Nan v Pan (S4-33-1485-2000)

(iii) That the Respondent shall pay the Petitioner a sum of MYR5,000 at the beginning of each calendar month as the monthly maintenance. [4] Throughout the years, several court orders were issued pursuant to several applications filed by the Parties concerning their marital disputes. In January 2015, the Parties ultimately reached a mutual agreement, documented in a consent order (“the 2015 Order”), which 28 July 2024 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 3 stipulated that the Respondent must pay the Petitioner MYR5,000 per month in spousal maintenance, a term which was also stipulated in the 2002 Order. The divorce was finalised in June 2015. [5] In August 2017 (“the 2017 Application”), the Respondent sought to vary the 2002 Order which contained the term pertaining to the monthly spousal maintenance by requesting a reduction from MYR5,000 to MYR2,500 per month. The 2017 Application was dismissed in September 2018. [6] In January 2024, the Respondent filed this Application, seeking once again to vary the monthly spousal maintenance by reducing it, this time, from MYR5,000 to MYR1,000 per month. Issues [7] The main issue for consideration by this Court was whether there was material change in circumstances to warrant a reduction in monthly spousal maintenance from MYR5,000 to MYR1,000, payable by the Respondent to the Petitioner. [8] Following the main issue, the Court had to also address the following questions, namely, (a) whether a consent order was subject to variation; and (b) whether the following circumstances amounted to material change, namely, the (i) Respondent’s advanced age and alleged deteriorating health; (ii) Respondent’s alleged reduction in income; and (iii) Respondent’s remarriage and new family. [9] This Application was dismissed for the following reasons. 28 July 2024 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 4 Contentions, evaluation, and findings Whether a consent order was subject to variation [10] At the outset, it was crucial to recognise that the term ordering the Respondent to pay the Petitioner monthly spousal maintenance in the amount of MYR5,000 was contained in both the 2002 and 2015 Orders. It was crucial to note that the Parties had consented to this term pertaining to the monthly spousal maintenance, pursuant to the 2015 Order. The issue, therefore, was whether a term that was agreed upon by the Parties could be the subject matter of a variation application. [11] On this point, I found instructive the case of Lau Hui Sing v. Wong Chou Yong [2008] 9 CLJ 232; [2008] 5 MLJ 846, where it was stated by Hamid Sultan Abu Backer J (as he then was) in the following passage: As a general rule, consent order even in a divorce matter must be rarely disturbed unless there are exceptional circumstances and that too clearly stated in the affidavit to warrant the intervention of the Court for the benefit of the minor children. Applying the above principle to the present case, the consent order must be honoured and complied with strictly by both parties, including the Petitioner Husband, since it was entered into voluntarily. [Emphasis added.] [12] Given this consensual basis, the Court had to approach this Application with careful consideration. This cautious approach was necessary because varying the term that was previously consented to by both Parties was not a trivial matter. Changing these terms required 28 July 2024 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 5 a compelling justification, which must be grounded in a significant or material change in circumstances. Such a change might include new evidence, changes in the situation of the Parties, or unforeseen developments that render the original term impractical or unjust. [13] Such careful approach by this Court was warranted to ensure respect for the original agreement between the Parties and to promote stability and predictability in legal arrangements established through mutual consent. By requiring substantial reasons for any variation, the Court strived to maintain the integrity of consensual agreements, thereby encouraging Parties to rely on and uphold the term they had negotiated and agreed upon. This predictability was essential in legal contexts as it provided certainty and clarity for the Parties involved, reducing the likelihood of frequent and arbitrary changes to legal orders and fostering a more stable legal environment. [14] Therefore, while I proceeded to enquire if there was a material change in circumstances, I adopted a cautious approach, meticulously scrutinising the Respondent's assertions, to ensure this application was not based on irrelevant factors. Material change in circumstances [15] The central issue to address in this Application was whether a material change in circumstances, as prescribed by section 83 of the Law Reform (Marriage & Divorce) Act 1976 (“Law Reform (Marriage & Divorce) Act”), had indeed taken place. This provision reads: 28 July 2024 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 6 Section 83 – Power for court to vary orders for maintenance The court may at any time and from time to time vary, or rescind, any subsisting order for maintenance, whether secured or unsecured, on the application of the person in whose favour or of the person against whom the order was made, or, in respect of secured maintenance, of the legal personal representatives of the latter, where it is satisfied that the order was based on any misrepresentation or mistake of fact or where there has been any material change in the circumstances. [Emphasis added.] [16] The term 'material change' was clarified by Azahar Mohamed