Keterangan SD1 semasa sesi soal balas dirujuk: PP: Setuju sebenarnya anda hanya menafikan semata-mata 105 di Mahkamah bahawa tandatangan bukan anda punya, cap jari bukan anda punya, hanya anda menafikan semata-mata? Setuju? 110 SD1: Saya tidak menafikan tapi saya berasa sangsi kemungkinan dokumen ini telah tukar milik; PP: kalau anda tak letak cap jari di sini, cap jari di IOU "It wont appser here" and this is an original Cap Jari not photostat, 115 setuju? SD1: Itu saya setuju. PP: Anda tidak menafikan tetapi, jadi anda setuju ini 120 tandatangan anda, ini cap jari anda? SD: Kemungkinan. PP Kemungkinan. Jadi sekiranya anda merasa sangsi anda 125 seharusnya mendapatkan seorang pakar cap jari atau pakar tulisan untuk membuktikan kes anda, setuju? SD: Setuju” 130 [9]. The respondent was thus entitled to rely on this uncontroverted expert testimony. Also, the burden lies with the party alleging fraud or forgery to prove it positively. Issue 2: Whether the Authenticity and Probative Value of the IOU (Exhibit P2) and the Source of Funds Were Properly Evaluated 135 [10]. The appellant's central argument was that the respondent could not have possessed RM77,000.00 to lend, pointing to the respondent's modest monthly earnings of RM1,800.00 to RM2,100.00. However, this line of argument is misplaced. [11]. The learned Magistrate was entitled to accept the respondent’s 140 explanation that the funds originated from an insurance payout received upon the passing of his late mother. While documentary proof of this source was not produced, the trial was not focused on the origin or legitimacy of the funds, but rather on whether a loan was in fact made and acknowledged 145 by the appellant. In that context, the lack of banking records was not fatal to the respondent’s case. [12]. The respondent’s evidence remained consistent throughout the trial. He testified that the cash sum of RM77,000.00 was handed to the appellant in the presence of SP2, and that the IOU was 150 executed as acknowledgment thereof. The appellant's allegation that the respondent lacked the means to lend such a sum was never pleaded and only arose during the trial, making it an apparent afterthought. It was therefore correct for the learned Magistrate to disregard this challenge, relying on 155 Malaysia Building Society Berhad v Modern Crest Sdn Bhd & 2 Ors [2007] 2 MLJ 169; [2006] 1 LNS 312; [2006] 5 MLRH 185, where the High Court held: "Harking back to first principles in civil procedure, it is trite law that parties are bound by their pleadings. An 160 offshoot of this principle is that parties must adduce evidence and advance their submissions on the basis of their pleaded issues. There is no duty on my part to hear and determine unpleaded” 165 [13]. The IOU, marked as Exhibit P2, was signed and thumbprinted by the appellant. Its authenticity was confirmed by expert evidence (SP3), which remained unchallenged. The appellant produced no expert or forensic evidence in rebuttal. In these circumstances, the Magistrate was fully justified in according full 170 probative value to the document. [14]. The appellant's bare denial, unsupported by any credible or technical contradiction, was insufficient to displace the respondent’s prima facie case. When viewed alongside the corroborative evidence of SP2, the learned Magistrate was 175 entitled to make the factual findings that she did in favour of the respondent. Issue 3: Whether the Magistrate failed to give proper weight or consideration to the respondent’s evidence Evaluation of 180 Credibility [15]. It is evident from the grounds of judgment that the learned Magistrate gave careful attention to the demeanour and consistency of witnesses. At paragraphs 40 to 43 of the judgment, she expressly assessed the credibility of the 185 appellant’s testimony and found material inconsistencies between his oral testimony and earlier police reports. She found serious contradictions between what the appellant said in court and what he had stated earlier in his police reports. She also noted that although the appellant claimed he did not know the 190 respondent, this was contradicted by proof of online bank transfers from the appellant to the respondent before the alleged loan occurred. [16]. The Magistrate also found that the respondent and SP2 were believable and consistent in their testimonies. On appeal, higher 195 courts will not overturn such findings unless they are clearly wrong and, in this case, this court found no such error. Issue 4: Rejection of the Counterclaim [17]. The appellant’s counterclaim sought a declaration that the IOU was unenforceable and void for want of consideration. The 200 learned Magistrate rightly rejected this relief, as the Magistrate’s Court has no jurisdiction to grant declarations. Under Section 65 of the Subordinate Courts Act 1948, its jurisdiction is confined to monetary claims within the prescribed limit. [18]. This jurisdictional bar has been consistently affirmed by the 205 courts. In Badan Pengurusan Bersama Mesahill v Gala Interaktif Sdn Bhd [2023] 7 MLJ 952; [2022] 6 CLJ 706; [2022] AMEJ 0625, the court held that declaratory relief, being equitable in nature, lies outside the powers of a Magistrate’s Court. The court observed: 210 “The magistrates' court has no jurisdiction to grant declaratory relief. Its jurisdiction is merely to decide all actions and suits where the amount in dispute or value of the subject matter does not exceed one hundred thousand ringgit. It is only a Sessions Judge who is 215 empowered to grant declaratory relief. This is clear from s 65 read with s 90 of the Subordinate Courts Act 1948.” [19]. This principle was also endorsed in Wong Loy Fatt & Anor v Lim Tok Yew [2015] MLJU 1966; [2015] 5 CLJ 602; [2015] 220 AMEJ 616, where Komathy Suppiah JC (as she was then) emphasised that declaratory jurisdiction rests with the Sessions Court and the High Court, not with a Magistrate. [20]. Accordingly, the learned Magistrate was correct in dismissing the appellant’s counterclaim as misconceived in law and 225 beyond the jurisdiction of the court’s powers. CONCLUSION [21]. The Magistrate correctly addressed the issues, and the respondent proved his claim on the balance of probabilities 230 under Sections 101 and 103 of the Evidence Act 1950. The appellant’s defence was a bare denial without supporting evidence. Finding no misdirection or error in the Magistrate’s evaluation of evidence, this court dismisses the appeal with costs RM3000 and affirms the judgment of the Magistrate dated 235 28 February 2024. Dated : 29 August 2025 240 [MOSES SUSAYAN] JUDGE HIGH COURT IN MALAYA AT IPOH, PERAK 245 250 For the Appellant : Subashini A/P Gunasegran Advocates and Solicitors [Messrs V.T. Singam, D. 255 Gunasegran & Co.] Ipoh, Perak For the Respondent : Kaladevi a/p Chandrasekharan Advocates and Solicitors 260 [Messrs K Devi & Associate] Ipoh, Perak 265 (Notice: This Grounds of Decision is subject to official editorial revision) 270 275 Headnotes: Civil-Procedure — Appeal — Magistrate’s Court jurisdiction — IOU document — Thumbprint authenticity confirmed by expert—No rebuttal evidence from the appellant — Burden of proof under 280 Evidence Act ss.101, 103 discharged — respondent’s explanation of funds accepted — appellant’s denial speculative, inconsistent, unsupported — Counterclaim seeking declaratory relief misconceived and barred by Subordinate Courts Act 1948 s.65 — Findings of credibility by trial court not disturbed on appeal — 285 Principle of appellate non-interference reaffirmed where there are no error or misdirection shown.