Nabisah Binti Abdul Hamid (PM 6413) v Pentadbir Tanah Kuala Langat (B-01(A)-511-10/2023)

These two appeals were heard together which were based on the decision of the learned High Court Judge (LHJ) at Shah Alam in two related land reference proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act 1960 (hereinafter referred to as "the LAA").

The first appeal (Civil Appeal No. B-01(A)-511-10/2023) concerns the acquisition of Lot 15614, PM 6413, Mukim Tanjung Dua Belas, owned by Nabisah Binti Abdul Hamid (hereinafter referred to as "the First Appellant"). The second appeal (Rayuan Civil No: B-01(A)-23-01/2024) concerns the acquisition of Lot 15562, PM 6364, in the same mukim, owned by Azhana Binti As'ad (hereinafter referred to as "the Second Appellant").

Both appeals were heard together due to the overlap in the legal issues raised and the proximity of the acquired lands and both Appellants and Respondents are represented by the same counsel in both appeals. In both matters before the High Court, the LHJ increased the market value of the scheduled lands from RM180.00 per square metre to RM190.00 per square metre. The decision which is the subject matter in the first appeal was delivered on 7 September 2023, while the decision which is the subject matter in the second appeal was delivered on 12 December 2023.

The central question before this court is whether the grounds advanced by the Appellants raise questions of law, in view of the prohibition on appeals relating to the amount of compensation as stipulated under ss. 49(1) of the LAA.

The material facts relevant to the first appeal are as follows. The First Appellant, Nabisah Binti Abdul Hamid, is the registered owner of Lot 15614, PM 6413, Mukim Tanjung Dua Belas, Daerah Kuala Langat, Negeri Selangor (hereinafter referred to as "the First Scheduled Land").

The land was compulsorily acquired by the State Government of Selangor for a project known as Tapak Loji Rawatan Air Bagi Projek Pembangunan Skim Air Rasau Daerah Kuala Langat, Selangor Darul Ehsan. The land acquisition proceedings were instituted via a declaration under s.8 of the LAA published on 21 October 2021.

The Respondent, Pentadbir Tanah Kuala Langat, initially awarded compensation based on a market value of RM180.00 per square metre. Dissatisfied with this award, the First Appellant filed Form N to object, thereby initiating the land reference proceeding in the High Court.

The LHJ assisted by two assessors, delivered her decision on 7 September 2023. The LHJ partially allowed the objection by increasing the market value from RM180.00 per square metre to RM190.00 per square metre, resulting in additional compensation of RM88,060.00. Late payment charges at 5% per annum on the additional compensation were also awarded.

As for the second appeal, it concerns the compulsory acquisition of land identified as Lot 15562, PM 6364, Mukim Tanjung Dua Belas, Daerah Kuala Langat, Negeri Selangor (hereinafter referred to as "the Second Scheduled Land"), owned by the Second Appellant, Azhana Binti As'ad.

It is to be noted that the land was acquired for the same purpose as the First Scheduled Land. The notice of intended acquisition was published on 30 September 2021 pursuant to s.4 of the LAA, and the formal declaration for acquisition under s.8 was made on 21 October 2021.

The Respondent initially awarded compensation at RM180.00 per square metre, amounting to RM2,080,800.00. The Second Appellant filed Form N objecting to the quantum.

The Second Appellant claimed for various heads of compensation including the value of the land, development costs for oil palm cultivation, loss of income from oil palm produce, cost of oil palm trees, and other ancillary costs as provided under the First Schedule of the LAA.

The Land Reference was heard and decided on 12 December 2023. The LHJ allowed the reference in part, increasing the market value from RM180.00 per square metre to RM190.00 per square metre, resulting in additional compensation of RM115,600.00. Late payment charges at 5% per annum was also awarded on this additional sum.

In both cases, the LHJ adopted a substantially similar approach to valuation. In both cases the LHJ rejected the Appellants' primary comparable (Comparable No. 3 in the respective proceedings). Although this comparable was situated in what the LHJ described as the 'lokaliti yang serupa dan terhampir', it was ultimately rejected as an outlier.