JC (as he then was) in the case of Sivajothi a/p K Suppiah v. Kunathasan a/l Chelliah [2006] 5 CLJ 318; [2006] 3 MLJ 184. It was established that 'material' is the operative word, indicating that not just any change qualifies, but rather a significant one. [17] George Seah SCJ elaborated on the phrase 'material change in circumstances' in the Supreme Court case of Gisela Gertrud Abe v. Tan Wee Kiat [1986] 2 MLJ 297 with the following passage: In our opinion, when an application is made to the court to vary an existing order for maintenance, the proper approach is to start from the original order and see what changes financial or otherwise, have taken place since that date including any changes which the court is required to have regard to under s 78 of the Act as well as any increase or decrease in the means of either of the parties to the marriage and make adjustments roughly in proportion to the changes, if that is possible. [Emphasis added.] [18] A more detailed explanation of the term ‘material change in circumstances’ may be found in Lim Hong Bee v. Mah Teck Oon [2010] 28 July 2024 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 7 8 CLJ 473, [2010] MLJU 264. In that case, Suraya Othman J (as she then was) stated that "the change in question must be material and not just any change. It signifies a change in a crucial and vital part. In determining whether there has been a 'material change' within the meaning of this section, all relevant circumstances must be considered." [19] Hence, in examining the question of material change in circumstances, the inquiry before this Court was not simply whether any material change had occurred. The crucial aspect was to determine if such change was sufficiently significant to warrant a departure from the status quo. The Court needed to assess whether maintaining the current state of affairs would be unjustified in light of the new, substantial, and pivotal changes that had taken place. This analysis required a comprehensive evaluation of all relevant factors and circumstances to ensure that any decision made was fair and equitable given the material changes presented. [20] It is also important to note that determining whether there has been a material change in circumstances is a question of fact, as established in the High Court case of Anna Tay Siew Hong v Joseph Ng Tiong Yong [1995] 3 CLJ 717, [1995] MLJU 257. This principle was further reinforced in the case of Navarajan a/l Subramaniam v Rajeswary a/p Muniandy [2019] MLJU 715 by Hayatul Akmal Abdul Aziz J in the following passage: The legal definition of material change in circumstances is not cast in stone. It is ultimately dependent upon the facts and circumstances of each case. No one case is like the other. 28 July 2024 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 8 [Emphasis added.] [21] The Respondent, therefore, had the legal burden to prove the material change of circumstances on a balance of probabilities: YCC v. LSY [2007] 7 CLJ 207; Ng Say Chuan v Lim Szu Ling [2010] 10 CLJ

[22] It was fundamental to note that the timeframe for considering a material change in circumstances spanned from August 2017 to January 2024, the date when this Application was filed. The significance of this period arose from the fact that the last application to vary the spousal maintenance term was made in August 2017 vide the 2017 Application”), which was subsequently dismissed in September 2018. The dismissal indicated that the Court did not find sufficient grounds at that time to alter the existing term regarding monthly spousal maintenance. Consequently, any application filed after the 2017 Application must present new evidence or circumstances that have emerged since. [23] As a result, the Respondent was not permitted to refer to facts and circumstances that existed before the 2017 Application. Allowing such references would effectively amount to relitigating issues that have already been decided by the Court. This prohibition was crucial because relitigating previously settled matters would undermine the finality and stability of judicial decisions. 28 July 2024 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 9 Whether Respondent’s advanced age and alleged deteriorating health amounted to material change in circumstances [24] In the present case, one of the arguments put forth by the Respondent was that his age and declining health constituted a material change in circumstances, justifying a reduction in his monthly spousal maintenance obligation from MYR5,000 to MYR1,000. [25] In my view, the Respondent’s argument did not hold water for several reasons. First and foremost, it was difficult to understand how the Respondent’s age was relevant to his ability to perform the kind of work that he was involved in. The Respondent is an entrepreneur who owns businesses, and the nature of his job does not require him to engage in manual labour or heavy physical work. As an entrepreneur, the Respondent’s primary responsibilities are likely to involve management, decision-making, and oversight activities that do not necessitate physical exertion. Therefore, the Respondent’s reliance on his age as a reason for his inability to continue working was misplaced and unconvincing. [26] Secondly, citing age or health without supporting evidence does not provide a sufficient justification for ceasing employment. It was essential to establish a direct and causal link between these factors and one’s inability to continue working. This requires medical documentation, expert testimony, or other relevant proof that illustrates how specific health conditions or age-related issues may impair one’s ability to perform one’s job duties. 