, and void. G. The Findings of this Court 23. Having carefully read and considered both the written and oral submissions of parties, this Court is of the view that the present application should be allowed. My grounds are as follows. The Respondents’ Decision-Making Process 24. It is trite law that the function of this Court in a judicial review application is fundamentally concerned with reviewing the decision-making process rather than the underlying merits of the decision itself. The Court must meticulously evaluate the contemporaneous administrative record, the internal documents, and the specific factors actually weighed by the Respondents at the time the impugned decision was made. 25. In doing so, this Court emphasizes that it must confine its scrutiny to the materials that were legally before the deciding authorities. The Respondents cannot supplement or retroactively reconstruct their reasoning through subsequent averments in affidavits filed in opposition to this judicial review if those grounds are absent from the contemporaneous decision-making record. Evaluation of the Contemporaneous Record 26. The bedrock of the Respondents' defence is that the Applicant's criminal charge was “disabitkan”, thereby triggering the proviso to Article 135(2)(a) of the Federal Constitution and allowing them to bypass the Regulation 37 procedure (the right to be heard). However, a strict evaluation of the records produced before this Court reveals a fatal flaw in the decision-making process. 27. The Respondents averred at paragraph 7 of Enclosure 14 that the Perakuan Ketua Jabatan submitted to the Disciplinary Board advised as follows: “Ketua Jabatan Pemohon telah pun mengemukakan Perakuan Ketua Jabatan untuk tujuan pertimbangan oleh Lembaga Tatatertib. Dalam perakuan tersebut Ketua Jabatan telah mengesyorkan bahawa memandangkan Pemohon telah disabitkan kesalahan di Mahkamah Majistret Temerloh pada 25.8.2022 dan dikenakan hukuman Bon Berkelakuan Baik”. 28. This Court finds that the Head of Department's premise was completely factually and legally erroneous. The Magistrate’s Court order under Section 173A of the CPC expressly contains no recording of a conviction. By asserting that the Applicant was “disabitkan kesalahan” (convicted of an offence), the Head of Department acted on a fundamental misdirection of law and fact. 29. The Respondents have argued in paragraph 1.5 of their written submissions in Enclosure 23 that a “sabitan” within their administrative context merely means “suatu dapatan oleh Mahkamah dalam undang-undang bertulis”. However, the record forwarded by the Magistrate's Court contains no recording of a conviction, nor does the Magistrate's order or the letter from the Senior Assistant Registrar state that a formal finding of guilt or a criminal conviction was entered. 30. Therefore, looking strictly at the documentary evidence available to the Disciplinary Board at the material time, there was no factual or legal basis to conclude that a criminal conviction (sabitan salah) existed. The finding that a criminal offence had been conclusively “proven” to justify bypassing the constitutional right to be heard was made entirely on a baseless assumption, unsupported by the exhibits produced. The Status and Effect of the Alleged Plea of Guilt 31. Before turning to the authorities, it is convenient to dispose of the Respondents’ reliance on an alleged plea of guilt, an argument which surfaced at several points in their submissions. The Respondents contend that because the Applicant pleaded guilty to the charge under section 292(a) of the Penal Code which resulted in him being sentenced to a bond of good behaviour under Section 173A of the Criminal Procedure Code, the charge was thereby “proven”, and that in any event the Applicant has since admitted his plea of guilt in his affidavit in support of this application. This Court rejects the said contention for the reasons that follow. 32. First, on a careful examination of the contemporaneous record, this Court is unable to identify any document emanating from the criminal court that records a plea of guilt by the Applicant. The Magistrate’s order under section 173A of the Criminal Procedure Code is silent as to any plea; the letter from the Senior Assistant Registrar is silent; and the Perakuan Ketua Jabatan speaks only of the Applicant having been “disabitkan kesalahan”, an assertion which the formal order does not state. There is therefore, on the material placed before this Court, no evidence of any plea of guilt at all within the contemporaneous record on which the Respondents acted. The averment of a plea of guilt surfaces only afterwards, in the Applicant’s own affidavit in these proceedings. It is a matter of some concern that the Respondents should seek to rely on a plea of guilt of which is nowhere disclosed in the letter by the Senior Assistant Registrar in reference to the Magistrate’s decision. 33. Secondly, an admission made on affidavit in the course of these review proceedings cannot be retrospectively imported into, and treated as part of, the administrative decision-making process. The legality of the impugned decision must be judged on the material that was actually before the deciding authority at the time it acted, and not on matters subsequently deposed to in litigation. Nowhere in the letters of decision is there any indication that a plea of guilt was consciously factored into, or weighed during, the disciplinary deliberations. 34. Thirdly, and in any event, even if a plea of guilt had been entered and properly placed before the Respondents, it could not in law have been elevated into conclusive proof that the charge was “proven” so as to extinguish the right to be heard. 