It is to be noted that the LHJ found that there was 'tiada bukti perbandingan lain yang menyokong harga transaksi bagi Perbandingan 3 ini'. The LHJ further held that 'satu perbandingan tidak melambangkan pasaran'.

Conversely, in both cases the LHJ found that the best comparable to be the Respondent's Comparable No.2, being Lot 11745, Mukim Teluk Panglima Garang (located in Sijangkang). After making necessary adjustments, including a -5% adjustment for location, the LHJ determined the market value to be RM190.00 per square metre in both cases.

As regards the second appeal, the learned Judge also dismissed the Second Appellant's claims for cost of oil palm development, loss of income, and cost of oil palm trees, holding that the land was already valued as planted agricultural land and that allowing these additional claims would result in double-counting. The claim for cost of purchasing replacement land was rejected as the Scheduled Land was agricultural land, not a residence or place of business.

The written submissions in both appeals raised substantially similar contentions. The Appellants contended that the appeals, although appearing to concern quantum, raise genuine questions of law. Questions of law posed by the Appellant in the Appeals. The Appellant raised the following questions of law:

Whether or not, in light of the provision of Paragraph 1(1A) of the First Schedule of the LAA, the High Court, in assessing the market value of the scheduled land in a land reference proceeding, can prefer a sales comparable which is located not within the vicinity of the scheduled land over a sales comparable which is situated within the vicinity of the scheduled land? ("Question 1");

Whether the High Court, in assessing the market value of the scheduled land in accordance with the provision of Paragraph 1(1A) of the First Schedule of the LAA, is required to choose a sales comparable which is supported by other sales comparable(s) as the basis of assessment of the market value of the scheduled land OR can the High Court rely on any one of the sales comparable adduced by the respective parties as the best comparable and thus the basis of assessment of the market value of the scheduled land? In the event of the former, is the High Court required to provide particulars and reasoning for the supporting sales comparable(s)? ("Question 2") and

In the event of disagreement between the assessors in the assessment of the market value of the Scheduled Land, is the High Court required to give reasons for preferring, or appear to have preferred, the opinion of either assessor? ("Question 3"). [19] First, it was submitted that the LHJ erred in law by preferring the Respondent's Comparable No. 2, which was located in Mukim Panglima Teluk Garang/ Sijankang (a different locality), over the Appellants' Comparable No. 3, which was located within the vicinity or locality of the Scheduled Lands (Tanjong Rabok). [20] It was argued that Paragraph 1(1A) of the First Schedule of the LAA mandates that regard must be had to sales within the vicinity, thereby giving priority to comparables located in the same area as the acquired land. It was contended that accepting a comparable from a different locality was against this statutory requirement. [21] Second, as regards the rejection of a single comparable as an outlier, it was submitted that the LHJ erred in law by rejecting Comparable No. 3 as an outlier on the ground that a single comparable does not represent the market value and therefore requires support from other sales comparables. It was contended that this requirement is not found in Paragraph 1(1A) of the First Schedule of the LAA. [22] In support of this