28 July 2024 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 10 [27] In the present case, although the Respondent had adduced medical reports to support his averments regarding his health conditions, such reports did not provide any link between the Respondent’s ailments and his claim of his inability to continue working. In the absence of such link, the Respondent’s argument lacked the necessary support and credibility. On this point, I found guidance in the case of Amarjit Kaur Atma Singh v. Gurbachan Singh Wazir Singh [2023] CLJU 2154, where Abdul Wahab Mohamed J in rejecting the application for variation of a court order, held: This court was of the further opinion that the RH's averment regarding his old age and health condition which affects his ability to work was unsupported by sufficient evidence. The first episode of heart attack took place on 8.2.2010 which was 13 years prior to the making of this Application. … Notwithstanding the above medical reports, this court finds a total lack of evidence to show that the RH was unable to work and lacks the financial means to continue paying the maintenance of PW in accordance with the Decree Nisi. The RH in the present case had clearly failed to show that he is financially adversely affected or suffers a financial detriment as a result of his old age and/or health condition... [Emphasis added.] [28] Thirdly, in repeatedly emphasising his advanced years as a significant factor that had purportedly limited his financial capability or increased his own need for funds, the Respondent had overlooked an important consideration, that is, the Petitioner, who is of the same age as the Respondent, also faced similar age-related challenges. She, too, is at a stage in life where medical expenses are a pressing concern, necessitating funds for medicines and medical treatments. This parity 28 July 2024 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 11 in their situations underscored the necessity of addressing her financial requirements with equal importance. [29] The Respondent argued that the Petitioner's monthly maintenance of MYR5,000 was unnecessary, asserting that it had been used to support adult family members who should not rely on her. However, I found this argument unpersuasive. The MYR5,000 was specifically allocated for monthly spousal maintenance, as agreed upon during the settlement. It is inequitable for the Respondent to now dictate how the Petitioner should spend this amount, as the purpose of the maintenance is to ensure the Petitioner's financial stability post-divorce. [30] Moreover, the Respondent failed to present any credible evidence of a significant change in circumstances that would justify reducing the monthly spousal maintenance from MYR5,000 to MYR1,000. Without such evidence, altering the agreed maintenance would be unjust and could potentially cause undue hardship to the Petitioner. The established amount was determined based on the Petitioner's needs and the Respondent's ability to pay, and this balance must be maintained unless compelling reasons are provided to warrant a change. [31] Furthermore, it was worth noting that the Petitioner, who is advancing in age, also has essential financial needs such as medications and medical treatments. These are critical expenses that must be considered alongside any maintenance payments. Thus, the contention that the Petitioner does not require the full monthly amount 28 July 2024 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 12 of MYR5,000 overlooked her genuine and necessary expenditures, which are integral to her health and well-being. Ignoring these vital costs would undermine her ability to maintain a reasonable standard of living, making it imperative to acknowledge and account for her medical and pharmaceutical needs in any financial deliberations. Whether Respondent’s alleged reduction in income amounted to material change in circumstances [32] The Respondent’s main contention was that his source of income had depleted due to his deteriorating palm oil business in Sabah. This contention was untenable for several reasons. Firstly, the Respondent had not exhibited his latest audited accounts and management accounts. Although the Petitioner had requested, via a letter in February 2024, for the Respondent’s latest audited accounts and management accounts for the financial year end of 2023, the Respondent had failed to produce the same. The Respondent argued that this Application was filed in January 2024, and, therefore, the latest audited accounts and management accounts for the financial year end of 2023 were not ready. [33] In my view, since the hearing of this Application was on 26 April 2024, the Respondent could have acceded to the Petitioner’s request to submit the latest audited accounts and management accounts for the financial year of 2023. However, the Respondent had failed to do so. [34] I also noted that the Respondent had contradicted himself regarding the floods that he claimed had disrupted daily operations and palm oil 28 July 2024 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 13 production, causing further damage and loss of income. In his affidavit in support, the Respondent claimed that these floods occurred in June