35. For these reasons, the Respondents’ invocation of the Applicant’s plea of guilt, whether characterised as conclusive proof or otherwise, was legally misconceived. It neither supplied the missing element of a recorded conviction nor cured the fundamental procedural impropriety arising from the denial of the Applicant’s right to be heard. 36. This Court is of the view that a charge is “proven” for the purposes of Article 135(2)(a) of the Federal Constitution only where the prosecution has adduced evidence by calling witnesses and tendering documentary exhibits, resulting in a conviction after the completion of a full criminal trial encompassing both the prosecution’s and the defence’s case, upon a judicial finding of guilt arrived at through due process of law. A charge is not “proven” merely by reason of a plea or the grant of a discretionary bond under section 173A of the Criminal Procedure Code. 37. The Respondents sought to rely on Tan Tek Seng @ Tan Chee Meng v Suruhanjaya Perkhidmatan Pendidikan & Anor [1996] 2 CLJ 771 to argue that a Section 173A order satisfies the requirement of a charge being “proven”. 38. That case is clearly distinguishable. In Tan Tek Seng, the officer underwent a full criminal trial in which the prosecution led evidence and proved the charge, at the conclusion of which he was found guilty and initially sentenced to six months’ imprisonment. It was only on appeal to the High Court that the custodial sentence was set aside and substituted with a bond under Section 173A. The procedural history there provided an unambiguous record of a judicial finding of guilt based on trial evidence. 39. In stark contrast, the record here is entirely devoid of any such finding. There was no trial, no evidence led, and no judicial finding of guilt. There was only a binding over under Section 173A. The principles in Tan Tek Seng cannot therefore be applied to the present factual matrix. 40. The facts and legal realities of the present case are closely analogous to those considered by Gunalan Muniandy JC (as his Lordship then was) in the High Court case of Kamsinah Karim v. ACP Kamarudin A Aziz (Pengerusi Lembaga Tatatertib Polis Johor) & Ors [2013] 7 CLJ 127 (“Kamsinah”). 41. In Kamsinah, a police constable was charged with a drug offence under the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952. The criminal court dismissed the charge with a caution under Section 173A(2)(a) of the CPC. The disciplinary authority subsequently dismissed her summarily under Regulations 33(1) and 38 of the 1993 Disciplinary Regulations, asserting that the offence had been “proven” and that her right to be heard was extinguished. As in the present case, the formal order recorded no conviction. 42. The High Court held that where a criminal court acts under Section 173A of the CPC and discharges an accused without recording a conviction, the disciplinary authority cannot summarily dismiss the officer without affording a reasonable opportunity to be heard, and that the statutory right to be heard must be observed strictly. This Court notes that no appeal was filed against Kamsinah, leaving its reasoning intact and persuasive, and finds no reason to depart from it. 43. In amplification, the Court in Kamsinah emphasised the need for strict construction where the termination of a public servant is in issue, holding as follows: “It is my view that in a case of this nature involving the termination of a public servant and its far-reaching effects, the law must be interpreted strictly in resolving the current dispute and there is no room for a liberal interpretation prejudicial to the rights of the subject. It is to be noted that in a criminal case the record is all important as regards the findings made by a court trying a case. Where there is ambiguity or vagueness as to the order or decision actually made, it should be resolved in favour of the aggrieved person, ie, the applicant in our case.” 44. Applying that reasoning, the formal order of the Temerloh Magistrate’s Court contains no recording of a criminal conviction, and demonstrates only that the Applicant was bound over under Section 173A(2)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Code, and so to treat it as a conviction is to misapply the written law. On this premise, the legal foundation to activate summary dismissal under Regulation 29 was missing, and the right to be heard under Regulation 37 ought to have been afforded when there is an ambiguity or vagueness in the decision of the Magistrate Court, and it should have been resolved in favour of the Applicant in this case. The Federal Court in Pihak Berkuasa Tatatertib Majlis Perbandaran Seberang Perai & Anor v. Muziadi Mukhtar [2020] 1 CLJ 1 45. This Court is further fortified in its conclusion by the decision of the Federal Court in Pihak Berkuasa Tatatertib Majlis Perbandaran Seberang Perai & Anor v. Muziadi Mukhtar [2020] 1 CLJ 1 (“Muziadi”). 46. Here, the Applicant pleaded guilty in the Bukit Mertajam Magistrate's Court to unlawful possession of property under the Minor Offences Act 1955 and was fined RM600. Some four years later, in August 2014, the second appellant received an anonymous letter regarding the respondent's conviction, prompting an investigation and the convening of an Internal Investigation Committee, before which the respondent admitted the offence. The first appellant (the Disciplinary Authority) initially resolved to terminate the respondent's service in the public interest under reg 50 of the 1995 Regulations, with full pension and retirement benefits, by letter dated 19.1.2015. The respondent rejected this decision. On its secretariat's suggestion, the first appellant then revoked the termination and instead, by letter dated 4.9.2015, dismissed the respondent under reg 39(g) of the 1995 Regulations without pension or retirement benefits on the basis of his conviction, and without first issuing any show cause notice or affording him a hearing. Aggrieved, the respondent applied for judicial review to quash the dismissal. 