prohibit the person given custody from taking the child out of Malaysia. [Emphasis added.] [21] At this juncture, it was imperative for this Court to remind Parties that the mere act of being awarded custody of the Child does not in any way imply or insinuate the non-custodial parent’s lack of fitness or otherwise. [22] In response to the allegations and claims presented in the Plaintiff’s affidavits, the Defendant vehemently contested and refuted them. As such, based on the cases of Diana Clarice Chan Chiing Hwa v Tiong Chiong Hoo [2002] 1 CLJ 721, [2002] 2 MLJ 97, [2002] 2 AMR 1527 and Gan Koo Kea v Gan Shiow Lih [2003] 4 MLJ 770, [2003] 6 AMR 459, [2003] 4 CLJ 539, in light of conflicting versions that have not undergone the rigorous test of cross-examination and re-examination, as would have been possible in a full trial with viva voce evidence, the Court’s duty was to disregard disputed facts and make a decision on undisputed facts. This crucial aspect of civil litigation practice has been eloquently summarised by Lord Templeman for the Privy Council in Tay Bok Choon v Tahansan Sdn Bhd [1987] CLJ Rep 24, [1987] MLRA 68, [1987] 1 MLJ 433, in the following words: At the end of the day the judge must decide the petition on the evidence before him. If allegations are made in affidavits by the petitioner and those allegations are credibly denied by the respondent's affidavits, then in the S/N Fheq4S9Wd0ivyDcVjl3ncA 15 June 2023 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 10 absence of oral evidence or cross examination, the judge must ignore the disputed allegations. The judge must then decide the fate of the petition by consideration of the undisputed facts. [Emphasis added.] [23] Furthermore, it was important to note that the Plaintiff’s assertion regarding excessive drinking was entirely subjective, lacking any substantial evidence to establish a connection between the alleged drinking and its impact, if any, on the Defendant’s ability to have access to the Child. [24] On the issue of missing the Child’s birthday, I took the view that it was feeble to say that such omission was indicative of bad parenting. The Plaintiff’s contention oversimplifies the complex nature of parenting and fails to account for various circumstances and contexts. It appeared that the Plaintiff had highlighted the Defendant’s flaws as a father and used such imperfections in her attempt to convince this Court that the Defendant’s access to the Child should be conditional and limited. [25] When considering the Child’s best interests, it was crucial to recognise that a healthy parent-child relationship extends beyond the confines of a single parent’s control. Allowing the Defendant to take the Child on trips and vacations alone fosters a bond between them, enabling the Child to experience different environments and create lasting memories. Restricting the Defendant from such opportunities could potentially hinder the Child’s personal growth and limit his exposure to diverse experiences. S/N Fheq4S9Wd0ivyDcVjl3ncA 15 June 2023 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 11 [26] Moreover, it was essential to promote a sense of trust and respect between both parents involved in the Child’s life. By granting the Defendant the freedom to take the Child overseas, it demonstrates a recognition of their equal parental rights and acknowledges that the Defendant’s relationship with the Child is not subordinate to the Plaintiff’s authority. Encouraging a cooperative co-parenting approach is ultimately in the best interests of the Child, as it provides a more balanced and harmonious upbringing. [27] It was also worth noting that imposing excessive limitations and conditions on the Defendant’s involvement with the Child may be viewed as an overreach on the part of the Plaintiff. It was imperative for the Court to assess the fairness and reasonableness of the Plaintiff’s demands, ensuring that they do not impede the Child’s access to a loving and meaningful relationship with both parents. [28] In my view, the Plaintiff’s conduct in seeking to limit and impose conditions on the Defendant’s access was extremely inequitable, as the circumstances in which a parent should be given limited and conditional