However, after the Petitioner disputed this, stating that no such flood occurred in 2023, the Respondent revised his statement in his affidavit in reply, correcting the date to 2021. [35] I found it peculiar that the Respondent could not recall when the floods occurred and had to be reminded by the Petitioner before correcting this in his affidavit in reply. This begged the question of whether the flooding had any impact at all on the Respondent's palm oil business. [36] Last but not least, I took the view that money is a variable. It fluctuates due to various factors, and a reduction in income alone did not automatically justify reducing spousal maintenance. The Court would require evidence of significant and enduring changes in the Respondent's financial situation, evaluated in good faith, to maintain stability and fairness in spousal maintenance arrangements. [37] In the present case, the Respondent relied on temporary income fluctuation, which in my view did not meet the criterion of ‘material change in circumstances.’ [38] In any event, the Respondent is the majority shareholder in a company and receives the largest dividends from this company as his primary source of income. His status as a majority shareholder implied a level of financial security and control over the company's profits, which contradicted any claim of financial hardship severe enough to warrant a reduction in monthly spousal maintenance. The Respondent's 28 July 2024 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 14 attempt to reduce his monthly spousal maintenance obligation must be scrutinised in light of his overall financial position, including assets, income streams, and lifestyle. [39] Given his substantial financial stake and significant earnings from these dividends, it was, therefore, untenable for him to plead poverty in an attempt to evade his obligation to continue providing monthly spousal maintenance to his former wife in the amount of MYR5,000. [40] In this regard, I drew guidance from the case of Tan Sin Wah v Yeoh Siow Lin [2015] 7 CLJ 533, where Mohd Nazlan Ghazali JC (as he then was) had concluded that the assertion by the applicant-husband regarding his alleged deterioration in business had not been supported by any clear documentary proof. His Lordship had stated in the following passage: [14] Has the applicant made out his case for a material change in circumstances? After having examined the statements made in the affidavits of parties, the key parts of which have been summarised in the earlier part of this judgment, I am persuaded to agree with the contention of the respondent's counsel that the applicant has not sufficiently proven on balance of probabilities that there has been a material change in circumstances under s. 96 of the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act

The affidavits of the applicant contain various assertions and averments which should have been, but in fact not accompanied with clear documentary evidence to support his application which makes it difficult for this court to accept the applicant's version, especially in cases such as the present, where there are conflicts of evidence on affidavit given the denials and disputations by parties. In the interest of clarity, I give the following as examples where the assertions have not been proven: [Emphasis added.] 28 July 2024 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 15 [41] In the same manner, in the present case, the Respondent had not been entirely transparent with the disclosure of documentary evidence to support his averments regarding his assets and income. As such, the Court was not convinced that there was in fact a reduction of income, or that such reduction had amounted to material change in circumstances. Whether Respondent’s remarriage and new family amounted to material change in circumstances [42] In support of this Application, the Respondent cited the need to support his new family, particularly his daughter, whose overseas education he is currently funding. [43] Although remarriage in itself may amount to a change in circumstances, determining whether it was material enough to merit a variation of the term pertaining to spousal maintenance required a more nuanced examination of the nature and extent of the change. The mere fact that the Respondent had entered into a new marriage did not inherently alter the financial responsibilities established by the original spousal maintenance arrangement. These obligations were based on the financial needs and circumstances of both Parties at the time the term was agreed upon. The rationale behind such term was to ensure that the Petitioner, who may have become financially dependent during the marriage, continued to receive necessary support. This consideration remained pertinent regardless of the Respondent's new marital status. 28 July 2024 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 16 [44] Thus, while remarriage may be a change in circumstance, any application for variation of the term pertaining to the monthly spousal maintenance must be substantiated by a thorough evaluation of the current financial situations and needs of both Parties. Only then will the Court be able to make a fair and equitable decision regarding the variation of the term pertaining to spousal maintenance. [45] On this point, I was guided by the Singapore case of ANH v ANI [2019] SGHC 170, where it was stated by Choo Han Teck J: Remarriage in itself is a change in circumstances but whether it is sufficient to merit a variation of the maintenance order requires further examination of the nature and extent of the change. Either party in a divorce is free to remarry. When the woman remarries, the ex-husband who is maintaining her may have the maintenance order revoked on account of the fact that the new husband is maintaining her. When the man remarries, and has a family with the second wife, any diversion of his income towards the maintenance of the ex-wife reduces the coffers of the new family and that needs to be considered too.

