(b) an express or implied condition or restriction, to which the land is subject or ordered to be subject under the State land law.” [27] We were of the view that the Land Administrator, by virtue of the above specific provision under the Act, is not allowed to take into consideration any building on any land to be acquired if the building is not permitted either under the category of land use or the express or implied condition or restriction, as found in this case before us. The Land Administrator could not award the Appellant for their orchid growing activity on the acquired land on the same ground that such use of the land was not permitted without the prior written approval from the Land Administrator. [28] Our view was that the provisions of subparagraph 1 (3A) of the First Schedule of the Act is very clear and the court should not go beyond the expressed language of the statute. The Federal Court in Metramac Civil Appeal No: J-01(A)-269-08/2017 19 Corporation Sdn Bhd v. Fawziah Holdings Sdn Bhd [2006] 3 CLJ 177, per Augustine Paul FCJ, at pages 200-201, held as follows: “The primary duty of the court is to give effect to the intention of the Legislature as expressed in the words used by it and no outside consideration can be called in aid to find another intention (see Nathu Prasad v. Singhai Kepurchand [1976] Jab LJ 340). Thus the duty of the court, and its only duty, is to expound the language of a statute in accordance with the settled rules of construction and has nothing to do with the policy of any statute which it may be called upon to interpret (see Vacker & Sons Ltd v. London Society of Compositors [1913] Act 117; NKM Holdings Sdn Bhd v. Pan Malaysia Wood Bhd [1987] 1 MLJ 39).” [29] We now come to the final issue, that is, whether legitimate expectation existed for the Appellant to be compensated. Citing the case of Syarikat Bekerjasama-sama Serbaguna Sungai Gelugor Dengan Tanggungan Berhad v. Majlis Perbandaran Pulau Pinang [1996] 3 CLJ 335, learned counsel for the Appellant submitted that the learned High Court Judge had wrongly dismissed the issue of legitimate expectation. Learned counsel argued that part of the land had been subjected to two previous acquisitions and on both occasions, the Appellant was compensated. [30] Learned ALA on the other hand submitted that the Appellant’s orchid growing activities on the land were carried out without prior permission of the Land Administrator which amounted to a breach the condition of the land. Further, learned ALA contended that the land owner had been compensated and since the Appellant had an agreement with the land owner, any compensation for whatever expenses or losses suffered by the Appellant should be taken up against the land owner. Learned ALA Civil Appeal No: J-01(A)-269-08/2017 20 concluded that even though the principle of legitimate expectation had been extended and accepted in Malaysia, it is not applicable in the instant case. [31] The principle of legitimate expectation was first enunciated by Lord Denning in Schmidt v. Secretary of State for Home Affairs [1969] 2 CH 149 (CA). The principle has been extended and accepted in Malaysia by the Federal Court in Majlis Perbandaran Pulau Pinang v. Syarikat Bekerjasama-sama Serbaguna Sungai Gelugor Dengan Tanggungan [1999] 3 MLJ 1 where it was stated as follows at page 59: “For our part, we prefer the view of Simon Brown LJ in Ex parte Baker (ibid) and Sedley J in Ex parte Hamble (ibid) as we find the reasoning there more persuasive. It is also a view which appears to be supported by de Smith, as the following extracts from his book, Judicial Review of Administrative Action (5th Ed), indicate (at para 13-034): Given the duty of a public body not to fetter its discretion under what circumstances will a legitimate expectation be protected in the face of a change in policy. Clearly, the change of policy must be ‘a lawful exercise of discretion’ (per Lord Scarman in Re Findlay [1985] AC 318, 338). The body’s discretion to alter its policy must therefore be exercised after taking into account relevant considerations, and ignoring the irrelevant. The body must also pursue authorized and not extraneous purposes. These considerations and purposes can include matters such as the need to maintain national security and matters of public policy. Nor should the discretion be exercised unreasonably ̶ ̶ for example, simply in order to confound the recipient of the expectation, or in bad faith. The conduct of the recipient of the representation should not be relevant to a decision to revoke the representation. Civil Appeal No: J-01(A)-269-08/2017 21 After referring to the potential antithesis between the object of the protection of the legitimate expectation (legal certainty) and the object of the ‘no fettering’ doctrine (flexibility) and observing that the issue may not always be resolved in favour of the latter, de Smith says (at para 13-035): Although free to alter its policy, the authority is by no means free to ignore the existence of a legitimate expectation. Now that legitimate expectation has been accepted in