access should only be in cases where there was evidence of child abuse or neglect, domestic violence, substance abuse or addiction, or if such parent had suffered severe or chronic mental instability or the inability to provide a safe and stable environment for the child. [29] The Plaintiff further contended that the Child was only four years old and to provide unsupervised and overnight access to the Child S/N Fheq4S9Wd0ivyDcVjl3ncA 15 June 2023 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 12 by the Defendant would not be in the best interest of the welfare of the Child. [30] In my view, such argument advanced by the Plaintiff was indefensible, and laced with emotional overtones. First and foremost, it was undeniable that the Child is no longer an infant. [31] In any event, to overcome the alleged ‘unfamiliarity’ issue, my decision was that the Defendant should have online access to the Child, on Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays for a maximum of 30 minutes between 7pm and 8pm, access which the Plaintiff must facilitate, and not interrupt or interfere with. This could assist the Child to familiarise himself with his father, the Defendant. [32] The Plaintiff expressed her apprehension about the Defendant immediately taking the Child out of Kuala Lumpur with immediate effect. Consequently, in my assessment, it was essential to gradually enhance the Defendant’s access to the Child, allowing for the development of a deeper and more significant bond between them. Based on this reasoning, my ruling was to provide the Defendant with physical unsupervised access, but which would initially be limited to Kuala Lumpur on alternate weekends (Friday to Sunday). This arrangement will continue for three months, until 27 June 2023. [33] In my perspective, a period of three months of consistent access will allow the Child to become more acquainted with the Defendant and reach an appropriate age to travel outside of Kuala Lumpur. Consequently, beginning 27 June 2023 the Defendant will be granted S/N Fheq4S9Wd0ivyDcVjl3ncA 15 June 2023 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 13 unsupervised access to the Child on alternate weekends (Friday to Sunday), enabling him to take the Child out of Kuala Lumpur. [34] With effect from 28 September 2023, the Defendant will be allowed to take the Child overseas for a duration of up to three weeks per trip, subject to the condition that the Plaintiff is provided, at least one month in advance, with the itinerary and information pertaining to such trip. Additionally, during this period, the Plaintiff will be entitled to maintain regular online access to the Child on alternate days, with each session lasting a maximum of 30 minutes. The timing of these sessions will be mutually agreed upon and arranged in a manner that accommodates the schedules of both Parties. Conclusion [35] In conclusion, with the aim of upholding justice, and following a thorough examination and judicious consideration of all the evidence adduced, encompassing both written and oral submissions by Counsel, this Application was allowed partially, as alluded to above. Dated: 15 June 2023 S/N Fheq4S9Wd0ivyDcVjl3ncA 15 June 2023 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 14 SIGNED …………………………………………. (EVROL MARIETTE PETERS) Judge High Court, Kuala Lumpur Counsel: For the Plaintiff – K Shanmuga and Kee Hui Yee; Messrs Kanesalingam & Co For the Defendant – Rajashree Suppiah, Amira Nur Nadia Azhar and Rex Kuan Kai Tat; Messrs Rajashree Cases referred to: ➢ APE v APF [2015] SGHC 17 ➢ Chow Sook Pheng v Wong Maun Hoong [2011] 1 LNS 260 ➢ CX v CY (minor: custody and access) [2005] 3 SLR 690 ➢ Diana Clarice Chan Chiing Hwa v Tiong Chiong Hoo 2002 1 CLJ 721, [2002] 2 MLJ 97, [2002] 2 AMR 1527 ➢ Gan Koo Kea v Gan Shiow Lih [2003] 1 MLRH 769 ➢ K Shanta Kumari v Vijayan [1985] 1 LNS 135 ➢ Tay Bok Choon v. Tahansan Sdn Bhd [1987] CLJ Rep 24; [1987] MLRA 68; [1987] 1 MLJ 433 ➢ Teh Eng Kim v Yew Peng Siong [1977] 1 MLJ 234 S/N Fheq4S9Wd0ivyDcVjl3ncA 15 June 2023 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 15 Legislation referred to: ➢ Guardianship of Infants Act 1961 – section 3 ➢ Law Reform (Marriage & Divorce) Act 1976 – sections 88, 89