It is a reasonable presumption that no one remarries merely to reduce his obligations of maintenance to the ex-spouse. It is therefore not right to deride the father here for his remarriage as if it were a problem of his own making as counsel submitted. The court has no business commenting, let alone pontificating, upon whether a divorcee should marry or not. What it has to do is compare the needs of the ex-spouse and the new family with the income that the maintenance provider has, and make a fair and reasonable attempt to balance the budget for them. [Emphasis added.] [46] In the present case, the Respondent had remarried in 2015, whereas his last attempt to vary the term of the monthly spousal maintenance was in 2017, which was dismissed in 2018. Given that the remarriage 28 July 2024 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 17 occurred before the 2017 Application was filed, it could not be claimed as a material change in circumstances. [47] Hence, in the present case, as was stated by Suraya Othman J (as she then was) in Lim Hong Bee v. Mah Teck Oon [2010] 8 CLJ 473, [2010] MLJU 264, the Respondent’s remarriage did not ‘constitute material change in circumstances’ as he was ‘unable to show that he was financially adversely affected or suffered a financial detriment as a result of it.’ [48] The Respondent proceeded to argue that he needed to channel his funds from supporting the Petitioner to funding his daughter’s education overseas, which he claimed was a monthly amount of MYR10,000, as she was studying in Australia. [49] At this juncture, several points needed to be emphasised. Firstly, the Respondent’s daughter was born in 2002 as a result of his extra-marital relationship, long before his remarriage in 2015. This meant that the daughter was already a teenager when the 2017 Application was dismissed. [50] Secondly, and more importantly, the Respondent’s financial commitment to his daughter's overseas education was made voluntarily, with full knowledge of his existing spousal maintenance obligations. The decision to prioritise this new expense over his court-ordered obligations to the Petitioner reflected a personal choice rather than an unavoidable financial hardship. 28 July 2024 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 18 [51] Courts generally do not view voluntary changes in financial circumstances as grounds for modifying the term pertaining to spousal maintenance. Opting for an overseas education involves significant financial investment. While there are benefits in doing so, it is not essential for a child’s development or success. Many high-quality educational institutions and valuable experiences are available locally, making overseas education a discretionary choice rather than a critical requirement. [52] The Respondent's decision to send his daughter overseas, despite having the option to choose a more affordable local education, did not constitute an involuntary or unforeseen change in his financial situation. If the Respondent had refused to ‘cut his coat according to his cloth’, it would be unfair for the Petitioner to be at the receiving end of the Respondent’s action. The Court must ensure that the spousal maintenance term, which was designed to provide financial stability to the Petitioner, is upheld unless there was a substantial and involuntary change in circumstances. [53] The Respondent’s ability to set aside MYR10,000 monthly to fund his daughter’s education overseas had significantly compromised the credibility and truthfulness of his claims. The Respondent had asserted that his income had depleted and that he was unable to fulfil his financial obligation towards the Petitioner. However, the substantial monthly allocation for his daughter’s education had cast serious doubt on these averments. It suggested that the Respondent still had considerable financial resources at his disposal, contradicting his claims of financial hardship and undermining the validity of his 28 July 2024 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 19 arguments against maintaining his financial obligations towards the Petitioner. This discrepancy highlighted a lack of transparency and honesty in the Respondent’s representations to the Court. [54] At this juncture, it was crucial to clarify that the Court is not in a position to pontificate on the Respondent's choice to remarry and start a new family. While