Law as an interest worthy of protection, its existence becomes a relevant consideration which must be taken into consideration in the exercise of a discretion. It is placed on the scale and must be properly weighed. Dealing with the balancing exercise, de Smith, says this (in the same paragraph): The weighing is, as we have noted many times, a matter principally for the authority, but the courts may intervene where the expectation is entirely ignored or given manifestly improper weight (see R v Inland Revenue Commissioners; ex p MFK Underwriting Agents Ltd & Ors [1990] 1 WLR 1545 per Bingham LJ when he said breach of an expectation may be unfair ‘particularly’ if the promisee acted on it. Cf the approach of Laws J in Secretary of State for Transport; ex p Richmond-upon-Thames London Borough Council & Ors [1994] 1 WLR 74). On the other hand, in R v Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food; ex p Hamble (Offshore) Fisheries Ltd [1995] 2 All ER 714, Sedley J accepted the existence of the substantive legitimate expectation). Continuing on the same theme, de Smith says this (at para 13-035): It is at this point that the fact that the promissee relied on the expectation to his detriment may be relevant. Detrimental reliance will add to the weight of the legitimate expectation. It may be Civil Appeal No: J-01(A)-269-08/2017 22 overridden by competing public interest, but the greater the evident detriment to the promissee, the greater the countervailing weight of the public interest in order to override an expectation that is held to be legitimate. Then, touching upon how the legitimate expectation of the Society had a procedural impact ̶ ̶ this being the second category of the formulation of the distinct senses in which the concept of legitimate expectation was employed by Simon-Brown LJ in Ex p Baker (ibid) ̶ ̶ the Court of Appeal said this (at p 919 para 1, AR ‘C’): In the second sense we think that the Respondent should have given advance notice of its intention to impose the second condition because the rules of natural justice demanded it. It is very possible that if a fair opportunity had been given to make representations the second condition would not have been imposed on 20 July 1993.” [32] However, we agreed with the learned ALA’s submission that legitimate expectation could not and should not override the express statutory power vested by a statute, that is, subparagraph 1(3A) of the First Schedule of the Act as in the instant appeal before us. This principle has been decided by the Federal Court in North East Plantations Sdn Bhd v. Pentadbir Tanah Daerah Dungun & Satu Lagi [2011] 4 CLJ 729: “[29] Kami juga berpendapat bahawa keputusan majoriti Mahkamah Rayuan adalah tepat apabila dinyatakan ‘Whether or not the doctrine of legitimate expectation applies depends on the facts of each case, it cannot and should not override the express statutory power vested in the State Authority.” Civil Appeal No: J-01(A)-269-08/2017 23 [33] The same principle was followed by this court in Ong Ah Hooi v. Pentadbir Tanah Larut Matang dan Selama & Anor [2017] 2 MLJ 256 where it was stated: ‘[18] With respect, it seems to us that this submission is a complete non-starter. In our view, the learned JC was correct in holding that there cannot be a legitimate expectation against clear provisions of law. There is a plethora of authorities in support of this proposition. In North East Plantations Sdn Bhd (supra) Abu Samah JCA (as he then was), delivering the majority judgment of the Court of Appeal, held: “In our judgment, legitimate expectation cannot override the express statutory provisions of the Code.”’ [34] We were of the unanimous view that there cannot be a legitimate expectation for the Appellant to be compensated by the Respondent in this case since its orchid growing activities on the land were carried out in contravention of the land’s express conditions and without the Land Administrator’s prior written approval. Conclusion [35] Upon a close scrutiny of the facts and the law before us, we found that the decision of the Land Administrator in not awarding compensation and in not issuing Form H to the Appellant did not suffer from any illegality, irrationality and procedural impropriety. Therefore, we found no reason to disturb the findings of the High Court in dismissing the Appellant’s judicial review application. [36] Based on the aforesaid, we unanimously dismissed the appeal with costs of RM5,000.00 to the Respondent subject to payment of allocatur Civil Appeal No: J-01(A)-269-08/2017 24 fees. The decision of the High Court was affirmed. The deposit was to be refunded to the Appellant. [37] We therefore ordered accordingly. Dated: 15 October 2018 signed (KAMARDIN BIN HASHIM) Judge Court of Appeal Malaysia Parties For the Appellant: Datuk Kuthubul Zaman Bin Bukhari Messrs Zaman & Associates Suite 12-01 & 12-02 Level 12 Menara TJB No. 9, Jalan Syed Mohd Mufti 80000 Johor Bahru For the Respondent: Abdul Malik Bin Ayob Assistant State Legal Advisor Johor Aras 2, Bangunan Dato’ Jaafar Muhammad Kota Iskandar 79100 Nusajaya