proposition, the Appellants relied on the Federal Court decision in Pentadbir Tanah Daerah Johor v Nusantara Daya Sdn Bhd [2021] 4 MLJ 570 to assert that a single, appropriate comparable can be used as the basis for valuation. [23] Third, as regards the alleged inconsistent application of standards, it was further submitted that the rejection of Comparable No. 3 was contradictory since the Respondent's Comparable No. 2, which was accepted as the best comparable, also did not appear to be supported by other sales comparables. It was argued that the LHJ applied inconsistent standards by requiring corroboration for the Appellants' comparable while accepting an apparently unsupported comparable from the Respondent. [24] Fourth, as regards the failure to provide reasons for preferring assessor opinions, it was submitted that the LHJ erred in law by failing to provide reasons for preferring the government assessor's opinion (which valued the lands at RM190.00 per square metre) over the private assessors' opinions (which valued the lands at RM275.00 per square metre). [25] It was argued that based on decided cases the LHJ was required to give reasonings when electing between differing assessor opinions, particularly given the substantial difference in valuation. In support of this proposition, the Appellants relied on Semenyih Jaya Sdn Bhd v Pentadbir Tanah Daerah Hulu Langat [2017] 3 MLJ 561. The Respondent's Submissions [26] In response to the submissions of the Appellants, the Respondent contended that both appeals must be dismissed as the Appellants' grounds principally concern the amount or quantum of compensation, which is prohibited by s. 49(1) of the LAA. [27] It was submitted that the appeals raise only questions of fact and the application of valuation principles, not novel questions of law. It was further submitted that the LHJ was entitled to prefer the government assessor's opinion over the private assessors' opinions based on the evidence adduced, as the opinions of assessors are advisory and not binding on the Court. [28] In support of this proposition, the Respondent relied on Amitabha Guha (as beneficiary for the estate of Madhabendra Mohan Guha) v Pentadbir Tanah Daerah Hulu Langat [2021] 4 MLJ 1. [29] As regards the rejection of Comparable 3 as an outlier, it was submitted that this was justified in the circumstances of the case. THE APPLICABLE LEGAL PRINCIPLES [30] Before addressing the specific grounds of the appeal, it is necessary to first establish the scope of this court's jurisdiction in an appeal relating to land acquisition. This threshold question is fundamental to determining whether the issues raised by the Appellants properly fall within the narrow category of appealable questions of law. [31] This prohibition is stated by s. 49(1) of the LAA, which stipulates: "Save as provided in section 40D, where the decision of the judge includes or comprises an award of compensation for land, there shall be no appeal therefrom." [32] However, the Federal Court in Semenyih Jaya Sdn Bhd v Pentadbir Tanah Daerah Hulu Langat (supra) clarified that this is not a complete prohibition. Appeals remain permissible on questions of law. [33] The Federal Court in Amitabha Guha (supra) states; What is a question of law? [46] It follows from the preceding paragraph that appeals to the Court of Appeal and to the Federal Court may only be mounted on questions of law. In a general sense, a question of law is an issue involving the interpretation of law (statutes or legal principles) and the application of the law to the facts of each individual case. What is a question of law has also been discussed and formulated in a line of cases:

questions of law are questions about what the correct legal test is. Questions of mixed law and fact are questions about whether the facts satisfy the legal tests: Canada (Director of Investigation and Research, Competition Act) v Southam Inc [1997] 1 SCR 748);

a question of law is a question concerning the legal effect to be given to a set of undisputed facts. This includes an issue which involves the application or interpretation of a law (Carrier Lumber Ltd v Joe Martin & Sons Ltd [2003] BCJ No 1602);

the question of whether a decision-maker has jurisdiction to determine a particular matter is usually considered a question of law reviewable by a court on a standard or correctness (Premium Brands Operating GP Inc v Turner Distribution Systems Limited [2010] BCJ No 349);

questions of law involve errors of law committed by a decision-maker. Errors of law includes the application of the wrong law, or a finding of fact in complete absence of any evidence (Southam, at [39]; I-Ntelink Inc v Broadband Communications North Inc [2017] MBQB 146);

questions where there is real doubt as to the law on a particular point (Datuk Syed Kechik bin Syed Mohamed & Anor v The Board of Trustees of the Sabah Foundation & Ors and another application [1999] 1 MLJ 257; [1999] 1 CLJ 325 (FC); and

questions of law includes the correctness of: (a) pure statements of law (eg, as to correct interpretation of a statutory provision); and (b) the inferring of a conclusion from the primary facts (where the process of inference involves assumptions as to the legal effect of consequences of the primary facts) (D-G of Inland Revenue v Rakyat Berjaya Sdn Bhd [1984] 1 MLJ 248 at p 252 (FC). [34] This distinction was elaborated upon in Pentadbir Tanah Daerah Johor v Nusantara Daya Sdn Bhd [2021] 4 MLJ 570, where the Federal Court provided important guidance on this issue. [81] The allegations of acting without evidence or acting against the evidence of a particular witness or report; or how a particular piece of evidence is to be treated, as raised in the questions posed, are actually complaints generally made in order to meet the general principles for appellate intervention. The views expressed by Michael Barnes in The Law of Compulsory Purchase and Compensation and by Lord Denning MR in Ashbridge Investments Ltd v Minister of Housing and Local Government [1965] 1 WLR 1320, that such complaints are points of law which may be raised on appeal and for which reasons the appellate court may interfere in the trial court's findings, is generally correct in the context and in relation to appeals sans the proviso to s 49(1). But for the clear terms of the proviso, such appeals on points of law may be entertained even if the appeal is on compensation or the amount of compensation. However, in the presence of the plain terms of the proviso, and the restrictive reading which we must give to the meaning of question of law as allowed in Semenyih Jaya, such complaints or grounds do not render or make the questions posed, questions of law. [82] We are of the firm view that the complaints of the respondent essentially concerned issues of fact and/or application of valuation principles when computing the amount of compensation to be awarded for the acquisition. Such issues of fact as well as the application of valuation principles as we have said repeatedly, are not questions of law; certainly not within the narrow and limited remit of what or how such a question of law may be properly and validly taken on appeal under the amended s 49(1). [83] We agree with the submissions of the appellant that the respondent's complaints relate solely and ultimately to the amount or inadequacy of compensation by reason of the deductions and adjustments made by the learned judge, a methodology and exercise that a High Court judge, sitting as the land reference court is perfectly entitled to undertake in order to determine the market value of the scheduled land. In fact, that is precisely the exercise required of the High Court under Act 486. The market value of any land is not a matter of say so but is subject to proof by evidence and according to the principles for determining compensation as statutorily provided in the First Schedule to Act 486. Those principles have been carefully prescribed so that adequate compensation under art 13 of the Federal Constitution may be determined. [35] After having considered the submissions of both parties and the applicable legal principles, we are of the view that the central question in this appeal is whether the Appellants have identified errors of law in the LHJ's findings, or whether the Appellants are merely challenging the LHJ's factual findings regarding valuation. This distinction is determinative of whether these appeals should be allowed or dismissed. [36] Paragraph 1(1A) of the First Schedule to the LAA provides as follows:

In assessing the market value of any scheduled land, the valuer may use any suitable method of valuation to arrive at the market value provided that regard may be had to the prices paid for the recent sales of lands with similar characteristics as the scheduled land which are situated within the vicinity of the scheduled land and with particular consideration being given to the last transaction on the scheduled land within two years from the date with reference to which the scheduled land is to be assessed under subparagraph (1) (emphasis added). [37] The Appellants argued that the LHJ has thus erred in law by preferring a sale comparable located in a different locality from the Scheduled Land, thereby disregarded the provision of Paragraph 1(1A) of the First Schedule of the LAA. It was further argued that given that the Appellant's Comparable is situated within the locality and thus the vicinity of the Scheduled Land, the Appellants Comparable ought to be used as the basis of assessment of market value of the Scheduled Land in accordance with the provision of Paragraph 1(1A) of the First Schedule of the LAA. In this regard we are of the view that the operative words of the provision above are 'regard may be had' to sales within the vicinity... The permissive nature of this language 'may be had' indicates that proximity is an important factor to be considered, but it does not create an absolute rule or requirement that a comparable from within the vicinity must always be preferred over a comparable from outside the vicinity, regardless of other considerations such as reliability, compatibility or other suitable factors. [38] From the grounds of decision we observed that the LHJ was fully aware of the requirements to the locality principle. This can be seen when the LHJ ultimately selected the Respondent's Comparable No. 2, the LHJ did not simply ignore the fact that it was in a different vicinity. Rather the LHJ performed a specific adjustment of -5% for location. This negative adjustment demonstrates that the learned Judge properly applied the principle in Paragraph 1(1A) by recognizing the geographical difference and by adjusting the quantum in the calculation. [39] We recognise that comparables vary: some may be geographically closer but less reliable, while others, though more distant, offer greater reliability in certain respects. It is the responsibility of the trial judge, with assistance from assessors, to weigh these factors and determine which comparable, after making appropriate adjustments, offers the most accurate indication of market value. This issue in our view concerns facts and how valuation principles are applied to the evidence presented in court, rather than being a legal question. We are also fortified in our view by referring to the following judgment in Nusantara Daya. [79] Having examined all the questions posed, whether we take the ten questions as posed or as grouped into the 'three issues' , these questions or issues are all about the award of compensation that was made by the High Court, how the final amount was arrived at and how that amount was wrong. At the end of the day, the High Court, assisted by the assessors, made various deductions in order to arrive at the market value. The High Court, as a Land Reference Court was entitled to make those deductions for the reasons stated, as those deductions are very much fact-based decisions, based on evidence adduced, the analysis of such evidence involving the court's appreciation and impression of such evidence when applying principles of valuation to the facts. Room must be given for a divergence of opinion on the evaluation of such evidence; more so when the appeal is statutorily limited. [40] Furthermore, as recognized by the Court of Appeal in Bank Pertanian Malaysia Bhd v MCI Bio Tech Sdn Bhd [2013] 9 CLJ 29, an appellate court should give full weight to the trial court's assessment of evidence and valuation unless there are demonstrable errors of law causing substantial injustice. We find no such error on this issue. Based on the above reasons we are unable to agree with the Appellants' first question that this is a question of law. [41] We turn now turn to address the Appellants' second question of law which relates to the arguments that the LHJ erred by rejecting Comparable No.3 on the basis that it was an outlier and that a single comparable does not reflect the market value, when there are case laws that permits valuation based on a single comparable. [42] The Appellants rely on the Federal Court's statement in Pentadbir Tanah Daerah Johor v Nusantara Daya Sdn Bhd [2021] 4 MLJ 570 that a single comparable can be used as the basis for valuation. It is therefore submitted that the learned Judge erred in requiring Comparable No. 3 to be supported by other comparables before it could be accepted. [43] After having considered this submission with care, we are of the view that there is no doubt that the Federal Court in Nusantara Daya confirmed that a single comparable is sufficient for valuation purposes, provided it is appropriate and suitable after necessary adjustments. However, this principle does not mean that every single comparable transaction must be accepted simply because it is the only transaction in a particular area, nor does it prevent a court from examining whether that single transaction is reliable and representative of market conditions. [44] We take the view that the principle in Nusantara Daya (supra) addresses the question: can valuation be based on a single comparable? The answer is yes, if it is reliable. However, whether a single comparable is reliable and ought to be adopted and accepted by the court is a question of fact and must be determined based on the facts of each case. It is not a question of law. [45] In the present cases, the LHJ found specifically that Comparable No. 3 lacked supporting evidence as there was 'tiada bukti perbandingan lain yang menyokong harga transaksi bagi Perbandingan 3 ini'. This was a finding that the transaction price reflected in Comparable No. 3 was not supported by