47. In Muziadi, the disciplinary authority sought to dispense with the officer’s right to be heard by relying on regulation 25(2)(a) of the Public Officers (Conduct and Discipline) Municipal Council of the Province Wellesley Regulations 1995, which excludes the right to be heard “where an officer is dismissed or reduced in rank on the ground of conduct in respect of which a criminal charge has been proved against him”. That provision is, for all material purposes, in pari materia with the proviso to Article 135(2)(a) of the Federal Constitution and with Regulation 34(2)(a) of the Public Officers (Conduct and Discipline) Regulations 1993 invoked by the Respondents here. 48. The significance of Muziadi for the present case is twofold. First, and most strikingly, the officer in Muziadi had in fact been criminally convicted, having pleaded guilty and been convicted and fined under the Minor Offences Act 1955. Yet the Federal Court held that even a genuine, recorded conviction did not extinguish his right to be heard before dismissal. If a true conviction did not permit the disciplinary authority to bypass the hearing requirement, then an order under section 173A of the Criminal Procedure Code, which records no conviction at all, plainly cannot do so. 49. Secondly, the right to be heard, codified in Regulation 37 cannot be rendered illusory the moment a disciplinary authority unilaterally characterises a matter as “proven”. Their Lordships emphasised that disciplinary proceedings of this nature are quasi-judicial in character and carry a mandatory duty to observe natural justice, the more so where what is at stake is the officer’s livelihood. This is seen when his Lordship Mohd Zawawi Salleh held as follows: “[93] This act of converting the initial decision to terminate in the public interest, which in itself breached the audi alteram partem rule was further exacerbated by the subsequent decision to dismiss the respondent. It amounted to a second and more serious breach of the said rule as by the decision, the respondent would be deprived of his right of pension etc. Those substantive rights were effectively removed or taken away from him, without affording him an opportunity of being heard in his own defence. Therefore, shortly put, the appellants had acted unlawfully and against the rules of natural justice, not once, but twice. [94] It must be noted that the “proceedings” conducted by the first appellant were quasi-judicial in nature and therefore the first appellant had the mandatory duty to observe the dictate of natural justice.” 50. On the facts before this Court, that mandatory duty was not discharged as no opportunity to be heard was afforded before the Applicant was dismissed. 51. Had the decision-making process properly recognized that there was no finding of conviction on the records before them, or had they properly evaluated the unique nature of a Section 173A bond, the Respondents would have been legally compelled to afford the Applicant his right to be heard under Regulation 37. 52. This deprivation severely impacted the fairness and proportionality of the outcome. This Court is unable to ascertain whether the Disciplinary Board would have arrived at a completely different conclusion had they followed the proper procedure by affording the Applicant a right to be heard. 53. Had the Respondents afforded the Applicant his constitutional right to be heard and put forward his mitigations, the ultimate outcome may well not have been the corporate capital punishment of buang kerja (dismissal). Armed with the truth that the criminal court did not deem a conviction appropriate, the Respondents had a spectrum of alternative disciplinary measures at their disposal under P.U.(A) 395/1993. They could have considered a reduction in rank (turun pangkat), a deferment of salary movement, or a simple recorded warning (amaran), while allowing an officer with an unblemished record since 2008 to retain his livelihood. 54. However, the Respondents by acting mechanically and upon an erroneous premise, they completely insulated themselves from exercising balanced administrative discretion. 55. In view of my decision above, this Court granted the following orders: (a) an Order of Certiorari to quash in its entirety the decision of the 1st and/or 2nd Respondents dismissing the Applicant from service by letter dated 24th July 2023; (b) an Order of Certiorari to quash in its entirety the decision of the 3rd and/or 4th Respondents rejecting the Applicant's appeal by letter dated 7th January 2025; (c) a Declaration that the punishment of dismissal (Buang Kerja) imposed upon the Applicant is null and void, and is of no effect and is set aside; (d) an Order of Mandamus directing the Respondents to reinstate the Applicant to his original position as Public Health Assistant (Pembantu Kesihatan Awam) Grade U19, together with all benefits properly due to him and without any loss of qualification, or other privileges; and (e) costs of RM2,000.00, to be paid by the Respondents to the Applicant. Dated 26th day of June, 2026. (KULDEEP KUMAR A/L JAMNA DASS) Judicial Commissioner High Court Temerloh Solicitors for the Applicant: Nurul Syuhada Abdullah Messrs Rama-Rozi & Associates Temerloh, Pahang Darul Makmur Solicitors for the Respondents: Najwa binti Hashim Federal Counsel Pejabat Penasihat Undang-Undang Negeri Pahang Kuantan, Pahang Darul Makmur