that was the Respondent’s right, it did not automatically justify reducing spousal maintenance for the Petitioner. The Court must balance the interests of all parties involved. [55] Therefore, the Respondent's financial burden due to his decision to fund his daughter's overseas education could not amount to a material change in circumstances to warrant a variation of the term of the monthly spousal maintenance. Concluding remarks [56] I must point out that, throughout this hearing, the Respondent's Counsel has repeatedly highlighted that the Respondent had already parted with a considerable amount of money and assets to the Petitioner based on previous orders of the Court. The Respondent lamented that it was, therefore, unfair for him to continue supporting the Petitioner with monthly payments of MYR5,000, given that the Parties had been separated for decades, and that the Petitioner allegedly has other sources of financial support. [57] It this stage of his life, the Respondent may feel short-changed by the considerable amount he has been paying to his wife since the judicial 28 July 2024 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 20 separation. However, it was crucial to remind both Parties that the aftermath of divorce proceedings often leaves one or both individuals financially compromised. Divorce inherently involves a reallocation of resources and adjustments to previously established financial expectations. [58] The payments made by the Respondent are part of the legal and equitable resolution of the marriage, intended to address the financial disparities that may arise post-separation. While the Respondent may perceive these payments as burdensome, they served to ensure that the Petitioner was not left in a precarious financial position due to the dissolution of the marriage. It is a reality of divorce that the financial landscape changes for both parties, and the maintenance payments are a means to balance these changes fairly and justly. [59] It was also important to understand that this was an application to vary, and as such, the Court's primary concern was whether there had been a material change in circumstances between the 2017 Application, and January 2024 which was when this Application was filed. [60] The Respondent's dissatisfaction with the current situation, particularly regarding perceived unfairness due to his previous financial contributions to the Petitioner, was beyond the scope of what this Court could consider. His obligations were either pursuant to court-ordered terms or those to which he had consented, and this was not the appropriate forum to review or renegotiate those terms. The Court's role was strictly to assess whether there had been material change in circumstances since 2017 that would justify a variation of the monthly 28 July 2024 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 21 spousal maintenance. It was imperative to focus on any significant developments that could impact the existing maintenance arrangements rather than revisit past grievances. [61] As such, after conducting a thorough examination of all the evidence presented to this Court, encompassing both written and oral arguments from both Parties, this Application was dismissed with costs. Dated: 28 July 2024 SIGNED …………………………………………. (EVROL MARIETTE PETERS) Judge High Court, Kuala Lumpur Counsel: For the Petitioner – Faid Naraendran and Gaggendeep Singh Gill; Messrs Faid Naraendran & Partners For the Respondent – Yugan Pathmanathan and Eric Clement A. Sebastian; Messrs Abd Halim Ushah & Associates 28 July 2024 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 22 Cases referred to: ➢ Anna Tay Siew Hong v Joseph Ng Tiong Yong [1995] 3 CLJ 717, [1995] MLJU 257 ➢ Amarjit Kaur Atma Singh v. Gurbachan Singh Wazir Singh [2023] CLJU 2154 ➢ ANH v ANI [2019] SGHC 170 ➢ Lau Hui Sing v. Wong Chou Yong [2008] 9 CLJ 232; [2008] 5 MLJ 846 ➢ Gisela Gertrud Abe v Tan Wee Kiat [1986] 2 MLJ 58, [1986] CLJ (Rep) 133 ➢ Lim Hong Bee v. Mah Teck Oon [2010] 8 CLJ 473, [2010] MLJU 264 ➢ Navarajan a/l Subramaniam v Rajeswary a/p Muniandy [2019] MLJU 715 ➢ Ng Say Chuan v Lim Szu Ling [2010] 10 CLJ 37 ➢ Sivajothi a/p K Suppiah v. Kunathasan a/l Chelliah [2006] 5 CLJ 318; [2006] 3 MLJ 184 ➢ Tan Sin Wah v Yeoh Siow Lin [2015] 7 CLJ 533 ➢ YCC v. LSY [2007] 7 CLJ 207 Legislation referred to: ➢ Law Reform (Marriage & Divorce) Act 1976 – section 83