or consistent with other market evidence available to the court. [46] Based on the above reasons, we find that the rejection of Comparable No. 3 by the LHJ as an outlier as it was lacking probative value was a justified conclusion concerning the weight of evidence. It was not an error of law or misapplication of the principle in Nusantara Daya. [47] While on this issue, we would also address the Appellants' contention, which asserts an inconsistency in the LHJ's approach. It was submitted that the LHJ erred in rejecting the Appellants' Comparable No. 3 for being a single, unsupported comparison, yet simultaneously accepted the Respondent's Comparable No. 2, which was also a single comparable apparently not supported by other transactions. [48] After having considered this submission, we are of the view that the allegation of inconsistency is based on a misunderstanding of the LHJ reasoning. It is our view that the learned Judge did not establish a rigid rule that every single comparable must be rejected merely because it stands alone. Rather, the LHJ assessed each comparable on its individual merits based on the totality of the evidence before the Court. [49] From the GOJ, the LHJ found that Comparable No. 3 was an unreliable outlier that did not reflect the market. This was a specific finding based on the evidence that the transaction price in Comparable No. 3 was not consistent with or supported by other available market indicators. Conversely, after examining all the evidence, the learned Judge was satisfied that Comparable No. 2, with appropriate adjustments including the location adjustment, provided a reliable indication of market value. To further support our view on this issue, we reproduced the relevant part of the GOJ which reads as follows: Pada pandangan mahkamah ini, satu perbandingan sahaja tidak melambangkan pasaran. Mahkamah berpandangan bahawa satu perbandingan ini, yakni Perbandingan 3 merupakan outlier. Perbandingan 3 yang merupakan outlier, pada pandangan mahkamah ini tidak boleh digunakan sebagai perbandingan untuk melambangkan harga pasaran. Tambahan pula, satu perbandingan sahaja tidak melambangkan harga pasaran. Seharusnya terdapat beberapa perbandingan lain bagi menentukan harga pasaran. Oleh itu, mahkamah ini menolak Perbandingan 3 penilai pemohon. [22] Bagi perbandingan yang digunakan oleh penilai responden, Perbandingan 5 berada di lokaliti berbeza dan oleh itu mahkamah menolak perbandingan tersebut. [23] Dalam kes rujukan tanah ini, tiada perbandingan sepunya. Mahkamah telah meneliti kesemua perbandingan yang dikemukakan oleh pihak pemohon dan pihak responder. Mahkamah mendapati Perbandingan 2 penilai responder iaitu Lot 11745 Mukim Teluk Panglima Garang adalah terbaik. Ini adalah kerana Lot 11745 ini mempunyai ciri-ciri sebanding dengan Lot Subjek. [50] Based on the above reasons we are of the view that the Appellants have not shown that the learned Judge had applied different legal standards to the two comparables. [51] We turn now to address the Appellants' Question 3 which relates to the arguments that the LHJ failed to provide reasons for preferring the government assessor's opinion over the private assessors' opinions, thereby committing an error of law under the principles laid down in Semenyih Jaya Sdn Bhd v Pentadbir Tanah Daerah Hulu Langat [2017] 3 MLJ 561. [52] The question is whether the learned Judge discharged this duty in the present cases. In our view, upon reading the grounds of judgment as a whole in both matters, the LHJ had given her reasoning on her preferences on which of the assessors reports that she found to reflect the compensation for the scheduled lands. [53] It is to be recalled that the LHJ had explained the process by which she arrived at the final valuation of RM190.00 per square metre. She explained why the Appellants' preferred Comparable No.3 was rejected and why it was characterized as an outlier. She then explained why the Respondent's Comparable No.2 was chosen as the best comparable and set out the specific adjustments made (including the -5% location adjustment) to arrive at the final figure. 54] In essence this finding and reasoning demonstrates that the LHJ clear preference for the methodology and conclusion which was aligned with the government assessor's approach, which favoured Comparable No. 2 and applied specific adjustments to account for differences between the comparable and the subject properties. In our view, it implicitly but unmistakably rejects the private assessors' approach, which preferred Comparable No. 3 and proposed a significantly higher valuation. [55] While we note that the LHJ did not include an express statement such as 'I prefer the government assessor's opinion for the following reasons...,' the substance of the reasoning in our view is present throughout the grounds of judgment. We do not see any flaw in that. While the approach taken by the LHJ may not be ideal, what matters is whether the grounds of judgment reveal the basis upon which the LHJ made her decision and allow the parties and any appellate court to understand the reasoning process employed. [56] In our view, the learned Judge's grounds of judgment meet this requirement. Based on the above reasons, this ground accordingly fails as well. CONCLUSION [57] For all the foregoing reasons, we are satisfied that the Appellants have failed to demonstrate any genuine questions of law warranting the intervention of this Court. The grounds advanced are, in substance are challenges to factual findings of the LHJ's evaluation of the evidence which are expressly not appealable. In the circumstances we dismissed both appeals with costs and the decisions of the LHJ in both matters in the High Court is affirmed. Costs of RM 15,000 for each appeal is given to the Respondent. Dated:14 January 2026 (ISMAIL BIN BRAHIM) JUDGE COURT OF APPEAL, MALAYSIA Counsel for the Appellants : Choo Wei Sern [Messrs Sern & Lee] Counsel for the Respondent : Etty Eliany Tesno (Federal Counsel) Nur Syafinaz Hayati Kamarrudin (Federal Counsel) [Pejabat Penasihat Undang-Undang Negeri Selangor]